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Abstract 
Momme v. §ydow 
Sociobiology, Universal Darwinism and Their Transcendence 
(PhD-Dissertation, University of Durham, Department of Philosophy, 2001) 
An investigation of the history, philosophy and critique of Darwinian paradigms, especially 
gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism and their types of reductionism- towards 
a theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes, evolutionary freedom and ecological idealism 
Based on a review of different Darwinian paradigms, particularly sociobiology, this work, both, 
historically and philosophically, develops a metaphysic of gene-Darwinism and process-Danvinism, 
and then criticises and transcends these Darwinian paradigms in order to achieve a tmly evolutionm:v 
theory of evolution. 
Part I introduces essential aspects of current sociobiology as the original challenge to this 
investigation. The claim of some sociobiologists that ethics should become biologized in a gene-egoistic 
way, is shown to be tied to certain biological views, which ethically lead to problematic results. 
In part II a historical investigation into sociobiology and Darwinism in general provides us, as 
'historical epistemology', with a deeper understanding of the structure and background of these 
approaches. Gene-Darwinism, which presently dominates sociobiology and is linked to Dawkins' selfish 
gene view of evolution, is compared to Darwin's Darwinism and the evolutionary synthesis and 
becomes defined more strictly. An account of the external history of Darwinism and its subparadigms 
shows how cultural intellectual presuppositions, like Malthusianism or the Newtonian concept of the 
unchangeable laws of nature, also influenced biological theory construction. 
In part Ill universal 'process-DanNinism' is elaborated based on the historical interaction of 
Darwinism with non-biological subject areas. Building blocks for this are found in psychology, the 
theory of science and economics. Additionally, a metaphysical argument for the universality of process-
Darwinism, linked to Hurne's and Popper's problem of induction, is proposed. 
In patt IV gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are criticised. Gene-Danvinism-despite its 
merits-is challenged as being one-sided in advocating 'gene-atomism', 'germ-line reductionism' and 
'process-monism'. My alternative proposals develop and try to unify different criticisms often found. In 
respect of gene-atomism I advocate a many-level approach, opposing the necessary radical selfishness 
of single genes. I develop the concept of higher-level genes, propose a concept of systemic selection, 
which may stabilise group properties, without relying on permanent group selection and extend the 
applicability of a certain group selectionist model generally to small open groups. Proposals of mine 
linked to the critique of germ-line reductionism are: 'exformation', phenotypes as evolutionary factors 
and a field theoretic understanding of causa forma/is (resembling Aristotelian hylemorphism). Finally 
the process-monism of gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and, if defined strictly, Darwinism in 
general is criticised. I argue that our ontology and ethics would be improved by replacing the 
Newtonian-Paleyian deist metaphor of an eternal and unchangeable law of nature, which lies at tl1e very 
heart of Danvinism, by a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution where new processes may gain a 
certain autonomy. All this results in a view that I call 'ecological idealism', which, although still very 
much based on Darwinism, clearly transcends a Darwinian world view. 
Keywords: Philosophy and History of Biology, universal Darwinism, Sociobiology, gene-Darwinism, 
process-Darwinism; problem of induction; critique of Darwinism; tautology; reductionism; exformation: 
hylemorphism; autoselection; evolution of evolutionary processes; autonomy, Ecological Idealism. 
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Preface 
It is a daring task for a single author to embark on an interdisciplinary inquiry dealing with Dar-
winism historically, biologically and philosophically. Even more so if one finally proposes a critique of 
assumptions central to current Darwinian paradigms. An interdisciplinary work is difficult particularly 
since the fields of research are often specialised. It requires some devotion to gain a mere overview of, 
for example, only the works published on a certain aspect of the historical person of Danvin, or on a 
certain dispute in the present day philosophy of biology. Yet, despite this side lesson, I consider it a 
genuine task of philosophy to undertake such broad interdisciplinary investigations. 
My thoughts on this matter, naturally, underwent a kind of evolution, therefore I will give a short, 
somewhat personal, account, of how I came to my present interdisciplinary interest of research. 
Some years ago, a friend of mine, Sita v. Richthoven, at that time student at Oxford, gave me 
Richard Dawkins' book The Se~fish Gene as a present. Since then I have been engaged with topics in 
the field of sociobiology-sometimes well into my dreams. It became immediately clear to me that this 
provocative book bore on many philosophical topics and not until later I realised that the book itself 
ought to be philosophically criticised as well. 
Although studying philosophy at the University of Bonn, I was also interested in biological questions 
and took a subsidiary subject in evolutionary biology. Philosophy at the University of Bo1m focused 
mainly on a canon of great philosophers from Plato, via Kant to Hegel. Subversive authors, like 
Nietzsche, have scarcely been read. Although I was in search for a more modem approach to philosophy 
and for a while was attracted by the sharp accuracy of analytical philosophy (U. Nortmann), I know 
now, with hindsight, that it was helpful for me to be forced to get a bit more acquainted also with some 
traditional continental philosophers. I think, I have only been able to resist some of the implications of 
gene-Darwinism due to the critical preparation I received through reading Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason. Parallel to my studies in philosophy I was doing a second full course of study in psychology. 
Through these diverse pursuits the structural similarities between the Darwinian process of mutation 
and selection and Thomdike's psychological approach of trial-and-error learning became apparent to 
me. 
At Durham University I had been given the opportunity to write an MA thesis that treated topics in 
the field of gene-Darwinism. I have then been granted permission to upgrade the work to the present 
PhD-dissertation. While I was working on the topics I became increasingly aware of the fact that a 
metaphysic of Danvinism is present in many other subject areas as well, such as the theory of science or 
economics. My supervisor, Professor Dr. David Knight, pmticularly helped me very much to 
understand and to investigate the historical backgrounds of Danvinian paradigms. The historical study 
provided the basis from which to work out differences between Darwinian paradigms and from which to 
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detect the conceptual biases in Universal Darwinism in general. This in turn had a huge impact on my 
systematic work on the critique of universal gene-Darwinism and universal process-Darwinism. 
Despite all concerns with biology and other subject areas this work is methodologically still mainly a 
philosophical one, especially in part four. Although I have done my best to understand the different 
subject areas in question, the broad scope of this work has, I am afraid, the disadvantage of not treating 
all broached discourses in the depth I would have liked to. But, after all, I think it would be worse to 
neglect the 'one long argument' running through the different chapters. 
My greatest debt is to the authors who I have read, friend and foe alike. Their texts alone have made 
my further work possible. I should like especially to mention two authors: R. Dawkins and, in the later 
course of my work, D. Dennett. Their writings inspired me, although in many respects I finally came to 
totally different or even opposing conclusions. But a dialectical understanding demonstrates that radical 
intellectual opponents enable us to realise the differences of our own position and to finally achieve a 
synthesis. Although I mainly tried to radicalise and then transcend gene-Darwinism and process-
Darwinism from within, I, of course, also owe much to their critics .. who-whether I realised it or not-
have paved the way for most of my arguments and vvho encouraged me that a different approach is 
needed and might become elaborated. 
More directly I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Professor Dr. David Knight, for his constantly 
patient, supportive and most friendly help! His advice, his corrections and his encouragement helped me 
substantially to prepare this complex work. I am also in debt to Dr. Soran Reader (also with the 
Department of Philosophy, Durhan1), who discussed some topics of the work with me. I an1 also pleased 
that I was given the opportunity for a dialogue with M. Midgley and a brief word with D. Detmett. I an1 
also thankful to the German Heinrich-Boll Sti_fiung. the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdiensr and 
the Kolner Gymnasia!- und Studienstiftung whose scholarships made my stay at Durham and this work 
possible. 
I particularly want to thank my father, Friedrich v. Sydow, for having taught me a love of truth early 
on, and currently for proof reading a large part of the work with his own logical rigour and linguistic 
sensitivity Personal debts can never be adequately acknowledged. But I also want to thank my mother, 
Anne, who has always supported this project and has given me the optimism to finish it. 
Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the help and advice of some critically-minded friends Paul 
Ambelton, Matthew Eddy, Fiona Pierce, Bill Pollard, Jem1ifer Smith, Sandra Tobbe, Rob Talbot and 
Alistair Wright. They have discussed cettain aspects of the thesis with me, have supported me to over-
come my German English or have helped me to believe in something else than Universal Darwinism. 
Although I am, of course, responsible for the final line of argument myself, the rational stimulations, 
the linguistic help and the moral support were an indispensable precondition for finishing this work. 
Momme v.Sydow, Bonn I Durham, 2000 
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Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature 
TI1is work proposes and elaborates a Philosophy of Nature which, although influenced by 
Darwinism, finally transcends Darwinism. I am particularly concerned with gene-Darv.~nism 
(~pp. 36 L 140 f, 191 f., 213 f) and process-Darwinism (~pp. 203 f) and l do first radicalise and 
develop these approaches before criticising them from v.~thin (~ pp. 237 f). Nature itself is always 
transcending itself, not only in its evolutionary products but-as I shall argue-also in its evolutionary 
rules: likewise theories have, besides external pressures, also an inherent and even more advanced 
tendency to transcend themselves. 1 The work started as an investigation into what I call 'gene-
Darwinism' in order to challenge its atomism, determinism and process reductionism. But I found 
Darwinian tenets also in other sciences, like psychology, theory of science, and economics; Darwinism 
has long become a universal world view. This universalised and radicalised approach fmally led me to 
criticise Darwinism in general. Although Darwinism has undeniably led to profound insights, it-
understood in a strict way (since it has been interpreted in many ways)-is essentially process-monistic, 
often even directly defined by natural selection. 
The process monism at the heart of Darwinism(:> pp. 107. 143, 214, 348) has sometimes been concealed For example 
the apparent Darwinian paradigm of the evolutionary synthesis appears partly to be pluralistic and not monistic. But one 
may question whether the synthesis is thoroughly Darwinian or whether the synthesis is essentially causally pluralistic. 
However, gene-Darwinism is more pronounced in these matters than the benevolent evolutionary synthesis. 
Darwinism, in principle still in a Paleyian-Newtonian manner, advocates one eternal law of nature, 
simple, predetennined and invariant. As will be shown, scholarship in the history of science has long 
revealed that the way from natural theology to natural selection was not too far. Although rendering the 
world to be evolutionary, the Darv.'inian explanation itself has remained static. (One may regard it as an 
atavism from a materialistically misunderstood Platonism) Evolution itself is not evolving. I propose to 
replace this metaphysic by a more flexible and truly evolutionary picture of evolution and the partial 
freedom of evolutionary mechanisms. 
I do not intend to propose a strict antithesis to all aspects of Darwinism or a concept of evolution 
completely purged from Darwinism. I want to make much use of original Darwinian concepts and take 
it, for example, that variational evolution is an indispensable theory. Nevertheless I shall argue that the 
outlined mono-mechanistic picture, central to the Darwinian paradigm, is ill-conceived. The proposed 
interpretative paradigm shift would show many biological concepts in a new light, but of course would 
need to incorporate the knowledge, which has partly been accumulated under the regime of Darwinism, 
in a similar way to which Darwinism incorporated originally non-Darwinian Mendelism. Perhaps, it is 
only of secondary importance whether the resulting, partly Darwinian view would still be called 
See also: H. Jonas. Organismus und Freiheit (1994/1973/1966), p. 20. 
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'Darwinian' or not. If a moderate paradigm shift would be achieved, the relationship to the social 
sciences might also become one of cooperation instead one of mutual mistrust. 
A philosopher, who dares to challenge a metaphor or a concept which is central to science, 
presupposes a certain understanding of the nature of philosophy and its relation to science as well. 
Philosophy of nature and nature of philosophy are in many respects interrelated. 
In this introduction hence I first give an account of my understanding of the nature of philosophy and 
its relation to science. I then outline and comment on my main proposals for a philosophy of nature. I 
also clarify that this work is indeed build on Darwinism, but is still intended as a critique of Darwinism. 
Here I can not give a detailed account ofmy argumentation. but I sketch the main line of argument. 
Nature of Philosophy and Its Relation to Science 
a) Philosophy as Metaphysics? 
Metaphysical questions have been increasingly disapproved of by a tradition reaching from Hume, 
Kant to early Wittgenstein and the adherents of logical positivism The Cartesian mind-body dualism 
combined with a focus on a subjective epistemological starting point has alienated Hume and Kant from 
traditional metaphysics. Moreover, the sciences successfully investigate the 'book of nature· now by 
experiment and microscope, rendering traditional metaphysics obsolete and revealing a different often 
materialist and atomistic view of nature (:> pp. 84 f). The critique of metaphysics served to get rid of 
endless metaphysical disputes, and replaced them with the more successful sciences. Another reason for 
the critique of metaphysics was "to make room for faith" 2, since the only possible metaphysic in the 
light of science vvould presumably have been a materialistic one. Kant still managed to reconcile the 
Newtonian world of matter in motion with strong individually binding ethics. He refuted traditional 
metaphysics but also made the rational subject the basis both of theoretical and practical knowledge. 
Logical positivism too, largely renounced (traditional) metaphysics. Although the self-image of 
logical positivism was that it represented an anti-metaphysical attitude, there is today a tendency to 
accept that logical positivism also itself introduced a certain metaphysics, presented, for example, in 
Camap's Der Logische A1~jbau der Welt3 This has been pointed out both by naturalists, who have 
radicalised the anti-metaphysical attitude of logical positivism, or by advocates of a renaissance of 
metaphysics, who regard metaphysics-for the good or for the bad-to be indispensable. Recently, 
analytic philosophers, too, still endeavouring to keep a distance from obscure speculations, have argued 
metaphysics to be possible, distinct from truth about logical possibility and distinct from the question of 
the mere actual 4 
I. Kant. Kritik der reinen Verrzw1fi- p. B XXX. :> footnote 237. 
H. Putnam. Reichenbach 's Metaphysical Picture ( 1996/1991 ), pp. l 00-l 0 I. 
E. g.: J. Lowe. The Possibility of A1etaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time ( 1998). 
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Without wanting to commit myself here to a certain specific methodology, I think that sophia, wis-
dom, and hence philosophy-despite a necessary basis in empirical investigations-, will and ought to 
always strive for a met:'lphysic at least in the sense of a general architectonic knowledge which 
necessarily transcends-to an of course limited extent- 'the given' incorporating both theoretical and 
practical knowledge. This work is roughly located between analytical philosophy and philosophy which 
is interested in whole systems. In style it is rather analytic, for example meticulously scrutinising the 
notion of Darwinism. Nevertheless this work is intended to contribute to a larger system of thought and 
reintroduces some tenets which have been dominant in certain 'continental' traditions, like for example 
the concept of hylemorphism. 
Postmodemism, in claiming the end of metaphysics (and of politics and of history alike), has, I think, 
left a vacuum, which-despite other intentions-had partly been filled by implicitly or explicitly 
Darwinian theories. A large part of this work tries to make the individualistic-or even sub-
individualistic-Darwinian metaphysic explicit and to render them disputable. In the absence of an 
explicit metaphysic, an implicit one, which is not open to discussion, is often adopted. Metaphysics may 
only be a framework-as even postmodernism is-which allows and guarantees a plurality of views. 
I consider at least such a general framework or metaphysics necessary. 
b) Metaphysics Entrenched in Science 
In the positivist tradition, it has often been assumed that sc1ence ought to be and mostly is 
metaphysically neutral and value free. Of course, I approve of the ideal of scientific fmdings being 
objectively or at least in some sense inter-subjectively testable instead of being committed to the idio-
syncratic values of a certain group. But I think one has to be aware that scientific findings are actually 
not completely free from metaphysical commitments. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno pointed 
out that especially the seeming neutrality of enlightenment is 'more metaphysical than metaphysics· 
itself 5 The history of science and the philosophical critique of positivism has revealed that even science 
is pervaded by assumptions not (directly) verifiable or falsifiable, which, if general in character, may be 
called metaphysicaL This does not mean that metaphysical questions are totally separated from 
empirical ones. Empirical evidence and metaphysics are difficult to disentangle. Nevertheless science 
has not only an empirical, but also a partly autonomous theoretical or even metaphysical aspect 
Even in physics, often regarded as prototypic science, concepts are not always directly testable. At 
least after the concepts have been established, some become tacitly assumed presumptions for further 
experimental investigations. For example, in particle physics it would be, in principle, possible to 
abandon the-well established-fundamental concept of energy conservation, instead of being forced to 
accept the existence of certain fundamental particles. The histmy of physics, though of course in part 
M. Horkheimer, T. W Adomo. Dlalektik der Aujklanmg (1944/1969), p. 29. 
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empirical, is also the history of metaphysical commitments. Even Ne,vton's Philosophiae Natura/is 
Principia A1athematica-not only because of its title-appears to be based in a certain philosophical 
discourse 6 There are philosophical differences between the concept of idealised mass points and modem 
field theoretic approaches 7 Science is theory-laden and, in its more general structure, philosophy-laden. 
The best scientists and philosophers were also metaphysicians. Whether they would welcome this or not, 
Darwin, Dawkins and Dennett are metaphysicians~ 930 Although the empirical side (induction, 
anomalies, etc.) play a role in paradigm shifts, it can be shown that to some extent theoretical and 
metaphysical considerations are also crucial. 
Moreover some scientific approaches claim universal validity, as explicit systems of metaphysics 
have also done. It has been claimed that gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism was not onlv 
empirically true, but was a conceptual and metaphysical necessity (:> pp. 205). 
The metaphysical questions we find in the sciences are sometimes new and closely related to recent 
empirical findings. ln the present work, concerned with gene-Dmwinism, I shall discuss, for example, 
how germ-line reductionism and gene-atomism are closely linked to empirical findings (though, I think, 
not strictly implied by them). Nevertheless many questions which arise in the course of my investigation 
surprisingly refer to old disputes in philosophy: the dispute about universalia, the problem of induction, 
discussions concerning notions of substance, reduction, explanation, supervenience, form and tautology. 
I do not think, this proves that there was only one philosophia perennis, but philosophers of biology in· 
my opinion are still not sufficiently aware of the resemblances of some of their specific disputes with 
disputes in other periods or in other subject areas. 
c) Science as Philosophy and Art 
Science, 1 am convinced, ought to actively face the challenge that it is in part, albeit of course not 
completely, also philosophy, a GeisteswissensclK!ft, an art. 
It is often-I think wrongly-assumed that metaphysics in science rendered science irrational. I think 
the opposite is true, the absence of an explicit metaphysic renders science irrational. Only in its absence 
will basic assumptions be adopted without a rational discussion, and paradigm shifts will indeed be 
something irrational. The most dangerous ideology is that ideology which we only in1plicitly adopt, 
since it can neither be discussed nor criticised. Metaphysical considerations in science (and in 
philosophy), in my understanding, are the attempt to treat basic theoretical questions in a rational way. 
Similarly, theory of science and epistemology may improve the self-reflection of science. 
Histories of science, philosophy and ideas ought to make implicit scientific assumptions explicit and 
thereby reveal the relations of such assumptions to other fields of knowledge. For example expressed in 
tem1s of hem1eneutics, sciences find themselves 'thrown' in given historical situations with given 
G. Bohme. Philosophische Gnmdlagen der Newtonschen lvfechanik. In: Ende des Baconschen Zeitalwrs ( 199311989). 
c. F. V. Weizsiicker. A!{/bau der Physik (1985), pp. 219 r 
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'horizons'. Historical hermeneutic has long argued that we can improve our understanding of a given 
situation if it is understood to be embedded in its history. 8 This general idea, also found in other schools 
of thought, is I think also partly applicable to biology. In the present work the intellectual history of 
biology shows that biology, besides its undeniable i1mer and empirical necessities, is also embedded in a 
larger culture ( ~ pp. 160 L particularly pp. 201 f.). 
The systematic philosophical discussion of scientific questions which are of general concern, should 
do more than just consider the top-down consistency. Although I regard empirical evidence as 
important, theories are not simply refuted by a single counterexample (falsification); theoretical support, 
I think, is and ought to be taken into account as vvell. Moreover, it can not be taken for granted that 
knowledge of lower ontological layers is truer than knowledge of higher ones. Physics, though 
concerned with the lower stratum, is no more true than biology, biology no more true than sociology. 
Top-down consistency is defmitely important, but overall consistency would be a much better criterion 
for truth. 
This view implies that in science, besides the dominating empirical and inner argumentative 
necessities, ethical concerns sometimes ought to play a role. Only then reason becomes the right reason 
or, as the ancients called it, 01·rhos logos, recta ratio. In this sense, a general 'henneneutics of nature' is 
needed9 Provided that scientific theories are often underdetennined, the responsibility of the scientist 
becomes apparent Particularly philosophers of nature, ought to take also the more general concems of 
other subject areas and ethics into consideration. 
d) Dialogue between Philosophy and Science 
I do not go so far as to claim that the way back to a pure metaphysics were free. Just as science is, 
and partly ought to be, concerned with metaphysical questions, philosophy too ought to reflect empirical 
evidence. Although, I think, a first person account and even radical phenomenological reduction 
abstracting from the actual world, are legitimate and necessary sources of knowledge, philosophy also 
has to face the 'facts' of the 'extemal' world. Philosophy indeed has to take the sciences, but also art 
and religion, into consideration. 
Neither is philosophy reducible to science, nor science reducible to philosophy. It appears to me, 
however, that both subject areas are mutually dependent on each other. As science justly claims to be 
relevant for philosophy, so too philosophers may deal with the philosophical aspects of science. 
Although science is even partly political, it would be dangerous and simply wrong to argue that science 
is politics. Science also has its own inner empirical and theoretical approach to truth. But, in my 
perspective, the philosophy of science is not restricted to the analyses of sense data or observation 
Generally: H.-G. Gadamer. Wahrheit und Methode. Ci11mdzt1ge einer philosophischen Hemwneutik ( 1960/1990), 
pp. 270 f; see also: M. Heidegger. Se in und Zeit ( 1926/1993). 
E. g.: F. J. Wetz. Hermeneutik der Natur- Hemwneutik des Universums ( 1995). 
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protocols, but also has to try carefully to treat theories in a broader context than is mostly done by the 
specialised sciences themselves. 
Any philosopher who, wit11 interest in present matters, advocates a Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomistic, Hegelian or 
Vlhiteheadian ontology of course implicitly challenges current sciences. I think, such challenges should be made explicit 
and should take tlle altematives of the relevant sciences into account. In this work I propose some, one might say, 
Aristotelian concepts, and develop them in the context of current scientific disputes. 
Of course the proposals made by philosophers of nature will never be infallible and may be proved 
wrong by empirical or theoretical arguments. But after the long period of positivism, it still needs to be 
stressed that scientists too are not infallible in questions concerning the (spiritual) interpretation of 
science. Philosophy and science should, therefore, enter into a closer dialogue. 
Of course, ,[n]othing signaled the emancipation of science from religion and philosophy more 
definitely than the Darwinian revolution" 10 But the separation of science and the arts, especially the 
tribal opposition of sociobiology and sociology, has wasted many resources and sometimes paralysed 
both sides. Sociobiology becan1e the antidiscipline of the social sciences, not only because of the 
ignorance of the social scientists, but, I am convinced, also because of the one-sidedness of some 
aspects of the biological approach. If rather different metaphors were adopted in biology, the results of 
biology will easier be received in the social sciences as well. 
Philosophy of Nature- Universal Darwinism and Its Transcendence 
My view of the nature of philosophy and its relation to science is that any approach to nature must 
partly be philosophical. It forms an essential background assumption for rendering paradigm shifts and 
philosophical reasoning in this field possible. Neve1theless, my treatment of the philosophy of nature 
does not start to develop a possibly Aristotelian antithesis to Darwinism, but, despite my inspiration by 
some canonical philosophers, I start with an immanent discussion of Darwinian paradigms. I even try to 
purge these paradigms from all other components and try to deepen their metaphysical foundation. Yet, 
I also argue that gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and indeed Darwinism in general are pointing 
beyond themselves and could be transcended. I believe that only after reaching the bottom of the 
Darwinian abyss, one can climb upwards again 
In the remaining introduction, [ shall firstly outline the background of the ecological crisis and its 
relation to the present investigation Then I sketch my investigation itself, subsequently discussing gene-
Darwinism, process-Darwinism and Darwinism in general This introduction, of course, will not 
anticipate my full argumentation In each of these three sections I shall give a short outline of the 
chapters which are concemed with the corresponding topics (:l especially the section on gene-
Darwinism). Moreover, I shall clarify my research motivation and my resulting position. Finally, I shall 
touch upon the relationship between Darwinism and religion. 
10 E. Mayr. Growth ofBiological Thought (1982), p. 14. 
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Although I argue that gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and in some respects even Darwinism in 
general ought to be transcended, I do not intend to propose an antithesis, but rather a synthesis or a third 
way. I shall veritably accept and also radicalise some aspects of these Darwinian approaches. My 
position could be characterised by steering a middle course between atomism and holism in regard of 
evolutionary units. With regard to evolutionary processes I, likewise, intend to steer a course between 
the unchangeable blindness of natural selection and the preordained omniscient unfolding of nature. 
Although I want to make use of the approaches, 1 intend to transcend the Darwinian concept of an 
unchangeably cruel and wasteful law of nature, equally valid for bacteria as for humans, and replace it 
with an understanding of nature emphasising the evolution of new evolutionary processes. 
a) Philosophy of Nature Facing the Ecological Crisis 
Any philosophy ought to face the problems of its age. Since at least the 1970s, the global ecological 
crisis and the need for global, local and political changes had become apparent 11 It was soon 
understood that there is not only a need for technical improvements and political laws restricting 
environmental pollution, but also for improving our ethics to complement and to give a foundation to 
these projects. 12 It has been argued that utilitarianism is linked to capitalism and egoism-despite its 
altruistic claims-, and hence to an exploitive attitude also towards nature. Likewise the Judaeo-
Christian tradition has been accused, because of its anthropocentrism, to have basically an exploitive 
attitude towards nature (L White~215 ). Both these very different philosophies were discussed as the 
cultural causes of the environmental crisis. Since then ecological revisions of ethics have come on the 
agenda too. It has even been claimed that philosophy in general (including also metaphysics, ontology 
and especially philosophy of nature) ought to become a 'philosophy of the ecological crisis']~ The 
reforn1ers differed as to whether only a modification of traditional approaches or a whole new approach 
is needed. In any case most authors have emphasised that one should integrate points, like the follovring 
in an ecologically refined system of ethics and philosophy: Our unity with our environment, the human 
responsibility for the biological and social enviromnent and for future generations, and hence the need 
for a sustainable development 
Could sociobiology or gene-Darwinism also be seen as part of the ecological movement? 
Sociobiology also gained influence during the 1970s and some proponents of sociobiology indeed have 
been concerned with questions of biodiversity. 14 The sociobiological emphasis on the biological 
underpinnings ofhuman behaviour also coheres-in some aspects-with the ecologists' general concern 
11 E. g.: D. L Meadows et. aL The Limits of Growth (1972); E. U v. Weizsacker. Erdpolitik (1990/1989); 
H Diefenbacher, U Ratsch. Verelendung durch Naturzerstomng ( 1992); A. Gore. Earth in the Balance- Ecology and 
Human Spirit (1992). 
12 E. g.: D. Cooper; lA. Pa1mer (ed.): The Environment in Question. Ethics and Global Issues (1992); K. S Shrader-
Frechette (ed. ). Environmental Ethics ( 198111988). 
13 V. Hosle. Philosophie der okologischen Krise ( 199111994). 
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with the biological sphere. In its gene-Darwinia.t1 version especially, sociobiology stresses the non-
transcendable animal character of humans and seems to explain the ruthless exploitation of the Earth, 
the environmental crisis, the exponential Malthusian population explosion and the limits of growth. The 
sub-individualist stress of gene-Darwinism somehow not only radicalises Darwinian individualism, but 
undennines it as well, since the genic continuity to the future is stressed. 
But whereas gene-Darwinism is reductionistic, stressing the not restrainable egoism of each selfish 
gene and denying the causal relevance of any superstructure, the ecological movement in a holistic way 
has always stressed the oneness of the ecosystem, the huma.t1 responsibility for the whole spaceship 
earth and cultural changeability as basis for a cultural and ethical reform. 
I shall show that gene-Darwinism has roots differing from those of the ecological movement. It drew 
from some reductionistic or atomistic currents in biology and in philosophy from that time and may 
have, with some metaphors, been inspired by a Thatcherite underst:U1ding of capitalism (~ pp. 191 f.). 
Gene-Darwinians does not only regard egoism as a metaphysical principle, but as the only political 
solution to the ecological and social crisis 15 Opposed to this, several theological, conservative, 
communitarian and socialist moral philosophers and also deep ecologists have advocated instead the 
necessity of a new morality and regard the crisis as partly being a result of the 'ruthless application of 
the atheistic egoistic materialism' or of 'the capitalist veneration of the mammon'. The Zeitgeist of the 
gene-egoistic paradigm is regarded not as the solution but as the very cause of the problem. I take the 
view that M. Midgley, although sometin1es quite polemic, has always been right in her basic impression 
"In tllis situation telling people that they are essentially Chicago gangsters is not just false and confused, 
but monstrously irresponsible. " 16 I shall argue in chapter 2 that, although an acknowledgement of 
certain egoist tendencies may be crucial, pure gene-Darwinism leaves no room to fonnulate an ethics, 
not even an ethics of moderate egoism(~ pp. 47 f.). 
A simple antagonism of opposed views does not lead us far in my opinion. 1 argue mainly against 
gene-Darwinism, because I think it is presently gaining a predominance that is too unbalanced. The dark 
sides of human nature need to become acknowledged, but, I think, only as far as we leave open a 
possibility for higher aspirations as well. Generally, as will become apparent in the next sections, only a 
metaphysics which is 'realistic' and 'idealistic' enough to be a true theory. will in my opinion provide a 
broad enough basis to solve the pressing ecological and social environmental problems. 
1 ~ E. 0. Wilson. Biophilia ( 1984); The Diversity o.f L({e ( 1992). 
15 T. Mohr. Zwischen genetischer Stalik und Dynamik der Lebensbedingungen ( 1996 ). 
16 M. Midgley. Gene-juggling ( 1979), p 455. 
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b) The Glory and Pover(v of Sociobiology and Gene-Danvinism - The Need 
for a Third Way 
17 
It is one objective of this work to clarify the essence of the biological paradigm which can be found 
to dominate sociobiology. This sociobiological paradigm (not equivalent to the sociobiological 
discipline) \vill in the course of the work be more strictly defined as 'gene-Darwinism'. The central 
notion of tllis paradigm is 'the selfish gene', which has been made famous-or notorious-by the 
Oxford Professor of the Public Understanding of Science, Richard Dawkins. 17 
Outline of the chapte•·s concerned particularly with gene-Darwinism. In chapter l I give a first 
account of the biological discipline of sociobiology and its main associated theories. Already in this 
introductory chapter I cast doubt on whether the theories of kin selection and of reciprocal altruism, 
mostly treated as direct implications of the selfish-gene view of evolution, can be regarded as parts of a 
pure version of gene-Darwinism l think, that although gene-Darwinism was a necessary precondition 
for these theories, it is not a sufficient one in itself 
In chapter 2 the etllical implications of gene-Darwinism are made apparent Gene-Darwinism is a 
universal ontology and claims to biologise ethics. In the social construction of such ethical 
'implications' many more theories actually play a role. Nevertheless, I try to develop the purest possible 
version of such an ethics. Besides an outline of some philosophical critiques, I show that even apparent 
proponents of an ethics based on a selfish-gene view of evolution actually shrink back from drawing 
extreme gene-Darwinian conclusions. Instead they implicitly adopt additional premisses from other 
traditions as well. It will be shown why gene-Darwinism appears ethically unsatisfactory, providing us 
with a motive for a further historical and philosophical investigation. 
In chapter 3, the first chapter of the historical part ll, light is shed on the historical background to 
Darwinism in general (~ introductory section on Darwinism in general). 
In chapter 4, I distinguish between the inner-biological differences firstly of Darwin's Darwinism, 
secondly of the evolutionary synthesis and thirdly of gene-Darwinism. It becomes apparent that all these 
largely Darwinian paradigms are far from being monolithic. Providing Darwinism is strictly defined, 
one may unexpectedly challenge the assumption that the evolutionary synthesis is as thoroughly 
Darwinian as one might otherwise conceive. This can be done not because the evolutionary synthesis 
has llistorically drawn from non-Darwinian Mendelism, but because in what I call tl1e 'second phase of 
the synthesis' (Mayr, Dobzhansky etc.), an atomistic or individualistic view of evolution has partly been 
abandoned and gene-interactions and the importance of gene-pools. As a result, a certain autonomy of 
macroevolution and salutatory speciation became accepted as central aspects of evolution. However, in 
17 R. Dawkins. The Sel(ish Gene ( 1976/89). 
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contrast to the other paradigms, a deeper understanding of gene-Darwinism is acquired and I go on 
characterising gene-Darwinism by its gene-atomism, its gern1-line reductionism and its process-monism. 
In chapter 5 an account of the external history of these mainly Darwinian paradigms is given and 
possible external roots of gene-Darwinism are proposed. This shows these paradigms as partly a social 
construct and hence a particularly appropriate object for philosophical critique. 
Part Ill is concerned with Universal Darwinism. Based on the historical investigation in chapters 6 
and 7, a generalised process-Darwinian approach is proposed (~ next section). Here gene-Darwinism 
is only briefly mentioned as a prototype of the other type of universal Danvinism, biologistic 
Darwinism. 
In part IV gene-Darwinism, process-Darwinism and Darwinism are criticised in general. In order to 
do this, I distinguish substance and process reductionism. 
In chapter 8 different types of substance reductionism are criticised; these are downward reduction in 
general, gene-atomism and gern1-line reductionism. Firstly, I show that a thoroughly downward 
reductionist position is in any case an incoherent epistemological (or ontological) approach. As an 
alternative a heuristics of interacting epistemological-ontological levels appears reasonable. 
Secondly, I oppose the view that gene-atomism is a necessary result of the meiotic shuffle and pro-
pose the (probabilistic) existence of higher units which render genes less selfish than one would assume 
otherwise. Opposed to the gene-Darwinian assumption that single genes (relatively short bits of DNA) 
are the only possible units of selection, I propose the concept of probabilistic higher-level genes at 
different loci in single organisms which, under certain conditions, are shown to have evolutionary 
stability. I also discuss conditions in which this whole may become subverted. Upon this basis the 
fallacy of claiming gene-atomism in a tautological way is discussed, which in my view plays a vital role 
in immunising the gene-atomistic research program (although not officially claimed). Furthermore, the 
difference between loci and alleles is scrutinised. In opposition to gene-Darwinism I propose a spectrum 
of different ways in which the good of a group may be achieved with and without group selection. What 
I consider to be the most interesting proposal is what I call 'systemic individual selection'. It is based on 
the interactive effects of genes at several loci of different organisms, which are potentially shown to lead 
to a stabilisation of properties which are good for the group. If such properties are in place, it is shown 
that this mechanism can stabilise them against egoistic subversion without group selection. Although 
this process is based on natural selection, it leads to a certain autonomy of adaptation to an external 
environment which is important for the concept of 'autoselection', which I propose later. When discus-
sing group selection in structured populations, I largely follow Sober's and D. S Wilson's model, but I 
add a proposal which I think could strongly extend the applicability of this basic model. In regard to the 
selection of whole groups and species selection I point out that, if they are combined with systemic 
individual selection, properties for the good of the group or for the good of species may be evolu-
tionarily stable without requiring the permanent selection of whole groups or species. (Although I have 
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not elaborated upon this, such a combination also appears imaginable to me in regard to group selection 
in structured populations.) As the last item here, I outline some ideas, about why one also has to accept 
the existence of (some) ecological whales in their own right, which, by processes which one may call 
ecological selection_ may under certain conditions also be stable against the subversion of 'selfish' 
species. 
Thirdly, germ-line reductionism-the claim that phenotypes are the mere vehicles of genes-is 
criticised, although I do, at least, accept Weismmm's barrier as a working hypothesis. I argue that 
phenotypes (organisms, groups and populations) are not only based on in-formation, but on ex-
formation as well. Phenotypes are not reducible to the gem1-line, but instead they themselves constrain 
or direct the pathways evolution could take. Hence the morphology of phenotypes has to be regarded as 
a11 evolutionary factor as well. Above that, these structures (or fom1s) may interact and eo-evolve with 
other structures of their kind. Somewhat speculatively, I argue that these structures could 
probabilistically be regarded as mutually dependent fields that influence each other. In this context I 
introduce the tenns 'exfonnation' and 'external memory', which are reminiscent perhaps of Aristotelian 
hylemorphism. Since morphology is, in my view, causally relevant and could (at least in a certain 
limited sense) be stored as exformation outside of the informational germ-line of a certain orgm1ism in 
question, it would in my view be wrong to consider phenotypes as mere vehicles. 
In chapter 9 Darwinian process-monism which is equally present in gene-Darwinism, process-
Darwinism and Darwinism in general is criticised (:l next sections). 
In chapter I 0 a short critique of the principle of entity egoism Is given. Finally, based on the 
foregoing investigation, I propose an alternative approach which I call 'ecological idealism'. 
In the following, only a few aruwtations are given in advance to sketch my intentions and m)' 
resulting ambivalent attitude towards gene-Darwinism. 
Gene-Darwinism is in many respects the purest Darwinism ever. In regard to evolutionary 
substances or units, gene-Darwinism, as we shall see, radicalises the individualist downward reduction 
of Darwin's Darwinism, which now focuses exclusively on the smallest thinkable unit of evolution, the 
single selfish gene. Weismann's barrier, in any case essential to neo-Darwinism, is now interpreted 
-in opposition to proponents of the evolutionary synthesis-in a way that renders phenotypes mere 
'vehicles' of selfish genes. In regard to evolutionary processes, gene-Danvinism radicalises Darwin's 
research programme of process reductionism (which Darwin himself did not carry through) and now 
focuses exclusively on the simplest thinkable evolutionary process, that of natural selection (blind-
variation-and-external-elimination) and evolutionary gradualism. "Anywhere in the universe, is 
Danvinian selection. [ ... ] Never were so many facts explained by so few assumptions"l 8 Apart from 
different tendencies in sociobiology, pure gene-Da1winism has also radicalised the Darwinia11 concept of 
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inner-specific struggle, a struggle which now even takes place within organisms ln contrast, the 
'benevolent' evolutionary synthesis did not focus especially on inner-specific struggle. To gene-
Darwinism even communication is understood as shifty manipulation and pitiless exploitation. Even 
behind marvellous love-songs the grimaces of egoistic genes are lurking. Finally, gene-Darwinism 
advocates a biologistic world view and biologisation of ethics and the social sciences more pronounced 
than that of Darwin himself 
The gene-Darwinian understanding of nature, where selfish genes are the only heroes in the Valhalla 
of etemal vicious fight and slaughter, may be regarded as abominable from the outset But one has to 
concede that gene-Darwinism (or rather sociobiology in general) has been remarkably successful in 
explaining otherwise mysterious aspects of animal and human behaviour: parent 'investment', incest 
taboo, the battle of the sexes and sexual bimorphism, the undennining of social group behaviour, etc. 
A simplified condenmation of all aspects of gene-Darwirusm would not be justified. One has to 
disentangle the valuable from the non-valuable aspects of that approach, and we should try to 
understand why the problematic aspects had such an appeal. I think both gene-Darwinians and their 
critics capture parts of the overall picture-they are all right and they are all wrong. 
I myself even radicalise gene-Darwinism, arguing that the idea of a selfish replicator can be 
understood as a basis of all other aspects of gene-Darwinism (although, at the san1e time, also pointing 
beyond gene-Darwinism). I do also accept the gene-Darwinian tenets of competition benveen single 
genes, the relevance of biological instincts for culture and the importance of natural selection for 
evolution (at least if natural selection is defined broadly). 
But I argue that gene-Dmwinian metaphysics' veneration of selfish genes, ubiquitous blind and 
wasteful natural selection and its biologistic interpretation of culture go to far. A more balanced third 
way is proposed in this work The focus on single selfish genes has to be balanced by an 
acknowledgement of gene-interactions and larger regulative systems as welL The exclusive focus on 
information (the gem1-line) has to be supplemented by the emphasis on structural necessities and what I 
call 'exformation' The exclusive focus on competition has to be balanced by incorporating cooperation 
not as a somehow resulting epiphenomenon but an essential aspect of evolution. The concept of an 
etemally cruel mechanism, which does itself not evolve, has to be replaced by the unfolding of 
mechanisms with a certain autonomy of their own (~ introductory section on Darwinism in general). 
The acknowledgement of human biological inclinations and instincts, even of something like rape, ought 
to be balanced by an approach which leaves appropriate room for education and cultural improvement 
Biology and culture do not play against each other in a zero-sum game, biology enables culture, and 
18 R Dawkins. River Out of Eden ( 1995), xi. 
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cultural values also have top down effects on our biology (e g. via our choice of sexual pmtners); hence 
it is problematic to speak of a purely biologically given side of the human constitution 
This whole work is a long argument to JUStify such a more balanced position. And here I may mention that misleading 
headlines like 'Gene for lntelligence/Criminality/Homosexuality Found' appear to me to be linked to a myth of the gene 
which is also supported by gene-Darwinism, with its tendency to neglect the complex svstem of gene-interactions and 
'exfonnation' 
Also the great expectations for the Human Genome Project, have in mv view partly been vexed by that myth. Of course 
the sequencing of human DNA has been a landmark in biological research, the eflects on medicine and on society (gene 
tests, etc.) are to be seen. Nevertheless the mere sequencing of DNA does not at all imply-what can often be read-that 
we have understood the DNA Such a claim is as naive as to assume that the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt were understood 
at the moment of copving them down. An understanding of the genome requires a deeper understanding of developmental 
biology, the organismic metabolism and its enviromnental interaction ( exfonnation) as well. Although, geneticists, I hope, 
are aware of these limitations, l am actually not sure about the cursorily infonned politicians responsible for public funds 
and the larger public. 
The growing influence of gene-Darwinism seems to be the final victory of a cmde materialist 
monism, neither caring for the actual complexity of the world nor for ethical values. I think this will 
prove to be a Pyrrhic victory. Its apparent one-sidedness naturally elicits critique. Further, I shall argue 
that gene-Danvinism even itself bears the genns to transcend itself Here I mention only two examples. 
Firstly, gene-Danvinism, although nonnally interpreted as a pinnacle of materialism, in my opiruon also 
involves the inherent tendency to shift the emphasis from matter to infonnation, or to fonn (eidos). This 
in tum may undem1ine its own reductionist positions. Secondly, although gene-Danvinism, as men-
tioned, can indeed be regarded as the pi1macle of Danvinism, its rather active understanding of the sel-
fish gene undermines the passive Darwinian understanding of the organism as a mere object of an exter-
nal environmental selection, which is also an assumption equally at the very heart of gene-Darwinism 
Since a theory is always an abstraction from reality (and something through which \ve only perceive 
reality), it is, in part also a theoretical and philosophical decision what concepts we put at the very 
heart of our theories. I argue that the focus of gene-Darwinism only on genes as evolutionary units and 
only on natural selection as an evolutionary process is one-sided. Some sociobiologists have tried, for 
example, by using concepts from game theory, to extend strict gene-Darwinism, starting to shift its 
emphasis from competition to cooperation. In my opinion, these approaches which seek out conditions 
with which to render larger systems stable, should be interpreted as being concerned with transcending 
gene-Darwinism Despite my sympathy for such modifications, I think Dawkins expresses the gene-
Danvinian philosophy more thoroughly: "Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our 
theory is a battlegrow1d of replicators, jostling, jockeying, fighting for a future in the genetic 
hereafter." 19 Although single genes are the simplest conceivable objects of evolution and natural 
selection is the simplest conceivable evolutionary mechanism, I think, that if higher levels of 
organisation, cooperation and slightly less wasteful mechanisms could be shown to exist, they should -
if possible-not be regarded as mere side-effects, but as parts of the paradigmatic core of our ontology 
19 Idem. The Seljish Gene ( 1989), p. 256. 
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c) Process-Darwinism -Its Radicalisation and Its Critique 
A spectre is haunting the intellectual world-the spectre of Darwinism. Darwin himself predicted: 
"My theory would give zest to [ ... ] metaphysics"20 But Danvin would be astonished at what paths his 
theory has taken, not only in regard of gene-Darwinism, but also of what I shall call 'process-
Darwinism', found in many sciences without own obvious link to biological Darwinism. 
The tenn 'Danvinism' is usually understood as a certain biological theory, but, it appears justifiable 
to call processes on different ontological levels Darwinian processes, if they are analogous to natural se-
lection (the central mechanism of biological Danvinism). 'Process-Danvinism' denotes radical 
approaches to whole subJect areas or even to philosophy as such. These exclusively allow Danvinian 
processes to be seen as evolutionary mechanisms or, more generally, as processes of knowledge 
acquisition. 
In this section of the introduction I give an outline only of those chapters concerned with 
Darwinian processes and process-Darwinism, particularly in non-biological subject areas. 
In chapter 2 I deal mainly with the ethics of gene-Darwinism. But in this context Dawkins' idea of a 
meme is introduced which is a general process-Darwinian trial-and-error approach to the cultural 
evolution of concepts and practices. I first try to extend this view by proposing analogous processes to 
biological kin selection and reciprocal altruism on the meme level. I then point out limitations of this 
atomistic and purely Danvinian understanding of the history of ideas. It shall also be shown that the 
assumed autonomy of memes, which I aim to support myself, is incoherent with pure gene-Darwinism. 
Additionally, it is shown that even this considerably extended two level theory does not seem to provide 
enough ground for a satisfying ethics. 
In part II, chapter 4, I describe in which way different Darwinian paradigms have historically 
focused on different levels of selection. Furthermore, I outline a biological multi-level approach, 
developed in opposition to gene-Darwinism, which in one version is clearly process-Darwinian 
In chapter 5, the interaction of the discussed paradigms with their general intellectual environments is 
elaborated, shedding light on the structural similarities of biological Darwinism with theories in other 
subject areas which are treated in the following part. 
In part III ·we tu m to universal process-Darwinism itself and mainly try to develop a positive account 
of this world vie\v. It shall become apparent that the Darwinian tum of Western intellectual history is 
more profound than often assumed and, likewise, affects subject areas which were in pmt developed in 
opposition to biological Darwinism. 
In chapter 6 I am concerned w·ith developing a process-Danvinian metaphysics. Firstly, it is shown 
that there are advocates of process-Darwinism, who not only claim that Darwinian processes on several 
1° Ch. Darwin. Notebook B ( ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 228. 
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ontological levels are supported empirically, but who appear to regard process-Darwinism as a 
universal principle. 
Secondly, I try to explain and deepen this assumption myself by developing an explicit metaphysical 
justification. Evolutionary processes in the biotic world as well as m culture are treated in this context 
as processes of knowledge acquisition. Therefore the epistemological problem of induction (Hume) 
appears to be applicable to these (originally) ontological questions as well. In my view, process-
Darwinism is linked to a Popperian negative 'solution' of the problem of induction, i. e. to the actual 
denial of induction. This appears to be the case, although Popper, who was himself influenced by 
Darwinism, still took a critical stance towards Darwimsm. However, provided one accepted a Popperian 
negative solution to the problem of induction, I shall derive two properties that any exploratory process 
would necessarily have to have and which I shall later regard to be defining aspects of Darwinism, the 
blindness of trials and the externality of selection. 
Thirdly, I shall in turn indicate a possible critique of such a metaphysical foundation Therefore 
I distinguish the following two claims. The first claim is that an exploratory process (like an organism 
or a theory) which does not 'know' an)1hing about a certain situation, is necessarily blind. This is true 
since blindness here is defined by not knowing anything about a situation. But this t.:'lutological truth has 
of course never been denied by inductivists. A more appropriate inductivist proposition would be for 
example "we are not blind, but there are bottom-up processes, internal processes of refinement of 
inforn1ation and predictions about not yet observed instances: and all three epistemological-ontological 
methods could (under certain conditions) be justified". I shall regard this second more tndy inductivist 
proposition-despite its problems-to be valid as well. Hence, I deny the premiss that the problem of 
induction can only be 'solved' negatively, and there is no need for the conclusion I have proposed. In 
spite of my critical attitude towards its metaphysical foundation, I shall continue expow1ding process-
Darwinism as a new alkahest (the hypothetical universal solvent sought by alchemists). Authors like 
Dennett and Hull will be mentioned and I shall work out why the notion of a replicator is logically at the 
very heart of Darwinism (thus pointing beyond their position). 
In chapter 7 I discuss process-Darwinian approaches found in particular subject areas. It will be 
shown that the psychological theory of operant conditioning, a theory of trial and error, can be 
interpreted as being process-Darwinian. Likewise, I go on to show that also Popper's falsificationist 
approach to the development of scientific theories, the process of conjecture and refutation, can be 
understood as being process-Darwinian. I shall also point to other process-Darwinian parallels, for 
example those in inmmnology and economics. In some of these different disciplines, one can not only 
reveal the presence of Darwinian processes or even process-Darwinism, but also the corresponding 
critical formulations, which may support or complement each other. The adaptationism of operant 
conditioning and of falsificationism, has been criticised along similar lines as that of Darwinism. 
Moreover, in psychology, for example, the cognitive turn has introduced a multitude of processes, 
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replacing the process momsm of operant conditioning. Compared with gene-Darwinism, universal 
process-Darwinism-if justifiable-would appear preferable~ nevertheless, it still places an emphasis on 
a universal war of entities and an assumed complete blindness of evolution. A metaphysical system 
regarding any evolutionary process as being unchangeable blind may in principle exclude the concept of 
sustainability. Jonas has pointed out that in his view any ethics which cares for sustainability makes the 
precondition of a possibility of a certain predictability of the future. 21 
In pmt IV, chapter 9 I scrutinise and criticise many different aspects of Darwinian processes. The 
first section addresses the problem that actually proposed process-Darwinian theories in different 
subject areas are often inconsistent with each other. Since process-Darwinism is in the same way as 
biological Darwinism based on the concept of natural selection, I outline the remaining sections of 
chapter 9 together with my general critique of biological Darwinism below in section d of this 
introduction. 
d) From Danvinism to an Evolutionary Theory of Evolution 
In this section I outline the chapters that are related to my critique of processes reductionism fow1d 
in gene-Darwinism, process-Danvinism and, I think, in Darwinism in general. 
On the whole, I aim to contribute to the transcendence of the static Darwinian understanding of 
evolution and replace it with a truly evolutionary understanding of evolution itself I argue that the 
essence of pure Darwinism is the theory of evolution by natural selection, understood as a given and 
unchangeable law of nature, a law of blind variation and environmental elimination. Without 
disapproving of all aspects of his "view of life", as Danvin called it I shall challenge the philosophy of 
Danvinism by emphasising that the process of evolution, in biology and culture, has not been 
condenmed to stay as blind, cruel and wasteful as it was in the beginning. 
I shall argue that the essentially static process-monism of Darwinism, particularly visible in gene-
Darwinism and process-Danvinism, is closely tied to the deist Newtonian understanding of the world as 
being ruled by a set of simple basic, eternal and universal laws of nature. The essence of this view goes 
back to Darwin. 
In his early notebook B he wrote: ,Astronomers might fonnerly have said that God ordered, each planet to move in its 
particular destiny. -In same manner God orders each animal created with cettain fonn in certain country, but how much 
more simple, & sublime power let attraction act according to certain laws such are inevitable consequen let animal be 
created, then by the fixed laws of generation, such will be their successors -"22 
Like "Ne\\rton, Darwin wanted a theory that had a universal character, applicable to all aspects of 
all living organisms including man and his 'higher faculties '"23 This approach was influenced by 
Herschel, Lyell and the theologian Paley, writers who argued for static or preordained laws of nature. 
21 H. Jonas. Prinzip Verantwortung ( 198411978), pp. 37-38 
22 Ch. Darwin. Notebook B ( ed. by D. Kolm, 19R7), orig. p. I 01. 
23 S. Schweber. The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing (!985), p. 39, also p. 49. 
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Paley also seems to have influenced Darwin's adaptationism and, likewise, Lyell Darwin's gradualism 
(~pp. 168 f). Paradoxically the concept ofthe W1changeability ofthe laws of nature goes back to the 
originally Platonic-Christian idea of machina mundi (:> pp. 81 f). But Danvin 's pious transformation 
of central aspects of natural theology into his own theory of natural selection resulted (taken as a 
radicalised Malthusian world view) in something like a principle of the unchangeability of cruelty and 
wastefulness, and rendered a benevolent God impossible. 
As argued earlier, scientific theories can have certain theoretical degrees of freedom with which to 
interpret 'given facts'. I stress that the Darwinian interpretation of evolution, particularly its process 
monism, ought to and could become transcended. I argue that a theory of an evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms, in which mechanisms may become semi-autonomous, would be a more appropriate 
interpretation of biological and, even more so, cultural evolution, than the picture of a pitiless 
mmwdifiable rule of natural selection. 
Despite advocating a different picture of evolution, I want to stress that I do not intend to propose a 
full blown antithesis to Danvinism, but, since still making abundant use of Darwinian concepts, rather a 
third way. In order to find a golden mean (aurea mediocratas) between the recently radicalised under-
standing of Darwinism and its numerous and partly also radical critics, I think one needs to achieve a 
synthesis by drawing from both extremes rather than ignoring them. In two previous sections I outlined 
such a middle position in regard to evolutionary objects, likewise I intend to achieve such a position in 
regard to processes. In my opinion it would be naive to neglect all Darwinian aspects of being 
completely. This is in my view not only valid for ontology but, as far as its background is concerned, 
also for ethics. But, I think one therefore does not need to advocate a Darwinian metaphysics, a pan-
Darwinian ontology or even only a pan-Darwinian biology. The facts and sub-theories accUlllulated to 
support Darwinian processes are, of course, not simply fancy, but rather need to be transfom1ed or to be 
seen in a different light, just as the newer Fisherian Dmwinism of the 1930s and 1940s (:> pp. 128 f) 
historically mtegrated the opposed non-Darwinian theory of Mendelism. Also main tenllS used in 
Darwinism have actually been coined by ardent opponents of Darwinism, for instance 'genetics' by 
Bateson, 'genotype' by Johannsen and 'adaptive radiation' by Osbom. 
Furthem1ore, l think one should keep in mind that well established theories might also become 
reinterpreted, at least in the way that Newtonism has become transfonned by modem physics. Indeed 
I consider Dmwin as the 'Newton of a blade of grass' (an expression early coined by Kant), and an1 
convinced that an 'Einstein of a blade of grass' is still to come. 
Mentioning physics refers to more than to a mere example of a historical paradigm shift. The proposal of this work of 
an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms is in three respects analogous to some developments in modem physics. Basically, 
the Darwinian understanding of organismic evolution has been interpreted in close analogy to the passive Newtonian 
tmderstanding of inert matter directed by gravitation ( :> for example Depew and Weber, pp. 172 f). Altematively my 
proposal, as outlined earlier, firstly supports a field theoretic understanding of organisms, replacing an atomic and 
corpuscular U11derstanding of the gene. Secondly, I regard evolutionary processes not as something completely extemal, but 
partly created by the evolutionary entities themselves, in a way following the Einsteinian stress that also the e:-1:emal 
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conditions of a physical process, i. e. time and space, are not simply given, but dependent on the physical objects 
themselves. (Already Leibniz argued that space must be based on the relations among bodies.) Thirdly, a truly evolutionary 
theory of evolution must stress that the laws of evolution are not simply given, but do themselves evolve, similar to the way 
that phvsicallaws and forces are today not simply taken as statically given, but understood to have evolved in time. 
(The first and second point of my proposals may remind the reader of the Aristotelian tradition, indeed Pierre Duhem 
actually worked out many parallels between modem physics and Aristotelian physics.) 
Before coming to outline the specific chapters related to the detection and transcendence of 
Darwinian process monism, I think I should give a justification for my preliminary definition of 
Darwinism, which I will fully elaborate upon later (~ particularly pp 107 f., 153 f, 348 f) The 
definition or re-definition of tenns is particularly important, since I am not working empirically but 
theoretically and I am concerned with the interpretation of facts. rather than their production. The act of 
de-fining, of drawing the line between thesis and antithesis, is not merely a matter of speaking, a flatus 
vocis, but determines which aspects are to be emphasised and which are to be neglected. 
Our evaluation of what is called 'Darwinism' is, of course, a function of what we mean by this term; 
and the meaning of this term has not only changed historically, but authors still differ in their present 
usage. In regard to evolutionary processes, natural selection is mostly accepted as the paradigmatic core 
of Darwinism. Other tenets partly linked to a pure understanding of natural selection are, for example, 
gradualism, individualism or more generally a 'view of life' banishing purpose, direction and spirit 24 
Natural selection is undoubtedly central to Darwinism, but it has been questioned whether 
Darwinism tends towards a basic advocacy of process-monism or a limited process pluralism. Whereas 
A Weismann purged Darwinism from every other aspect, thereby claiming to reveal its true essence, 
G. Romanes emphasised, on the contrary, that Darwinism is essentially pluralistic in character. 
Darwin's Victorian Darwmism was not only fonnulated in a guarded way, but was indeed partly 
more pluralistic than most Darwinian approaches since. Darwin himself adopted a straight-forward 
Lamarckian theory of acquired characters as an integral part of his theory. However, today's 
Darwinians, in many respects differing with Darwin himself, and even most critics of Darwinism 
(myself included) would not dare to argue in such a traditional Lamarckian way. 
Nevertheless, in a modified way, both positions can also be found today, gene-Darwinians, like 
Dawkins, have even radicalised Weismatm's neo-Darwinism as the only true Darwinism, whereas, for 
example, J. Gould and some other critics of ultra-Darwinism have advocated a pluralistic understanding 
of Danvinism, allowing for and requiring other evolutionary factors apart from natural selection25 
Although I follow and partly radicalise Gould's stress on evolutionary process-pluralism, in regard 
to the definition of Darwinism, I agree with Weismann and Dawkins in stressing strict process-monism 
as the core of Darwinism. But in regard to the definition I have several reasons to follow those, who I 
aim to oppose, as tar as their understanding of evolution is concerned. 
24 E. g. S. J. Gould. Ever since Darwin (199111973), pp. 12-13. 
25 !bid, pp. 268 f. 
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Firstly, the tenn 'Dmwinism' underwent historical transformations. Present Darwinian theories in 
many respects differ from Darwin's Darwinism (:d pp. 110 f). Weismann's barrier, the strictly blind 
character of all variation, and, at least concerning gene-Darwinism, the strict process reductionism have 
become defining aspects of Danvinism in general. 
Secondly, I critically evaluate the larger claims of present Darwinism, denying true ethics 
(~ pp. 48 f.), purpose and spirit. They are, I think, mostly tied to a radical interpretation of Darwinism. 
Since I expect that this radical Darwinism can be shown to be wrong, I am in favour of a strict-but 
still appropriate-definition of Darwinism in generaL in order to make it as clear as possible that these 
more general claims are wrong. 
Thirdly, a strict interpretation of Darwinism and natural selection would focus on what had been 
new in Darwin's evolutionary theory. Additionally, such a definition would reveal the beautifully simple 
essence of Darwinism, which was understandably emphasised by the gene-Darwinians. Furthermore, a 
strict definition, would be fair to what may be regarded as the essential remaining message of theories of 
alternative research traditions, advocating less blind and wasteful-though not necessarily 
Lamarckian-views of life. Hence, a strict definition, which considers the historical background, in my 
opinion would do justice to the essence of both Darwinism and its alternative research traditions. 
Fourthly, I aim at a strict definition of Darwinism and natural selection, in order to disentangle the 
tautological aspects of Danvinism from its non-tautological falsifiable ones (~ pp. 348 f). 
Fifthly, Danvinism today has become widely applied not only in biology, but also in many other 
sciences as well (:> pp. 218 f.). Therefore it has become again an important task to specify its meaning, 
thereby enabling a fu1ther theoretical development. In order to make the, in my opinion concealed, 
evolution of evolutionary mechanisms theoretically visible, I aim at improving the resolution of the 
relevant concepts and shall in the course of this work achieve a strict definition of Darwinian processes 
and of Darwinism in general. 
I realise that one perhaps might not accept these arguments favouring a strict definition of 
Darwinism. If I myself were convinced of the suitability of a broad definition of Darwinism, like "a 
theory of evolution in which the variation of evolutionary entities and their survival plays an important 
role", I should, of course, be a Darwinian, a biological one and also a cultural one. As I pointed out 
already, I am in some respects actually more Darwinian than Darwin himself. 
But I am not mainly concerned with definitions. Stressing an evolution of the evolutionary 
mechanism and the active role of evolving entities is primary to me, the meaning of the term 
'Darwinism' is secondary. If one adopted a broad definition of Darwinism, this work would not be 
understood as a critique of Darwinism in general, but still as a critique of process-monism, which is at 
least often found in Darwinism. 
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There are also reasons why one may want to adopt a very wide notion of Darwinism, besides wanting to mununise 
Darwinism against criticism One may want to honour Darwin by naming the valid theory of evolution (and of metaphvsics) 
after him, since Darwin indeed has the merit to have been the first to stress the importance of variation and blindness in 
evolution (but not the concept of evolution itself :> pp. 94 r) and to propose a simple algorithm leading mechanically to 
evolution. Anotl1er reason may be the beauty of tl1e assumption that the whole of evolution has one very simple unified 
explanation, unified under the name 'Darwinism'. One also might not dare to break with a currently accepted tradition, 
which in so many respects tumed out to be right. Or it may, likewise, be useful to claim an Important person like Darwin as 
one's own predecessor. Furthennore, there may also be ideological reasons, for example if one were to regard competition 
as still being too much neglected in our present world view. 
But nonnally Darwinism is in fact understood as strictly implying several tenets, which I indeed 
should like to criticise: 'the survival of the fittest' (~ 9.1 a), the exclusive evolutionary importance of 
natural selection(:> 9.1 b), or that there is no role for synthesis as well (~ 9.3 a), that it is reasonable 
to regard variation as being invariably blind(:> 9.3 b), that selection is best understood as always being 
an external and opportunistic response to the moment (~ 9.3 c), that it is reasonable to regard the 
evolutionary process as itself unchangeable without new autonomous mechanisms coming into being, 
changing the course of evolution (~ 9.3 d) and finally a world view of competition, biological 
detern1ination, and the denial of a purpose beyond survival and egoistic reproduction. If only one of 
these claims is understood to be a defining aspect of Darwinism, then my work should indeed also be 
understood as a critique of Darwinism in generaL 
Since I regard most of these previously mentioned claims as cardinal to approaches with an 
Darwinia11 self-image, I do regard my philosophical view of life-despite debts to Darwinism-as being 
critical of Darwinism or at least of its conm1on interpretation. In particular, its stress on an 
unchangeable blind and externally given law of nature shall be challenged. 
Outline of the chapters relevant to Darwinian process monism and its transcendence. Chapter 3, 
on the pre-Darwinia11 history of biology partly provides the larger background for the concept of eternal 
laws, in a way leading back to the notion of a machina mundi. the world machine mled by the eternal 
ideas of God. 
In chapter 4 I provide a preliminary working definition of Darwinism, based on natural selection, 
forming the intersection of the subsequently treated sub-paradigms of Darwin's Darwinism, the 
evolutionary synthesis a11d gene-Darwinism. We will follow the history of more or less process-
reductionist paradigms, finally expounding the process-monism of gene-Darwinism. 
In chapter 5 the cultural background to Darwinian sub-paradigms is discussed. Darwin's 
background is of particular importance. I shall interpret Dmwin's approach as a Malthusian synthesis 
of the often neglected pre-Darwinian romantic (or romanticising materialist) evolutionism and of the 
Newtonian mechanistic understanding of nature as law-based matter in motion. 
Process-Darwinism both as a collection of theories found in many other subject areas besides 
biology and as a metaphysic are treated in chapters 6 and 7. Tllis has been outlined in the preceding 
section and here it should merely be 311110tated that process-Darwinism has actually been defined by 
Dmwinian process-reductionism. 
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Chapter 9 is particularly concerned with the different aspects of Darwinian process reductionism, 
their critique and transcendence. (Chapter 8 is concerned with different types of genetic reductionism 
and has been outlined earlier.) Chapter 9 is philosophical and partly speculative: in order to reach a 
'distant argumentative (local) optimum', a certain degree of speculation might sometimes be warranted. 
Here I only outline the topics discussed, since a summary of the results, particularly of the critical 
chapters, can be found at the end of this work. 
At the beginning of chapter 9, I discuss the possible tautological aspects of Darwinism. Instead of 
discussing one tautology, I distinguish two types pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism. I shall come 
to the conclusion that Darwinism, although definitely not wholly tautological, indeed makes use of 
tautological definitions and thereby partly immunises itself against criticism. 
I then shall propose a stricter definition of Darwinism and natural selection, purged of all 
tautological aspects. Moreover, my definition, as already mentioned, is designed to unveil changes in the 
evolutionary mechanism itself. Natural selection is now strictly defined as the two-step process of blind-
variation-and-external-elimination. I propose a scale of approaches between the strictly Darwinian pole 
of a blind, wasteful, unchangeable, passive and adaptationist evolution, and a Lamarckian or Okenian 
pole, stressing a directed, non-wasteful, changing and active wlfolding of evolution. I personally oppose 
both radical positions and discard for example the traditional Lamarckian understanding, which denied 
the importance of variation completely. But I equally turn against a strictly Darwinian, or better 
Dawkinsian, understanding of biological or cultural evolution. 
In the course of chapter 9 I discuss several aspects of my strict definition, trying in detail to falsify 
pan-Darwinism. I mainly deal with biological Darwinism, which is more advanced than the cultural one 
and hence, in a way, a more powerful enemy. Firstly, I challenge the understanding that the phenomenon 
of sexual reproduction can not be regarded as true synthesis 
Secondly, I discuss the Darwinian tenet of the blindness of all variation. I argue in a detailed way 
that one has to interpret the known facts in a way that renders directed variation possible and actually 
appearing (particularly if starting from an originally Darwinian viewpoint). Moreover, it is argued that 
one may easily conceive certain kinds of adaptive variation as a reaction to the environment. 
Thirdly, I challenge the view that selection is always external (natural) and always an opportunistic 
response to the moment. It will be argued that 'hetero-selection' might be replaced by 'auto-selection'. 
The spirit of such a claim is, I think, as close to an active unfolding of organisms as to a passive 
Dmwinian understanding of evolution as an adaptation to a given environment. 
Finally, I shall discuss in which way we may conceive that evolutionary processes come into being 
and gain a certain freedom from their original basis of pure natural selection. I consider circularity or 
self-referentiality as a criterion for the emergence of new processes, a concept which, in a way, goes 
back to Kant. I shall argue that processes changing the blindness and cause of evolution could gain a 
certain autonomy. (I actually distinguish two types of autonomy which can be involved.) 
Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophv of Nature 30 
In chapter 10 I am concerned with the transcendence of selfishness and at the end of the work I 
outline the resulting metaphysical picture I should propose as an alternative to metaphysical Darwinism. 
The resulting picture of the evolution of evolutionary processes differs considerably from the 
Darwinian picture of one eternal and universal mechanism or algorithm (Dennett) of evolution. Even so, 
I employ mechanisms, which have also been employed by Darwinians, but my interpretation of these 
mechanisms shall differ. 
I take sexual selection as an example. a concept introduced by Darwin later in his life, as being con-
cerned with the evolution of man and tried to moderate his original position (~pp. 115 f). My inter-
pretation of that concept contradicts the spirit at least of present Darwinian process-monism. Sexual 
selection-almost totally neglected by the evolutionary synthesis-again became an academic topic 
under the sway of gene-Darwinism. On the whole, gene-Darwinians have understood sexual selection as 
being reducible to the natural selection of genes Contrarily, I shall regard sexual selection as a process 
in its own right. Although it itself is based on lower processes, like natural selection, sexual selection 
does not remain identical with these processes, and is no mere short-cut or acceleration of natural 
selection. In this work, sexual selection is understood not only as an adaptation, but also as a new evolu-
tionary process, a new mode of evolution, changing the direction of evolution itself A new process 
changes the 'evolutionary landscapes' at various levels of organisation. According to my 'view of life' 
there are no mere adaptive landscapes, expressing the fit to an external environment, but evolutionary 
landscapes, themselves partly created by the evolutionary entity and process concerned. It will be shown 
that sexual selection can under certain conditions retain its direction, even if natural selection counter-
selects. Hence,. a new process can gain a certain autonomy from natural selection. Such autonomous 
tendencies may have led, for example, to the enonnous antlers of deer, but also may have played a role 
in tendencies most of us would regard as more positive, like the evolution of the biological basis of 
human morals. 
Palaeontology, but also genetics, is full of adaptations, which could also be understood as new 
evolutionary mechanisms, changing not only the speed but also the course of evolution. Similarly, for 
example, the evolutionary synthesis is a treasure-house of mechanisms, which mono-mechanistic gene-
Darwinism, as we shall see, has started to neglect We may also, for example, think of the human 
plasticity, which combined with sexual selection builds a feedback loop, in a way producing variation in 
response to experiences and values. 
Back to biology itsel±~ we may, for example, think of numerous mechanisms linked to species 
(sexually interbreeding populations), like sexual recombination, isolation, genetic drift, founder effect 
etc. Gene-Darwinism consequently largely denied the existence of species and subpopulations, in the 
sense of regarding them and the corresponding mechanisms as reducible to single selfish genes and 
natural selection. In contrast, I also advocate the existence of entities above the level of single selfish 
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genes ( :> two sections before). The 'invention' of species and the conesponding evolutionary 
mechanisms enabled that the evolutionary process could cross valleys and could reach new peaks on the 
evolutionary landscape. But again these new mechanisms also change the evolutionary landscapes; 
properties of organisms, like inner-specific coherence or cooperation, impossible before, now become 
evolutionary possible or even probable. 
Although opposing gene-Darwinism, I want to make use of the processes discussed in sociobiology, 
like reciprocal altruism. But I do not interpret these processes as being fully reducible to gene-selection 
For exan1ple, an evolutionarily stable strategy of reciprocal altruism, has certain preconditions on the 
level of the population as well (:> p. 46). Although built on a gene-Darwinian basis, 1 should regard 
even such a strategy itself as an evolutionary process, transcending gene selection. 
I am not concerned with giving an account specifically dealing with the evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms, but I intend to render such an account generally as being conceptually possible. Treating 
processes not merely as adaptations, but as things which themselves influence the course of evolution, 
changes them from only objects of evolution to being partly subjects of evolution as well. 
Although, for methodological purposes, I distinguish between evolutionary processes and evolutio-
nary objects, it also becomes apparent that this distinction is ontologically not reasonable. I shall take a 
Whiteheadian stance and regard objects as processes and, vice versa, processes as objects. Species for 
example, are not only evolutionary objects, but, as I have indicated, could be understood to be evolutio-
nary processes as well. The same is valid for selfish atomistic replicators, the most simple conceivable 
evolutionary objects, linked to the most simple 'atomistic' process of natural selection(~ p. 216) 
But if a Whiteheadian identity of objects and processes is taken seriously, it would not be warranted 
if one accepted the emergence of new entities and denied the emergence of new processes. In this respect 
gene-Darwinism is indeed consistent in also denying higher evolutionary processes above natural 
selection as it is denying the existence of higher evolutionary objects above selfish genes. But I argue 
that it is also consistent (and preferable) when, in chapter 8 gene-Darwinian object-reductionism and in 
chapter 9, gene-Darwinian process reductionism are criticised. In both chapters a top-down causation is 
advocated; in chapter 8, reducing the necessary selfishness of genes, in chapter 9 reducing the necessary 
blindness of evolutionary processes. 
In chapter 8, as outlined earlier, I not only attack gene-atomism and advocate the reality of larger 
genic units, but also criticise germ-line reductionism and advocate the reality (causal relevance) of 
phenotypes, for example, of organisms, groups and even of ecosystems. What does this mean in the 
light of an evolution of evolutionary processes understood in a Whiteheadia.n way? I suppose it follows 
that phenotypes have to be regarded in a way as being evolutionary processes themselves. They indeed 
do play a role in determining the course of evolution. There is a developmental logic; ce1tain body-plans 
bear certain possibilities and constraints for future evolution, hence they, so to speak, direct evolution. 
(As mentioned earlier, I shall also propose another exformational, field theoretic justification for a 
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revival of morphology or Aristotelian causa forma/is.) According to such a vtew, Darwinism, and 
particularly gene-Darwinism, was wrong in regarding phenotypes as mere vehicles of genes and not as 
evolutionary factors themselves. Hence, research on a morphological 'logic' was largely discarded (but 
see the recent endeavours for example of Goodwin and Webster, in taking up this research tradition26 , 
:> pp. 156 f). Although I do not want to rely exclusively on that tradition and think that the supported 
understanding of phenotypes would also challenge the view of evolution as simply adaptation instead of 
stressing a developmental 'logic' to evolution (I think, this corresponds to what Gould and Vrba called 
'exaptation'). This also supports my view that the evolutionary process as a whole is not externally and 
eternally given, but at least partly a function of evolution itself The evolutionary process itself is both 
natura naturans and natura naturata (~ p. 79). 
If evolution is understood as a process of knowledge acquisition-apart from the differences between 
the biological and culturallevel-L so to speak, oppose a mere correspondence theory of evolution, and 
try to supplement it by a coherence theory. In this respect 1 could be placed between Darwinism and 
idealist biology. Furthennore, I try, on the biological level, to refute strict falsificationism and a mere 
trial-and-error metaphysic of knowledge acquisition. 
I shall argue that even in biology, there is no simple eternal and externally given law of evolution 
relentlessly ruling the world. Although the Darwinian process in my view is indeed the simplest 
evolutionary algorithm conceivable, I argue that evolution transcends natural selection in its strictest 
sense and that evolution itself evolves. 
The focus on simple explanations, as favoured as tl1e via moderna, particularly since Willian1 
Ockhan1, has many advantages, a simple explanation as such is definitely preferable to a complicated 
one. But, independent of the positive intentions of advocates of this principle (also of Ockham), this 
could also lead and has lead to 'terrible simplifications' 27 Like some other critics of Darwinism, I 
believe that Darwinism will either not survive or will be strongly modified by the necessary transition 
from the "sciences of simplicity" to the "science of complexity"28 ( ~ also p. 15 7). 
On the whole, I think, it makes a difference whether the essence of evolution is understood to be 
selfish atomic replicators, struggling in an unchangeable pitiless process of natural selection, or whether 
the essence of evolution is understood as the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, where entities may 
partly become subjects instead of mere objects of evolution and the blindness and seUishness on relevant 
explanatory levels can be reduced. 
In regard to its cultural consequences, an idea of an evolution of evolutionary processes is not prone simply to transfer 
the picture of unchangeable 'natural' Darwinian process to politics. It will rather become easier to conceive a certam 
autonomy of culture, if we were used to the idea of processes gaining a certain autonomy from biology. (Nevertheless, still 
echoing Descartes' and Snow's dualism, l regard thought, language and ethjcs as the most distinctive human capacities.) 
26 G. Webster; B. Goodwin. Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles zn Biology ( 1996). 
27 E. g.: A. Ch. v. Guttenberg. Biologie als Weltanschauung ( 1967), pp. 25, 35, 51. 
28 D. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 18. 
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This, of course, does not mean that we can lean nothing from evolution, but the proposed ontology would have different 
leanings and would, I hope, imply a more cautious procedure. 
Our general view of life is often in a simplified way taken as a metaphor for culture. Whether we regard this as 
irrational or not, we have to consider its effect when concerned with topics of larger relevance. Social laws, easily 
associated with laws of nature, would according to the proposed view presumably not be taken as eternally given, but as 
being improvable. Also my theory of exformation would stress that we have almost no fixed nature at all, but that existent 
biological inclinations are moulded by the environment. and in the case of humans to a strong extent by themselves. 
Furthennore, steering a middle course between atomism and holism, my approach, I hope, could neither serve as a 
justification for an unrestrained laissez-faire economics nor for a totalitarian theory neglecting the individual. If anytl1ing is 
suggested by this view of life, I think it is the relativelv active role of the evolutionary subject and the improvabilitv of the 
evolutionary process transcending the blind stmggle for life. Finally, this view in its spirit would, I think, oppose the claim 
of the end of philosophy as well as politics. 
In this sense, this work could be taken as a manifesto that evolution should be taken more seriously 
than Darwinism. Evolution may be primordially ruled by something quite close to blind and wasteful 
natural selection, but evolution is the process with the inherent possibility or even tendency to-at least 
partly-transcend this blind wastefulness, enabling sustainability and the autonomy of higher 
aspirations. It is not only genes. organisms, populations, species and even ecosystems that are evolving, 
but also the very process of evolution itself 
e) Danvinism and Religion 
Despite its O\Vn religious sources, Darwinism, ever since Darwin, had a problematic relationship 
with religion. This work is not conunitted to a certain religion or even to religion as such, nonetheless 
my proposed view of life, I think, renders a moderately religious world view as being at least possible. 
I shall not consider the substantial differences between the world's religions. Although actually focusing 
on Christianity, I mainly aim to achieve a view of life which transcends the philosophy of a mere 
egoistic stmggle for life, as found in some radical accounts of Darwinism. StilL my vindication of 
freedom may well not only make room for metaphysics, but for faith as well. 
Darwinism is, I argue, neither philosophically nor religiously neutral. As mentioned earlier, Darwin 
himself was influenced by Paley's adaptationism and the partly deist belief of his time in the existence 
of universal and eternal laws of nature (:> pp. 168 f.). Nevertheless, Darwin, who had earlier ain1ed at 
becoming an Anglican priest, had difficulties-as becomes apparent from his notebooks-in coming to 
terms with the materialist and atheist (or at least agnostic) inclinations of his own Malthusian 
explanation of evolution(~ pp. 182 f). 
The theological reception of what has been called Dmwinism appears to me to be historically a quite 
complicated matter. The anecdote of the opposition of Bishop S. Wilberforce:l341 (the son of the 
abolitionist and philanthropist W Wilberforce) to Huxley·s support of Darwinism, is well known. On 
the other hand, some Victorian Darwinians, like the American biologist Asa Gray, tried to ham10nise 
what he called 'Darwinism' with religion. Here we face the problem of the historically varying definition 
of Darwinism. I think that most of the self-proclaimed Victorian 'Darwinians' are, at least from the 
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present vie\vpoint, 'pseudo-Darwinians' 29 I shall give reason for the view, that it is appropriate to 
regard random variation and natural elimination as the true core of Darwinism (also from Darwin's 
perspective, but particularly in hindsight). Moreover the emphasis on the universality and eternity of 
natural selection as w1changeable law of nature is, I argue, central to Darwinism. Darwin, after reading 
Malthus, scribbled in his notebook: "since the world began, the causes of population & depopulation 
have been probably as constant as any of the laws of nature with which we are acquainted. "30 By 
transfom1ing the Malthusian concept into his concept of natural selection, Darwin, I argue, involuntarily 
introduced something like the rather diabolic principle of a conservation of cruelty and wastefulness. 
"To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas I Beyond the power of man."31 Darwinism in this sense, 
does not, if taken as a world view, harmonise with the belief in a benevolent Creator. In this sense, I 
think, Darwinism could indeed be understood as a paradigmatic example of modern materialism, in the 
age-old struggle between a teleological and mechanistic Weltanschauung, which played a role m some 
of the most disastrous developments of our century 32 
Contrary to its rather critical stance towards religion, Darwinism, particularly gene-Darwinism, 
itself became almost a religion. Darwinism became worshipped as the "universal solvent"33 Darwinian 
processes have replaced God as universally explaining ubiquitous adaptation. Gould has pointed out 
that such 'explanations' are often post-hoc "just-so-stories". But Darwinism as world view does not 
only claim to explain everything, but appears also to have the inclination to justify, as worldly theodicv, 
not only the cruelty of nature, but of society as well. Is not the elimination of the weak and wounded, or, 
for example, at least unemployment a natural necessity? In any case the God of thorough gene-
Darwinism is at best a 'blind watchmaker' 34 He is worse than Des cartes' deceitful demon. If "there is 
only one Creator who made the tiger and the lamb, the cheetah and the gazelle, what is He playing at? ls 
he a sadist who enjoys spectator blood sports?"35 Particularly gene-Darwinism claims that even human 
love and sexuality can in principle be completely understood in gene-egoist terms. The evolutionary syn-
thesis has at least left the possibility of an authentic care for groups, and thereby, we may say, the 
Gnostic hope that in a bad or ignorant world, there are at least sparks of what we may regard as good 
With radical gene-Darwinism this understanding collapses into an in a way diabolic understanding of an 
essentially not improvable world of egoism and struggle. Although during some periods materialistic 
and atheistic correction may be needed, this radical view, in my opinion, at any rate overstates the case. 
29 Cf. P. Bowler, :> esp. footnote 387. 
3° Ch. Danvin. Notebook E ( ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. 3. 
31 Th. R. Ma1thus. An Essay on the Principle of Population ( 1798), p. 98 ( :> also footnote 690). 
32 R. Nachtwey. Der Irrweg des Darwinism us ( 1959), Kap. I, 6, 7, 8. A. Ch. v. Guttenberg. Biologie als Weltanschauung 
(1967), e.g. pp. 27, 35, 53. 
33 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995 ), p. 521. 
34 R. Dawkins. The Blind Watchmaker ( 1986 ). 
35 Jdem.Riverouto(Eden(l995),p.l09. 
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My proposal of the evolution of evolutionary processes does allow a more positive understanding of 
nature_ Favouring the autonomy of new evolutionary processes, one may in a Manichaean Gnostic way 
argue that at least spirit is ruled by God. But, I think, in principle the argument goes further, and is open 
to a 'Christian' interpretation of evolution, giving the whole of evolution a more positive understa.nding_ 
"It is the Lord of all Creation"_ If creation were understood as an eternally, equally wasteful and cruel 
process, this would be cynicaL But if the process of evolution itself is understood as an ongoing creat10 
continua, stressing a certain freedom of lower processes and the possibility (and perhaps tendency) to 
reduce wastefulness and cruelty, a Christian interpretation of our nature, ma:y become viable_ 
God understood along the lines of ecological idealism is taking part in the world and is unfolding the 
world and itself more in the way of process theology, of creatio continua than of deist theology. Whe-
ther the transcendence is in an Aristotelian way still completely coming from within and hence starting 
inunanently, or whether there is a Platonic background of etemally pre-established forms, which are 
only reached in time, is open to dispute. In any case God and the Good is always transcending the actual 
and humans could be understood as the main earthly agents of this process of God's self-expression_ 
I suppose it would also be consistent with a proper Christian understanding of the history of ideas, not to regard current 
gene-Darwinians as mere enemies (Uwugh actually Christianity has often treated those of different faiths badly), but as 
proponents of a view pointing beyond itself Even the Devil is nothing but a £.11len angel. 
Though indeed considering the religious possibilities of my proposed view of life, I of course do not 
intend to take a naive religious view, ignoring science. I, for example, differ widely with evangelical 
literalist creationism, which seems to take the Genesis as an observation protocoL Proponents of such a 
view appear to me to be sometimes not only scientifically antediluvian holdouts, but surprisingly their 
literal reading of the bible epistemologically in my view resembles the naive position of materialists who 
!i' simply believe in the 'given' material of science, the so-called facts or sense data. 
On the one hand, I, of course, do respect and even share the intuitive distaste of many educated 
people in accepting some aspects of the evolutionary theory, particularly of gene-Darwinism and the 
application of its unscrupulous egoist and materialist philosophy to ethics_ Hence, I regard literalism, 
partly, as an understandable, albeit wrong, overreaction against the, in my view also inadequate, 
Darwinian world view. I also share the belief that the Bible or more generally Christian religion and 
philosophy is pmt of the positive core of occidental culture (though, for example, its anthropocentrism 
might need a modification)_ Christianity and other religious communities (apart from lunatics or profit 
makers) may inspire us to gain a deeper understanding of our nature and our purpose_ 
On the other hand, I am convinced of the importance of high scientific standards_ As pointed out 
before, scientific research and metaphysical considerations (including perhaps also religious 
considerations) ought to be mutually inspiring, each contains the other, a11d each has its own scope for 
Introduction: Nature of Philosophy and Philosophy of Nature 36 
action. 36 Corresponding to my methodological position, I do not challenge the theory of evolution as 
such, as literalists have done, since it appears to me that overwhelming evidence proves its truth. This 
is, I am convinced, the case, albeit the taxonomic school of cladists has shed serious scientific doubt on 
the adequacy of our construction of evolutionary trees. Further, I accept moderate approaches in the 
animal rights movement (in this respect even the writings of P. Singer). Nevertheless, we should be 
aware that theories are complex scientific and also cultural constructions, and hence I regard it as 
legitimate to aim at modif)ring the current Darnrinian interpretation of evolution. 
The originally positive belief in one universal and eternal law of God, transforn1ed into the belief of a 
universal and eternal rule of blind-variation-and-external-elimination, provides us with a wrong 
metaphysical picture. As mentioned, this does not mean that I am critical of all aspects of Darwinism. 
But, I am convinced that particularly, if taken as a world view, competition has to be balanced by co-
operation, blindness by sight, wastefulness by sustainability. The acceptance of a sub-individual 
evolutionary leveL ought to be complemented by supra-individual levels and in some respect by a 
defence of the substantiality of the individual organism itself. Biological detern1inism ought to be 
balanced by the notion of autonomy, an acceptance of our biological nature by an acceptance of the 
importance of our cultural second nature and, finally, the eternity of the evolutionary mechanism has to 
be replaced by a philosophy of an evolution of the evolutionary process itself. I think only if such a 
balanced and perhaps more optimistic account became accepted, it would become possible to 
acknowledge the true aspects of Da1winism and even Dawkinsism, in the social sciences too. 
Although the Christian concept of nature has been for long under the sway of a misconceived 
Platonism, resulting in deism and finally in the Darwinian claim to the unchangeability of a blind and 
cruel universal law of nature, I think Christian thought and other religions are in principle open to the, 
one should think, preferable idea of the evolution of evolutionary processes and the tradition of process 
theology and Creatio continua. 
An Outlook. It would be hubris to hope that a PhD-dissertation like this could even serve as a 
prolegomena for the paradigm shift which I want to support in this work. But in many historiographic, 
biological and philosophical texts I found theoretical genns of a similar intention. Hence, I an1 
optimistic that a proper tractatus biologico-philosophicus with a full elaboration of ecological idealism 
will soon be written. 
3
" Cf: John Paul ll. Fides et Ratio ( 1998), § 17. 
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Part 1: Sociobiology and Its Ethical Implications 
"We do not have a science of nature, we have a science of our descriptions of nature. ,. 
W Heisenberg, 1960, p. 209 
Part I. Sociobiology and Its Ethical Implications 38 
The notion of sociobiology seems to refer in a fairly neutral manner to an existing subJect matter, 
like, for example, biochemistry. Such a subject matter apparently could be defined in two ways. Firstly, 
it could refer to the science (logos) concemed with group behaviour (socio) of living beings (bios). 
Secondly, it could refer to a sociology or aspect of sociology, which tries to contribute to an explanation 
of human social behaviour by analysing its biological or evolutionary basis. 37 From my point of view it 
would be preferable to use the tem1 'biosociology' to refer to the second meaning, to distinguish these 
two meanings. However, the actual usage of 'sociobiology' includes biosociology and sociobiology in 
the narrow sense 
Besides these neutral meanings the term 'sociobiology' is also often used to denote a school of 
thought, which at this point might be roughly signified by the selfish-gene point of view38 In this first 
part, in chapter I, a provisional biological characterisation of this paradigm is given and, in chapter 2, 
its ethical inclinations or implication are considered. The present part has an introductory character, 
where we (largely) start with sociobiology as it has normally been presented in the last decades, largely 
excluding philosophical discussions. Later, when we have gained a deeper historical and metaphysical 
understanding of different Darwinian paradigms, we will be able to more clearly contrast this paradigm 
against the discipline. 
In the second historical part of this work, the paradigm will be contrasted to other Darwinian paradigms (intemal 
history) and understood based on their intellectual background ( extemal history). Il1 the third part on the systematic philo-
sophy of universal Darwimsm, the essence of the sociobiological paradigm will be elaborated more clearly. In the fourth 
part the found principles, i. e. gene-atomism, germ-line reductionism and Darwinian process monism will be criticised39 
The distinction of a-largely indisputable-subject area on the one hand and a-disputable- para-
digm of sociobiology on the other hand entails that not necessarily all scientists who work in the subject 
area advocate the paradigm. In regard to the biosociological application of sociobiology especially its 
application to ethics, but also in regard to biological theories, the opinions of biologists indeed diverge 
almost as widely as the opinions of philosophers do 411 Moreover, even biologists who are nonnally 
treated as advocates of sociobiology as paradigm, sometimes stray from the path of virtue. R. Dawkins, 
for example, has called E. 0. Wilson, who is one of the fow1ding fathers of sociobiology, as the last 
advocate of 'the old benevolent regime' 41 Furthermore, some theories which nom1ally are regarded as 
37 Another generally possible rneaning of this tenn \vould be the sociological: cultural study of the intellectual background 
of biology. That such a usage appears almost absurd, in principle shows how unbalm1ced the present usage IS. 
:>pp. 202. 
38 Nevertheless the tenn 'sociobiologv' has sometimes been used even in an almost opposite holistic sense e. g. 
E . .Tm1tsch. Die Selbstorganisation des Universums (1979/88), pp. 193 f., I 02-104. 
39 :>pp. 140, 191,207,258,303,324. 
40 :>pp. 57 f., 145 f 
41 Wilson, although already incorporating a genes view of evolution into his synthesis, still also sustains the concept of 
group selection, :> footnote 43. Because of this, Dawkins excludes Wilson's tome from the new sociobiological 
paradigm altogether. The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), pp. 56, 193. Wilson in tum regards Dawkins approach as 
reductionistic. See Dawkins. In Defence ofSelfish Genes ( 1981 ), p. 573. 
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directly following from the selfish-gene viewpoint, such as the concept of an Evolutionarily Stable 
Strategy, could, in my opinion, also be interpreted in contradiction to this paradigm (~ p. 46). 
However, an introduction of the biological and ethical phenomenon of sociobiology will be given 
here, and I will only begin to distinguish between the discipline and the paradigm, which in 1ts pure 
version will later be defined as 'gene-Darwinism' (:;, pp. 140 f). 
Chapter 1: The Biological Theory of Sociobiology42 
The impressive tome S'ociobiology, The New S~vnthesis. published in 1975 by Edward 0. Wilson 
(* 1929), is often regarded as the first comprehensive manifesto of the sociobiology. In this work 
Wilson, an American entomologist who had earlier published important works on ants, incorporates 
concepts like kin selection and reciprocal altmism into a generalised account of animal and human 
group behaviour. 
In regard to his biological theory Wilson is in fact still much more guarded than others following in 
his wake. But because he coined the tenn 'sociobiology' and because it was he who, in a recognised 
textbook, started to put an emphasis on concepts, which are associated with the selfish-gene viewpoint 
of evolution, it is reasonable to regard him-maybe not as the first proponent-but as one of the main 
founding fathers of the sociobiological paradigm 
Wilson stands somewhere between the sociobiological paradigm, which I equate with 'Dawkinsism', the radical gene's 
viewpoint of evolution, and the synthetic theory, focusing on population biology. Wilson still argues in a more holistic way 
and still for example discusses the possibility of group selection 43 Nevertheless there are passages where Wilson sounds 
like a thorough gene-Darwinian. 44 In contrast to Wilson, Dawkins45 and many spokesmen of today's sociobiological 
paradigm46 have more clearly banished that level of selection from the realm of scientific respectability. 
Nevertheless, Wilson had already laid down the biosociological research programme m its most 
radical version, clain1ing that sociology should be reduced to biology. Because of his claims to 
'biologicize' culture and even ethics,47 and the change in the biological emphasis, which he at least eo-
42 Some aspects of the first part have been treated in ru1 older unpublished paper of mine. Nevertheless, millly aspects ru1d 
quotations, have been added. Soziobiologie und Utilitarismus ( 1993 ). 
43 E. 0. Wilson. Sociohiology (I 975), e. g. pp. 7, I 06-1 17, and :> footnote 4 I. 
44 !bid, e. g. p. 3. Wilson with regard to humans, in On Human Nature estimates group selection as unimportant ru1d 
regards selfislmess of single genes and individuals as the sole driving force of the present society, pp. I 55-156, 158-
159, 164. 
45 Dawkins contests the existence of genomes or populations (groups). The Selfish Gene ( 1976/89), :> footnote 57. 
Although The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89) is generally more guarded, pp. 38, 61, I 05-106, I 08-9, 116, he still keeps 
up this position, pp. 4, 114-115, 191 f.. His position in River out of Eden (1995) in this aspect of his theory is even less 
clear, but he still does not renounce his old claims, ~ footnote 566. 
46 See e. g. E. Voland, P Wink! er. Aspekte der Hominisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie ( 1990), pp. 9-54. 
47 E. 0. Wilson. Sociobiology ( 1975), p. 562, ~ footnote 71. . 
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provoked, tllis new current was on tl1e one hand soon singled out for criticism, 4R and on the otl1er hand 
· · £ 1 · I I 49 · I .1 l so s1 also gamed strong mfluence, even or examp e m psyc 10 ogy or m p u osop 1y . 
Richard Dawkins (* 1941 ), an Oxford biologist and widely-read writer of popular science, has not 
only popularised these theories, but he has been much more marked in his atomistic zeal. Whereas 
Wilson only adopted the selfish-gene viewpoint as one important additional possible explanation, 
Dawkins in The Se(ftsh Gene (1976) radicalised, simplified or purified this approach by advocating the 
selfish-gene view as ilie one and only type of biological explanation of evolution. Many biologists (and 
laypersons) have followed in Dawkins' footsteps. Although Dawkins did not publish substantial 
collections of empirical evidence, as Wilson or Darvvi.n did, he has contributed-one may provocatively 
say, as metaphysician-to the clarification and generalisation of some central biological notions. 
Dawkins is treated here as a main proponent of sociobiology as paradigm, because he radicalises and 
purifies central sociobiological concepts and completely focused on tl1e concept of the selfish gene. 
Nevertheless, Dawkins in two respects has left the core of the sociobiological paradigm or what I am going to call gene-
Darwinism. Firstly, he has expressed his creed of an independence of the cultural-memetic-sphere. :> 162 Secondly, in the 
Extended Phenotype he has conceded at least some limitations of his original approach 52 Despite this, Dawkins still 
generally insists on an approach almost exclusively based on the notion of the selfish gene.:> 45 
Dawkins' selfish-gene vie\v of evolution, normally combined with Wilson's reductive attitude to 
culture stated in Sociobiology, moulded sociobiology, so that this view is not only regarded as the 
sociobiological paradigm, but almost the only proper treatment of the sociobiological subject matter. 
There are of course many more important authors who played a role in the creation of the 'new 
synthesis' of sociobiology. Some of them will be mentioned in the course of this work. At this point only 
some selected books should be mentioned, written by biologists often for a larger audience: 
One influential early book, which tried to prove that group selection could play no significant role in evolution, was 
George C. Williams' Adaptation and Natural Selection. A Critique a_( Some ('urrent Evolutionary Thought (1966). 
Dawkins, here treated as the main spokesman of the sociobiological paradigm, has published some other popular books 
besides The Selfish Gene (1976), which no doubt was his most important manifesto. In the The Extended Phenotype (1982), 
a more academic book, he defends his positions only slightly more guarded and additionally works out the concept of the 
extended phenotype. b1 The Blind Watchmaker ( 1986), published a decade after The Selfish Gene, Dawkins even argued 
that Darwinism is not only actually, but in principle, the only possible theory of evolution. Darwinism has replaced the 
deist concept of a Godlike watclunaker. Otl1er books of Dawkins, also written in Dawkins gifted style of popular science, 
are The River Out of Eden ( 1995 ), Climbing Mount Improbable ( 1996) and Unweaving the Rainbow ( 1998 ). 
Wilson's main general contribution besides Sociobiology ( 1975) was Genes, Mind and Culture (1981 ), eo-published 
together with the physicist Charles J. Lumsden. There he advocated a more guarded position of eo-evolution of culture and 
genes. Wilson's most influential popular book was On Human Nature (1979), where he almost as radically as in sociobio-
logy favours a biological understanding of human society. Consilience ( 1998) is a rati1er literary and more guarded book. 
b1 Gennany W. Wickler' Die Biologie der Zelm Gebote (1975) and Das Prinzip Eigennutz (1981, with U. Seibt) had 
some impact. Wickler is the successor ofK. Lorenz as head of the lvfax-P/anck Institut for eti10logy in Seewiesen. 
48 :>e. g. pp. 54 f, 145 f. 
49 E. g. H. Plotkin. Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994). J H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, J Tooby. The 
Adapted Mind ( 1992, but :> footnote 857), :> pp. 218 f. 
50 E. g. D. Dermett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea ( 1995). 
51 :> interaction of the Darwinian sub-paradigms with other fields and Process Darwinism, pp. 160 ff, 202 ff. 
52 R. Dawkins. The Exrended Phenotype (1982/89), chapter 3, esp. p. 35. The concept of the 'Extended Phenotype' itself 
may not only be regarded as a radicalisation of this paradigm, but in some respects as transcending the replicator-
vehicle ideology, see esp Chapter 4, 12, 13. 
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Today there are a huge number of scientific and popular works in this field. Moreover, the issues raised by sociobio-
logy, partly treated in this work, have been a vivid area of discussion in the expanding field of philosophy of biology. ~ 120 
1.1 Two Basic Postulates 
Within the paradigm of sociobiology I think two partly implicit basic postulates or presuppositions 
have to be distinguished. I think one may call them basic postulates, since they are mostly starting 
points of argumentation and they are normally not challenged within the paradigm itself Nevertheless 
they are in my view not necessary strict fundamental principles. Firstly, as will be worked out later, the 
founders of this paradigm had some deeper reasons to adopt these postulates; secondly, it will be shown 
that these concepts are central, but not elementary, and, thirdly, we will also provide reasons to 
challenge these concepts. 
But as a first characterisation of this theory these postulates seem to be basic and important enough 
to provide a starting point for our further investigation. 
a) Postulate of 'Se{fish' Genes as the On(}' Units of Evolution 
The concept of the 'selfish gene' is, in my view, the most central concept of the sociobiological para-
digm and the later developed concept of 'gene-Darwinism' will be build around this notion. The reduc-
tive attitude towards culture. which we outline as second postulate in the next section, might in many 
cases be due to the general reductive stance within biology, largely expressed by the first postulate. 
G C Williams had launched an attack against any concept of group selection in 1966,53 tuming 
especially against the far going proposals of V. C Wynne-Edwards 54 Williams urged that the burden of 
proof would rest with group selection and that, in fact apparent group adaptations could better be 
construed in terms of individual adaptations. Group altruism, he holds, was completely reducible to the 
individual inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness, introduced earlier by W. D. Hamilton, extends the original 
notion of fitness and includes positive effects on relatives as welL Though Williams argues 
enthusiastically for explanatory individualism, one may assume from this that the concept of inclusive 
fitness had already left an individualist biology behind, pointing in the direction of a more radical, sub-
individualistic, gene-based evolutionary biology. A selfish-gene viewpoint seems to have been implicitly 
present to some extent in the texts of Hamilton 55 and R. L Trivers in particular (~ p. 44 f), but only 
Dawkins coined and popularised the metaphorical phrase in his book The Se(fish Gene. 56 
53 G. C. Wilhams. Adaptation and Natural Selection ( 1966). 
54 V. C. Wy1me-Edwards argued that populations appear to regulate their sizes sometimes to levels well below the 
momentaneous environment's carrying capacity. Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour ( 1962 ). 
55 But Hamilton has not been an exclusive gene-Darvlinian~ since he, in certain cases, still acknowledged group selection. 
CL E. Sober, D. S. Wilson; Onto Others (1998), p. 42, :> footnote I 00 L 
56 R Dawkins. The Se[fish Gene (1976/89). According to Dawkins the general founding of U1is view could be attributed to 
W. D. Hamilton. But Dawkins argues that it has been he himself who had drawn the final conclusions of this approach 
and had abandoned even the notion of inclusive fitness still related to the ontological level of the individuaL Replicator 
Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), pp. 61-62. 
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The selfish gene postulate is that only single genes, not whole genomes57, organisms or species, are 
the entities which are selected. 58 Single genes, which in this approach are the only persisting replicators, 
build up phenotypes Sometimes the notion of a phenot)1Je is-I think consequently-extended to 
include an organism's behaviour and its products, like a bower-bird's bower or a human's house 59 
Phenotypes or extended phenotypes are regarded as mere means of the survival of single genes: they are 
ephemeral 'survival machines' 60 Accordingly we are regarded to be 'survival machines', or puppets of 
our genes, which have only the one 'goal': the replication of our genes. 
It should be noted that the notion 'gene' is defined not simply as a nucleotide or sequence of 
nucleotides. Dawkins uses the word gene to mean ''a genetic unit that is small enough to last for a large 
number of generations and to be distributed around in the form of many copies"61 . A gene is defmed by 
its immortality or lastingness, and not by its physical properties 62 
Dawkins, like Williams, has dismissed concepts like group selection and group altruism. According 
to Dawkins, "'altruistic groups· will be over-run by selfish individuals"63 Altruistic groups were not 
evolutionarily stable and hence would not evolve. Like "Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in 
some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain 
qualities m our genes I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected m a successful gene is 
ruthless selfishness. Tllis gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfislmess in individual behaviour.''64 
The postulate of selfish genes will later be discussed in a refined version. under the headlines of gene-atomism, genn 
line reductionism and Darwinian process monism. :> 3q 
b) Postulate of Genetic Determinism 
Based on the first postulate, the sociobiological paradigm comes to the conclusion (or starts with the 
premiss) that organisms, and also human beings, are to a great extent determined by their genes. 
The atonlistic aspect of the selfish gene view of evolution definitely has reinforced the tendency in 
science (and even more in the tabloid press) to use tetms like 'gene for homosexuality' in a simplifying 
way. Dawkins conceded that talk about genes which is indispensable to him may lead to simplifying 
misinterpretations Moreover, he distanced himself from that type of genetic deternlinism which denies 
the ontogenetic variability and flexibility of gene-expressions 65 
57 R. Dawkins. The Se((ish Gene (1976/89), pp. 24 f.; G. C Williams. Adaptation and Nawra/ Selection ( 1966), 
e. g. p. 57. 
58 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), pp. 7, 33, 39, 40, 55. 
59 Idem. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89). 
60 Idem. The Se((ish Gene ( 1976/89), pp. 48 ff. 
61 !bid, p. 32. 
62 I will argue that the notion of a gene already involves the-non-materialistic-notion of fonn or infom1ation 
( ~ p 250 f. ) and I will show that some other aspects of such a definition are problematic ( :> p. 259). 
63 R Dawkins. The Se!fish Gene ( 1976/89), p. 8. 
64 Ibid. p. 2. 
65 R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), pp. 9-29. See also reply of M. Midgley. Se(fish Genes and Social 
Darwinism (1983), pp 366-367. 
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Nevertheless, it has been argued, that even if the variability and flexibility of the phenotype and 
behaviour of organisms is taken into account, most sociobiologists still stress that humans and other 
animals are determined by genes in their general conditions as well as in their special inclinations 66 I 
think such a charge is largely justified, due to the fact that the concept that organisms are mere vehicles 
of their genes is central to the sociobiological paradigm. Culture is also often regarded as part of our 
extended phenotype and hence understandable as only serving the survival of each individual's selfish 
genes. (Despite such extreme claims, some sociobiologists have argued with less hubris 67) 
However, in its strong version the sociobiological paradigm is the '·uncompronusing application of 
evolutionary theory to all aspects of human existence"68 Culture is largely either seen as an 
epiphenomenon, or as being reducible to biology and hence also based on natural selection and the 
survival of the fittest. Some, for example, have argued that consciousness is a 'real but evolutionarily 
irrelevant property of a system'69 . Others, like Wilson, advocated that basis of our emotions, which "are 
consulted by philosophers who wish to intuit the standards of good and evil", are the hypothalamus and 
limbic system, also formed by natural selection 70 
Hence, Wilson urged that "the time has come for ethics to be removed temporarily from the hands of 
the philosophers and biologicized "71 According to such a position, "the humanities and social sciences 
shrink to specialised branches of biology; history, biography, and fiction are the research protocols of 
human ethology; and anthropology and sociology together constitute the sociobiology of a single 
. . --70 pnmate species. · -
Tllis war cry of downward reductionism, seems to me to be especially linked with what I will later call gem1-line 
reductiotlism. But also gene-atomism and Darwinian mono-Mechanicism contribute to this reductionist stance. 30 
In chapter 2 we will take a closer look at the ethical consequences of the sociobiological paradigm. 
1.2 Theories of the Evolution of Apparent Altruism - Sociobiological Theorems? 
We will now introduce two explanations, which based on the postulates of the sociobiological 
paradigm, should explain phenotypic 'altruism' in tenus of egoism at the genotypic level of the single 
'selfish' genes. 
The metaphorical notions of U1e 'selfishness' (Dawkins) or 'morality' of the gene (Wilson) in the present context do 
of course not imply any conscious intention of genes. Selfislmess and morality are defined in a 'behaviouristic' sense in 
regard to evolutionary outcomes 73 
66 E. g. S. l Gould. Ever since Darwin (1991/1973), pp. 253 f. 
67 Although Dawkins belongs to the most radical gene-detenninists in the sense of denying the causal relevance of the 
phenotypic vehicles, his concept of memes may indeed not necessarily imply gene-detenninism (U10ugh I think that for 
an alternative interpretation another framework would be preferable).:> pp. 60 f, footnote 165. 
68 E. 0. Wilson. On Human Nature ( 1995/1978), p. x. 
69 I-I Mohr. Freiheit und die bio/ogische Natur des Menschen ( 1984), p. 48 (my transL ). Mohr in fact regrets Ulis result. 
70 E. 0 Wilson. Sociobiology (1975), p. 3. 
il !bid, p. 562. 
72 !bid, p. 547. 
73 R Dawkins. In Defence ofSe((lsh Genes (1981), pp. 557-558. 
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M. Midgley has objected that "Genes cmmot be seltish or unselfish, anv more than atoms can be jealous, elephants 
abstract or biscuits teleological."74 I agree that the notion of selfishness in a psychological contexi is conunonly used in an 
conscious intentionalist and not in a consequentialist sense. Nevertheless 1 am not sure if this forbids a metaphorical 
application of these notions within biology and hence 1 will not rest my own criticism on a linguistic criticism of this sort75 
According to this paradigm the behaviour of a phenotypic 'survival machine', if seemingly altruistic, 
could be explained based on genetic detenninism and genetic egoism. This behaviour would not, for 
example, be explained as a property of a larger group or gene pooL as has been done by the 
evolutionary synthesis (:> pp. 126 f). Genes are regarded to be the only appropriate units of 
explanation. In the following sections I want to introduce the theories which are often advocated 
together with the selfish-genes approach to explain apparently altmistic behaviour: the theory of kin-
selection and the theory of reciprocal 'altruism'. 
Advocates of the selfish-gene view of evolution have to treat these theories as something like 
theorems. In rough analogy to mathematical usage, theorems are propositions which deductively follow 
from basic mathematical axioms or postulates. From the postulates of 'selfish genes as the only existing 
entities' and 'natural selection as the only existing evolutionary process' (:> p. 1 07) the following 
theorems should follow and should be reducible to them(:> following pages and pp. 140 f., 213 f.). 
Although it would indeed be beautiful if these theories were deducible and reducible theorems, I 
doubt that this is the case. In my opinion even these theories are not theorems but may constitute a 
partly autonomous level of explanation, based, for example, on additional starting conditions. 
In the following sections I will briefly mention some arguments supporting the view, that the theories may have a partly 
autonomous character and are not reducible theorems. Generally, it may seem surprising that I want to disentangle theories, 
which build almost the core of a paradigm, from the very basic postulates of that paradigm. In my view such a procedure 
could be legitimate. It has also been applied by Darwinism itself. Darwinism came to incorporate Mendelian genetics as a 
central plank of its theoretical corpus, although this theory was built as bulwark against Darwinism in the first place. One 
may turn the force of a theory against a world-view from which it has derived. We may in principle use theories which 
seemed to support the sociobiological paradigm to criticise this paradigm itse!C6 
However this may be, in the following I mainly introduce the theories as if they were theorems 
exclusively based on the basic postulates of the sociobiological paradigm. 
a) The Theory of Kin Selection 
The wording 'kin selection' was coined by the influential English biologist J. Maynard Smith 77, but 
some of the relevant concepts had been developed earlier by W. D. Hamilton. The basic idea of the 
theory of kin selection is, from a gene-Darwinian view-point, that it has an equal survival value for a 
gene to 'support' an identical other gene as to 'support' itself. 
74 M. Midgley. Gene-juggling ( 1979), p. 439, Se(fish Genes and Social Darwinism (1983), pp. 368-372. ( ~ footnote 124.) 
75 On the difference of psychological (or: vemacular) and evolutionary altruism and the problems of the metaphor of 
altruism in evolutionary biology, see: D. S. Wilson. Definitions of Altruism and Selfishness. ( 1998/1992). E. Sober. 
lf!hat Is Evolutionmy Altmism? (1998/1988), pp. 460--462. 
76 ~also pp. 250 f., 388. 
77 l Maynard Smith. Group selection and kin selection (1964), pp. 1145-1147. 
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By ' supporting the other organism, the infonnation a gene has, does not survive in the gene itself, but 
in the different identical copy (:> p. 250) . This ' altruism ' is evolutionarily stable, because the gene 
which has been helped to survive will still carry the infom1ation to ' help ' its identical copy. 
For diploid organisms, like humans, there is generally a probability of 50% for genes that parents 
pass them on to their direct descendants . Genes of grandparents and grandchildren have only a 
probability of 25% to be shared with the person in question . This probability is expressed by kin-
coefficient r (Figure 1) . 
F igure 1: The kin-coefficient r plays a central role in the theory of kin selection , r is a 
measure of the relatedness of two organi sms. From the ·gene ' s viewpoint ' it reflects 
the likelihood of a gene being present in another organism. The tigure is valid for 
diploid organisms (like human beings). The thickness of the arrows indicates the 
probability for a gene of the focused organism (' I') to be transferred in a symbolised 
process of replication also of specific relatives. (See: R. Alexander. Darwinism and 
Human Affairs, 1979) 
Behaviour which IS 
phenotypically ' altruistic ' 
could, according to tllis 
theory, only spread witllin 
a population if the fol-
lowing inequality, named 
after the biologist William 
D. Hamilton78 , is fu lfilled : 
For an ' altruistic ' 
organism (1) the costs (c) 
have to be lower than the 
benefit (b) for the or-
gamsm which receives 
help (2) , multiplied by the 
probability for the genetic 
relatedness of the two 
organisms (r) .79 
Dawkins, as advocate 
of a radical selfish-gene 
view of evolution , 
consistently proposed to 
give up the term 'kin selection', pointing to tl1e reducibility of kin selection to gene selection. "If we 
accept neo-Darwinia.n gene-selection.ism, kin selection necessarily follows ."80 
78 W. D. Hamilton . The genetical evolution of social behaviour ( 1964 ), pp. 1-16, 17-32. 
79 See e. g. E. Voland, P. Wi.nkler. Aspekte der Hominisation aus Sicht der Soziobiologie ( 1990). 
80 R. Dawki..t1s. Replica tor Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), pp. 67, 62;. :> footnotes 556, 826 . 
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Opposed to Dawkins, E. 0. Wilson still propounded the theorv of kin selection under the heading of group selection. 
Wilson has obJected that group selection is not always reducible to gene-selection, whereas group selectwn 1s anathema to 
Dawkinsian Darwinism. ;,43 (I do not know whether Wilson has explicitly defended the irreducibility of kin selection.) 
But as is largely ignored by gene-Darwinians also Hamilton himself in his later publications rather tended to a 
multilcvel interpretation of his concept of inclusive fitness. 81 
b) The Theory of Reciprocal 'Altruism' 
The second sociobiological theory which explains apparent 'altruistic' behaviour is based on the 
principle of reciprocity. Robert L. Trivers coined the tem1 'reciprocal altruism,s2 Behaviour which is 
phenotypically 'altruistic' can only be developed, ifthe altruist also profits by it. An 'altruistic' indivi-
dual or gene will only survive, if it finally supports other individuals or genes in order to support itself. 
Hamilton and Axelrod have shown that, under ce1tain conditions, reciprocal 'altruism' may evolve 
and will not easily be invaded by organisms or genes with 'cheating' strategies. Reciprocal altruism is 
hence an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)-a concept generally introduced by Maynard Smith83 
In my opinion, it could be doubted whether the concepts of ESSs and, specifically, of reciprocal 
altruism can smoothly be integrated into a radical selfish-gene view, as adherents of this view propose. 
Even if taken for granted that ESSs work on single genes, in my view, one need not to advocate an ontology which 
denies the reality of all higher entities above these single genes. In my opinion the concept of an ESS is better regarded as 
supporting the approach of emerging evolutionary mechanisms, opposed to what I will call gene-Darwinism. 
The evolution of an ESS, for instance of reciprocal altruism, needs certain additional, non-reducible, preconditions be-
yond the existence of selfish genes. Besides, for example, the ability to 'recognise' co-operators, a minimum proportion of 
genes favouring the strategy of reciprocal altruism have to be in place. These starting conditions will firstly often be 
achieved only by mechanisms on the population level, like the founder effect ( ~ pp. 132 f.); secondly an ESS could itself 
be interpreted as a mechanism working on the level of the population as a whole. The !requency dependency of an ESS im-
plies that an individual strategy depends on what the majority of the population is doing. But if a population detem1ines the 
individual gene-not vice versa-than it would be inappropriate to claim that evolution is only the result of single genes 
and not at least partly the result of properties of whole gene pools as well. Provided suitable stmting conditions, genes in a 
population following a certain ESS will acquire different properties, e. g. will be less selfish than genes in a different 
population. In my view this is clearly at odds with the radical selfish-gene view of evolution. ( :> also pp. 241 f., 258 f) 
My view is in accordance with J. L. Mackie, who also interpreted the concept of an ESS as an irreducible mechanism 
in its OW11 right84 This position is in my opinion justified, although the radical gene-Darwinist Dawkins, has welcomed 
Maynard Smitl1' theory. Also Maynard Smith himself, according to autobiographic notes, has increasingly tended to a 
reductionist approach. Nevertheless, he is still relatively open for a more holistic approach and, I speculate, if not pressed 
to decide between reductionism and holism, Maynard Smith would prefer a middle course85 At least his tlleOI)', as we have 
seen, can be interpreted in this way. Surprisingly even Dawkins, as he dealt with more pressing quarrels, once did not 
clearly oppose the interpretation of an ESS as group selection86 However, I agree with Mackie that such an interpretation 
would undennine Dawkins' strictly gene-Darwinian approach. 
In any case, at least from the viewpoint of a paradigm based solely on selfish genes, all forms of co-
operative or 'altruistic' behaviour are only derived from the 'selfishness' on the level of single genes. 
81 W. D. Hamilton. Innate social aptitudes in man ( 1975). ~ footnote I 00 I. 
82 R. L. Trivers. The evolution o..f reciprocal altruism (1971 ), pp. 35-57. 
83 W. D. Han1ilton, R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation (1981 ). J. Maynard Smitl1. Evolution and the The01y of 
Games ( 1982). See e. g. tl1e concise overview of A. Rosenberg. Altruism ( 199211 998), pp. 453-458. 
84 J. L. Mackie. Law o..f the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles o..f Evolution ( 1978), pp. 460-463. 
85 See: J. Maynard Smitl1. Shaping Life (1998), pp. 42-45. 
86 R Dawkins. In Defence of Selfish Genes (1981 ), pp. 563-564. 
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Chapter 2: Ethical Implications?- The Morality of the Gene? 
Many-albeit not all-sociobiologists have explicitly drawn, or have been inclined to draw, ethical 
conclusions from their often detenninistic and atomistic views on human nature. Wilson in his book 
Sociobiology claimed that ethics ought to become 'biologicized,s7 'The Morality of the Gene', the title 
of the first chapter of that book, became the credo of a whole bio-ethical research programme. Many 
following in Wilson's wake advocated an even less 'benevolent' and more pronounced gene-Darwinian 
b. I 88 10 ogy. 
In tllis chapter the subsequent topics will briefly be treated. First, I will try to outline central ethical 
conclusions which seem to follow if we accepted the premiss of the sociobiological paradigm as an ex-
haustive biological basis for ethics. We will confine ourselves to the basic assumptions of this para-
digm. In this case I think that the resulting 'ethics' must be formulated in biological terms, that is, they 
must focus on genetic or individual competition and must advocate only one value-that of survival. 
Secondly, it will be shown that the claim that sociobiology could serve as a sufficient basis for all 
our ethical considerations has in fact been treated in a highly controversial way. Both in biology and in 
philosophy the biological assumptions and the way ethical conclusions are dra-wn have been challenged 
It appears to me that many apparent proponents of a sociobiological ethics still actually use concepts 
from quite different traditions, partly contradicting pure gene-Darwinism. 
Thirdly, based on some of these proposals, I develop an e>..1:ended version of the sociobiological 
approach to moral behaviour, which is still similar in spirit, though it is a trial to overcome some of the 
most pressing problems of an ethics solely based on gene-Darwinism Here Dawkins' notion of memes 
is taken seriously. Moreover, I apply the stmcture of the concepts of kin-selection and reciprocal 
'altmism' to this meme concept. However, despite these strong modifications, the 'ethical implications' 
of this strongly modified theory will still fall short of traditional standards of ethics. 
Fourthly, Moore's concept of a 'naturalistic fallacy' will be considered Moore objects logically to 
the assumption of any evolutionary etllics that somehow normative conclusions could be drawn from 
descriptive propositions. Even if Moore was right, the problem remains that gene-Darwinism as 
universal ontology would still leave almost no room for an alternative foundation of etl1ics. 
Concludingly, reasons will be given for embarking on our historical and systematic journey in search 
of alternative biological and metaphysical concepts as the basis for a different ontology and ethics. 
R? E. 0 Wilson. Sociobiology (1975), p. 562, ~footnote 71. On Wilson's sociobiological approach towards ethics see 
also On Human Nature (1978/95); M. Ruse, E. 0. Wilson. Moral Philosophy as applied Science ( 1986). 
88 On Wilson's position compared with radical gene-Darwinians ~ footnotes 41, 43-46. On gene-Darwinism ~pp. 191 f. 
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2.1 The Moral of §odobiology? -'The Currency Used in the Casino of 
Evolution is Survival' 
will now, as a thought experiment, outline what a morality based purely on the sociobiological 
paradigm may look like. Given that the biological premises of this paradigm were a true and exhaustive 
account of the relevant parts of evolutionary biology, what 'ethical' conclusions would have to be 
drawn? It is of course difficult to answer this question, because the approaches of the supporters of a 
sociobiological ethics differ widely (:d p. 57). 
Bayertz, for example, distinguishes approaches in how far they regard themselves as an exclusive 
basis for ethics. In accordance with him I will argue that the strong version, which is based solely on the 
sociobiological paradigm, is not capable of fommlating a satisfying ethics. In any case, concerning the 
strong version I will mostly use the tem1 'morality', to refer to the description of values and behaviour, 
instead of 'ethics', denoting the prescriptive nonnative discipline, because it is obviously questionable 
whether a descriptive science, and especially gene-Darwinism, could itself provide prescriptive 
standards (on the problem of the natural fallacy, :>pp. 65 f.) 89 The weak version, which only claims to 
explain the evolutionary roots of morality, but which does accept a certain freedom as basis of our 
moral decisions, is much less interesting, though I would not call it trivial 90 
In any case I think the main problem of the weak version is a different one. The weak version, and 
particularly its claim of an only biologically infom1ed, but still autonomous ethics, could not be 
warranted on purely gene-Darwinian grounds. The concept of autonomy is even in contradiction with a 
strict interpretation of gene-Darwinism91 An extension of the biological or metaphysical basis of gene-
Darwinism (something which we will aim at in this work) would be needed to render a 'gene-ethics' 
with a certain autonomy possible(:> p. 49). 
I here try to confine myself to the central features of the sociobiological paradigm and hence sketch 
an as pure and as strong version of a corresponding morality as possible. 
Radical proponents of the sociobiological paradigm regard morals essentially as a mere biological 
adaptation in human evolution and hence as a topic which has to be treated by biology. The sociobiolo-
gical paradigm, or gene-Darwinism, provides us with a specific framework of how morals could be 
interpreted. Such an interpretation \vould in any case-whether supposedly normative or not-, if 
accepted, influence our morals; even if gene-Darwinism would claim that there is no morality at all, that 
truly unselfish altruism or an honest appeal to other higher moral principles, like justice or equality, is 
89 Alternatively one may use the tem1s 'ethics' and 'meta-ethics'. 
9° K. Bayertz. Evolution rmd Ethik. GrojJe rmd Grenzen eines phi/os. Forsclnmgsprogramnrs (1993), pp. 24-33. P. Kitcher 
has distinguished-and criticised-four ways to biologicize ethics. Vier Art en, die Ethik zu biologisieren (1993 ). 
91 Similarly e. g.: K. Bayertz. Autonomic rmd Biologic ( 1993), pp. 334, 336, 337, 347. On naturalist theories of evolution 
in general: H. Krings. Sokrates uberlebt. Zum Verhdltnis van Evolution rmd Geschichte ( 1984 ), p. 174. 
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neither evolutionarily viable nor evolutionarily justifiable. As in the case ofNietzsche, a non-ethics may, 
of course, influence our actual moral attitudes. 
An orthodox believer of gene-Darwinism, purged of all other components, would in my opinion act 
as a prudent ultra-egoist. He would indeed cooperate as long there is a profit. But he or she would of 
course whenever possible avoid to help the weak and wounded. The gene-Da~winian would not even try 
to be a 'fair egoist', as, for example, envisioned by Adam Smith. A radical gene-Darwinian would 
betray, exploit and kill, whenever a profit is expected and no punishment or retaliation is to be feared. 
Morals, like many other features of our social life, \vould mainly be regarded as means of some genes 
manipulating organisms build by competing genes 92 In principle there would be no justice at all, only 
different strategies of reproduction. Who wants to blan1e the cuckoo in the nest, who wants to blan1e the 
rapist following his specific strategy of reproduction? Blunt gene-Darwinism indeed has to be taken 
seriously! If this approach is taken to its conclusions it would free the rapist from his bad conscience 
-the only remaining emotional problem would be his fear of being caught. Subjectively we would be 
able to condemn the rapist, but in principle, if the austere metaphysical starting point of gene-
Darwinism is not extended, the rapist would be as right as those who would condemn him. The judge of 
course may see this differently, but this would not be a question of justice, but one of power. The rapist 
would differ from the judge only in the regard that the rapist is not powerful enough to enforce his own 
reproductive strategy. Accordingly, morality and justice would not only be tmderstood to be somehow 
influenced by power structures-as they definitely are-, but would themselves simply be power 
structures, \\~thout leaving the possibility of claiming that these structures are not just. On the 
battleground of reproduction, justice would be regarded to be completely reducible to the will to power. 
Definitely most sociobiologists, and even many radical gene-Darwinians, have proposed 
sociobiological ethics with higher ethical intentions. Some have argued that we have to take the selfish 
essence of humans into account, to solve the most pressing global demographic, ecological and social 
problems 93 I do indeed agree that an ethics is needed, which also acknowledges our 'lower' all too 
human inclinations. I would even concede that on first sight I find the radical nature of this approach 
highly stimulating and positively provocative. But taken to its conclusions, it appears to me to be 
utterly wrong and even dangerous to deny all higher values, like justice, truth, happiness and cultural 
refinement, leaving nothing but the selfish genes' bleak tactics in the unrestrainable stmggle for life. 
This situation refers us back to the mentioned problem of the weak version of 'gene-ethics'. In my 
view it is not the problem to acknowledge a certain egoistic tendency (of genes or of individual humans), 
if some room is left for higher aspirations. But it is indeed a problem of gene-Darwinism, that it is com-
92 E. Voland. Moral durch Manipulation? Ein evolutiondres Szenario (1996), pp. 1119-1122. See: R. Dawkins. The Ex-
tended Phenotype (1982/89), chap. 5.; R Dawkins, J R Krebs. Animal signals: inj01mation or manipulation? ( 1978). 
93 E. g.: Th. Molu·. Zwischen genetischer Statik und Dynamik der Lehensbedingungen (1996), p. 1115. Even M. Ruse and 
E. 0. Wilson in Moral Philosophy as Applied Science (1986), p. 192, were interested in improving tile possibility for 
human long-tenn survival, though Darwinism itself in principle is only concemed with blind momentary survival. 
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pletely gene-reductive and by definition unstratified. Unless this paradigm is not extended, it will have 
the tendency of disavowing any state of justice on a higher leveL There is, for example, no built -in con-
cept of the equality of genes in the struggle for life. Why should there be one? An order to structure this 
struggle would necessitate a principle on a meta-Jevel (e g. an a prioric principle or a social contract of 
genes), a level which in my view is radically denied by the very essence of pure gene-Darwinism. 
Without discussing these complex matters in detail, I at this point only want to distinguish three 
pivotal aspects of a strict application of the sociobiological paradigm to morals. 
Firstly, the sociobiological paradigm claims to 'biologicize' ethics. :l?l, 145 Either a biological basis 
for ethics should be provided, or-according to the strong gene-Darwinian version, on which we 
concentrate-ethics should even be formulated in biological tem1s (~ pp. 42 f). According to the 
strong version, culture is understood as a part of the biological process. Correspondingly ethics would 
be understood as a specialised branch of biology of a single primate species. :l 72 Despite its complexity 
and plasticity the biological phenomenon of culture is, according to the specific evolutionary theory 
employed, simply an adaptation evolved by natural selection. 
Although I also consider it to be honourable to strive to bridge the old gap between the two cultures, 
this is done here exclusively in a 'bottom up way'. Ethics gets 'biologicized' from below. What was 
traditionally the 'higher' realm of freedom is simply explained by the 'lower' processes of biology. 
Such morality would not be based on freedom in the traditional sense, since the human subject and 
the T would be regarded as a product of genes and environment or even as a 'vehicle' of genes 94 And a 
vehicle is not free, it is an object instead of a subject95 
E. 0. Wilson argues that our emotions, upon which we base our moral thought, are formed in the 
limbic system and the hypothalamus. These brain structures "evolved by natural selection", hence our 
morals evolved by natural selection96. :l 151 
Even if culture is understood as not being directly controlled by the genes, any renunciation of an 
advantage in reproduction, by emancipation from "the biological imperative to maximise the genetic 
fitness", will be inlmediately punished and eliminated by natural selection of the seemingly 'free' 
behaviour would again directly be put under a more specific control of the genes 97 Wilson: "Can the 
cultural evolution of higher ethical values gain a direction and momentum of its own and completely 
94 See: G. Vollmer. Moglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutiondren Ethik ( 1993), pp. 125-126. 
95 E. g.: K. Bayenz. Auronomie wzd Biologie (1993), p. 346. M. Weingarten. Organism en, Objekte oder Subjekte? ( 1993). 
96 E. 0 Wilson. Sociobiology (1975), p. 3, On Human Nature ( 1978), p. 6. 
P. Kitcher in Vier Arten, die Ethik zu 'biologisieren' (1993), pp. 225, 228 f, has pointed out, that this argument 
-against the intentions of Wilson-would also absurdly render mathematics, biology and other sciences to be 
reducible to natural selection. Kitcher also challenged the assumption that ethics could completely be understood in 
terms of emotional reaction. I will not engage in detail in this specifically ethical discussion, but I will criticise the 
biological paradigm itself; :> part IV. 
97 E. Voland, P Winkler. Aspekte der Hominisation aus Sicht der Soziohio/ogie (1990), p. 19, quoting H. Mark!, Natur 
und Geschichte (1983, my trm1sL ). The tenn 'biological imperative' has also been used e. g. by E. 0. Wilson, On 
Human Nature ( 1995/1978), p. 166. 
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replace genetic evolution? I think not The genes hold culture on a leash. [ .. .]"Culture is the "circuitous 
technique by which human genetic material has been and will be kept intact. Morality has no other 
demonstrable ultimate function."98 
Proponents of this approach hence promote a 'Darwinian history', or better 'Dawkinsian-Wilsonian 
history'. To them for example wealth concentration "must once have been (or must still be) the means to 
a reproductive end. No other currency counts in natural selection. "99 
As pure gene-Darwinism biologically denies the existence of any higher strata above selfish genes, it 
as interdisciplinary approach denies the autonomy of culture. 
This differs from a weaker approach which only advocates the existence of biological inclinations, not constraining, but 
creating or enabling culture. 100 As mentioned, I think-despite my sympathy for such a view-tlmt such a freedom of 
culture could not be warranted solely on gene-Darwinian grounds. 
Secondly, the sociobiological paradigm focuses on competition. It is a mam tenet of the 
sociobiological paradigm that all altruistic phenomena have to be explained by 'egoism' on the level of 
the genes(~ pp. 4L 140, 258 f). 
Nature is red in tooth and claw more than ever before; even proponents agree that a special 
unsentimental dog eat dog language came to dominate the new paradigm. 101 "Fundamentally, all that we 
have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators, jostling, jockeying, fighting for a 
future in the genetic hereafter. " 102 Consistently it has been argued that "so long as DNA is passed on, it 
does not matter who or what gets hurt in the process. It is better for the genes of Darwin's ichneumon 
wasp that the caterpillar should be alive, and therefore fresh, when it is eaten, no matter what the cost in 
suffering. Genes don't care about suffering, because they don't care about anything." Generally the 
"Universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no 
purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. [ ... ] DNA neither cares nor knows. 
DNA just is "103 And one had to complete the manifesto of biological nihilism with: 'DNA just is all 
there is.' - The rest are vehicles or extended phenotypes, which are in any case only means to promote 
the ruthless selfish interests of single genes. 
In a purely gene-Darwinian approach, morality is to be understood as manipulation of phenotypes by 
some genes to the disadvantage of others.= 92 Following the message of this paradigm one may rape, 
betray and kill without any feeling of guilt-one only should not get caught(:> above). I think the main 
result for morals would be that saints (and anyone pursuing something beyond gene-egoism) would be 
considered to be either fools, lunatics or sanctin1onious hypocrites. An excellent excuse for not pursuing 
higher aims! The remaining morality would be non-moral. Leaving the problem of the naturalistic 
98 E. 0. Wilson. On Human Nature (199511978), p. 167. 
99 M. Ridley. The Red Queen ( 199511993), p. 242. 
100 E. g. L. Cosmides, J. Tooby. The Psychological Foundations ofCulture (1992), p. 39, ~also footnote 857. 
101 R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 56. 
102 Idem. The Se(fish Gene ( 1989), p. 256. 
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fallacy aside, the most direct moral result would either be a condemnation of morals or the veneration of 
competition, without the least constraint. 
Although, I think, such a tendency would actually follow, the view would not strictly logically be implied. Because even 
these nastv conclusions are based on tl1e traditional assumption that morality should serve the conunon good. But why in a 
gene-Da~·inian metaphysics should not one gene morally exploit other genes? If everything is 'allowed' even morality 
would be allowed-and by defmition always interpreted as an exploitation. 
I have conceded that some sociobiologists intended to make the egoistic tendencies explicit to 
transcend them at least in a limited way (~ above). Nevertheless, I think, it is inconsistent for pure 
gene-Darwinians to argue suddenly on the level of the whole or in terms oflong term development, since 
the central claim is that it is an etemal biological (and thus social) law that there neither is (or can be) a 
larger whole nor a care for evolution in the long term. 
Another more conclusive objection to my radical conclusions is that, if we grant that kin-selection 
and reciprocal altruism are parts of pure gene-Darwinism-an assumption which could be 
questioned 104 -then at least the support of the closest relatives and of cooperating partners-as long as 
a future utility is expected-is in evolutionary terms 'reasonable' and may actually be fostered by this 
ontological view. 105 
However, the focus of this paradigm and hence of a resulting morality is on the struggle for life, gene 
against gene, and, as an approximation, individual against individual. 106 
Thirdly, according to the sociobiological paradigm there is only one 'currency'-survival 
(~ also firstly above). Dawkins states: "The currency used in the casino of evolution is survival, strictly 
gene survival, but for many purposes individual survival is a reasonable approximation. "107 
Correspondingly Dawkins argued that all utility functions of all living bodies reduce to one. "Darwinian 
theory tells us that all survival is just a means to the end of gene propagation". "God's utility function" 
is maximising DNA survival. 108 
Organisms and human individuals are regarded as mere vehicles, serving normally nothing else than 
the survival of those genes which constructed them. I think the focus on (gene-)survival may be the most 
important aspect of this approach if applied to ethics: E. 0. Wilson concedes it as an unpleasant 
unavoidable result that "no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives created 
by its genetic history."109 Hence it is the 'biological imperative to maximise the genetic fitness':> 97 or to 
maximise the probability of surviving in future generations in as many copies as possible. It could be 
103 ldem.RiveroutofEden(l995),pp. 131,133. 
104 :>pp. 43 f., esp. p. 46. 
105 llm . G. Vo er stresses these posit1vc aspects. Moglichkeiten und Cirenzen einer evolutionaren Ethik ( 1993), p. 127. 
106 R. Dawkins. The Se((ish Gene (1976/89), p 2. 
107 !bid, p. 55. 
108 R. Dawkins. River Out of Eden (1995), pp. 104-106, 124 
109 E. 0. Wilson. On Human Nature ( 1978/95), p. 2. 
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doubted whether this view, if it dominated common 'morals', would lead to a sustainable population 
development. (Imagine what the rich would do, if they adopted this moral.) 
However, gene-Darwinism appears to know only one commandment, one moral principle. This com-
mandment-like Christian natural law-is equally descriptive and normative; it claims to be an empiri-
cally found description of what we are essentially aiming at. Though essentialistic, the content of this 
commandment of course utterly differs from traditional approaches: "Thou shalt survive in the struggle 
for life." More precisely: "Thou shalt strive to maximise the replication of thy genes with all thy means 
and thou shalt not ever have any scruples towards thy neighbours in achieving this purpose." 
The principle of survival or gene replication would replace traditional religious and philosophical 
principles and values, like love, piety, goodness, benevolence, eudaimonia, happiness, courage, justice, 
duty, respect, beauty and truthfulness. Hence this concept of morals or ethics generally contradicts most 
philosophical schools of ethics from Platonism, Aristotelianism, Kantianism 110 to hedonism and 
utilitarianism. In particular it is in stark contrast to any fonn of ethics based on freedom or on rational 
consideration of what is good. Any intentionalism also seems utterly opposed to this approach. But a 
consequentialist act-utilitarian ethics which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers of 
people is clearly at odds with a gene-Darwinian ethics. Why care for happiness? Why care for others? 
Also, the refinement of culture or living conditions would have no intrinsic value A gene-Darwinian 
'survival ethics' appears at least in some regards to be consistent with Hobbes' moral philosophy built 
only on self-love (though Hobbes also adopted a theory of social contracts) or with Nietzsche focusing 
on the "value for life' and struggling against Christian 'slave morality'. 
It should be noted that a gene-Darwinian survival ethics is not concerned with the survival of groups, 
the survival of the whole species, or the survival of the idea of goodness. The only 'normative' purpose 
of evolution there is, is the unchangeable tendency to survive, especially of those genes acting as 
maximally selfish as possible. It is doubtful whether on such a basis only a general survival ethics could 
be built. "In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get 
hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. 
[ ... ] DNA neither cares nor knows. DNA just is. And we dance to its music." 111 
Though aspects of our daily Lebenswelt might have already supported the development of this 
paradigm (~ pp. 191 f.), it is apparent that an ethics or a moral focusing on biology, competition and 
survival would in turn completely change our Lebenswelt. Although many questions will be left open, it 
seems obvious how such an approach would effect our treatment of the weak and wounded, who might 
not have much to offer in an ethics which is at best based on reciprocity. Even if promoters of an 
'ethics', which is purely based on the sociobiological paradigm, might surpass my imagination in their 
110 In the light ofKant's mvn writings, a biologistic interpretation of his a priori appears to be inappropriate. 
111 R. Dawkins. River out of Eden (1995), p. 133. 
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ability to develop a more complex and satisfying moral system, how would such an 'ethics', focusing 
only on biology, competition and survival, if popularised affect our lives? 
2.2 Different Philosophical Attitudes Towards Sociobiology 
There is a broad range of different views evaluating the claim of a 'sociobiologization' of ethics. 
Here I do not review the long controversial history of evolutionary ethics (e. g. H. Spencer, J. Huxley or P. T. de 
Chardin); I rather confine myself to proposals made in the present context of the rise of the gene-Darwinian paradigm (on 
its historical background :;:) part II). 
Disputes have arisen as well in regard to the biological premisses of the sociobiological paradigm as 
in regard to the way ethical conclusions are drawn from this biological approach. 112 Here I shall mainly 
be concerned with the former more basic dispute, that is whether the strict sociobiological paradigm is 
regarded to be the only possible biological theory on which an ethics nught be based. Later I shall dis-
cuss the problem that gene-Darwinian ethics has often been accused of committing a naturalistic fallacy 
when deriving ethical nonns from biological 'facts' (~ pp. 65 f.) First, I shall sketch how some 
philosophers have criticised tlus approach. Secondly, I shall outline the positions of some other 
philosophers who apparently support sociobiological ethics, to point out that even they are not pure 
gene-Darwinians, but had to extend this paradigm, if they wanted to justify their often relatively 
moderate ethical conclusions. 
a) Philosophical Criticism of the Sociobiological Paradigm 
Within the mainstream of philosophy, sociobiology as a whole and particularly what I called 
'sociobiological paradigm' (gene-Darwinism) is still often simply ignored. This may be interpreted as 
the strongest possible criticism. Indeed many philosophers regard the claim that ethics is a branch of 
evolutionary biology as too absurd to merit a considerable response. 113 
Nevertheless, since a 'naturalistic tum' took place in analytic philosophy (~ p. 196) it has become 
more acceptable to import models from biology also in the context of traditional epistemological or 
logical questions. Besides the rise of an explicit evolutionary epistemology, it generally became 
acceptable, for exan1ple, to mention, without further qualification, that complex human capacities 
simply evolved by 'natural selection' 114, neglecting any structural argumentation, any closer scrutiny of 
the evolutionary process, any culture-gene-interaction (for example via sexual selection) etc. I 
Moreover the flourishing field of philosophy of biology was established, partly owing to the 
increasing influence of gene-Darwinism. Philosophically this discipline has mainly grown out of analytic 
philosophy and is now discussing biological questions in depth, though usually still in isolation from 
112 See e. g. the anthologies: K. Bayertz ( ed. ). Evolution und Ethik (1993 ). W. Ltitterfelds ( ed. ). Evolutiondre Ethik 
zwischen Naturalismus und Jdealismus (1993). A L Cap1an ( ed. ). The Sociobiology Debate ( 1978). 
113 P. Singer mentions tllis as tl1e dominant attitude: The Expanding Circle ( 1981 ), p. XI. 
114 E. g.: W. v. Quine. Epistemology Naturalised ( 1968/1969), p. 90. On Popper's Negative Methodology ( 1974), p. 219. 
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other branches of philosophy. Some philosophers have embraced the sociobiological paradigm, others, 
partly in meticulous work have shown difficulties of this paradigm. However, ignoring sociobiology has 
become difficult, as even critics conceded, because philosophers "cannot really complain if somebody 
tries to fill the vacuum they leave"115 
While some ignored the sociobiological paradigm, others met it with a broad range of explicit 
criticism. This spectrum ranges from approaches with a totally different metaphysical background to the 
discussion of single biological topics. Here only a first introduction to some objections made by 
philosophers can be given. 
One group has insisted on a neo-Aristotelian, or even neo-Thomistic approach, within philosophy 
and biology. In Germany especially the philosophers Robert Spaemann and Reinhard Low have 
fonnulated a harsh criticism of the sociobiological paradigm and of Darwinism in general, arguing 
radically in favour of a rehabilitation of a teleological view of nature. 116 Philosophers not directly 
interested in evolutionary theory, have also proposed a rehabilitation of the Aristotelian causa forma/is, 
for example to solve the mind-body problem, understood as a built-in problem of a Cartesian 
d d. f 117 un erstan mg o matter. 
Some philosophers have also stressed that a theory of evolution which is to lead to acceptable ethical 
results must incorporate the concept of freedom from the outset. 118 Some steps in a formulation of such 
a theory were made by Hans Jonas 119 Also, for example, Anthony O'Hear argued against the gene-
Darwinian claim that evolutionary ethics, evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary aesthetics could 
give an exhaustive account of the true, the good and the beautiful. The rational human being could to a 
certain extent transcend its biological roots 120 Although O'Hear regards an exclusively sociobiological 
approach to human nature as inconsistent with his position, he focuses on defending traditional values in 
the cultural sphere, instead of challenging in detail the contradicting biological theory itself. 121 
(Beginning fom1 the other end, but I think with the same goal, I will confine myself mainly to the 
discussion of the biological basis.) For example Nagel also argued that an application of evolutionary 
theory in the field of culture is not acceptable. 122 
Critics often turned against the (neo-)Darwinian passive understanding of evolution. They criticised 
the fact that organisms were understood as mere vehicles and also opposed the emphasis on an 
115 M. Midgley. Beast and Man (197811995), p. xi. 
116 A PhD-thesis of R. Isak gives an excellent overview of their theories conceming evolution: Evolutionismus und Tele-
ologie: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem teleologischen Denken Robert Spaemanns und Reinhard Lows[. . .] (1990 
11991 ). Republished as: Evolution ohne Ziel? ( 1992 ), pp. 53-186. 
117 E. g.: M. McGi1m. Real Things and the Mind Body Problem ( 1999, unpubl. ). 
118 P. Koslowski, Ph. Kreuzer, R. Low ( ed. ). Evolution und Freiheit ( 1984 ). 
119 H. Jonas. Evolution und Freiheit ( 1984 ). Organismus und Freiheit. Ansatze zu einer philosophischen Biologie 
(197311994), e. g. pp. 17 f. 
120 A. O'Hear. Beyond Evolution. Human Nature and the Limits of Evolutionary Explanation ( 1997). Also: Has the Theory 
of Evolution any Relevance to Philosophy? ( 1987). 
121 A. O'Hear. Beyond Evolution (1997), p. 141. 
122 T Nagel. The View from Nowhere (1986 ), pp. 78-82. 
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adaptation to an extemally given environment. Instead they tried to reinterpret organisms rather as 
subjects than as objects of evolution. A merely reactive understanding of phenotypes ignored the 
creative, fonn-giving and spontaneous activity of these evolutionary agents. Recently, for example, the 
German philosopher Weingarten wrote a book on this topic. 123 Within the influential Anglo-American 
philosophy of biology, for example, David Hull criticised the gene-Dan¥inian vehicle view of organisms 
(despite, I think, taking adaptationism and some other metaphysical tenets of gene-Darwinism on board, 
:>pp. 217 f) The general philosophical criticism of the passive understanding of organisms has been 
influenced by the work of many historians of science and some biologists, like Gould, Lewontin and 
Goodwin(:> pp. 145 f.). 
Many critics did not advocate the need for a general change in the predominantly Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, but only tried to excoriate the sociobiological paradigm. Mary Midgley, for 
example, has on the one hand always emphasized the evolutionary nature of man, on the other hand she 
has trenchantly resisted the claim to biologise ethics along egoistic gene-Darwinian lines and in several 
publications vividly opposed the 'gene-atomism' (:>pp. 106 f.) of today's sociobiology. 124 In Beast and 
Man (1978) she based her own account on the work of the Nobellaureates K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, 
who have rather favoured an approach focusing on populations, regarding truly altruistic behaviour as a 
usual inner specific trait. Midgley has considered this approach to be consistent with her emphasis on 
the irreducibility and plurality ofmotives. 125 
Within the philosophy of biology detailed analyses of specific biological problems, especially of the 
sociobiological paradigm, have been made. 126 The unit of selection became the most discussed and 
controversial topic, considering whether genes, organisms, gene-pools, groups, species or ecosystems 
might be the relevant entities of evolution. Hull and Ghiselin, for example, have early advocated that 
species and not only genes may also be regarded as evolutionary 'individuals'.=> 843 The philosopher 
Elliott Sober (often allied with the biologist David Sloan Wilson) has also opposed Dawkins' thesis that 
the gene is the one and only unit of selection and altematively advocated the possibility of certain group 
selectionist models and the possibility of a true altruism on a biological basis. 127 In philosophy of 
123 M. Weingarten. Organismen-Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution ( 1993). 
12
'
1 M. Midgley. Beast and Man (1995/78), pp. xvi-xxii (revised edition), 89-103, 128-134. In a discussion in the Joumal 
of Philosophy Midgley in Gene-juggling (1979) fonnulated one of the most acrimonious critiques of R. Dawkins' 
Se(fish Gene ( 1976). She reacted to an article of J. L. Mackie's, Law of the Jungle (1978), which she understood to be 
Dawkinsian (though this could be seen differently, :> p. 46). R. Dawkins keenly struck back in his article In Defence of 
Se!fish Genes ( 1981 ), which in tum was answered by Midgley in the more guarded but still critical article Se(fish Genes 
and Social Darwinism ( 1983). Midgley's recent book with the ambiguous title The Ethical I'n·mate ( 1995/94) is rather 
concemed with more general topics; but in regard of sociobiology she still maintains her objections, pp. 71-91. 
125 M. Midgley. Beast and Man (1995/78); on her biological position: pp. xv (revised edition), 19, 23, 138 (also: The 
Ethical Primate (1995/94), pp. 130-132); on her understanding of motives: pp. 16, 105-115, 134, 142, 152, 168. 
126 See e. g. the anthologies: D. L. Hull, M. Ruse ( ed.). The Philosophy of Biology ( 1998); C. All en, M. Bekoff, G. Lauder 
( ed. ). Nature's Ptuposes. Analyses of Function and Design in Biology (1998); D. S. Bendall ( ed.). Evolution from 
Molecules to Men (1983); U. J. Jensen, R. Ham!, ( ed. ). The Philosophy of Evolution ( 1981 ); M. Ruse ( ed. ). What the 
Philosophy ~(Biology is (1989); A L. Caplan (ed. ), The Sociohiology Debate ( 1978). See also: E. Lloyd. The Structure 
and Confimzation of Evolutionary Theory (1988/1994 ). 
t
27 E. g.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. Unto Others (1998), E. Sober. What is Evolutionmy Altmism ( 199811988). 
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biology also many other aspects were scrutinised, whether they are present in or absent from the 
sociobiological paradigm. Some keywords have been: adaptation, altruism, development, function and 
progress. A crucial objection to Darwinism has always been that some central propositions have been 
seen as formulated in a circular way 128 
Since there is a rising flood of literature in all specialised areas of philosophy of biology, it would 
not be possible for me, treating as well the history as the philosophy of this topic, to consider all 
relevant sources in each field on my own. Nevertheless, I shall come back to some of these topics during 
the further work in much more detail. In this section only some objections are being mentioned to show 
that gene-Darwinism is not above criticism. 
Also in biology there is a range of positions, which have challenged the strict interpretation of the sociobiological 
paradigm and inspired and encouraged the philosophical proposals. Some biologists of the evolutionary synthesis, like E. 
Mayr, have opposed the Selfish Gene's point of view, and have advocated that species and whole populations are tl1e un.it of 
macro-evolution. 129 
Especially S. J. Gould and R. Lewontin argued in favour of macroevolution and against pan-adaptationism. 130 Their cri-
tique of 'ultra-Darwinism' became almost a critique of Darwinism in general. Gould and Eldredge in their palaeontological 
theory of punctuated equilibrium emphasised an independence of macroevolution and a rather saltatory view of evo· 
lution. 131 Gould, like also Lewontin, turned against the idea of genetic detern1ination, favouring an idea of potentiality. 132 
B. Goodwin and his research group even favour a totally different approach of 'rational morphology'. 133 This approach 
openly resembles a rather romantic or transcendental fran1ework in biology(:> pp. 96 f.). 
Later on a more detailed description of alternative biological approaches will be given(:> pp 145 f.). 
Though some philosophical (and biological) criticism might indeed have been formulated in an ill-
considered way, it seems to be mistaken to dismiss all basic criticism from the outset as a reaction of 
those "over-excited by political misunderstanding"134 
b) Support of Sociobiology as a General Framework of Ontology and Ethics 
There is also a spectrum of supporters of a sociobiological paradigm, consistently advocating its 
relevance for ethics. I have given a radical account of a gene-Darwinian ethics above, inspired mainly 
from writings of some biological proponents of the sociobiological paradigm. 
But philosophers too have tried to face the scientific 'facts' and to build up an ontology and an ethics 
out of these elements. I will here mention only three influential examples. 135 
Daniel Dennett in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995) takes a radical Darwinian and Dawkinsia.11 
stm1ce. In some passages of this book he also wams us that Darwin's idea might be dangerous and that 
some authors may overemphasise a biological detenninism, where a cultural explanation would be more 
128 :>literature in footnote 1069. 
129 E. Mayr. E. g.: Animal Species and Evolution ( 1963 ), p. 621. One long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 145. 
130 S. J. Gould: R. C. Lewontin. The Spandrels of San M a reo and the Panglossian Paradigm ( 1979). 
131 S. J. Gould, N. El dredge. Punctuated Equilibria ( 1977). 
132 E. g.: S. J. Gould. Ever since Darwin (1991/1973 ), pp. 251 f. 
133 13. Goodwin, G. Webster, J. Wayne-Smith. The 'evolutionmy paradigm' and constructional biology ( 1992). 
G. Webster, B. Goodwin. Fomz and Transformation (1996). 
134 R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 61. 
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adequate. 136 Nonetheless, Dennett in many respects favours a biological explanation and an approach to 
culture which in regard of the employed processes is likewise Darwinian itself 137 At least in this sense 
he radically draws the conclusion that to him there is "no denying, at this point, that Darwin's idea is a 
universal solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of everything in sight." 138 
Peter Singer in his book The Expanding Circle. Ethics and 5iociobiology (1981) initially almost 
totally accepts the ontological background of the sociobiological paradigrn 139 But then Singer argued 
(reminiscent of Moore's argumentation) that there is an unbridgeability of facts and values. To him, 
ethical decisions still have to be based on reason and are only informed by sociobiology. 140 
Although I finally do agree with Singer in his belief of a certain independence of reason, I think, as 
indicated earlier, that this conviction could not be warranted solely on the basis of the sociobiological 
paradigm. If the reductionism of the sociobiological paradigm were taken seriously, how would one 
defend the claim of a true autonomy of reason? 
Singer gives the example of the autonomous decision of foster parents to bring up children from a poor economic and 
social background (pp. l 70 r ). 
I agree that a photo of these children may indeed mobilise our tribal instincts to help them. Even following the socio-
biological paradigm it would be possible that we have such impulses. According to this paradigm such emotional 
inclinations to help people we are acquainted with, could evolve only in groups of very close relatives. Still, at first it may 
seem possible to build a more universally orientated ethics on such basic tendencies of behaviour. 
But foster parents who have become gene-Darwinians, would, I think, abandon their old benevolent views. 
Understanding themselves now as 'gene machines' they would come to the conclusion that their fom1er impulse to help 
poor children one is acquainted with today does not lead to the maximal reproduction of their own genes. So why should 
they now still trust the1r 'misled feelings· or such 'non-adaptive side-effects'? In my opinion, they-thinking of cuckoos in 
the nest-would not U1e least be motivated to continue their involvement as foster parents. 
Hence, I think Singer implicitly combines sociobiological premisses with premisses from other tradi-
tions, advocating freedom of rationality. According to gene-Darwinian metaphysics genes build the only 
relevant strata. This sociobiological paradigm would interpret rationality as another part of the orga-
nismic vehicle, serving nothing else than the replication of selfish genes. In such a framework I consider 
it as impossible to suddenly claim an independence of reason. No 'logic of justice' moulds rationality, 
but only the selfish interests of genes. Despite some affinity with Singer's compromise ben:veen the 
sociobiological paradigm and freedom of rationality, on gene-Darwinian grounds I do not think that his 
position could be warranted. 
In my opinion the possibility of emergent and independent properties needs to be already built into the core of our 
ontology (:>part IV). 
135 I do not discuss Richards' benevolent evolutionary ethics, since it is not gene-Darwinian. R. J. Richards. Evolutionary 
Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987). Critically see also: M. Ruse. Evolutionmy Ethics ( 1995), pp. 273-280. 
136 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), pp 485-493. 
137 In his iimer-biological attitude he is clearly a gene-Darwinian, nevertheless he should rather be seen as an advocate of 
what I will later discuss as 'Process Darwinism' (~ pp. 214 f.). 
138 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), p. 521. 
139 I have to concede that Singer briefly mentions the possibility of group selection Expanding Circle ( 1981 ), pp. 18-22. 
140 P. Singer. The Expanding Circle ( 1981 ), pp. 77, 90 f.; Singer's 'inner logic of ethical thinking' here might even remind 
us of the idealist concept of an inner logic of the unfolding of reason. 
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Michael Ruse has influentially argued that Darwinism, and especially the sociobiological paradigm, 
has to be taken seriously. 141 Although Ruse in principle would also allow different levels of 
understanding above genes and although he even admits that the 'overall perspective of sociobiologists' 
has hidden metaphysical or ideologically commitments towards methodological reductionism, he finally 
takes a stance in favour of an exclusive focus on genic selection. Instead of criticising gene-selection as 
one-sided, he argues that it has turned out to be a highly fruitful scientific strategy. 142 Upon discussing 
cases of objective episternic scientific standards which had ruled out a cultural bias Ruse mentions-
one-sidedly-group selectionist models. 143 Ruse even regards himself as an 'ultra-Darwinian', who 
takes "adaptation to be the all-pervasive fact" and "natural selection to be the beginning and the end of 
causation". 144 
Though Ruse appears to be one of the most thorough advocates also of an application of the 
sociobiological paradigms to ethics, I think, he recently tried-at least half-heartedly-to moderate 
some of the radical conclusions I have indicated above(~ pp. 48 f.). 
Ruse radically advocates that "ethics is an adaptation, put in place by our genes as selected in the struggle for life, to 
aid each and every one of us individually". 145 There is neither ideal mathematical moral truth nor "extrasomatic moral 
truth". Instead "moral premises [ ... ] are the result of an idiosyncratic genetic history". In this sense ethics, according to 
Ruse "is without justification", but a "collective illusion of our genes". 146 Nevertheless, Ruse argues that "biology shows 
that internal moral premises do exist", they are feelings about 'right' and 'wrong' "in fact brought about by ultimatelv 
biological processes. " 147 
In some paragraphs Ruse appears to argue that on this basis a universal moral might be build, which forbids killing and 
even commands to love your neighbour as yourself. 148 Such a strong ethical claim could, I think, not at all be warranted, if 
Ruse truly would base morals solely on the sociobiological paradigm, exclusively centred around egoistic survival. A 
thorough gene-Darwinian would have to argue that a truly benevolent attitude towards groups does not any more serve ones 
gene's survival-as we do not only live in groups of close relatives. Hence, nothing would speak against dropping a 
benevolent attitude (apart from hypocrisy). Even Ruse, in a slightly different context, states that it will weaken our morality 
if we find out that the genes have only deceived us into thinking that there is an objective morality. 149 
Ruse may have felt this inconsistency and in Evolutionary Ethics (1995) it seems to me that he has implicitly slightly 
modified his biological starting point. TI10ugh still an adaptationist, he almost seems in some passages to have become a 
constructivist (still with Darwinian leanings), stressing not the adaptation of evolutionary lines to an external environment, 
but an inner dynamics of the communities themselves. 150 Though I support such a view, I think that this is in contradiction 
to gene-Darwinism and even to the core of what came to be known today as Darwinism in general ( :::> pp. I 07, 348 f.). 
Ruse, historically versed, has himself often described the essence of Darwinism, also in the case of human evolution, to be 
'natural selection'. 151 
Hence it seems that Ruse may implicitly partly have adopted an extended biological basis too. 
141 M. Ruse. Taking Darwin Seriously (1986). 
142 M. Ruse. Sociobiology and Reductionism ( 1989), pp. 59-60, 64-65, 78-79. Also: A{vstery of A1ysten·es. Is Evolution a 
Social Construction (1999), pp. 128-129. 
143 M. Ruse. Myste1y of Mvsteries. Is Evolution a Social Construction (1999), esp. Chap. 12, esp. p. 249. Though Ruse 
keeps almost silent on external motivation ofDawkins, he conceded that not only Gould's and Lewontin's position and 
style, but also Wilson's may be culturally based. Chap. 7-9, esp. p. 191. See also Heing Mean to Steve (2000). 
144 M. Ruse. David Hull through two decades ( 1989), p. 9, see also p. 11. 
145 M. Ruse. Evolutionary Ethics (1995), p. 257; also: M. Ruse; E. 0. Wilson. Moral Philosophy as Applied Science 
(1986), p. 173. 
146 !bid, (1986), p. 173, also pp. 186, 187; (1995), pp. 257, 268, also p. 291. 
147 !bid, (1986), pp. 174, 179. 
148 !bid, (1995), pp. 257,287,264. Rather relativistic statements: pp. 271,290-291. 
149 !bid, (1986), p. 179; (1995), p. 257. 
150 !bid, (1995), pp. 290-291. 
151 !bid, (1986), pp. 174, 175, 176, 187. 
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In conclusion, even apparent proponents of a sociobiological ethics appear to use concepts which are 
in contradiction with strict gene-Darwinism (:>also pp. 140, 213) 
In the next section I shall try to develop an approach which already clearly transcends gene-
Darwinism, though still following a similar line of argument. It should render the ethically slightly more 
moderate conceptions of some apparent proponents of gene-Darwinism, like Dennett, understandable. 
Moreover, I shall try to extend the extended version as far as possible, to find out how a more satisfying 
account of ethics might be achieved. 
2.3 M erne 'Altruisms'? -A Further Extension of the Sociobiological Paradigm 
a) Memes -A Limited Comeback of the Idea of Logos 
In this section the concept of memes will be introduced and I shall additionally propose two memetic 
mechanisms. Finally I will access the ethical implications of this now truly extended approach. 
As has been seen, conventional sociobiology tries to reduce apparent biological forms of 'altruism' 
to the concept of genetic 'egoism', dismissing for example group altmism. Conceding that we regard kin 
selection(~ p. 44) and reciprocal 'altruism' (~ p. 46) as theorems of gene-Darwinism-which I have 
questioned-, at least these two forms of egoistic apparent 'altmism' are theoretically viable. 
Dawkins in The Selfish Gene has briefly introduced another basic concept, that of so called 
memes
152 Memes-analogous to genes-are replicators on the cultural level, "the smallest elements 
that replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity." They are bits of knowledge, of human 
practices or, I think, could be objectified in an object. They jump from brain to brain or can be photo-
copied. Memes are defined as standing in competition and as evolving solely by natural selection. 153 
Although the concept of a meme ('the meme of a meme') seems not to be very common m 
sociobiology. it has become a prolific replicator in the texts of philosophers, like D. Hull 154, or 
D. Dennett155 , and psychologists, like H. Plotkin. 156 
Although its history is often completely ignored, the aspects of the concept meme, (seemingly) 
stressing an independence of a higher level of infom1ation, are very old. The meme of a meme has a 
much longer history than its new name. Its history reaches back at least two and a half thousand years 
to the concept of nous (partly also to the concept of logos), presumably best translated with spirit, also 
in an individualistic sense with mind. Note the same etymology of mind and meme. Gennanic muni 
meant spirit (I always liked that my own forename "Momme " should derive from this venerable word) 
and is related to Greek mimneskein, French meme and English mind, memory and meme. Nous often 
152 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene ( 1976/89), chapter I!, pp. 189-20 I, The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), pp. !I 0-2. 
153 D. Deru1ett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea ( 1995), pp. 344-345. 
154 E. g.: D. Hull. The Metaphysics of Evolution (1989), p. 7. 
155 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea ( 1995), pp. 341-370. 
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referred to the largely independent inherent process of culture, to the history of ideas (eidos in its 
nominalist or realist sense). 
In Plato's Theatetus and Svmposium thoughts are understood to be the children of the soul and philosophy has much to 
do with the difficulties of pregnancy. In Christian philosophy spirit (!at.: spiritus) has been linked to theism, spirit proper 
(spiritus rectus) was individually and supra-individually directed towards God, as in Greek philosophy nous and logos 
were not only opposed to nature (physis), but were often conceived as a process of teleological rational unfolding. Though 
nous also was understood in the sense of static Platonic ideas, which could be grasped by individuals, also neo-Platonic in-
fluences (as in the reception of Aristotle) seem to have contributed to more dynamic and collective interpretation. 
To the Hegelians-here resembling neo-Platonists-philosophy as a whole is centred around the notion of spirit 
(Geist). Geist to Hegel is processual, already in nature but mainly in history. Hegel distinguishes between the subjective 
spirit, focusing on individual reflective processes, the objective spirit, focusing on the supra-individual historical reflective 
processes, and finallv the absolute spirit, reflecting freely on the highest values and the process of reflection itself. 
At the turn of the 20th century Dilthey tried to re-establish the concept of a cultural objective spirit (objektiver Geist). 
Ideas can be objectified for example also in architecture. In the following cultural philosophical movement the label 
objectiver Geist was shortened to Geist again, but was still concerned not witl1 individual psychology but intellectual and 
cultural history. Correspondingly, becoming a true person was understood as adopting culture, as the cultivation of mind. 
Despite the rise of biologism at the time of the Nazis, the notions of Geisteswissenschafien and Naturwissenschaften in 
German still refer to the academic disciplines either concerned with nature or with spirit (culture). 
However, one need not to be Hegelian to argue that there is a history of ideas~ the history of ideas, though young as 
academic discipline, has in any case since long been an accepted part of philosophy and history. 
Though Dawkins' concept of a meme resembles the old concept of no us or spirit in claiming a 
process of cultural transmission of i111111aterial infonnation1 57, it strongly differs in other respects. 
Firstly, the original notion of nous is narrowed down by the notion of memes, abandoning its 
rational, normative and teleological connota.tions. However, this is often done by modem authors. 
Secondly, memes are often conceived in an atomistic way as totally separate, stable and independent 
entities. (Moreover they are often understood as genotypes distinguishable from their phenotypes.) 
Thirdly, memes are 'selfish' memes, only 'aiming at' their self-reproduction and developing 
mechanistically in a strictly Darwinian way by blind variation and external selection, resulting in 
differential survival and hence in a tree of conceptual decent. 158 
Most aspects, especially those mentioned in the second and third point, have been criticised. 159 For 
example, it might be difficult, as a truly Darwinian theory, to replace all phenomena of intellectual 
synthesis by processes of selection. 
However, provided such a memetic extension of sociobiology would be able to claim the inde-
pendence of the cultural level, it would-though still partly Darwinian and Dawkinsian-clearly 
transcend, and I think improve, the biologistic gene-Darwinian research progra111111e. In my terminology 
it would not be gene-Darwinism any more but the simplest type of Universal Process Darwinism. 160 The 
concept of memes seems to reintroduce an independence of culture, on which the sociobiological 
156 H. Plotkin. Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (1994), pp. 215-27, esp. p. 218. 
157 Note how closely tile term infomzation resemblances the Greek tenn eidos, forn1; :>also pp. 250 f., 307 f. 
158 
:> I later provide a metaphysical justification of such a view, which I later will refuted again, pp. 207 f. 
159 E. g.: D. Holdcroft, H. Lewis. Memes. Minds and Evolution (2000). 
160 
:> the sections on the historical parallels of Darwinism with other subject areas (pp. 160 f.), on Universal Process 
Darwinism (pp. 214 f.) and on the critique of process reductionism (pp. 324 f.). 
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paradigm actually had declared war. A ontological dualism would be revived in new terms: in a sense 
Descartes enters through the back door. 
But I think it would be consequent to even go one step further. I want to add two types of apparent 
'altruism' of individual humans based on memetic 'egoism'. Although I have not found this proposal 
elsewhere, it is so obvious, that I imagine that it will presumably have been introduced by someone else 
before me. 161 
Although memetic kin selection and memetic reciprocal 'altruism' almost follow from the viewpoint 
of 'selfish memes', I would stress, as I have done for the biological stratum, that it needs further con-
ditions to effect these additional processes (starting conditions, recognition of kinship or similarity etc.) 
Types of 'Altruism' Based on Memetic 'Egoism' 
ll1eme- 'Altruism' based 
Relatedness or Similarity 
Reciprocal Meme- 'Altruism' 
on Corresponding to kin selection on the biological level, memes might 
'egoistically' support their relatives in the same brain or in different 
brains, if they were identical (or similar enough). One might 
formulate a mathematical inequality analogous to Hamilton· s 
(~ p. 45), where memes would replace genes. 
One might even go one step further. In principle one may think of 
Meme-Similarity Altruism, where also similarity replaces related-
ness. But one should note that this would transcend the Danvinian 
stress on the only branching line of descent without synthesis. 
In either case, information would support a copy of itself outside of 
itself. I think some phenomena indeed seem to be explainable with 
this proposal. In academia, for example, the support of adherents of 
the same school. 
Corresponding to genetic reciprocal altruism, this theory would 
predict reciprocal 'egoistic' support of memes. Analogous to the 
biological problem this could only evolve in a meme pool where 
reciprocal altruism of some sort becomes an evolutionarily stable 
strategy and is not overrun by concepts, which do not reciprocate 
the support. 
Comparatively to gene-Darwinism the memetic reintroduction of the concept of nous and its 
refinement above appears to me to be a positive development. Many intellectual phenomena may 
already be explainable in this theory with its beautifully simple structure. However. in the next section it 
will become apparent that the ethical results and premisses of even this extended version have to be 
considered critically. 
When later I will criticise this conception in detail in order to transcend it, I do not mean that I oppose these concepts 
completely. I can well imagine that ti1ey tum out to be fruitful. I even tend to integrate them-with modifications-into my 
own ontological proposal. But I will show that it is utterly \Vrong to take atomistic Darwinism, whether genetic or memetic 
to be a complete metaphysics, directing fueoretical and practical reason. Instead my approach will neither be atomistic nor 
holistic and will also be built around the metaphor not of an unclumging etemal Darwinian law of nature, but of the 
evolution of semi-autonomous evolutionary processes. 
161 See M. v. Sydow. Evolutionismus und Utilitarismus (I 993), pp. 25-26. I also supported 'group selectionist' conceptual 
'altruism'. At fuat time I did not realise that this would not be in line wifu U1e atomism dominating the discussed view. 
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b) Problems oftlte Extended Genetic-Memetic Approach as a Basis for Et/tics 
Though we seemingly have left gene monism behind us, I am going to argue now, that the meme 
conception is not reconcilable with strict gene-Darwinism, even if restricted to the biological sphere. 
Moreover, I shall argue that even if this were possible, this approach-without further modifications-
would still deteriorate common morals to a tactic to best ensure the survival of one's genes and memes. 
I think this will be the case because it only partly changes the first and second of the outlined tendencies 
of a purely gene-Darwinian ethics(~ p. 50). 
Firstly, the meme-concept initially seems to overcome biological determinism. Even Dawkins 
indicates in The Selfish Gene that he regards an independence of the memetic level to be possible. 162 
I would of course appreciate the concept of a certain independence of nous or culture, and in this 
regard, I think, we may indeed gain some insights from some aspects of this approach. Nevertheless, in 
two regards such a belief appears to be inconsistent even only with inner-biological gene-Darwinism. 
a) Gene-Darwinism itself is an enterprise of thorough downward reduction. I will later distinguish its 
gene-atomism, its germ-line reductionism and its process reductionism (:> pp. 140). Within a generally 
(downward) reductive paradigm it will be implausible suddenly to justify an autonomy of higher 
levels. 163 Within the individuaL selfish genes would be regarded to be more basic than memes (though I 
think this is not necessarily so). Memes will be understood to replicate only at mercy of these genes. 
This would for example imply that humans still would seldom propose something which does not 
directly serve their gene's survival. Since the concept of an inner logic of memes is also completely alien 
to this merely selectionist account (apart from my proposals above), memes, like other organismic 
organs, would still mainly be understood as being vehicles for genes in their struggle for life. Human 
communication would still be regarded to be at the service of the genes, corresponding to Dawkins' and 
Krebs' understanding of "all of animal communication as manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-
sender"164. At this point it seems that one is forced to join the advocates of orthodox gene-Darwinism, 
who reproach Dawkins for being inconsistent and a tu m coat if he asserts an autonomy of memes. 165 
Nevertl1eless, if we neglected the utterly downward reductionist framework, I think, it would be 
possible to argue that even the simple process of natural selection could in principle 'bring life' into the 
ontological level of concepts. However, in my opinion there is no reason to assume that life has been 
restricted to this simple process. But because the whole topic of autonomy has normally not been 
elaborated in this context and as it is indeed difficult to advocate autonomy in the reductionist sprit of 
gene-Darwinism, I consider this meme concept on a mere gene-Darwinian basis not yet stable. 
162 R Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), pp. 191-3, 20 I, 331; The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), pp.II0-2. 
163 See e. g.: K. Bayertz. Autonomie und Biologie (1993), p. 336. 
164 !bid, p. 57. 
165 R Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 110. 
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b) I find this conception is also unstable the other way round. If indeed a certain cultural autonomy 
could be claimed-as I think-, it would undermine the radical gene-Darwinian polemics in human 
biology. 
If downward reductionism would generally be weakened by introducing another level, it would 
-despite specifically biological problems (:> pp. 258 f)-also become more questionable within 
biology. 
In addition, human phylogenesis would have to be conceived differently. The polemics that our 
emotional system and our limbic system evolved by 'natural selection', would then be regarded to be an 
unwarranted and dangerous simplification. In my view our emotional system seems to have partly 
evolved by cultural 'selection', mostly via sexual selection, rather than by natural selection. Moreover, 
in this context the strict Darwinian concept of selection may have to be challenged. But allowing for 
some cultural influence on gene survival, our genes would not necessarily be as selfish as they might be, 
since they also are in part moulded by culture. The resulting view would indeed be utterly different from 
the popularised selfish gene biology. 166 
In summary, it will be at least difficult on inner-biologically gene-Danvinian grounds to sustain the 
independence ofmemes. However, ifthis were be possible, gene-Darwinism would be undermined. 0Ve 
already see a tendency of gene-Darwinism to transcend itself.) 
Moreover, as far as biological determinism might be reduced, another problem would arise. One of the main 
motivations to develop evolutionary naturalism has been the hope of resolving the modem epistemological problem of truth 
and reference, dominating philosophy since Descartes, by an objective theory of correspondence. But as far as a 
independence of the meme-level would be conceded, evolutionary epistemology would need to become a historical 
epistemology (which I consider necessary). But, in this case the traditional epistemological problem would arise again. 
Independent as ti1e historical cultural level would be, one would again lose the correspondence of the appearances to the 
ti1ings in themselves, which one hoped to gain by the concept of adaptation. Accordingly, already today the discourse on 
evolutionary epistemology, is starting to reduplicate the whole range of traditional epistemological positions, from realism 
to non-realism. 167 I think that the Darwinian inspiration in this discourse ought to be and will be melted witi1 conceptions of 
different, even idealistic, traditions. A new synthesis needs to be reached. 168 
Secondly, competition would still be the only basic driving force of biological and cultural evolution. 
Certainly, the extended meme approach leaves more room for cooperation on the level of individuals. 
Nevertheless, cooperation would still not be based on the notion of the good, but would be pursued only 
to reproduce ones own genes and memes maximally, regardless of their content. The utterly competitive 
emphasis would still be due to the atomism and process-Danvinism dominating this approach. It will be 
16
" E. 0. Wilson On Human Nature (1978/95). Wilson together with C. J. Lumsden in a more profound work. Genes, 
Afind, and Culture ( 1981 ), appear to have advocated a less one-sided approach of the eo-evolution of genes and memes. 
167 On evolutionary epistemology and Universal Darwinian Processism, :> pp. 202 f. 
D. T. Campbell and K. Lorenz introduced tile notion of hypothetical realism, which has found many followers: 
K. Lorenz. Die Ruckseite des Spiegels ( 1973), pp. 17-20, 303. G. Vollmer. Evolutiondre Erkenntnistheone (1975), pp. 
34-40~ Was konnen wir wissen? Band 1 (1988), pp. 285-290~ R. G. Meyers. Evolution as a ground for realism ( 1990); 
R. Millikan, Language,. White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for A lice ( 1993) [Quoted in B. Pollard. The Nature 
of Rule-Following ( 1996)]. Recently non-realist positions have been formulated. E. g.: D. Campbell Epistemological 
Roles for selection theory ( 1990); M. Ruse. Does Evolutionary Epistemology Imply Realism? ( 1990). 
168 :> also p. 406. 
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shown in tllis work that the radicalness of tl1is emphasis is to be challenged even within the biotic 
stratum and, of course, even more in ilie cultural stratum. 169 
In U1e further text I shall sometimes make use of the word logoi. Logoi as U1e Greek diminutive fom1 of the old 
philosophical notion of logos should denote concepts or ilieories with a certain life of ilieir own, but not to be interpreted in 
a radically atomistic and Darwinian way. 
In regard to the third point, the only measure which exists for Darwinism, for genes and memes 
alike, is short tenn survival (~ pp. 348). The notion of sustainability is, I think, opposed to a 
Darwitlian concept of evolution, which in principle only cares for the moment(~ pp. 386 f). The con-
cept of the unchangeable blindness of this process will also be challenged in this work ( ~ pp. 3 61 f). 
Moreover tl1e notion of goodness is completely missing, as there are no 'lligher' levels at all. There is 
no intrinsic good. Each entity de facto simply strives for its own survival. Only a few philosophers will 
resist committing a naturalistic fallacy, whereas common sense would, I think, simply conclude that 
each entity essentially strives and thus ought to strive for survival (~ p. 65). The Thou (e. g. in the 
sense ofBuber) or ilie Other (e. g. in the sense ofLevinas) has in this conception no intrinsic value at all 
(~ pp. 406 f.), as far as it does not benefit the survival or the reproduction of ilie entity in question. 
Based on ilie 'principle of egoism' living entities are defined by a caring for themselves, altruism by 
definition is explained by egoism. 
Despite ilie improvements of the extended gene-meme theory (of which I will make use in my ovm 
ontological proposal), I think it is not yet possible to build a satisfying ethical system on iliese still 
atomistic and Darwinian grounds. The meme concept seems to be most helpful to overcome biologism, 
but I think it is actually inconsistent with biological gene-Danvinism, the main object of investigation in 
this work. Even if it would be possible to formulate a non-biologistic meme ilieory compatible with 
gene-Darwinism, I tl1ink the mainly competitive spirit focusing only on survival would still exacerbate 
morals. 
2.4 Naturalistic Fallacy? 
Because not having achieved an ontology which is consistent with inner-biological gene-Darwinism 
and wiili traditional higher ethical aspirations, we turn to tl1e question wheilier a descriptive science 
could anyhow provide normative ethical standards. 
Many sociobiologists recoil from drawing ethical conclusions from their biological ilieory and have 
resisted Wilson's harsh claim iliat etllics should become a branch of evolutionary theory. The ethical 
implications are too much in contradiction with ethical common sense. For example, would tl1ere be any 
reason to care for the bodily or mentally incapable? Even Dawkins states: "I am not advocating a 
morality based on evolution" and in a footnote he distances himself from "the government of the new 
169 For my critique of gene-atomism, ~pp. 259 f.; on the melting of ideas, ~ e. g. p. 354. Also process reductionism and 
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right, which has elevated meanness and selfishness to the status of ideology"170 P. Singer, who, as we 
have seen, advocates a comparatively moderate ethics only someho·w informed by biology, distances 
himself from bridging the "gap between facts and values"171 . 
The accusation of committing a 'naturalistic fallacy' has been the most common objection to a 
naturalisation of ethics. The Cambridge philosopher H. Sidgwick initiated objections against Spencer's 
naturalistic ethics 172 But only Sidgwick's disciple G. E. Moore in his Principia Ethica fully elaborated 
the objection to any naturalistic fallacy (even also to Sidgwick's hedonism). 173 
To Moore the predicate good could not be reduced to another tenn, like more evolved, or pleasure 
To him the notion good is simple, unanalysable and indefinable. 174 Although we are here only concemed 
with evolutionary ethics, it should be noted that Moore considers any definition of good by another 
notion a naturalistic fallacy. 
From the viewpoint of analyses of language based on formal logic, Moo re's line of argument appears 
to be valid beyond all doubt: from a descriptive 'is' or 'is-not' premises it is not possible to draw 
prescriptive 'ought to' or 'ought not to' conclusions. 
But against the background of other ontologies also different views have been and, I think, could be 
proposed. The separation of is and ought refers back to I. Kant's 175-and already D. Hume's 176-
distinction of Praktischer Vernunft and Theoretischer Vernunfi. In a way it might be traced back to 
R. Descartes, and to the earlier concepts of a free alter deus, and a detennined machina mundi 
(:>pp. 80 f). I think, besides logical reasons, Kantians were inclined to stress this distinction, to secure 
ethics from Newtonian physics, increasingly interpreted in a materialistic way. Kantians, though 
adopting Newtonism in a transfonned aprioric sense, could still found ethics on subjective freedom 
Nevertheless, Kant in his Critique of Judgement tried to unifY the separated parts of reason (:> p. 86) 
But the history of philosophy shows approaches where the is and the ought are not disconnected 
from the outset-though they are still something different. If human aims, discourses, structural or 
logical necessities are taken into account, one might be entitled to draw conclusions from the 'is' to the 
'ought', because the 'ought' might be already part of the 'is' .177 Advocates of natural law (like Plato, 
Aristotle or Aquinas) partly advocated such a position178 I think in their writings we do not fmd the 
clear dichotomy of description and prescription; in their approach the 'descriptive-nonnative essence' of 
the missing concept of the good is linked to ti1is approach, :>pp. 324, 406. 
170 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene ( 1989/76), p. 2, 267-268. 
171 P Singer. The Expanding Circle. Ethics and Sociobiology ( 1981 ), p. 77. 
172 R J. Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior ( 1987), pp. 322-323. Also: 
G. E. Moore. Principia Ethica (1994/1903), pp. 113 f.. 
173 G. E. Moore. Principia Ethica ( 1994/1903), directly on Spencer sections 29-35, on Sidgwick section 36 f.. 
174 !bid, sections 5-14, 23-24. 
175 I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason. ( 1787/1781) and Critique of Practical Reason ( 1788). 
176 D. Hume. Treatise o_(Human Nature (1739), ill. i. I. (pp. 455 ff.). 
177 If there are autonomous tendencies in the 'is', then, I think, also Moor's concept of the intrinsic good has not to be 
denied. 1 am proposing an approach similar to such a position. :>also pp. 406, 414. 
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human beings is to be good or to strive to be close to God. Despite this difference with Moore, these 
authors would nevertheless strongly agree with him, that we cannot simply identify the term 'good' with 
the way (our) nature actually works. 179 
Today those who want to circumvent the logical problems and to join the descriptive and nom1ative 
realm have to face the problem that on the descriptive side Dmwinian biology (instead of Newtonian 
physics) is holding centre-stage. But the evolutionary record indeed makes clear, that the ought-or at 
least the knowing of the ought-was not always given, but has to have come into being. Corres-
pondingly some supporters of evolutionary ethics have tried to show that the boarder between normative 
and descriptive proposition is not impermeable. For example Vollmer argued that facts inform us what 
ethical statements are possible: concerning the debate on equal rights and duties we could not claim that 
men equally ought to bear children as women do. 180 
However, in the framework of the sociobiological paradigm itself, the logical argument against the 
natural fallacy could not that easily be dismissed, because an approach of this kind is normally 
tmderstood to be a materialistic one, which abandons any truely normative aspects inherent in the 
ontology itself (linked to its denial of causa forma/is and causa finalis). Hence, Moore's objections 
cannot easily be circumvented by starting with an ontology which is itself normatively laden. 
Also Moore's resort of regarding the predicate good as something 'simple, unanalysable and 
indefinable' is not open to sociobiology. In their reductive framework everything has to be explained in 
tem1s of gene survival; an emergent autonomous property of intrinsic goodness could not exist. 
Moreover an exclusively sociobiological paradigm, does not allow for an inner logic of rationality, an 
autonomy of reason or our mvn emergent purposes within culture. 
There are thus only two unpromising ways open to the followers of an exclusively sociobiological 
metaphysics: 
a) The abandoning of ethics. In evolutionary theory there is-strictly speaking-only an 'is'; an 
'ought to' simply does not exist. Hence there would be neither a naturalistic fallacy nor an ethics at all. 
Dawkins has argued against the "unspoken but never justified implication that since science is unable to answer 'whv· 
questions, there must be some other discipline that is qualified to answer them. " 181 -
(Eve Marie Engels, I think correctly, has pointed out that the early advocate of an evolutionary ethics, Spencer, did not 
commit the naturalistic fallacy, since he is not interested in the intrinsic good anyway. 182) 
An abandoning of ethics would not carry the burden of a Darwinian 'biological imperative'. Still one 
may ask what else would fill the ethical vacuum if only a sociobiological 'is' remains. 
178 See e. g. J. M. Finnis natura/law in Oxford Companion to Philosophy ( 1995), pp. 606-607. 
179 G. E. Moore's position: Principia Ethica ( 1994/1903), section 34. 
180 G. Vollmer. Moglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutiondren Ethik (1993), 123-125. 
181 R Dawkins. RiveroutofEden (1995), p. 95. 
182 E.-M. Engels. Herbert Spencers Moralwissenschaft- Ethik oder Sozialtechnik ( 1993), p. 272. 
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The practical difference to a 'biological imperative' might be that we would not tend to eradicate any non-adaptive 
side-effects of our nature, still we would by no means neiti1er combat the process of natural evolution-as T H Huxley has 
demanded:)423-nor try to channel tius process to get more ethical. 
b) An evolutionary morality. The other unpromising possibility for gene-Darvvinians is to assume 
-paradoxically quite similar to the mentioned pre-modem conceptions-that there is no gap between 
the 'is' and the 'ought' and hence no naturalistic fallacy. Here, 'is' and 'ought to' are related, even more 
directly than in traditional natural law, that is, if also the 'ought to' developed in evolution only by the 
mechanism of natural selection, the seemingly independent 'ought to' is in the end an 'is'. At the first 
sight this may sound relatively hopeful, since we would be able to keep our moral beliefs. But this 
argumentation could in principle be continued in three ways, from which only the last one is in my 
opinion viable for radical gene-Darwinians. 
Firstly, one may argue that all moral tenets are justified, simply because we hold them; they evolved 
and hence have proved to be evolutionarily stable. Similar to the position of having no ethics at all, one 
would only care whether a moral actually exists and evolutionary theory would not contribute anything 
to the evaluation of these found morals. We would not have lost that much, but we would not have won 
much either. In any case, I think it is not possible to design an evolutionary theory which remains totally 
neutral. Gene-Darwinism is definitely not neutral It would change e. g. the moral attitudes of foster 
parents (~ pp. 48 f) Gene-Darwinism as highly reductive theory, which does not render morals as 
entities or truth of his own but only as means, would focus on optimising their assumed essence of 
evolution and not such mere means (~ third point). 
Secondly, one may identify a descriptive-normative tendency in evolution. In classical temunology, 
one tries to identify the 'essence' either of evolution in general or of a part of evolutionary history, e. g. 
of human evolution. Julian Huxley thought that progressive integration is the proper characterisation of 
human evolution. Recently, R. Richards, abstracting from an actual proposal of how society would 
work best, has proposed that men in their nom1al "structured context" essentially strive "to enhance the 
community good" and hence "each ought to act altruistically."183 Richards' proposal would indeed in its 
result reconcile evolutionary ethics with a Kantian ethics (by which Richards is obviously influenced). 
However, this way is not open to gene-Darwinians, who regard the care for the community good at best 
as an evolutionary side effect. 
The third possibility, I think, is the only one open to strict gene-Darwinians They would have to 
claim that Evolution has only one essence: gene-survival (Though Mayr was correct in arguing that 
species essentialism has been abandoned by Darwinism in general, it is one of the main claims of this 
work that Darwinism is still essentialistic in regard of evolutionary processes.) Accordingly we would 
have to follow the 'biological or selectionist imperative' and multiply our genes by any means. 
183 R. J. Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 613, 620, 622. 
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In conclusion, the two ways of how a gene-Darwinian (or only a memetic selectionist) approach to 
ethics can circumvent a naturalistic fallacy, are either to abandon ethics or to consider the 'ought' to be 
already present in the 'is'. I have argued that the latter evolutionary ethics, though in principle open for 
other values as well, would on a merely gene-Darwinian basis lead to a veneration of gene-competition 
and to the biological imperative to replicate by any means. 
2.5 The Need for a New Paradigm in Biology 
From the common sense view the above ethical or non-ethical consequences of gene-Darwinism seem 
to me untenable. But the reference to common sense may appear to be only a too weak argument. 1 think 
there are also other epistemological reasons to look for a different ontological basis for ethics. I think 
there are tlu-ee epistemological reasons to aim at a new paradigm within biology: 184 
The first reason for taking a critical look at these still comparatively new theories is the lack of the1r 
consistency with theories from other subject areas and paradigms. Though we shall see that 
Darwinism has strongly influenced other subject areas (:> pp. 160 f., 218 f.), gene-Darwinism or the 
outlined refined theory is not yet totally predominant in our universe of discourse. These theories claim 
to be universal and are at odds with many well established theoretical and ethical persuasions we have. 
We, as mentioned, may believe in a search for 'just' ethical principles or may hold that individual 
persons or groups are not only epiphenomenal and ephemeral, "like clouds in the sky or dust-stonns in 
the desert."185 
Sociobiology itself, of course, wants to achieve a consistent unification of different subject areas, 
and it is not possible to judge only from the inconsistency with other theories that this approach itself 
needs to be refined. E. 0. Wilson: "It may not be too much to say that sociology and the other social 
sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches of biology waiting to be included in the 
Modern Synthesis. "186 But if the theory makes such strong claims we do have the duty of scrutinising 
this theory as critically as possible. Of course, the argument of a lack of consistency with other 
important theories is only valid for those people which still hold theories which are at odds with the 
sociobiological paradigm. 
Secondly, a lack of consistency to empirical 'facts', or better 'phenomena,, is a criterion which 
makes us search for nev,· approaches. This argument is linked with the first one, because the existence of 
many alternative theories indicate that there are also many phenomena which may be interpreted more 
appropriately by them. We may have experienced an illller necessity of rational argumentation. Or we 
may think of the behaviour of Mother Teresa or simply the daily behaviour of opening the doors to one 
184 Discussing the underlying epistemological theory which is implicitly present in these claims would lead too far. It is a 
mixture of coherence theory aJld correspondence theory, which may explain itself if one reads the outline of ecological 
idealism ( :> pp. 414 f.). 
185 :>footnote 1015. 
186 E. 0. Wilson. Sociobiology ( 1975), p. 4. 
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another (in situations where direct reciprocity could not be asswned). Such 'facts' might urge us to seek 
for other explanations or at least extensions of this theory 
I did not mean to imply by the last examples that being ethical always presumes to be altruistic. (Kantian ethics does 
not necessarily require one to give a drunken beggar all ones belongings.) However, the assumption of an i1mer logic of 
justice is excluded by gene-Darwinism. 
Adherents of the sociobiological paradigm might still object that these facts are also in some indirect 
way explainable in terms of there own. 
The third point is a possible lack of consistency within the theory itself We have already seen an 
example how an extended meme theory may undermine biological gene-Darwinism. An argument based 
on consistency seems to me a stronger argument than the foregoing one. A militant proponent of the 
sociobiological paradigm could not immunise him- or herself against inconsistencies which may arise 
from the own logic of this theory itself. In this work I mainly try to transcend gene-Darwinism from 
within(:> pp. 237 f). 
For discussing possible problems of tllis paradigm we have to first understand the underlying 
philosophical structure of these paradigms. 
Dawkins wrote that "philosophy and the subjects known as 'humanities' are still taught almost as if 
Darwin had never lived. No doubt this will change in time." 187 Although I agree with this to a certain 
extent, I also tllink the same statement could be stated the other way round: 'Biology including 
especially sociobiology, and many other sciences are still taught almost as if tl1ey do not had any 
historical roots and made any philosopllical presumptions. No doubt tllis will change in time.' 
187 R. Dawkins. The Se!fish Gene (1976/89), p. I 
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Part 11: The Unfolding of Logos in Regard to the Philosophical 
Conceptions of 'Physis' and Darwinism 
Each succeeding age discovers that the primary classifications of its predecessors will not work. 
In this way a doubt is thrown upon all formulations of laws of Nature which assume these 
classifications as ,firm starting points. A problem arises. Philosophy is the search for its solution. 
71 
A. N. Whitehead. Nature and Life (1934), p. 10. 
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In our search for a formulation of a new biological paradigm, I will in this part discuss the scientific 
and cultural construction of the sociobiological paradigm and of Darwinism in general, and trace the 
development of its background assumptions through history. 
Science is in the present treatment rather regarded as a process of construction than a process of dis-
covery. 188 In my opinion it is through such an understanding that the history of science becomes more 
than a necrology and hagiography, potentially not only describing science, but inspiring it as welL 
To understand science as a process of construction criticises the 'myth of the given'. Even if we 
employ a notion of a thing in itself in a Kantian way, we could never have direct access to these 
'things·; our sensibility is always interacting with our understanding. Logical positivism has been 
criticised that observations are always-at least to a certain degree-theory-laden. Nevertheless the 
construction view of theories also has its dangers: construction might be misinterpreted as opening the 
way for arbitrary interpretations. But a proper understanding of construction, in my opinion, also 
acknowledges constructional constraints and an inner logic of empirical, methodological, theoretical and 
ethical considerations. (:>pp. 11 f) 
Such an approach to the history of science and philosophy seeks to give a deeper historical-genetic 
tmderstanding of the discussed theories and also to reveal constructional altematives. 
This in one way 'evolutionary' approach takes not only biology but also culture seriously. The 
historical enterprise is not in a vicious but in a virtuous circle linked to our systematic position: we will 
only understand the systematics of our theories on the basis of their history: and we will only understand 
history on the basis of the systematics of our theories. 189 
Within the history of science-and therefore also within the history of biology-two general 
approaches can be distinguished. 190 
On the one hand, there is a position, called internalism, often held by scientists working as historians 
in their O'W'l1 field. This position focuses on developments within a certain theory or a certain science. 
The approaches of advocates of intemalism (like E. Mayr191 or in some respects Th. Kulu1 192) may 
188 See, e. g., P. Bowler. Charles Danvin (1990), Chapter '1l1e Problem of Interpretation·~ Evolution (1984 ), pp. 341-342. 
189 My understanding of history of science ought to be coherent with my systematic considerations and with my general 
approach of' ecological idealism' ( :> e. g. pp. 42 I f). 
190 Similar: E. Mayr. One Long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 39. The Growth of Biological Thought (I 982), p. 13. 
191 The zoologtst Emst Mayr, one of the founders of the so-called evolutionary synthesis, is one of the most profound 
historians of biology, with a mainly intemalist viewpoint. AIU10ugh he accepts U1e extemalist explanation of why 
Darwinism had been refuted in the begitming, he is much more guarded in applying this approach to the explanation of 
the rise of Darwinism (Mayr, 1991, p. 39 f, 1983, p. 33). His main historical work is The Growth of Biological 
Thought ( 1982). A popularised short, but still infonnative, book is One Long Argumellt (199 I). 
192 Thomas S. Kulm's book The Stmcture of Scientific Revolutions (I 962) is in some respects not classifiable as a work of 
i11ternalism. His theory left an explanatory gap why paradigm shifts actually take place, and hence may even mark a 
trend of historiography to external approaches, trying to close U1is gap. Moreover, Kuhn himself has often been 
understood as calling attention to factors, like the scientific conmmnity, which are at least external to the theory in 
question. Nevertheless, Kuhn himself is mainly concerned with inner-scientific explanations and the scientific 
conmmnity, which are part of the science in question and in this sense internaL 
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differ strongly, not at least because the intemal-extemal distinction is a relative one. A treatment could 
be intemal or extemal in regard either to a specific theory or to a whole scientific discipline in question. 
The stronger version of internalism, which focuses only on aspects within the range of a theory itself, discusses ti1e 
empirical or logical evidence of a theory, its predictive power or the rise of explanatory problems. The weaker version 
additionally covers aspects, which are external to a U1eory, but internal to U1e relevant science, like the role of the scientific 
conmmnity and the itmer consistency within a science as a whole. 
On the other hand, there is a position called externalism, which emphasises that any scientific theory 
and subject is embedded in and determined by its more general intellectual and cultural context. This 
position is primarily held by historians, sociologists and philosophers working in the field of history of 
science. Within this second approach we have again to distinguish between two notions of 'context': 
One group of the historians of science rather focuses on the socio-economic, the other rather on the 
intellectual context of a theory. In practice of course, most extemalist historians will adopt neither of 
these idealised extreme positions, but could be placed somewhere between these extreme positions. 
a) The social historians of science (e. g. A Desmond, R Young) emphasise the socio-economic 
context and will often have a more sociological background. Some base their investigation on a certain 
social-psychological or historical theory (for example a Marxist position); others, without referring to 
an explicit theory, try to reconstruct in detail the whole objective (or even subjective) Lebenswelt of a 
scientist in question (for example A. Desmond, J. R. Moore in their biography on Darwin 193). 
This approach has achieved iliat in history of science also sociology and economics have to be taken seriously. 
Nevertheless, advocates of a socio-economic approach go too far in my view, if they implicitly or explicitly adopt a 
reductive view in regard of ilieories, according to which theories would have no own reality, but would be a mere 
epiphenomenal superstructure built on a given socio-economic basis, like individual or class interests. 
b) On the other hand there are historians of thought (e. g. J. C. Greene194 or, I think, P. Bowler), who 
focus mainly on the intellectual context of certain concepts. This is based on the two assumptions that 
knowledge is not a mere epiphenomenon, and that the different parts of knowledge or human logos 
interact with one another. The tradition of world views, into which a scientist is 'thrown', determines or 
at least influences the way he or she builds up theories and experiments and thus perceives the World. 
Theories are regarded as both affecting and being effected by the temper of an age. Within this 
framework historians again have very different approaches. They may be for example implicit or 
explicit followers of Fichte, Schelling or HegeL and will focus on the unifying logic within the whole 
logos or what these philosophers called 'Spirit' Or they might e. g. be influenced by very different 
'postmodem' philosophers, like Derrida and Foucault, who similarly focus on 'discourses' shaped by a 
general 'episteme' of a time. 
193 A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991 ), see pp. xvi-xviii. 
194 John C. Greene tries in Science, Ideology, and ~Vorld View ( 1981) to show the impact of ideology and World Views on 
the Darwinian Revolution. In the essay The Kulmian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection 
(first pub!. 1971) he outlined his methodology in contrast to tile one ofTh. S. Kulm. 
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Today it becomes more and more difficult to distinguish these approaches and indeed it seems to be 
fruitful to regard the opposed internal and (the two) external approaches to history of science not as 
exclusive, but as complementary. In my view, especially in phases of scientific revolution, both internal 
and external reasons for the process of scientific construction have to be taken into account. This would 
imply that on the one hand history in general and on the other hand the history of a certain science or 
theory-for example of evolutionary theory--are essentially interwoven with each other. History, 
according to this position, only can be understood by looking at the partly autonomous subhistories; and 
the partly autonomous subhistories are only understandable by relating them to history as a whole. 195 In 
the following my historical investigation will proceed according to these lines. 
This position might mirror some metaphysical assumptions, which at this point should not be discussed, but only 
made explicit. In my opinion, theories neitl1er can completely be separated from the history as a whole, nor is tl1ere an all-
embracing homogeneous history, without different sub-currents with their own inner dynamics. Strictly speaking there is no 
isolated theory, no part of logos (logoi), no unrelated 'Sprachspiel', no discourse totally on its own; but neither is there a 
completely homogeneous temper of an age, a completely consistent Zeitgeist, logos or 'episteme'. The difficult task in 
regard to the historical whole-part problem is to formulate a sound middle position. 
In regard to epistemological or ontological part-whole problems I would and will later on in more detail advocate a 
similar middle position The epistemological part-whole problem, could be exemplified by Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit196: 
This ambiguous picture shows, I tl1ink, that t11e extreme epistemological positions are both one-sided: a) If there were only 
'sense data' as the complete inductive basis for our (bottom-up) perception, then we would not be able to switch vohmtarily 
between the perception of a duck or a rabbit. If our perceptions the other way round were exclusively based (in a top-down 
way) on an abstract concept of a duck or a rabbit, it would be possible to see say m1 elephant without any more difficulty 
than we have in seeing a duck or a rabbit. Quite obviously (but still not accepted by all philosophical directions) a middle 
position has to be found, which of course still leaves the difficult problem of fonnulating such a position. But, for example, 
already I. Kant favoured a balanced solution to the epistemological part-whole problem: "Gedmlken olme Inhalt sind leer, 
A..nschauungen olme Begriffe sind blind."197 I will later develop at detail a metaphysical stance where whales llild parts are 
interacting llild base this on a field conception, similar to the antique view of hylemorphism. 198 
Consequently, in this part of this work both approaches to the history of biology, the internalist and 
the externalist approach, will be treated: 
In chapter 4 ofthis part 'From Darwin to Dawkins' the internal logic of the theories ofDanvinism 
will be explored. I will support the hypothesis, that there have been certain distinct, but minor, 
paradigm-shifts within the main theory of Darwinism, and I will thus challenge the assumption often 
found in popular science that Darwinism is a monolithic and unchangeable theory. J will try to show 
how, with these subparadigms, central notions (like 'gene', 'unit of selection', 'species' and other 'taxa' 
etc.) underwent a change of meaning, largely due to the general character of these paradigms. 
In chapter 5, on 'Darwinism-from Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology?', a survey of the 
external influences on Darwinism and of those external influences originating from Danvinism will be 
195 It has been stated tl1at the romantic view of history is similar to such m1 approach: 'The development of the natural 
sciences is genetic, possesses an internal logic and depends on economic m1d social factors. Internal and external 
dimensions do not have to be mutually exclusive.' D. v. Engelhardt. Historical consciousness in the German Romantic 
Natuiforschung ( 1990). 
196 L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations (Philosophisclw Untersuchungen). 1976 (195811953), p. 194. 
197 I. Kant. Kritik der reinen Vemunft. p. A 51/B 75. ("Thoughts wit110ut content are empty, intuitions without concepts arc 
blind.") 
198 
:>In part IV, chapter 8, I shall oppose substance (pp. 240 f.) and process reductionism (pp. 324 f.) and I shall advocate 
holism, top down causation (pp. 266 f.) and exfonnation (pp. 307 f.). I t.hlllk that the criticised reductionist proposals 
are one-sidedness. However, I intend to pursue a middle course between atomism and holism. 
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given I shall try to show that Darwinism and Dawkinsism are not only a reactions empirical 'facts', but 
also partly influenced by other theories and world views, For example, it is broadly acknowledged that 
Darwin was influenced by Malthus and the classical liberal economic theories, Without denying the 
importance of a moderately socio-economic account, this chapter mainly focuses on the intellectual 
external history, 
Based on the explored historical interrelations of Darwinism with other academic disciplines, I am in 
the following part, in chapter 6 and 7, going to develop systematically what I call 'Universal 
Darwinism' and especially 'Process-Darwinism', 
Before the different Darwinian subparadigms are described, in regard to their internal and external 
history, in the chapter 3 on the 'Unfolding of the pre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of 
'Nature'' a sketch will be given of the philosophical traditions on which modern biology is built, or 
from which it has distanced itself In this chapter internal and external history are not separable, 
because biology still is quite directly part of the general intellectual and philosophical development 
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Chapter 3: Unfolding of the Pre~Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions 
of Nature 
If a biologist today, at the tum of the twentieth century, were to work e. g. within a Platonic or 
Aristotelian framework, tlus would not be in accordance with the general research programme(s) of 
today's biology and hence would place him- or herself outside the scientific community. 
Still, our historical investigation is not beginning with the rise of Darwinism and of its sub-
paradigms, but in this chapter with its ancient, mediaeval and modem philosophical predecessors. Later 
some pre-Darwinian schools will be distinguished, forming already an own discipline of biology. 
Tllis approach is obviously opposed to the historically innocent, almost ignorant, view uttered by an 
important author of the present debates that ,all attempts to answer the question before 1859 are 
worthless and that we will be better off if we ignore them completely." 199 Many historians, like, for 
example, Bowler, Cunningham, Depe\v, v. Engelhardt, Greene, Jardine, Rehbock, Richards and Weber, 
and also philosophers and biologists, like Weingarten and even Mayr, do seem-to put it moderately-
to have a different opinion. 
By an lustorical account which goes back much further than 1859 we will also gam a deeper 
understand of Dan'li.nism, for example its distorted Christian-Newtonian underpinnings and its Pan-
Adaptionism. Moreover we may broaden our horizons in regard to altemative biological accow1ts. The 
Dan'Jinian paradigm-shift has no doubt brought improvements, but did it improve evolutionary theory in 
all respects? Even the early history of the philosophical notions of nature may enrich us by its great 
variety of concepts, from which we perhaps could leam something. 
In this chapter, as already mentioned, we will not differentiate between an extemal and an intemal 
history, because biology only lately becomes separated as a discipline. 
3.1 The Ancient Views of qrocn<;- Nature as Organism 
Westem thought rises in ancient Greece. There are of course also interesting non-Westem 
conceptions of nature. For example, earlier than all westem accounts the book I Ching, the Chinese 
'Book of Change', handed down to us by Confucius (c. 551-479 BC), gives a dynamic account of 
Nature, Cosmos and Humankind. 
I am content, to concentrate on the mainstream of Westem philosophies, firstly because of the limited space of tlus 
overview, secondly because of my lack of knowledge of non-Westem philosophies and thirdly because of the predominant 
influence of Westem thought. 
199 R. Dawkins quoting G. G. Simpson. The Selfish Gene ( 1976/1989 !), p. I. Th.is corresponds to the simplifying view that 
'the growth of biological thought' is largely the story of Darwinism's triumph over alternative explanations of 
existence. Dawkins. Universal Darwinism ( 1983 ), p. 403. 
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a) From Myth to the Pre-Socratics -the Development of Basic Notions 
Greek thought dawns in a world of magic and myth. In its begitming all 'things' were alive and 
animate. The Greek tribes (like presumably most other tribes) were surrounded by forces and ghosts of 
nature, present in the earth, the sea, the trees and the wind. In Greece these primordial dark forces 
became more and more personified, firstly in the pre-Olympian, still matriarchal goddesses like Gaia 
(goddess of the earth), then in the bright, heavenly, anthropomorphic Olympians. This living and 
animate nature (hylozoism) could still be studied in the writings of Thales' (c. 624-546 BC): "pant:'1 
plere theon einai" (all is full of goddesses). The magic and mystical forces at the dawn of Greek thought 
were believed to be dynamic and 'fluid>2oo 
Although today's scientific neo-Dan'linian view of nature is also dynamic. the magic and mystic 
intuition at the dawn of Greek philosophy does not only differ in the methodological respect, but was a 
dynamics of an 'enchanted· nature, alive as a whole, including stonns and planets, and it was not a 
dynamics of mechanical clockworks or puppets of 'selfish genes', which in tu m are programmed by the 
an etemal law of nature, the simple algorithm of mutation and selection. 
It appears that the very first philosophical approaches to q:r6<rtS (physis-nature) gave direction to 
the further intellectual development. This might to a certain extent be interpreted as an unfolding of 
ideas which in a different way have already been present in the begitming. I will fonnulate them as three 
antitheses. 
(1.) Matter and form: The philosophers ofMiletus in Asia Minor, Thales and Anaximander (c 610-
545 BC), focus on the 'material', the oucri.a, as the essence of being. The Phythagoreans in contrast 
have formulated an antithesis by focusing on number and fonn 
(2.) Being and Becoming: Heraclitus (c. 544-484 BC) believed that everything is flowing (navm 
p£1.); whereas the Eleatic Parrnenides (c. 540-470 BC) stated that there could be no change at all, but 
only permanent being. 
(3.) A resulting third primordial antagonism already present in pre-Socratic thought could be found 
in the conceptions ofDemocritus (c. 460-370 BC) opposed to those of Anaxagoras (c. 500-428 BC). 
The mechanistic philosophy of Democritus could be interpreted as a specific synthesis of the being-
becoming and the matter-form antagonism mentioned before: To him the world is built up out of basic 
elements, out of indivisible 'atoms'. On the one hand elements (matter) are in a Parmenidian way etemal 
to him, on the other hand he assumes their combination (form) in a Heraclitian way to be always in flux 
In a similar frame of mind Empedocles (c. 483-425 BC), a predecessor of Democritus, already stated a 
mechanistic theory of evolution. Anaximander had already pronounced a simple hypothesis of evolution, 
assuming a development of human beings out of fishlike creatures. Empedocles and later the Roman 
200 K. Gloy. Das Verstandnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des wissenschaftlichen Denkens (1995), Bd. 1, pp. 31. 
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Lucretius (97-55 BC)-because of their evolutionary VISIOn of the survival of viable random 
combinations-may be regarded as early predecessors of Darwinism as a specific theory of evolution. 
Anaxagoras tries to solve the 'oucria versus form'-problem and the 'being versus becoming'-
problem in different way: He claims that the basic primordial substances, out of which the world is 
build are crnE:pjla'ta (spermata), gem1s which have the same essence like their resulting end-product. 
So although phenomena obviously do change, their essence stays the same. Anaxagoras differed from 
the later mechanistic monism of Democritus in another way: to hin1 the Spirit (vouc;) is the origin of 
motion ofthe Universe. 201 
After the stage is now set, two main different basic meanings of the concept of nature or c:pucrtc; can 
be detected: Firstly the notion 'nature' is used for an all-including Oneness, understood either 
holistically or atomistically. Secondly, nature is also regarded as a part of this Oneness, and is 
contrasted with 'tEXVll (techne-culture, art), vouc; (nous-spirit, reason) and VOjloc; (nomos-law, 
moral) 202 These two notions of nature and these antagonisms are largely still with us today. 
We will see that Plato and Aristotle built their highly influential philosophical systems as a solution 
of the developments and basic tensions mentioned before. 
b) Platonism- Pltysis as 'Tecltne' 
Plato (427-347 BC) states his philosophy of nature in the Timaeus 203 , which was very influential 
during the early medieval period and during the renaissance. Despite some shallow and obscure 
descriptions,204 today's reader could still be impressed by its metaphysics. The core of his theory of 
ideas is also given in the central dialogues, Politeia, Phaidon, Phaidros and Symposion. 
Plato, like Anaxagoras, opposes a mechanistic, materialistic metaphysics and provides a synthesis 
for the matter-form antagonism, for the being-becoming antagonism and to the physis-nomos 
antagonism: Behind the actual world, which is changing, he assumes the existence of forms or ideas 
(iOE:at), which are eternal. The actual, changing world is fanned by (metexis) the unchanging world of 
ideas. Later on the actual world has been called mundus sensibilis and the world of ideas mundus 
intelligibilis. The factual world is formed by the world of ideas rather in a teleological (causa finalis) 
than in a 'causal' (causa e.fficiens) way. All things are striving to reach their end, their telos ('tf:lcoc;), 
prefom1ed by these eternal fom1s or ideas. 
Since the nature (as a whole) is ordered by these ideas, Plato speaks in the Timaeus not only from 
'nature' ( c:pucrtc;) but from 'cosmos'. This cosmos is created by the demiurge. The demiurge is not the 
201 Similar, e. g.: J. Hirschberger. Geschichte der Philosophie. Band 1. Altertum und Mittelalter (199111948). A view of 
history, as given in the present section, is characteristic of a dialectic, e. g. Hegelian, school of thought. 
202 L. Honnefelder. Natur- Verhaltnisse ( 1992 ), p. 11. 
203 Plato. Timaios. Transl.: H. Muller (1857). In Werke, ed.: G. Eigler ( 1990). 
204 For example: men who are cowards are born in their next life as women. !bid, p. 90e. 
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almighty Christian God, who is creating ex nihilo, but the demiurge is confronted with eternal matter in 
the state of chaos. This chaos is transferred into the state of order (cosmos) by eternal forms, by the 
eidos of the demiurge. In this sense, nature is to Plato harmonious, a thing of art ('tEXVTl ov), and 
designed in a rational way. 
c) Aristotelianism -Physis as 'Autopoiesis' 
Aristotle solves the outlined tensions of the early ancient thought in a modified way. With Aristotle 
(384-322 BC) the form (eidoslmorqhe) came into being within the world. Aristotle accused Plato of 
dividing the actual world and the world of forms/ideas by a gap (chorismos): The one World is doubled 
in as a perceivable and a true world. Aristotle hence tries to bridge this gap, or even to unite these two 
worlds again. To him the ideas are immanent within the actual things (eide en h_vle) and not 
transcendent outside (eide chorista) 
Thus, Aristotle is often contrasted to Plato. Aristotle is regarded as a proponent of a nature, active 
and creative in itself, a self-organising, autopoietic nature ( <XU'tO = self, n:otECH~ = making), whereas 
Plato is seen as a proponent of a made nature ('tEXVT] ov). In the terminology of the schoolmen the 
former proposes a creative nature (natura naturans). the latter proposes a created nature (natura 
natura fa). 
Although the different emphasis of Plato and Aristotle is not in question, it recently has been stressed that similarities 
of these most influential ancient philosophers are too often neglected: Aristotle, but also Plato, regarded the whole nature or 
cosmos as an organism. 205 
Given the Aristotelian concept of ideas or forms immanent in nature, we might understand his notion 
of entelecheia (EV'tEAEXEt<X): A thing which has reached its telos, within its 'natural' form. The notion 
'entelecheia' is also used for a possibility, a tendency of a thing to reach its form Aristotle's teleology 
is an immanent, not a transcendent teleology. 
This conception of telos is only understandable m the light of Aristotle's aetiologl06 Aristotle 
distinguishes four causes, or better aspects of explanation207 : (1.) causa materia/is, the cause of the 
matter, (2.) causa forma lis, for example, all notions of species and genera, (3 .) causa e.fficiens, closest 
to modem billiard ball causality, and (4.) causa.finalis, the end, goal or telos (1f:lvo~) of something. 
Today most scientists would presumably reject the concepts of causa forma/is, and causa finalis. I am not going to 
grapple with this fundamental question whether these are reasonable concepts here, but it seems to be plausible to assume 
that it is at least questionable whether it is possible to demolish these conceptions completely. Does the periodic system of 
chenlistry implicitly make use of the concept of' ideal fonns' and an ·teleology of reaching a stable state'? 
205 It is being discussed whether this opposition is artificially build up by Aristotle, and if Aristotle should not be seen as a 
completer of Platonic thought rather than an opponent of it. (K. Gloy. Das Verstdndnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des 
wissenschaftlichen Denkens ( 1995), Bd. I, pp. I 08 ff.) 
206 Aristotle. Physics, Second book, third chapter (e. g. the edition of Ross, 1936/1960). The Atiology is also expounded in 
the Metaphysics t'l, 2. Outlines of Aristotles aetiology are also given in his zoological books, for example at the 
begiruling and the end of the De generatione animalium (e. g. the edition of Peck, 1943). 
207 The different causes, c&no:, are not separable causes, but could only in union fumish a complete explanation of natural 
processes. Ross. Aristotle's Natural Philosophy (1936/1960), pp. 35-36. 
Part Il Chapter 3: Unfolding ofPre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of Nature 80 
In some subcultures of the scientific biological community there have been also explicit attempts to employ Aristotelian 
philosophy as a source for evolutionary theory. For example, Hans Driesch208 (a disciple of Haeckel) in the 1920s focused 
on the concept of entelecheia. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco l Varela209 have, since the 1970s, put emphasis on 
the concept of autopoiesis or Rupert Sheldrake210 has, since the 1980s, developed the concept of morphogenetic fields. 
Aristotle, coming out of a family where the medical profession was hereditary, was very much 
interested in the Philosophy of Nature and Science. The physics (<l>ucrtKTJ), where he for example 
expounded the aetiology outlined and also critically discussed the notion of chance211 , is one of his 
central books. Moreover, Aristotle (despite of course having predecessors) could be said to have 
founded biological taxonomy or even biology. His main biological books are the Historia animalum; De 
partibus animalium and De generatione animalium 212 He not only collected many observations about 
many species of animals and built up a taxonomy, but (by doing this) he also built up specific biological 
theories. Aristotle for example focused on different ways of reproduction as a major feature to 
distinguish species213 and in this respect anticipates most schools of modem biology. 
It would be interesting to discuss how far Aristotle's general metaphysical stance, is mirrored by or has even been 
derived from his zoological works. Such a discussion would have extended the scope of this work, and the neo-Aristotelian 
approaches in evolutionary theory, mentioned previously, appear anyhow to have drawn mainly on general Aristotelian 
(meta)physics and less on specific aspects of the Aristotelian zoological work. 
We shall touch upon the influence of Aristotle on modem taxonomy again later on (:;) p. 94). At this 
point I do not want to discuss the details of Aristotelian biology, but only to sketch some general aspects 
of metaphysics in which the corresponding philosophy of nature had been imbedded. 
3.2 Medieval Philosophy- the Divine De-Enchantment of Nature 
During the medieval period in Europe the ideas of the Judaeo-Christian tradition had become 
inseparably combined with the previously described Greek traditions. Here we will not follow in detail 
the single stages of this process: the first assimilation of Plato's Timaeus, then in the 13th century the 
influence of Aristotelianism and finally a new influence of Plato's rediscovered works. 
Instead I will focus in the three following subsections on two aspects of the (much richer? 14 medieval 
synthesis. Firstly, I will try to point out why the combination of Judaeo-Christian and Greek thought 
208 H. Driesch. The Science & Philosophy of the Organism ( 1929). 
209 H. R. Maturana & F. J. V are la. Der Baum der Erkenntnis ( 1987/1984 ). 
210 R. Shelclrake. Das Gedachtnis der Natur (I 99111988). 
211 Aristotle. The Physics. Book ll, chapter 4-6. 
212 Other zoological works of Aristotle are: De incessu animalium; De anima; Parva naturalia; De motu animalium. It 
should be noted that it has been argued that some of the zoological books attributed to Aristotle, e. g. parts of the 
Historia Animalium, show traces of other authors. 
213 Aristotle. De Generatione animalium ( ed. A. L. by Peck: 1943 ). 
214 Scholars of medieval philosophy may forgive me, when I here could only touch upon this topic, because in my view it 
would be worse to neglect the medieval belief system and its underpimting of modern thought. This is indeed often 
clone in accounts of the history and philosophy of modern biology, although we will show distorted echoes of these 
mediaeval beliefs paradoxically still present even in Darwinism. 
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had a tendency to undermine itself. Secondly it will be shown that Christian thought, despite the decline 
of medieval scholasticism, still has formed the great and also dangerous basis of modem thought215 
a) The World as 'Machina Mundi' 
Although it might seem paradoxically, Christianity was the mam driving force for the 
demystification of nature: Christianity, as a monotheistic religion, has banned the goddesses who-for 
the pagans-had animated the trees, the wind and the earth. Also the sun and the moon lost their godlike 
. 216 propert1es. 
Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BC - c. AD 50) and later on Saint Augustine (354-430) ham1onised the 
Judaeo-Christian myth of creation of the Genesis with Platonism, equating God's ideas (which created 
the world in seven days) with the Platonic concept of eidos. 217 God, in this view, is the transcendent 
Creator (natura naturans), the actual world and what we call nature is created (natura naturata). This 
Platonic view is linked with the idea that we could read the 'book of nature' as we read the holy 
scripture. The phrase 'the book of nature' was coined by Augustine and gives support to the design 
argument as a rational basis for belief in the existence of God. This is the case although Augustine still 
strongly emphasised theological arguments based on revelation.m 
To Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), although he was predominantly influenced by Aristotelian 
thought, nature was not godlike. But nor was nature machinelike to him: indeed autopoietic, but not 
created out of itself, but made by God, who is the prima causa, the summum bonum etc. 219 
As Platonic thought became revived at the end of the medieval period, the concept of eternal fom1s 
(one might say paradoxically) became coherent with the rise of mechanistic explanations, also referring 
to eternal, repeatable patterns. 
The living nature ofthe Greeks (also of the original text of Plato) had by then died. In the translation 
of Plato's Timaeus by Chalcidius, which had a huge impact on medieval thought, the term for the Jiving 
cosmos was wrongly translated as "beautiful machine of the world". 220 Despite such perhaps partly 
contingent facts, the demystification of nature seems also to follow the itmer logic of the synthesis of 
Greek thought and transcendent Judaeo-Christian monotheism. The world as we enter the period of 
scientific discovery (:> pp. 83 f.) had already increasingly been seen as a machine (machina mundi) 
following the eternal laws of a transcendent God. 
215 Ly1m White stated as early as 1967 that Clrristianity is responsible for the environmental crisis. An overview on the 
controversial discussion about this and its further developments is given by: E. Hargrove. Beyond the Lynn White 
Debate ( 1986). Without being able to engage in this debate, in my view it is as absurd to assume that the present 
ecological crisis is a monocausal result from Christian tenets of the 15°' century, as it is to assume that Christianity was 
not preswnably the most important underlying and changing driving force which moulded both humanism and 
mechanicism. See e. g.: R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurzeln der okologischen Krise ( 1991/1990), esp. pp. 15-16, 35. 
216 Similar: M. Brurnlik. Die Gnostiker (1992), p. 15. 
217 R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurze/n der okologischen Krise ( 199111990), p. 18. 
218 !bid, pp. 22-23. 
219 St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae (1963-75/1266-73 ). 
22° K. Gloy. Das Verstiindnis der Natur. Bd. I (1995), pp. 157-158, 166. 
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b) The Human as 'Alter Deus' 
One of the characteristics of Christianity-and one might cynically add, maybe one of the main 
reasons for its wide dissemination in the species of homo sapiens-is that its ethics is anthropocentric. 
'Love thy neighbour' refers to interhuman ethics, not to ecosystems. But Christianity, of course, does 
not only advocate the uniqueness of mankind because of an egoistic 'speciesism'. Humans gain this 
unique position according to the Christian framework, because they are regarded as creatures between 
angels and beasts. Man are made "in the image of God and after his likeness".221 Only humans are 
endowed with some divine properties, like freedom, the ratio recta etc. 
In late scholasticism e. g. Nicholas Cusanus (1401-64) proclaims man to be an 'alter deus', to be 
similar to God especially in his creative abilities. This forecasted the modem idea of the creative genus, 
although throughout the medieval period, most persons were still humble and content with their 
providence. TI1is development has built one of the foundations of the modem emphasis on the individual 
and his or her unlimited technical abilities; and thereby-combined with the demystified nature-the 
basis of the destructive realisation of the biblical instruction "subdue the earth and have dominion over 
the fish ofthe sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing."222 
c) Universalia -from Realism to Nominalism 
The emphasis on the creative powers of the individual human, IS paralleled by an important 
epistemological development: universalia-for example the species like 'squarehood' or 'doghood' 223-
become individualised. A traditional realist understanding of universalia would regard species as 
existing general entities. Contrary to this the nominalists predominant in the late medieval period, like 
William Ockham (c. 1285-1348), regarded species as unreal (neither ante rem nor in re): universals 
were only abstract notions which we build up in our mind (universalia in intellectu). 
This resembles an 'individualisation' in two respects: firstly the human being now individually 
constructs the world, so traditions are less important than before. Secondly the single individual entity 
is real, not the general one. 
It will be shown that the outlined concepts of machina mundi and alter deus, combined the rise of 
nominalism, still build the underlying agenda of many modem approaches. 
3.3 Modern Philosophy- Nature as Clockwork, Creator as Watchmaker 
During the Renaissance ancient thought was rediscovered in all its colourfulness: The books of Plato 
and Aristotle were now read in their original versions and not onJy their medieval commentaries. The 
pre-Socratics, like Democritus, the Greco-Roman traditions of Epicureanism and Stoicism, but also the 
221 Genesis, 1 ,26. 
222 Ibid. l ,28. 
223 On universals in general :l footnotes 912, 938. 
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occult traditions, like Cabbalism, and much else had been adopted. Within this great motley of 
Renaissance thought two broad intellectual movements stand out, humanism on the one hand and the 
rise of natural science on the other224 
We will see that these movements still carried on the Christian hidden agenda of the human as alter 
deus, and the universe as machina mundi. This is the case although God, the central notion of medieval 
thought, became less and less important in the course of modem philosophy. 
a) The Rise of Science- the Alter Deus Explores the Clockwork of God: 
Copernicus, Bacon, Newton 
The rise of science corresponded with an increasingly mechanistic account of nature. This account 
was made possible paradoxically by the revival of Platonic thought in the late medieval period and the 
Renaissance, combined with an increasing nominalist materialistic tmderstanding of substance. 
At least most of the early mechanists, like Newton, still thought that they were totally consistent with 
theology, because they had revealed mechanisms, eternal patterns, the eidos, which are the eternal ideas 
in the mind of god. 225 Driven by the notion of the machina mundi of the late medieval period and by the 
monotheistic de-enchantment of nature, the mechanistic understanding of nature celebrated one victory 
after another. 
In the year of his death, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), a Polish astronomer and orthodox 
ecclesiastic, published De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium, where he elaborated the hypothesis that 
the earth revolves the sun. Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) gave a unifying mechanical account of falling 
bodies and of inertia. Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) showed that the movement of the planets is 
elliptical, which was seen as evidence against the Aristotelian (and Copernican) conception that 
movement is naturally circular. But in Kepler's view still the Platonic-Pythagorean aspect was more 
important than the materialistic one; hence he as an astronomer could regard himself a priest of God's 
book of nature226 
Fra.ncis Bacon (1561-1626), himselfLord Chancellor of England, fonnulated the subliminal ideology 
of the flourishing mechanistic science. He banned teleological explanations (causa .ftnalis) from science 
and thereby gave way to modern thought, focusing mainly on causa efficiens (causality) and causa 
materia/is (matter). "Inquiry into final causes is sterile, and like a virgin consecrated to God, produces 
nothing "227 Bacon became the high priest of the new science. Bacon turned against Aristotelianism and 
gave support to Platonism, which then moulded the English philosophy of nature. 228 He continued and 
accentuated the Christian zeal of the god-like scientist, the alter deus, to read in the 'book of nature' 
224 D. Cooper. World Philosophies (1996), pp. 226-237. 
225 E. g.: R. Groh; D. Groh. Religiose Wurzeln derokologischen Krise (1991/1990), pp. 17 f 
226 Letter from Kepler to Herwart van Hohenburg, 26.3.!598. Mentioned in: !bid, pp. 25-26, footnote 5!. 
227 Quoted in without source in: l D. Barrow & F. l Tip! er. The Anthropic Principle (199011986 ), p. 49. 
228 Mentioned by R. Groh, D. Groh Religiose Wurzeln der okologischen Krise ( !99!11990), p 36. 
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and to explore the machina mundi so as to change this world But by dismissing teleological 
explanations, still central to Platonic schoolmen, Bacon contributed to the transformation of English 
Platonism into a mechanical Platonism and finally into mechanical materialism. 
This outlined early scientific, and philosophical229, development culminated in lsaac Newton's 
(1643-1724) paradigmatic book Philosophia Natura/is Principia Mathematica (1687). Nature now had 
\)ecome "this vast Machine of the Universe, the wise Production of Almighty God, consisting of a great 
number of lesser Machines, every one of which is adjusted by the same Wisdom in Nature, Weight and 
Measure"230 The metaphor of the machina mundi, which referred at first, in the translation of Plato's 
Timaeus by Chalcidius (:> p. 81), to the living whole of the universe- 'zoon ·-, has changed its 
meanmg to a dead machine, once made by a divine constructor and now running without any 
intervention. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth century the plain metaphor that the universe is a Clockwork once 
made by a divine watchmaker became increasingly common. 231 Kepler for example wrote in a letter that 
his ain1 is to show that "celestial machinery is not something like a divine living organism, but like a 
clockwork"232 To hin1, as to Newton and Leibniz these metaphors refer to both a mechanistic universe, 
but also to the eternal harmony once created by a deistic God, who does not interfere with the actual 
world after its initial creation. 
New science, in its early reading, was taken not to undennine theology, but on the contrary as 
providing evidence for a more rational theology. In those times of religious struggles, basing theology on 
a scientific argument of design also seemed to prevent dangerous religious disputes. 233 Accordingly early 
modem scientists were still often vigorous believers in a deistic, but omniscient, watchmaker, which was 
much more than today's neo-Darwinian belief in only a 'blind watchmaker' 234 . 
b) Humanism- the Alter Deus Replaced the Christian Deus 
The second aspect of Christian dogma shaping modern thought is its humanism. The humanistic 
belief in the value of the human being has been linked to the Christian belief in the inherent worth of the 
human, as being created in the image of God. Accordingly humans are regarded as creatures between 
beasts and divinity. In the Renaissance the notion of the human as the alter deus had even be 
radicalised, by emphasising the free and god-like human ability to create and change the physical world. 
229 G. Bolm1e. Philosophische Grundlagen der Newtonischen Mechanik ( 1989/ 1993), pp. 278-295. 
230 J. Harris. Lexicon Technicum. London 170411710, Article 'Nature'. Quoted in J. Mittelstrass. Le ben m it der Natur 
(1991/1987), p. 39. 
231 K. Gloy. Das Verstdndnis der Natur. Die Geschichte des wissenschafllichen Denkens ( 1995), Bd. I, p. 166. 
232 Quoted Ibid, pp. 166, 311. (Letter from the lOth of Feb. 1605. English translation by the author. OriginaL "Scapus 
meus hie est, ut Caelestem machinam dicam non esse instar divinj animalis, sed instar horologij". Johannes Kepler in 
seinen Briefen. ed. by M. Caspar & W. von Dyck. Bd. I, Mi.inchen, Berlin ( 1930), p. 219. 
233 R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurzeln der okologischen Krise ( 1991/ 1990), pp. 31-34, 46. 
234 R. Dawkins. The Blind Watchmaker (1991/1986). 
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Mankind has the right and the duty to understand and to creatively change the mechanical world, to 
make use and even to exploit nature. Correspondingly early scientists and engineers explore nature and, 
based on this knowledge they invent machines. Between 1550 and 1750 there was a flood of so-called 
machine books, optimistically linking descriptions of constructions with theological or philosophical 
instructions. Here the argument of design was used the other way round, the mechanist, the engineer is 
constructing machines in analogy to the creating God. 235 
Hence as early modem science is linked to the Christian notion of machina mundi. the technical 
construction of machines is linked to the notion of the alter deus. These two developments are in the 
further course of history still interacting: on the one hand the understanding of the laws of God's nature 
built the basis for building machines, on the other hand the metaphor of machina mundi will become 
refommlated in terms of machines current at certain times (e. g. clockwork and today, perhaps, 
computers). 
Moreover, the predominant belief in the value of the human being served and still serves as a basis of 
most systems of Western ethics. Although the notion of God through Reformation, deism, agnosticism 
and atheism had been increasingly removed from the modem Weltbild, the idea of human value is still 
with us. The alter deus, with all his creativity and freedom, replaced the deus of Christianity. 
Humankind has followed the Christian demand and became almost god-like. We learned to create nearly 
everything: materials, machines, artificial environments like houses and, today, by genetic engineering 
even organisms and, in principle, humans themselves. Hence, there seems to be less and less need for the 
notion of God as creator. 
By means of this removal of the Christian god, modem philosophy became confronted with two main 
problems: 
• Firstly, ethics increasingly emphasising the notion of the alter deus has lost support of the notion of 
a good God and become at least in danger of undennining its own basis. Today the partly divine 
human nature, and therefore its ethical value, has come under attack (:> already pp. 48). We 
recognise an irony of history: The Christian belief in human value is, by realising its consequences 
and by replacing God, in danger of undennining itself 
It is one main modem task to build an ethical system not based on God, but on reason. This can be 
seen as trying to build humanism independently of its own original basis. The alternative is to build it 
on reasoning, which is of course itself a very humanistic notion. By doing this, philosophers of the 
enlightenment, often involuntarily, saved and carried on the Christian (and modem) hidden agenda to 
emphasise the unique human value. 
• Secondly, ethics is under attack from the-also Christian based-belief in a mechanic universe. If 
the first problem, to give reason for the value of the human and humane, is not solved, an inclination 
m R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurze/n der oko/ogischell Krise (1991/1990), p. 60. 
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arises for the mechanistic view of nature to be also applied to humanity itself Hence the balanced 
dichotomy of mechanistic nature on the one hand and partly divine human nature on the other, is in 
danger of collapsing into a mechanistic monism. This mechanistic approach would exactly destroy 
that value, which it once aimed to support It was especially Darwin who will move the boundaries 
between machina mundi and alter deus, as he gave a largely mechanistic account of biology and at 
least the origin of humankind. 
Early modem philosophical accounts have still tried to keep the balance of the concept of human 
uniqueness and the concept of a mechanistic universe. Descartes' dualistic philosophy can be regarded 
as the first modem attempt to combine, on the one hand, the increasingly mechanistic assumptions of 
physics and astronomy, and, on the other, the uniqueness of the human and humane. 
c) Descartes and Kant- Dualism of Human Freedom and the Clockwork of 
Nature 
Rene Descartes (1596-1650), educated at the Jesuit college of La Fleche, is normally seen as 'the 
father of modem philosophy', and, despite generations of further predecessors, I think rightly. His first, 
and he thinks undeniable premise after all his Cartesian doubt, is the 'cogito ergo sum '-not God. 
Although Des cartes 'proves' the existence of God in the second step, it is important that in the tirst step 
it was possible for him, to start with the assumption of an evil deceitful demon, who is using all his 
power to mislead him. 
The absolute certainty of the cogito, of the I am thinking, carnes on the Christian belief in 
uniqueness of the human, and leads to its modem subjectivist form. Following his argument, the first 
thing one can conclude from the cogito is that there is a sum, an existing T characterised by its 
thinking. If we are thinking, the first thing which is necessary given is a 'thinking thing' (res cogitans). 
It is crucial that this thinking thing is defined completely independent from the body. 
The second key notion of Descartes' dualism is the material 'extended thing' (res extensa). 
Descartes gives the example of wax, which loses its qualities when it is heated. According to Descartes 
this example shows that qualities are changing and only matter, whose essence is extension, persists. 
Descartes, himself also a significant mathematician and scientist, shared the mechanical and deter-
ministic view at which the physics and astronomy of his time had arrived. In Le Monde an early treatise 
of him on physics, he had already abandoned the scholastic concept of fom1. The complete 
transfonnation of Platonism resulted in a mechanistic, atomistic approach applied to all 'things' apart 
fom1 the human res cogitans. Descartes "regarded the bodies of men and animals as machines; animals 
he regarded as automata, governed entirely by the laws of physics, and devoid of feeling or 
consciousness. [ ... ] If we knew enough, we should be able to reduce chemistry and biology to 
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mechanics; the process by which a seed develops into an animal or a plant is purely mechanical."236 By 
this the Aristotelian idea of entelecheia and self-organisation (autopoiesis) had been ruled out-as is 
important in this context-also in biology. 
The Cartesian position, like other dualist philosophies of a free mind and a detennined body, 
implies-driven by the dyadic notions of the alter deus and the machina mundi-two of the most grave 
modem philosophical problems. 
(a) Starting from the side of alter deus or res cogitans, how could the gulf to the machina mundi or 
res extensa be bridged? This is the radicalised modem question of epistemology and truth. 
(b) Starting from the side of machina mundi or res extensa, hmv could the gulf to the alter deus or 
res cogitans be bridged? This is the main modem question of ontology, anthropology or, more precisely, 
the modem mind-body problem. 
Immanuel Kant ( 1724-1804 ), the most significant philosopher of the enlightenment, carried on 
Desca.rtes' approach to save ethics in an deterministic Newtonian phenomenal world, by giving it a 
subjectivist turn. Kant "found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith"237 He 
went on with David Hume's (1711-76) sceptical answer to the epistemological question, which Hume 
applied even to causal explanations in general, which have been the core of the prevailing Newtonian 
physics. Kant agreed with Hume that we could not conclude from mere associations on a causal 
structure of reality. He states that although there is something out there, it is basically not possible to 
get knowledge about the 'thing in itself (Ding an sich). 
But Kant again retained some features of the world of appeara.r1ces by his conceptual shift, sin1ilar to 
the shift of Copemicus, who found that we should seek "the observed motions not in the heavenly 
bodies, but in their observer"238 : To Kant space a.r1d time are still existent in the sense that they are 
necessary conditions of our sensibility. Causality, likewise, is a necessary notion to make our experience 
possible. Ka.r1t calls this type of notion 'category' ('Kategorie' or 'Verstandesbegriff a priori') 239 With 
his subjectivist stance, at least in an epistemological sense, Kant is part of the individualistic current of 
his time, which has-as we have seen-reaches back to the veneration of the human being as alter deus. 
However, by his subjectivist stance Kant distances himself from the deist Newtonian view, that the 
eternal mathematical clockwork of nature is created by God, as clockmaker. To Kant the rational 
being-the huma.r1-' creates' God, as an 'idea of reason' only imposed by us to the world. These ideas 
of reason could neither be proved, nor disproved. 
236 B. RusselL History ofWestem Philosophy (1991/61/46), pp. 545-546. 
237 I. Kant. Kritik der reinen Vemunfi. p. B XXX, my translation. ("Ich mul3te also das Wissen aufheben, urn zum Glauben 
Platz zu bekommen".) 
238 !bid, p. B XXll. My translation of "die beobachteten Bewegungen nicht in den Gegenstanden des Himmels, sondem in 
ihrem Zuschauer". 
239 !bid, p. A 80, B I 06. 
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Besides the subjectivist approach Kant also shares with Descartes some sort of dualism. In his third 
critique 'Krttik der Urteilskrajt' he gave an outline of his whole 'transcendental' philosophy: 
Accordingly philosophy is divided into two distinct parts; practical philosophy, which is based on our 
knowledge a priori of the moral law and our freedom and theoretical philosophy, which is based on our 
knowledge a priori of nature240 The border between the worlds of practical and theoretical reason now 
cuts through the single subject: the totally causally detem1ined self within the physical world and the self 
as a completely free rational being. 
Kant in the second part of the Critique of Judgement tries to bridge the gap of these two approaches 
m his philosophy of biology. Although Kant in his theoretical philosophy had come, despite his 
subjectivist-logical turn, to similar results to Newton's, and phenomena (not noumena or Dinge an sich) 
were regarded as moving causally detennined (causa efficiens) and machine-like in space and time, 
Kant in the third critique-at least to some extent-also re-established the notion of teleology (causa 
finalis) as an organising (regulative) principle, which connects our knowledge of nature and of moral 
truth 241 Hereby Kant's philosophical account of biology, partly inspired by the reading of 
J. F. Blumenbach, turned against an exclusively mechanistic picture of the organism. Organisms are 
both their own cause and effect. The parts of an organism are according to Kant only understandable 
when referring to the whole: different from a clock they exist not only for the other parts of the whole, 
but because of the other parts 242 Teleology, in Kant's view, helps us to structure our perception of the 
deterministic nature for the use of practical philosophy. But to Kant this regulative principle is only a 
useful intellectual tool to structure the multitude of appearances, not like causality a constitutive 
necessary one 243 (For example,-according to Kant-it is reasonable to say that the photosynthesis is a 
means to the end of supplying energy for the plant's metabolism. Nevertheless any understanding will be 
fundamentally also be causal.) 
In summary then, in Kant's transcendental philosophy, with his great new answer to the 
epistemological problem, the concept of machina mundi is carried on within theoretical reason by the 
mainly causally determined universe of appearances, and the concept of the alter deus is in a sublime 
way carried on by the freedom within practical reason. He tries to make both realms compatible by 
introducing teleology as a regulative idea. Hence, it has been possible to Kant to be impressed by both, 
"the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me"244 
2~0 I. Kant. Krltik der Urteilskraft (1799/ 1793/1790), pp. XVI-XX. 
w !bid, part ll 
2~ 2 Mentioned in: M. Weingarten. Organismen-Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution ( 1993), pp. 18, 21-22; R l Richards. 
The Meaning of Evolution (1992), pp. 22 f. 
2~3 I. Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft (1799/1793/1790), p. 270. 
244 Idem. Kritik der praktischen V emu rift (Critique of Practical Reason). pp. 161-162, original: pp. 288-289 ("der bestirnte 
Himmel tiber mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir"). 
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d) Idealism & Romanticism- the Dynamic Trial of a Unification 
It is One force, One interplay and weaving One drive and impulsion to ever higher l~fe. 
Schelling, In: The Proteus ofNature (1800-1801) 
Building on Kant's conception that all appearances (phenomena), are formed by our own sensibility, 
understanding and reason, and on Kant's conception of the freedom of (practical) reason, the 
philosophers of German Idealism changed and radicalised Kant's approach completely. Inspired by 
Spinoza, they tried to give a unified account of what Kant had tom into two pieces. They eliminated the 
'thing in itself, and built up a pure (transcendental) Geistesphi losophie, which should comprise both 
parts, nature and what we might call human logos or nous. 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) starts in his main work, Wissenschaftslehre, with the I (Jch). 
The first necessary distinction is that the absolute I sets the 'Non-I' (Nicht-Ich), and by this also a 
'remaining' e45 This is the distinction ofworld and self. which all of us experience within ourselves. 
Friedrich Wilhelm J. Schelling (1775-1854) turned this subjective Idealism ofthe young Fichte, into 
an 'objective' one. Influenced by Spinoza's pantheistic idea of the Deus sive Natura, God is to 
Schelling the absolute I. This T, the T of God or of the whole of primordial nature, develops against 
its own resistance, in opposed forces of productivity (natura naturans) and inhibition (natura 
naturata), throughout all stages of nature and human reason. To Schelling nature has been alive from 
its very beginning, and it is rather the permanent than the change which needs to be explained. Nature is 
not a machine but an organism and a soul. This approach radicalised Kant's criticism of an exclusively 
mechanistic account of the biological world, a criticism also present in the accounts of the early 
Naturjorscher Blumbach, Wolf and K.ielmeyer246 Schelling already advocated an unfolding of nature, 
an evolution in the much more original sense of the word (ex-volvere), although he emphasised an 
idealised, theoretical and partly a prioric conception, and not an empirical one. This (ideal) development 
culminates and has its end in humanity, where nature comes to consciousness. 247 
Schelling's objective idealism and also Joham1 Wolfgang von Goethe's (1749-1832) holism 
dominates the idealist or romantic tmderstanding of nature. The poetic movement of romanticism was 
also influenced by Kant and the romantic philosophers. For example, the English romantic poets Blake, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats, Byron, Shelley and Scott-albeit speaking a more poetic language-
share many views with these philosophers 248 
245 J. G. Fichte. Grund/age der gesamten Wissenschafts/ehre (1794 ), p. I. 104. 
246 R. J. Richards. Meaning of Evolution ( 1992), p. 28; Th. Bach. Kie/meyer a/s 'Vater der Naturphi/osophie '? (1994 ). 
247 Important works of Schelling's early period, during which he expanded his Naturphi/osophie were: Ideen zu einer 
Phi/osophie der Natur (1797), V on der We/tsee/e ( 1798, 2"d 1806, 3'd 1809), Erster Entwuif eines Systems der 
NatUiphi/osophie (1799). 
248 There is much material on this topic. See e. g. M. Sherwood. Undercurrents of Influence in English Romantic Poetry. 
AMS Press: New York ( 1971/34 ). 
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The notion of romanticism, like most interesting abstract notions, is at once indispensable and misleading. There are 
many different meanings of the term, slightly differing from literature to the sciences, from country to country. Often 
especially in the English speaking countries 'Romanticism' is used in a quite broad sense, closely linked to the work of 
Rousseau, the rise of objective idealism, to the work of Schelling, Hegel and Goethe. Historically speaking the penod 
between 1790-1830 and into the 19th century is meant. 
But although I am also going to use 'r~manticism' in this broad sense, it has to be noted that Goethe, for example, 
never considered himself a Romantic. Gem1an history of literature often distinguishes between Klassik, and Friihromantik, 
HocHromantik, Spatromantik. Kant although also often subsumed under this broad meaning249 , conceptually and in stile 
was at odds with the idealists who abandoned any 'thing in itself and with the rather poetic romantics. Also Hegel actually 
turned against Romanticism in its more strict sense. There are also other tenns to cover a more specific meaning not so 
closely linked with the strongly poetic attitude of the Romantics, like Naturphilosophie, Gem1an idealism, morphology etc. 
Still the broad meaning of Romanticism, is useful to contrast the sketched Naturphilosophie against a purely 
mechanistic approach to Nature. Later on we will distinguish different schools of biology ( :> see also pp. 98 f.). 
Also some scientists had been strongly influenced by these idealist or romantic approach. Romantic 
Naturforscher (literally: investigators of nature) played, as new historical research has shown, an 
important role in the so-called 'Second Scientific Revolution,.zso Romantic scientists, like the physicists 
Johann Wilhelm Ritter251 (1776-1810) and Hans Christian 0rsted252 (1777-1851), the chemist Humphry 
Davy253 (1778-1829) and to a certain extent his assistant Michael Faraday, the biologists(:> pp. 102 f.) 
Lorenz Oken (1779-1851) and Joseph Henry Green (1791-1863), the geographer Alexander von 
Humboldt (1769-1859) and many others were crucial in founding and inspiring many of our today's 
disciplines. "We can no longer simply assent to Justus von Liebig's view that Naturphilosophie was the 
Black Death of the nineteenth century. "254 
Besides a new scientific approach, the ideal of Bildung was the other basis of the central role of Romanticism ill the 
Second Scientific Revolution. Especially in Germany there was a "radical call for 'die Neuerscha!Jimg der Universitdt aus 
dem Geist des deutschen Idea/ismus' ('the new creation of the university out of the spirit of German idealism')." The 
discussion about the new creation of the university started from the "first principles, and exiended from the nature of 
Bildung "255 The philosophers, Schelling, Fichte, Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834 ), Wilhelm v. I-Iumboldt (1767-
1835), Friedrich v. Schiller (1759-1805) and also Kanl, most of them at least associated with idealism or romanticism, 
played the leading role in this movement, also in practical tenns, founding the new Humboldt University of Berlin256 
Romantic ideas have also been i11fluential on the founders ofLondon University and within the United States. 257 
Some of the previously mentioned scientists, like 0rsted, are utterly critical of the obscure and some-
times, in their view, false way Schelling used empirical propositions. 258 Because of this and because of 
their at least partly empirical orientation, it seems sensible to distinguish Romantic Natwiorschung and 
249 A difference in usage is annotated e. g. in D. v. Engelhardt. TFissenschaft und Philosophie der Natur um 1800 (1994), 
p. 257. For examples of a broad usage see: A Cul111ingham; N. Jardine. Romanticism and the sciences (1990). 
A Quintan. Philosophical romanticism (1995), p. 778. 
250 This is the thesis of A Cunningham's and N . .Tardine's anthology Romanticism and the sciences (1990), see pp. 1-9. 
See also e. g.: D. Knight.Science in the Romantic Era (1998). 
251 W. D. Wetzels. J. W. Ritter: Romantic phvsics in Gennany ( 1990). 
252 There is a new edition and translation (by L. & J. B. Homer) of 0rsted' s writings: Soul in Nature with Supplementary 
Contributions, London: Dawsons (1966). See also footnote no. 258. 
253 Ch. Lav.'Tence. The power and the glory;: Hum phi)' Davy and Romanticism ( 1990), D. Knight. Humphrey Davy. Science 
and Power (1998/1992). 
254 D. Knight. Romanticism and the sciences ( 1990), p. 22. · 
255 E. S. ShatTer. Romantic philosophy and the organization of the disciplines [ ... ] ( 1990), p. 38 (both quotes). 
256 In the ideas of university and Bildung the other romantic tenets are recurring: the concept of freedom of thought recurs 
in the concept of scientific freedom; the ultimate unity of all knowledge recurs in the concept of a university with all 
subjects, with the central unifying subject of philosophy and in the unity of teaching and research. 
257 E. S. ShatTer. Romantic philosophy and the organization of the disciplines [ ... ] (1990), pp. 39, 40. 
258 H. A M. Snelders. Oersted's discove1y of electromagnetism ( 1990). 
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Natwphilosophie259 Apart from this, the romantic scientists share with romantic philosophers their 
basic tenets. By introducing these tenets into science, they have already favoured evolutionism 
(~ pp. 102 f.) and paradoxically at least prepared the ground for Darwinism, which then vigorously 
attacked the remaining Romantics. 
I will now outline three defining aspects of Romantic Naturphilosophen or Natwforscher: 260 
Unification, Dynamism and Organicism. 
Unity: To Romantic philosophers and Romantic scientists, following Spinoza's conception of one 
substance, the idea of ultimate unity of the world (and by this of the absolute I, of god) was central: they 
claimed that there is an unity of nature and culture, a unity of mind and body, a unity of forces, a unity 
of body plans and a unity of the scientific and the artistic enterprise. 
Nature and culture are not the opposed realms of necessity and freedom. Nature and culture are both 
alive and organic, they are one unity, developed out of the same origin, understandable with the same 
historico-genetic method. Advocates of objective idealism advocated a necessary 'logical' unfolding of 
logos. Corresponding to these tenets the Romanticists and Idealists also tried to unify the subjective 
(knowledge) and objective (nature) side of consciousness 261 Owing to this urge for unity many of the 
leading Romantic scientists were both scientists and artists or philosophers, like Davy, Goethe, Oken 
and Ritter. One of the features which commonly drove the romantic scientists was this urge for 
unification and the search for a uniting force behind different forces. With the discovery of electro-
magnetism 0rsted united the previously separated physical forces electricity ar1d magnetism; Ritter dis-
covered that ultra-violet rays belong to the electromagnetic spectrum; Davy could introduce the 
fundamental conception of chemistry that chemical affmity and electricity are manifestations of one 
power. The tenet that all force is one "led some men of science in the next generation towards the 
conception of conservation of energy"262 
In all fields of thought, and also in applied areas as education and politics the Romantic tenet of unity was present. For 
example in politics Fichte was one of the main promoters of the unity, still limited, of Gem1m1y m1d U1e biologist Oken got 
involved in the Wartburg(est, a political feast for German freedom and unity. 
Dynamism: The unity of nature and culture is essentially complemented by the idea of a new and 
common history of nature and culture 263 The "unfolding of a generative history of nature through an 
'original intuition"'264 is the aim of Schelling's Naturphilosophie. Similar approaches were taken by the 
late Fichte, Friedrich Holderlin (1770-1843), Navalis (Freiherr v. Hardenberg, 1772-1801) and Johatm 
Gottlieb v. Herder (1744-1803). 
259 Similar: D. v. Engelhardt. Historical consciousness in the Gemwn Romantic Natwforsclmng (1990), p. 56. 
260 Similar: M. Heidelberger. Naturphilosophie ( 1998), p. 739. 
261 D. v. Engelhardt. Historical consciousness ( 1990), p. 56. 
262 D. Knight. Romanticism and the sciences ( 1990), p. 21. 
263 Similar: D. v. Engelhardt. Historical consciousness (1990).p. 63. 
264 A Cunningham; N. Jardine. The age of rejlexion ( 1990), p. 5. 
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Although Schelling had not built up an empirical but an ideal or transcendental evolutionary scheme, 
this ideogenesis or 'dynamic evolution' built the intellectual foundation for the application of the 
historical-genetic method in science and art, and the theory of descent within biology and for 
evolutionism and transformism in general: 
"The eighteenth century begins to perceive nature as subject to change. "265 Many cosmological and 
geological studies state the transformation of nature, which suggests the transformation of the animated 
nature as well 266 
Idealist and romantic biology emphasised both the notion of form or body plan and the notion of 
transformation (for details :> pp. 102 f). Many idealist and romantic authors (e. g. L. Oken, C G. 
Carus, G. R. Treviranus, F. Tiedemann, J. F. Meckel and E. R. Serres, and already K. F. Kielmeyer 
and J _ H. F. Autenrieth) combined these two notions within the concept of a recapitulation, that embryos 
of higher animals pass through stages of lower animals. Embryogeny repeats zoogeny. Tllis concept of 
recapitulation, the 'law of parallelism' or Meckel-Serres law became closely bound to the notion of 
'evolution' 267 
In 1801 Henrik Steffens (1773-1845) explicitly speaks of"a 'theory of evolution', but in the sense 
of an idealist"268 The romantic palaeontologist Georg August Goldfuss (1782-1848) argued 1826 in 
favour of an actual metamorphosis of the animal kingdom, "similar to that of the foetus, its periods 
being contemporary with the formation periods of the globe "269 "It cannot be overemphasised that the 
task of Natwphilosophie was primarily historical, and Oken's definition makes tllis patent 
Naturphilosophie had to demonstrate how the universe originated, and to reconstruct its development or 
Entwicklung from the original Idea thought by God to its highest matlifestation as man."270 Tllis concept 
of an Entwicklung, of an 'evolution' is a deeply romantic one, which Darwin, surely did not invent but 
only changed and cmmected with other concepts ( :> pp. 163 f.). 
Organicism: The analogy of Nature as developing organism, or the gestation of nature is the third 
Romantic tenet, with which I want to deal here. The whole is regarded as more than an accumulation of 
parts. Naturforscher emphasised the notion of the archetype (present in Kant's Critique of Judgement) 
searching, like Goethe, for unifying body plans. To Kant and even more to the idealist and romantic 
Naturforscher organisms are their own sources of activity, witl1 a formative active striving, a 
Blumenbachian-Schellingian Bildungstrieb. Nature is not a mechanism, but alive, or a "slumbering 
265 D. v_ Engelhardt. Historical consciousness (1990), p. 56. 
266 !bid, p. 57_ 
267 For a detailed accout of these recapitulation theories, and their influence on Darwin, see: R J. Richards. The Meaning 
of evolution (1992), esp. chapter 3, 4, 5 and p. 47. 
268 D. v. Engelhardt. Historical consciousness ( 1990), pp. 57 f. 
269 G. A. Goldfuss. Grundriss der Zoologie (1826), p. 33. 
270 E. Richards. The Romantic gestation a_{ nature (1990). p. 132. 
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spirit"271 In the poems ofthe great romantic chemist Davy "nature is not 'it' but[ ... ] 'she'; personified 
and active, 'natura naturans' rather than 'natura naturata', in progress rather than complete: God is 
working his purpose out. "272 This aspect shows that the romantics certainly were hostile to the 
enlightenment's mechanical account of nature. 
The Breakdown of Romantic Science. Apart from the massive sublime influence of Romanticism 
on science, generally Romanticism has finally failed its quest to build up a unified, holistic framework 
of human knowledge. The positivist account seized power in science in general and also in biology. Of 
course, we know today-and this has been long ignored273 -that even positivist accounts were strongly 
influenced by Romanticism. Especially the belief in the ultimate reality and unity of forces and also the 
dynamic account of nature and culture became accepted basic assumptions in science and art. Still, 
apart from these influences, the different positivistic, mainly mechanistic paradigm took over. 
But why then had Romanticism and Objective Idealism failed? Although the answer is presumably 
highly complex, I will try to provide a provisory one: I think Romanticism and Objective Idealism were 
from their beginning basically one-sided. Despite the romantic ain1 to unify, to synthesise the 
(seemingly) opposed realms of subject and object, of 'I' and world, of nature and culture, Fichte and 
later Schelling built their systems only on one of Kanf s 'two worlds': they mainly built their system on 
the side of the freedom of reason, on the side of the transcendental I. Although it might be their merit to 
emphasise the necessity of (a priory) rational construction within science, at least some proponents of 
this approach underestimated the importance of empirical testability. Because of this, many concepts, 
especially the transcendental constructions of the genius Schelling, 'lost ground' and became cryptic 
Romanticism became dominantly "poetic and aesthetic"274 and in parallel many different creative ideas 
arose. Even Science was pluralistic and speculative. Navalis declared: "The ways of contemplating 
nature are innumerable"275 At its worst, 'facts' of science were ignored: D. H. F. Link, "a most 
respected Naturforscher [ ... ] complained that the Naturforscher had been advised to forget everything 
he had learned."276 Because of these reasons Th. H. Huxley-the bitter enemy of Owen-, who became 
"probably the single most influential and destructive English-speaking critic of the 'metaphorical 
mystifications' of Naturphilosophie' opposed sharply the 'wild-eyed speculations', 'oracular 
utterances' and general verbal gymnastics of the unruly Romantics". 277 
271 F. W. J. Schelling. Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur), (179711988), p. 42. 
(Quoted by D. Cooper: World Philosophy, 1996, p. 310.) 
272 D. Knight. Romanticism and the sciences (1990), p. 14 (paraphrasing P. Piper). 
273 According e. g. to: A. Cmmingham; N. Jardine. Romanticism and the sciences ( 1990). 
274 !bid, p. 5. Also e. g.: N. Jardine. Naturphilosophie and the kingdoms of/lature (1996), p. 232. 
275 Navalis. Werke. H.-J. Mahl, R. Sanmel (eds.) Munch en (1978-87). Vol. ll, p.234. (Quoted in: N. Jardine, E. C. Spray. 
Natures of cultural history ( 1996), p. 4.) 
276 S. R. Morgan. Schelling and his 'Naturphilosophie' ( 1990), p. 35. 
277 E. Richards. 'Metaphorical mystifications ': the Romantic gestation of nature in British biology ( 1990), p. 130. 
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Still, Objective Idealism and Romanticism founded an tmpressive body of speculation and 
knowledge, and in my opinion it was wrong to dismiss this current altogether. True, I do not see 
a straight way back to this paradigm, but we may still regard this paradigm as an old sunken treasure, 
containing perhaps not only false strings of pearls. Especially in biology we might find conceptions 
(~pp. 102 f.), which have been neglected by the mainly mechanistic account of the positivist 
successors. 
In addition Romanticism moulded the currents which came afterwards. On the side of philosophy 
Romanticism got 'cleaned' of its central idealistic assumptions and was changed to a hollow dynamism, 
found in the philosophy of will and then in the philosophy of life. On the side of science the concept of 
evolution was carried on, but in a increasingly different positivistic and mechanistic framework 
3.4 The Rise of Biology as Science- Torn Between Eternal Form and Evolution 
Aristotle founded European biological taxonomy and biology two thousand years earlier than 
Linnaeus and he was highly influential not only during the medieval ages but at least till the 18th 
century. For example, only Lamarck renamed Aristotle's classification of all animals into 'blooded' and 
'bloodless' as 'vertebrates' and 'invertebrates'. 278 Aristotle's general philosophy has already been 
mentioned before (~ p. 79), and here only his influence on taxonomy will be mentioned. 
Aristotle had already described more than 500 species and arranged them in his Historia animalium 
(History of Animals) hierarchically along what was later called the scala naturae (Great Chain of 
Being). He had also included man among the quadrupeds. 
After translations of Aristotle's zoological works from Arabic279 , scholastic 'biologists' from the 
thirteenth century on were strongly influenced by Aristotle. But they passed over the dynamic and 
reproductive aspects of Aristotle's theory. The scholastics emphasised our proximity to angels and 
removed humans from nature. 280 So it is important to distinguish between the ancient and the mediaeval 
Aristotle. The scholastics transformed Aristotle's hierarchical taxonomy into a linear Great Chain of 
Being, with its origin rather in God than in matter, normally conceived in a completely static sense281 
It was only in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century that biology emerged as a specialised 
science. Although Litmaeus and Buffon made important steps in building up this science, they were 
both still general naturalists, also working on the kingdom of minerals and on geological development 
Around 1800 several authors independently atmounced the birth of 'biology' as a new scientific 
discipline. The tem1 'biology' emphasised a specific methodology for studying organisms and was 
coined in contrast, on the one hand, to mere descriptions or classifications of nature and, on the other 
hand, to the exclusive mechanistic account predominant in physics: In 1797 Roose and in 1800 
278 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 152. 
279 Only mentioned by A L. Peck. Introduction to his trm1slation of Aristotle's De partibus animalium (1937), p. l 0. 
280 L. Schiebinger. mammals, primatology and sexology ( 1994 ), pp. 186 f. 
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Burdach282 coined this term. In 1802 Treviranus a1mounced the birth of a new scientific discipline283 and 
almost in parallel, Lan1arck made a similar application of the term 'biology' 284 
It is difficult to structure the manifold different biological theories of that time-a time before the 
regime of Darwinism gave biology a unifying framework. Although many disputes are often described 
dichotomically, I think it is reasonable to distinguish at least the following three dominant groups:285 
a) Romanticising Materialistic Biology, focusing on the transmutation of species or organisms. 
b) Transcendental Biology, with the central concept of a necessary form or structure of an organism. 
a) Romantic (and German Idealist) Biology, with the concept of the unfolding of nature (evolution in 
the literal sense). This concept combines an emphasis on structure and on development of nature. 
After a section on Linnaeus these groups will be described successively (section b, c, d). In 
conclusion I will once again give a comparative overview to justify this classification. 
a) Hierarchical Taxonomy Instead of 'Scala Naturae'- Linnaeus 
Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778), also called Carl van Linne, is often regarded as the 'father' of modem 
biological taxonomy. Of course there were also 'grandparents' in the early modem era, who could not 
be treated here 286 
Linnaeus worked on all three classical kingdoms of nature, vegetable, animal and mineral. His 
hierarchical taxonomic 'tree' (each entity is only part of one higher entity) had five levels: class, order, 
genus, species and variety. Since Philosophia botanica (1751) Linnaeus gave orga1lisms generally two-
word names, denoting their genus and species. He overca1ne the habit of longer and transient phrase-
nanles, which themselves gave a short description and contrasted the animal with other animals287 
Certainly, he did not always display a 'natural' order, but at least he founded a stable, communicable 
and internationally accepted system of classification, which became a common basis for modem 
biology. 
281 D. Dennett proposes the metaphor of a chandelier hanging from God. In: Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), p. 64. 
282 But Burdach, teacher of von Baer, still refered to the specialised meaning of the study of man. R. J Richards. Meaning 
of Evolution (1992), pp. 17-18. 
283 See: T. Lenoir. Morphotypes in Romantic biology ( 1990), p. 119. 
284 T. G. A. Roose. Gnmdzuge der Lehre von der Lebenskra.ft. Braunschweig (1797, 2"d ed. 1800); K. F. Burdach. 
Proptideutik zum Studium der gesammten Heilkunst. Leipzig ( 1800), p. 62; G. R. Treviranus: Biologie oder Philosophie 
der belebten Natur (1802) Gottingen, Bd. 1, p. 2. J. B. Lamarck. Recherches sur 1 'organisation des corps vivans. Paris 
(1802), p. 202. 
Quoted by: D. v. Engelhardt. Wissenschafz und Philosophie der Natur um 1800 ( 1994 ), p. 260. 
285 Later on it will be shown how some dichotomies can be derived from this classification (:> p. Fehler! Textmarke 
nicht definiert. ). 
J. C. Greene implicitly also distinguishes in The Kulmian Paradigm and the Dmwiman Revolution in Natural Histm·y 
(1971/1981) three similar types of theories, pp. 38-46. 
286 I have to skip naturalists and taxonomists like Hieronymus Bock ( 1489-1554 ), Andrea Cesalpino ( 1519-1603 ), Jolm 
Ray (1627-1705), Joseph Pitton de Tournefort (1656-1708) because the work of Linnaeus was most influential. See 
E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982 ). 
287 L. Koemer. Car/ Linnaeus in his time and place ( 1996), p. 149. 
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Linnaeus' system was by no means created ex nihilo. He adopted parts of his structure and many 
names from Aristotle. For example, the names of the classes in which he divided the animal kingdom 
(Aves, Amphibia, Pisces, Insecta, Vermes and Quadrupedia) are derived from the Latin translations of 
terms used already by Aristotle. Linnaeus himself only coined the class label 'Mammalia', replacing the 
Aristotelian tem1 'Quadrupedia' in later editions of his 5'ystema Naturae 288 
In his first and canonical 1Oth edition (1735/ 1758) of his .S'ystema naturae he classified men very 
closely to monkeys. In the first edition he lumped men together with them under the Anthropomorphia 
division of the Quadrupedia and later he put Homo sapiens together with Homo troglodytes (orang-
I H 789 utan) under t 1e genus omo.-
It is obvious that such a mere classification is not free of any implicit theory. The way Linnaeus de-
scribed and ordered nature has many theoretical and even socio-politicae90 aspects. Linnaeus believed in 
the rational order of God's creation, in the fixity of species (in his later days at least in the fixity of 
major groups) and because of this in the possibility of an adequate taxonomy of clearly distinguished 
taxons. On the other hand, this taxonomy could also be seen as a preparation for the overcoming of the 
idea of a linear order of a scala naturae: his hierarchical tree-fom1ed taxonomy is the basis for the 
scientific conception of phylogenesis as a branching process with a conunon descent, stated by 
transformists like Geoffroy St. Hilaire and later on by Darwin. 
b) (Romanticising) Materialistic Biology- Buffon, Lamarck 
I call this school-in an apparent contradiction in ten11S- 'Romanticising' Materialistic Biology, 
because the father of tllis school, Buffon, who could be regarded as the first modem 'biologist' who 
proposed evolutionism, is not only conunonly regarded as a materialist, but had also been strongly 
influenced by Spinoza, favourite oftl1e German Romantic philosophers. 
Go•·ges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon (1707-88) was the first influential modem naturalist who 
speculated about the transformation of species. He not only very early introduced some philosophical 
concepts to biology, but he also gave an example of great scholarly work, especially with llis main work 
Histoire naturelle (1749-1789), which when completed, consisted of 36 volumes. 
Buffon disputed Linnaeus' system291 and focused himself not so much on the abstract and fixed 
defmition of animals, but studied living animals in their natural surroundings, focusing on geographical 
differences 292 He defined species in terms of tl1e possibility of interbreeding rather than morphology 293 
He realised differences of species in different ecosystems which led him to speculations about why these 
288 L. Schiebinger. mammals, primatologv and sexologv ( 1994 ), pp. 185 f. 
But Cuvier still used the tenn "quadrupeds" in his great 'fossils' volumes of 1812. 
289 D. Knight. Ordering the World (1981 ), pp. 57, 79-80. 
290 L. Schiebinger shows how the patriarchal view of Li.nnaeus is parly fossilised in the present taxonomy Mammals, 
primatologv and sexologv ( 1994 ). Gender and natural history ( 1996). 
291 C. J. Greene. Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Histmy ( 197111981 ), pp. 34-37. 
292 D. Young. Discovery a_{ Evolution ( 1992), p. 61. 
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differences arise: species can, according to him, to a certain extent adapt to their enviromnent, but they 
could also degenerate and become extinct. At first, he believed that all of today's species derived from 
40 prototypical species, while the late Buffon even played with the idea of common descent. 294 When 
Buffon in 1749 proclaimed his theory of the formation of the earth, he called forth a strong critical 
response, particularly on religious grounds. But in 1778, when he published Les epoches de la nature 
(The Epochs of Nature). a supplementary volume to his Histoire naturelle, he was only perfunctorily 
criticised for his claim that human history is only the last of seven epochs of the development of 
nature295 
Buffon 's philosophical background is-as mentioned earlier-not sufficiently described by simply 
calling him a materialist. It is indeed true that he dismissed the doctrine of final causes: "Those who 
believe they can answer these questions by final causes do not perceive that they take the effect for the 
cause"296 But unlike Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Paul Baron d'Holbach (1723-1789), his ultimate 
constituents of Nature were living and active. Although Buffon used a deistic language, he had a 
pantheistic philosophy, originating in Spinoza's 'deus sive natura' (God or Nature). Even more 
explicitly Jean Baltiste Robinet ( 1735-1820) presented a view of cosmic vitalism. 297 
Jean-Baptiste de Lamarck ( 1744-1829) stated his explicit theory of evolution at the Museum 
National d'Histoire Naturelle (National Museum of Natural History) in Paris, which was founded 
during the French revolution with the commission to build up a rational biology "that would mirror the 
rationality of the new France and would distance it from the chaotic medievalism of the ancien 
I • JJ298 
regzme 
Lamarck was influenced by Buffon, whose son he tutored and who had, in pre-revolutionary times, 
been the administrator of the Jardin du Roi, which in 1793 was reorganised partially by Lamarck as the 
new museum. 
Like Buffon, Lamarck was a convinced evolutionist. Lamarck thought of a time scheme of millions 
of years for earth history and continental changes. He was convinced of the transformation of animals 
as a consequence of his geological theory,299 through his biological studies of the mollusc collection of 
the Paris Museun130° Corresponding to his optimistic revolutionary zeal he strongly believed in an 
'upward' progression also in nature. Despite this and although later in history saltationist theories were 
subsumed under the term Lan1arckism, Lamarck himself was, like Darwin, not an advocate of 
293 D. Knight. Ordering the World (1981 ), p. 79. 
294 A Wolf. Bu.ffon 's philosophy. In: Hist01y o.fScience, Technology, and Philosophy(?), pp. 792-793. 
295 D. v. Engelhardt. Historical consciousness (1990), p. 64. 
295 Mentioned in: M. Rudwick. Minerals, strata and .fossils ( 1996), p. 285. 
296 G. D. Buffon History o.f animals. Quoted in: J. Barrow & F. Tipler. Design Arguments in Anthropic Cosmological 
Principle. p. 68. 
297 A Wolf. Bu.ffon 's philosophy. In: History o.fScience, Technology, and Philosophy(?), pp. 792-793. 
298 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism evolving (1995), p. 43. 
299 J. C. Greene. Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History ( 197111981 ), pp. 41, 43. 
300 See: E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982), p. 346. 
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essentialism and was convinced of the gradualness of evolutionary change. 301 In this sense he has to be, 
along with Danvin, contrasted with the essentialism of transcendental and romantic biology. 
In his early writings Lamarck assumed only one scale302 of rising complexity. By this he (implicitly) 
took over the Christian idea of the Great Chain of Being and 'dynamised' it. Because of this 
wudirectional process, extinction does not play an important role in Ius system. Although the branching 
remained less central to him than later on to Darwin, from 1800 to 1815 he progressively replaced the 
picture of a linear upward progression by that of a branching tree303 
But to Lamarck the organisms were not objects but agents of this upward directed evolutionary 
process. Active individuals-like revolutionaries-''take their fate into their own handsd04 First in his 
Discours d 'ouverture (1800), then in his Systeme des animaux sans vertebres ( 1801) and in his 
Philosophic Zoologique (1809) species "transformes en une espece nouvelle, distincte de l'autre"305 
Animals are able to face the change of the environment, by actively changing their behaviour, which in 
turn causes a change of their physical properties. In this sense new characters were not directly 
introduced by the environment, but produced as a response to the environment by the internal activities 
of the organism. Acquired properties are not lost in each generation, but they are inherited. 306 
Although Lamarck was a materialist to whom nature was mainly "a law-bound system of matter in 
motion"307, who did not believe in essentialism or teleology, I think it is still correct and necessary to 
describe him also, like Buffon, with the adjective 'romanticising', because his materialism was not 
based on Ne·wton's mechanical vision, but on the idea that matter has "self-creating powers and self-
developing energies "308 . 
c) Transcendental and Essentialist Biology - Cuvier, (early) Owen, Agassiz 
The term 'Transcendental Philosophy' is nornmlly applied to Kant and his followers. It also refers in 
general to a philosophy built on philosophical knowledge a priori 309 Knowledge a priori is a necessary 
precondition to our understanding and is not empirically but in a logical sense true. 'Transcendental 
Biology' would consequently mean the basic biological knowledge derived from such concepts a priori 
301 !bid, pp. 346, 355. 
302 Lamarck had to acknowledge that not all species could be arranged on one scale, he changed this extreme view, 
assuming this scale only for larger taxa. He also stated the brm1ching of lines, but this has never been (as in Darwin's 
theory) the core part of his theory. In Histoire Nature/le des Animaux sans Vertebres (1815) there are two main lines. 
Both especially the articules (vertebrata) m1d inarticules, both are branching. See: F. M. Wuk:etits. Evolutionstheorien 
(1995), p. 40. 
303 E. Mayr. Growth o_(Biological Thought(l982), p. 351. 
304 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Danl'inism evolving (1995), p. 45. 
305 J. B. Lmnarck: Philosophie zoologique ( 1809), I, p. 261. 
306 See: E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 357; D. v. Engelhardt, Wissenschaft und Philosophic um 1800. 
(1994 ), pp. 261-262. 
307 I. C. Greene. Kuhnian Paradign1 and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History (1971/1981 ), p. 42. 
308 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Danvinism evolving (1995), pp. 47-48. 
309 I. Kant. Kritik der Reinen Vemunft. A, Bp. 25, 150. 
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Kant, especially to his Critique of Teleological Judgement, tried to give a unifying account of 
mechanistic and teleological principles. Apart from a certain rehabilitation of teleology as a regulative 
idea, he also formulated the (regulative) concept of a fundamental uniting ground plan of an 
organism. 310 Kant already at least even considered evolution with common descent311 Still Kant' s main 
focus is on necessary structure (in an aprioric sense), whereas Romanticism in the narrow sense 
(~ small print) focused on the evolutionary unfolding and partly still on (aprioric) structure. But it has 
to be conceded that the line between transcendental and romantic biology is blurred. 
Romanticism in the broad sense has been used to cover both accounts ( :> p. 89). Transcendental biologists and 
romantic biologists may be distinguished by referring either predominantlY to Kant or to Schelling. But Schelling built his 
system of Natwphi/osophie on some aspects of Kant' s more rigorous transcendentalism, and some biologists also seem to 
have changed their views along these lines. Moreover, although many biologists of that time had a considerable knowledge 
of philosophy, tl1ey may have drawn from Kant and from Schelling or Goetl1e in a rather eclectic way. Hence iliese two 
approaches have been and often are used synonymously. 
Because ilie notions of transformation and morphology are cmcial to early evolutionary theories, I dare to use them to 
separate arbitrarily tl1e two approaches: romantic biology should be defined wiili reference to ilie notions of transfonnation 
and fonn, whereas transcendental biology should refer only to a partly rehabilitated notion of a prioric or essentialist fonn 
or body plan. 
Classical essentialist biology should also be discussed here under the same heading. As already out-
lined, Platonists, Aristotelians and scholastics have believed in quite different ways in the existence of 
an essence of entities. Normally the underlying, defining and indispensable 'core' of an entity is meant. 
These more directly ontological currents should be lumped together with the more epistemological 
transcendental biology, because on different foundations both could advocate common unity of plan and 
often (at least in the limited sense of an regulative idea) also made use ofthe concept ofteleology. 
In biology we come across terms like transcendental morphology or anatomy, which can refer to 
both a biological discipline and a school which focuses on a unifying plan of the parts of an organism.312 
Proponents have been influenced by Kantianism or by classical essentialist schools. 
Biologists like Cas par Fried rich Wolff (1734-94) and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-1840) 
emphasised the historical-genetic method as biological methodology and that biological phenomena such 
as "ontogenesis, growth and reproduction could not be reduced purely and simply to physico-
mechanical forces. "313 Recently also this role of Karl F riedrich Kielmeyer ( 17 65-1844) had been 
stressed314 By their account these Natw:forscher hoped-like Kant-to "chart a course between the 
Scylla ofreductionistic mechanism and the Charybdis ofvitalism" 315 
310 L Kant. Kritik der Urteilskra.ft ( 1799/1793/1790), pp. 289-298. 
311 Ibid, p. 368 f 
312 Ph. Rehbock. Transcendental anatomy ( 1990). 
313 W. Lefevre. Die Entstehung der biologischen Evolutionstheorie. Frankfurt a111 Main (1984), pp. 26-68. Referred to in: 
T. Lenoir. Morphotypes in Romantic biology ( 1990), pp. 119-120. 
314 K. T. Kranz (ed.). Philosophie des Organischen in der Goethezeit: Studien zu Werk und Wirkung des Natuiforschers 
Car/ Friedrich Kielmeyer (1994 ). 111. Bach. Kielmeyer a/s 'Vater der Naturphilosophie '? (1994 ). ( ~ footnote 318.) 
315 T. Lenoir. Morphotypes in Romantic biology ( 1990), p. 120. 
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Blumbach and Kielmeyer also influenced Schelling and have also adopted some transforrnationalist approach316 Hence, 
it mi2.ht have also been reasonable to class them as romantic Biologists. They provide good examples how difficult a 
distin~ction between transcendental and romantic biology is. Blumbach has even coined the notion 'Bildungstrieb ', crucial 
for romantic biology. 
The most important biologist focusing on the unity of type argument was Georges Cuvier (1769-
1832). He gained influence in the time of the Napoleonic Empire and also in postrevolutionary France 
after the defeat of Napoleon. Like Lamarck and Geoffroy St. Hilaire he worked at the Museum National 
d'Histoire Nature/le. Probably he was more influenced by (the medieval conception of) Aristotle than 
by Kant, because it seems that teleology was more to him than only a regulative idea. Cuvier had spent 
his youth at the Karlsschule in Stuttgart where he had "been steeped in essentialism. "317 There he was a 
fellow student of and tutored by Kielmeyer, who-methodologically influenced by Kant-tumed against 
an exclusive mechanistic account of nature. 318 
Influentially Cuvier advocated the concept of body plans: In his great work Le regne animaP 19 
( 1817) he reduced the basic types of Aristotle and distinguished only four basic body plans or 
embranchements: radiata (e. g., jellyfish and starfish), articulata (e. g., bees and lobsters), mollusca 
(e. g., clams and octopuses) and vertebrata (e. g., fish and men). By this he focused not on the 'vertical' 
linear series of evolution320, like Lamarckism did, but on 'horizontal' unbridgeable differences between 
taxa, say between the exoskeleton of articulata and the i1mer skeleton of the vertebrata. 
He stated the so-called 'principle of correlation': the parts are coadapted to the whole of the 
organism. This corresponds to Aristotle's idea of the principle unifying the parts of an organism (soul) 
or Kant's regulative idea of 'the whole structuring the part'. Because to Cuvier there is no part of an 
organism which can independently change on its own and because of the huge differences of the 
embranchements he, like Linnaeus, was normally considered an advocate of the concept of fixity. 
But even Cuvier adopted the concept that within the embranchements species could accommodate 
their particular structure. 321 Himself famous for his research on fossils, Cuvier had to face the empirical 
fact that not all fossils, which he found around Paris, corresponded to living species. As also the theory 
of migration did not seem to explain the problem, he saved the hard-core of his indeed rather static 
paradigm by adopting geological catastrophism. He believed (like Buffon) that species could become 
extinct. To him there are whole series of e>..'tinct faunas, especially caused by geological catastrophes 322 
316 R. J. Richards. Meaning of Evolution ( 1992 ), pp. 25-2 9. D. v. Engelhardt, Wissenschaft und Philosophie um 1800. 
(1994), p 262. 
317 E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 364. 
318 R. J. Richards. A4eaning o.f Evolution (1992), pp. 18-19. D. v. Engelhardt, Wissenschaft und Philosophie um 1800. 
(1994), pp. 255,260,262. (~footnote 314.) 
319 Frz.: The Animal Kingdom. 
320 Before 1800 Cuvier was similar to Lamarck in being convinced of a linear evolution. 
321 R. J. Richards. The Meaning a_{ Evolution (1992), pp. 51-52. 
322 See: J. C. Greene. Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural History (197111981 ), p 39. 
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Because there had been also newer fossils which could not be found in older strata, he also assumed that 
"new species, based on existing body plans, are inserted by God into a vacated ecological slot"323 
In any case, Cuvier was regarded rather as a strong advocate of the concept of fixed form, in Mayr's 
terms 'essentialism', than of transformation. 
Because of his rather static World View, Cuvier has sometimes been associated \vith reactionary politics opposing in 
the field of biology the radical, democratic ideas of the French Revolution of his opponents Lamarck and Geoffroy 
St. Hilaire. 
Richard Owen (1804-92) is often regarded as 'the British Cuvier'. He was as influential in Britain 
as Cuvier was in France, especially with his main works On the Archetype and Homologies of the 
Vertebrate Skeleton (1848) and On the Nature of Limbs (1849). He took over the methodology of 
comparative anatomy and the concept of body plans. Like Cuvier he also was engaged in a dispute 
against the (mainly materialistic) theory of evolution. 
Robert Edmond Grant and Robert Knox brought mainly Lanmrck's materialistic, but also 
Geoffroy's and Oken's romantic ideas, to Edinburgh. The emerging conflict of Owen versus Grant and 
Robert Knox in the 1830s mirrors the conflict between Cuvier versus Lamarck and Geoffroy St. 
Hilaire. The result of the conflict was also similar. Owen, at that time a non-transformational 
essentialist, at the end of the conflict gained dominance over the romanticising materialist Grant. 
But from the 1840s Owen himself became strongly influenced by later rather evolutionary romantic 
currents ofGermanNaturphilosophie. Because ofthis we might not only call him 'the British Cuvier', 
but also-later in his life-'the British Geoffroy', 324 and because of this we will treat him once more in 
the next section on romantic biology. 
Louis Rodolphe Agassiz ( 1807 -1873), called 'the American Cuvier', was a Swiss-bom palae-
ontologist and the founder of academic biology in the United States. Although he was influenced by 
Oken's Naturphilosophie, while studying with him at Munich, he advocated the fixity of species. Hence 
he is not treated here in the section 'romantic biology', but we deal with him here directly after Cuvier. 
To Agassiz, opposite to today's biology, only genera and all higher taxa have real existence. The 
fom1s of higher taxa outlive the individual and they are like Platonic forms-more real than the 
individuals that exemplify them. Like Cuvier he believed that species could become eA'tinct and are 
separately 'created'.325 Also like Cuvier he focused on a 'horizontal' aspect. Agassiz not only saw the 
differences of body plans of different species, which could not be ordered in one linear Scala naturae, 
but he also focused on different-we would now say-'ecological systems'. To Agassiz each zoological 
region is separately created 326 
323 D. J. Depew & B. Weber. Danvinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 45. 
324 See: Ph. Rehbock. Transcendental anatomy ( 1990), p. 153. 
325 I could not judge here, whether the notion 'creation' to Agassiz might mean something similar as 'unfolding of nature' 
means to the romantics. If this were the case then I would have to treat Agassiz in the class of romantic biology. 
326 
D. Knight. Ordering the World ( 1981 ), p. 113 f ~/ · · "u '~~~ 
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d) Romantic Biology - Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen 
In response especially to Schelling (:> pp. 89 f) objective idealism and romanticism also gained an 
early influence in biology. Later on, at the end of the 191h century, when there was an eclipse of 
Darwinism, similar ideas had their second heyday in biology, corresponding to a world wide revival of 
idealism in philosophy(~ pp. 124 f, 186 f). Here we are concerned with pre-Danvinian approaches. 
In Lorenz Oken's (1779-1851) book 'Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie' (1809-11) Naturphilo-
sophie is to him-as to Schelling-a historical as well as a structural enterprise. Man and Nature have 
both one Entwicklungsgeschichte, with its highest manifestation in the human being. But for the process 
of unfolding, the aspect of forn1 or structure is centraL Even more, differing from the Lilmaean-
Cuvierian tradition, structure is dictating function, not function form 327 Many scholars emphasise that 
Oken 'only' believed in an ideal transformation, not in actual transformation;328 whereas other authors 
seem to have different opinions 329 Anyway, in the tradition of Oken "it becan1e the custom to look upon 
the different forms of anil1mls as developed out of one another"330 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, poet and naturalist was influenced by Spinoza, Schelling and even 
by Erasmus Danvin331 , Charles Danvin's grandfather. In Die Metamorphose der Pjlanzen (1790) 
Goethe argues that the parts of plants could be understood as transformations of one underlyil1g 
structure- that of the ideal leaf He advocated the Blumbachian Bildungstrieb, an illherent drive to 
perfection, although he also accepted the importance of external conditions to evolution, on which 
Danvin would later on rest his theory. Goethe believed that repetition and transformation are crucial 
aspects of evolution. Goethe, like Oken, proposed a vertebral theory of the skull, meaning that the skull 
is composed out of transformed vertebrae. His search for a common archetype, basic to all organisms 
led to his discovery of the human intermaxillary bone. 
Romantic biologists like e. g. Oken, Car! Gustav Carus ( 1789-1869) or Geoffroy St. Hilaire are 
characterised by the focus on the unity of the morphology of an organism, on a conunon archetype, on 
necessary serial development, on an inner tendency to progress, on parallelism of ontogenesis and 
phylogenesis, on (ideal) transformation, and on the phenomenon of homology, which shows that certain 
ideal types of fonns are reached in different lines of evolution. 
The theory of recapitulation became very important for the notion of evolution, linking the notion of individual 
( embryological) and species development (or even ecological development). In early versions the theory of embryo logical 
recapitulation referred to stages of now-existing species, in the later to stages of now-extinct species. 332 
327 J. C. Greene. Kuhnian Paradigm and the Danvinian Revolution in Natural Histmy (19711!981), p. 44. 
328 See e. g.: E. Richard. The Romantic gestation of nature (1990), p. 133: R. l Richards. The Ai/eaning of Evolution 
(1992), p. 42; D. J. Depew & B. Weber Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 49. 
329 According to the Gem1an philosopher R. Low, Oken defines zoology as 'science of the development of species of 
animals' (my transL ), but regards transmutation of species as an insight a priori. Die E11tstehung des Neum in der 
Natur (1984 ), p. 55. The interpretations of Oken may refer to the different importance attributed to knowledge a priori. 
330 K. E. von Baer. Ober Entwicklungsgeschichte der Thiere. Konigsberg (1928), pp. 129-201 (trans. T H. Huxley). 
Quoted in: E. Richards. The Romantic gestation of nature ( 1990), p. 132. 
331 D. King-Hele. Erasmus Danvin and the Romantic Poets ( 1986), pp. 169-171. 
332 This aspect is exellently treated in R. J. Richards. The Meaning ~{Evolution (1992). 
Part II. Chapter 3: Unfolding ofPre-Darwinian Philosophical Conceptions of Nature 103 
Etienne Geoffroy St. Hilaire (1772-1844), who could be referred to as 'the French Oken', was 
influenced via Oken and Carus by Schelling. Organisms are not only natura naturata like in Platonism, 
but to him also natura naturans. 333 He was clearly convinced of actual transformation Still he believed 
like his German predecessors in an inner logic of development, in the explanatory force of concepts like 
serial development, parallelism and homology. To him the structures of the parts of an organism have to 
correspond with the whole in a necessary way (unite de plan). In this respect he is in accordance with 
Cuvier, whom he worked with for a long time. Still, Geoffroy abandoned teleology and even also 
introduced concepts of elimination and adaptation334 In 1820, still following the research programme of 
uniting body plans, he found parallels which united the mollusca and radiata. and the articulata and 
vertebrata. In 1830 he even proclaimed the unity of the whole animal kingdom. This transformational 
unification of the embranchements brought Geoffroy into conflict with Cuvier's fixism. 335 
Geoffroy's alignment with Lamarck in the Cuvier versus Lamarck debate is due to their common 
belief in transfom1ation. But because of their co-operation, conceptual differences between them have 
often been ignored. Geoffroy did not believe in one 'ladder of nature' where every species has to climb 
up from the bottom, but in common descent. Moreover his explanation of evolution was mainly 
structural along idealist/romantic lines rather than being mechanistic, so that Goethe even in his last 
works still tried to support him. 
After the death ofLamarck in 1829, Cuvier managed, because of his reputation and some reasonable 
points in the debate, to finish the dispute in his own favour. On the solemn occasion of Lamarck's 
funeral, Cuvier, according to the tradition of the academy, gave a memorial lecture. He presented tllis 
lecture in the way that it seemed that he buried not only Lamarck, but also Lamarck's and Geoffroy's 
theories. Cuvier's ideas dominated French biology after Cuvier's death in 1832 till about 1850. 
Since the 1840s Owen (~ also p. 101) was increasingly impressed by the Romantics and even by 
their concept of an inunanent divine unfolding of nature, although he had before vigorously attacked 
Grant's rather materialist Lamarckian evolutionary approach. 
In Ills conceptual change, Owen was especially influenced by Joseph Henry Green ( 1791-1863), who 
himself studied w1der Oken and was affected by the tl1ought of the romantic poet and philosopher 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834). Green seemed to have come to the beliefthat the old argument 
from design must be "replaced with a new argument based on divine self-expression"; hence the origin 
of species was to him, as to the German romantic idealists "the creative self-extemalisation of a divine 
nlind inm1<ment in nature, rather than as a collection of highly rigid, if well-adapted, machines produced 
333 D. J. Depew and B. Weber in their usually very scholarly book Darwinism Evolving (1995) designate this current as 
'neomedievalizing obscurantism ofNaturphilosophie', which might be a bit one-sided. p. 55. 
334 E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982 ), p. 363. 
335 R. J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution (1992), p. 52. 
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by a quaint eighteenth-century Deist designer. "336 Green already argued that Evolution was not linear 
but treelike337 Coleridge played an important role in introducing the thoughts of Kant and the idealists 
to a larger public, particularly since translations did not begin to appear well into the 1830s . His mainly 
poetic approach did much for the accessibility of these thoughts , but in England gave them a reputation 
of flights into vague spiritual realms 338 
Although the young Owen, the 'British Cuvier ', had led the campaign against some materialist 
evolutionists, the later Owen, the 'British Geoffroy · came to believe in a romantic concept of trans-
fonnation . In his On the Nature of Limbs (1849) he considers the possibility of an actual unfolding of 
the divine creation and although in the 1850s he was guarded enough to largely evade mentioning tllis 
issue in print, he still made suggestions about the branching process of natural development339 
Owen 's biography might force us to distinguish even more periods of his intellectual development. After reading van 
Baer' s critique of the principle of recapitulation, Owen dismissed this central romantic principle340 
Despite Owen · s positive attitude towards evolution in general he opposed the mechanistic Darwinian 
account of evolution. There was for example a clash between Owen and T . H. Huxley, Darwin' s 
bulldog, at the meeting, where the famous anecdote of a clash between Huxley and Bishop Samuel 
Wilberforce ( 1805-73) took place341 That Owen really believed in actual evolution, apart from his 
dislike of Darwin' s Origin, is supported by his welcome to Robert Chambers ' (1802-71) Vestiges in 
1844, which had popularised romantic evolutionism in England342 
e) Conclusion: Overview of the Preceding Three Schools 
In table 3 a more fonnalised (and thereby strongly simplified) overview of the different 
characteristics of the previously described schools is given, with the two middle coltunns justifying my 
distinction that there are three groups of partly concurrent biological theories . 
336 D. J. Depew; B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 55. 
m R. J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution ( 1992), pp. 74 , 77. 
338 S. M . den Otter. British Idealism and Social Explanation ( 1996), p. 22 . 
339 E. g. mentioned in : P. Bowler. Chm·les Darwin ( 1990), pp 25 , 30-31. 
340 See: R. J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution ( 1992 ). 
in the medieval interpretation the fonn is an 
idea of God 
causafinalis, causa ef(iciens (also of course 
causa materia/is and causafomwlis) 
341 D. Knight. Ordering the World (198 1), pp. 170 f. , R. J. Richards . Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories 
of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 549-551. 
342 !bid, p. 168. On the popularity of the vestiges: J. Secord. Introduction to Chamber ' s Vestiges ( 1994), pp. ix f., xxvi f. 
343 See annotations of table 4 . 
344 But see: R. J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution (1992), p. 63. 
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morphology (function ) 
fonn (eidos) differentiation of Oneness, 
self-conscwusness 
transfonnation (ideal ) morphology (structure) deus sive natura; development of nature towards 
self-consciousness 
transformation (actual ) morphology (structure) conunon descent, deus sive natura, development 
of nature towards self-consciousness 
transfonnation 
transfonnation 
transfonnation 
morphology 
morphology 
morphology 
common descent, development of nature 
toward self-consciousness 
popular science; development of nature towards 
self-consciousness 
de us sive natura, development of nature towards 
self-consciousness 
still a very mechanistic approach 
nominalistic natural selection 
Table 1: Simplified overview of some of the important biologists and naturali sts from around 1800 to the time before 
Darwin 's Origin (1859). The authors are not only ordered chronologically but also systematically. The numbers refer to 
what I regard the three main classes of theories: 0 (Roma.nticisi11g) materiali sti c biology, 6 essentialist and transcendental 
biology, €) romantic biology. The colunm headings ' vertical' and ' horizontal aspects' are referring to our today 's picture of 
ru1 evolutionary ' tree ' . The vertical dimension is concerned wiU1 chru1ge of lineage throughout time. The horizontal aspect is 
concerned with diHerences at one tin1e and their explru1ation. (Al so ~ U1e sections b, c, d of this chapter. ) 
Despite all doubts about details of such a classification, one main reason to classify pre-Darwinian 
theories of (non-)evolution in (at least) three types. was to give an account of the backgratmd of the 
disputes, where seemingly only two opposed sides have been engaged . In the previously mentioned 
conflicts of Linnaeus versus Buffon, of Cuvier versus Lamarck/Geoffroy St. Hilaire and of early Owen 
versus Knox/Grant there normally seem to be only two camps : the biologists, who believed in the fixity 
of species (6 ) versus the biologists who believed in the transfonnation of species (o and €) ) . In this 
dispute the difference within the transformationalist camp between Oken and Geoffroy St. Hilaire on the 
one side and the Lamarckians on the other side is overshadowed by their alliance against the dominant 
third Cuvierian group emphasising the fixity of species. 
Secondly, looking at the intellectual roots of these currents, we are inclined to lump all biologists. 
which focus on fom1, i. e. transcendental biologists, and romantic biologists advocating idealist 
345 D. Yow1g. Discovery' of Evolution ( 1992), pp. 55-56, 61. 
346 !bid, p. 63 . 
347 E. Mayr. One long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 17. 
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evolution into one big group (® and ID). Indeed this combination indeed mirrors the existing historical 
com1ection between Kant and the Gennan idealists. The relation to a traditional essentialist view is that 
necessary ideas/forms and even notions like teleology could become reintroduced on the basis of Kant's 
'subjective' turn. The intellectual history ofthe relevant biologists is also strongly interwoven: Geoffroy 
for example was influenced by Oken (ID) but worked also a long time together with Cuvier (®), who 
himself studied in Germany. Owen, the British Cuvier, a prototypic proponent of (transcendental) fixity 
of species (®), later also took a rather dynamic stance (ID). Hence the distinction between this two 
groups becomes also blurred. 
Despite the similarities of ® and ID, and of S and ID there are of course a few sinlilarities between 
materialistic evolutionism (0) and transcendental fixity (ID). A (sinlplifying) solution to describe both 
differences and similarities, is to group pre-Darwinian biologists into the three described groups 
according to the following logic. 
Evolution 
--.evolution 
---, importance of form 
importance of fom1 
Table 2: 0 (Romanticising) materialistic biology, S essentialist and (early) transcendental biology, 19 romantic biology. 
This table gives us a simple clue, why the similarities and connections between authors are often seen in the ways 
mentioned in the text. In spite of this an abstract table like the present one looses much infonnation. The table could not 
adequately show up all the differences between the groups. Certainly 19 is not the logical conjunction of C A S. The 
notion of evolution in 0 is mechanical and in C) it refers to an 'organismic' unfolding of nature as a Godlike whole. 
Moreover the notion 'morphology' in S focused on function, in 19 on structure~ and in S we may from our present 
viewpoint regard form or morphology as an indicator of an 'horizontal aspect', whereas in 19 fom1-thinking of the 
parallels of zoology and embryology-is not necessarily linked to a horizontal aspect! 
In the next chapters we will give an account of the development of Darwinism, which in Britain had 
already gained influence in the 1860s, although evolutionists like Owen and Knox turned against this 
type of explanation of evolution,349 and although Victorian 'Darwinism' differed considerably both from 
Darwin's theory and modern Darwinism350 In chapter 4 we will focus on the internal history of the 
development of Darwinism, introducing three main sub-paradigms of its theoretical development 
Discussion of which currents Darwinism and its sub-paradigms have been influenced by will be 
addressed in chapter 5, on the external history of Da~winism. 
348 C. Darwin mentioned that Owen expressed the hopelessness of that concept in his work on the nature of the limbs. In: 
Origin (1859), p. 416. 
349 Ph. F. Rehbock. Philosophical Naturalists. Themes in Early Nineteenth-Century British Biology ( 1983 ), pp. 192, 195 
350 P. Bowler, ~ footnote 387. 
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Chapter 4: The Internal Logic of Evolutionary Theories 
-from Darwin to Dawkins 
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In this chapter on the internal history of evolutionary theories, the main claim is that there have 
been structurally different subparadigms within the main Darwinian framework. Only in Chapter 5, 
when dealing with an external history of these subparadigms (~ pp. 160), will it for example be 
discussed how Darwin had come to his theoretical synthesis out of Newtonian and Romantic thought 
and how this synthesis was influenced by theories of Malthus and by the economic situation in Britain. 
Here, the main differences of these sub-paradigms will be investigated. 
If we want to trace the subparadigms of a Darwinian research tradition through history one has to 
make clear what is meant by the tenn 'Darwinism'. The way we define 'Darwinism' is crucial, because 
it determines, what and who is to be regarded as Darwinian. Even several aspects of Darwin's own 
theory, the theory of acquired characters (which he took over from Lamarck) and his theory of 
pangenesis would today certainly not be regarded as an example of Darwinism (:> pp. 110). Hence, we 
need at least a working definition of Darwinism to exclude such notions 351 E. Mayr describes a whole 
range of meanings of the term 'Darwinism' :352 Darwinism is seen as 'Darwin's theory of evolution', as 
evolutionism, as anti-creationism, anti-ideology, as selectionism, as variational evolution, as creed ofthe 
'Darwinians', as new world view353 and as a new methodology. 
At least for use in an internal history of Darwinism I think, in accordance with authors like E. Mayr 
and others354, that it is reasonable to regard evolution by natural selection as the conceptual core of the 
Darwinian research tradition. During the further course of the work it will become clear that this notion 
is central to Darwinism and contrasts best with other views of evolution. However, if we give so much 
impmtance to natural selection this notion needs further specification 351 Normally the term 'natural 
selection' has a double meaning which is clarified by regarding natural selection (in its broad sense) as a 
two step process355 (or as a two step algorithm356). Tlus two step process consists (a) of a blind chance 
351 Later on we will define Darwinism in an even stricter way,:> pp. 154, 348 f. 
352 E. Mayr. One Long Argument ( 1991 ), pp. 90-106. In Darwin 's Five Theories o_f Evolution (I 985) and in Weismann and 
Evolution (1985), pp. 297-305, Mayr gave a list more confined to the biological meanings of the term 'Darwinism' (I) 
again evolution as such, (2) theory of common descent, (3) multiplication of species, (4) gradualism, (5) natural 
selection. 
353 For example J. C. Greene defmes 'Darwinism' more generally as the world view that seems to have been arrived at 
more or less independently by Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, and Wallace. See: Darwinism As a World View, in Science, 
Ideology and World View (1981), pp. 128-130. 
354 E. Mayr. One Long Argument (1991), pp. 107, 68; Darwin, intellectual revolutionmy (1983), p. 33; Growth of 
Biological Thought (1982), p. 510. Also e. g.: D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 2. 
355 E. Mayr. Diversity of Life ( 1978179), p. 19; Darwin, intellectual revolutionary (1983), p. 34; One long Argument 
(1991), p. 68. 
356 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 48-60. 
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process357 of overproduction of varying entities, and (b) of natural selection in the narrow sense, the 
differential elimination ofthese varying entities (according to their degree of fit to a given environment) . 
Following these basic theoretical princip les the scarcity of resources fo llows and the ' struggle for life" 
will be severe. This process, which is an "opportunistic response to the moment"358 should lead to an 
evolution by common descent and to the ' sun,ival of the fittesf. 
If Dan;vinism is understood as the above two step process, it is also easily contrasted to other 
historical concepts of evolution which have advocated a less wasteful and more directed evolutionary 
mechanism . In this work I mainly give an account of the Dmwinian sub-paradigms . By doing tllis I 
mostly neglect the parallel development of a Lamarckian or romantic evolutionary research traditions . 
For several reasons a closer scrutiny of these cun·ents would also be important : These school s of thought are not simply 
replaced by ti1e 'Darwinian Revolution ', but they also fonn a research tradition which still exists and which has interacted 
with and sometimes challenged the Darwinian tradition. lt may be even difficult to di sentangle ti1e traditions: 
Some Darwin.ians might be not as thorough Darwinians as ti1ey suppose themselves to be, using e. g. the notion of body 
plans. Romantic and romanticising materialist biology seems even to have played a rol e a lready in the fonnation of 
Darwin ' s quite different ti1eory ( ~ pp. 163 f.). P . Bowler has pointed out that it is a historical myth, crea ted by modem 
Darwinists, to assume ti1at with the 'Darwinian Revolution ' a pure version of Darwinism already became predominant il1 
the late nineteenth century3 59 At the end of the 19th century, Darwinism was even supposed to be on its deathbed 
( ~pp. 124 f. ). The succeeding so-called ' evolutionary synti1esis' also draws largely from non-Dan.vinian Mendelian 
sources. Even gene-Darwinism which seems to be the most thorough version of Dan.vinism paradoxically may in some 
regards be influenced by romantic aspirations . Moreover, despite the empiri cal and theoretical defeat of romantic biology 
by the accepted evolutionary synti1esis ( ~pp . 136 f.) , parallel to ti1e hardening of ti1e syntl1esis a little new bloom could be 
observed . Not only radical advocates of a morphological account should be cotmted to this trad ition, but-to be hi storically 
fair-partly also those, who emphasise inner constraints and direction ( ~ pp. 145 f. ). 
Later on in the light of a strict definition of Darwinism one may disentangle ti1e Danvin.ian and Non-Danvi.nian aspects 
present in many partly syncretic ' Danvi.n.ian ' subparadigms. 
If we regard natural selection as the unifying core of Darwinism, it becomes clear that Darwinians 
have differed (and still do differ) considerably in many respects. Table 5 already should here provide a 
rough first impression that Darwi11ism has been far from being monolithic (without of course aiming to 
give any final or complete account of the mentioned authors). 
struggle between 
individuals 
357 J Monod , E. Mayr, K. R. Popper, R . Dawkins, D. Dennett. ~ footnote 1133 . 
358 E. Mayr. 0 11e Long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 44. 
strong bel ief in 
adaptionism ofthe 
individual 
no extreme 
adaptionism any more 
359 P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988); Darwin ( 1990), particular chapter 1, 4, 9. 
(presumabl y yes. but 
not fanned out) 
yes (alU10ugh with a 
certain a111bi valence) 
yes, in U1e beginning. 
later not 
yes, in U1e beginning, 
later not 
360 Huxley seems to have had at least some scientific doubts about tl1e adequacy of natural selection, and mainly favoured 
'Danvini sm' because it advocated explanations by natural forces. E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982), pp . 
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whole genotype 
genes m gene pools 
genes in gene pools 
group/deme-level , 
gene, individual 361 
groups and 
individuals 
' biologica l' concept 
of species 
' biological· concept 
of species 
'biological' concept 
of species 
109 
yes: eugenics 
ideo logica l disengage-
ment, plural ism 
ves (but reservations) 
Table 5: Incomplete table on some ' characteristic features ' of the theories of authors usually regarded as largely being 
Darwiniru1. 
Because we can not treat each author separately. we have to try to order these different views . 
Focusing on the most important authors and with regard to the present discussion (mainly the unit of 
selection debate), I think it is reasonable to focus on the following three sub-paradigms within the 
Darwinian research tradition: 
• The subparadigrn of individuai-Darwinism, focusing on the struggle between single individual 
organisms . In particular, Darwin 's Darwinism in his middle period, which is of high historical 
importance, falls into this class. However, it would be wrong to assume that individuai-Darwinism 
united all early Darwinians . Darwinism in this early period was very diverse. A. Weismann, the 
founder of so-called ' neo-Darwinism ', may also be treated as an example of this sub-paradigm . 
• The subparadigrn of probabilistic population genetics . This paradigm is also often denoted as the 
'evolutionary synthesis '. We here will distinguish two phases of this synthesis: In its first phase 
R. Fisher and J. B. S_ Haldane introduced the probabilistic aspects into the synthesis and put 
emphasis on single genes within a pamnictic gene pool In the second phase S Wtight. 
Th. Dobzhansky, E. Mayr and others finished the evolutionary synthesis by introducing population 
structure into these models and by emphasising additional other evolutionary mechanisms (although 
natural selection still played a very central role) . 
510-511 [refering to E. B. Poulton. Thomas Hemy Huxley, in hi s Essays on Evolution, Clarendon: Oxford ( 1908), PP-
193-219) . Also mentioned e. g. by P. Bowler. Darwin ( I 990), pp. 156-157, 16 1. 
361 Evolution in Mendelian Populations (I 931 ). On the matter of the unit of selection Wright slips back ru1d forth . Ruse, 
M . Are Pictures Really Necessa1y? The Case ofSewa/l Wright 's 'A daptive Landscapes ( 1996), p. 326. 
362 E. Mayr.OneLongArgument(l99l) . p. 14 5. 
363 H. W. Ingensiep . Zur Kontroverse zwischen Soziobio/ogie und philosophischer Ethik ( 1990), p. 55 . 
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o The subparadigm of gene-Darwinism or of the selfish-gene viewpoint. This viewpoint is advocated 
e g. by R. Dawkins, G. C Williams and in some respect by E. 0. Wilson. It focuses on single 
'egoistic' genes. 
The notion of sub-paradigms should he understood here only in a loose sense, not denying that within such a 
subparadigm change is possible. Actually I am going to argue that the sub-paradigm of the evolutionary synthesis was 
fanned in two phases and that gene-Darwinism already bears genns to transcend itself. The notion subparadigm should 
only emphasise that within the Darwinian tradition one could distinguish relativei_v coherent (one may think of the 
'principle of correlation of parts'), in some sense incommensurable approaches. These sub-paradigms are, I think, under 
different 'ontological regimes' 364 and organised by specific central ideas, which are as essential to them as natural selection 
is to Darwinism in general. Despite this they could still exist beside each other. Gene-Darwinism became influential in 
ethology, sociobiology and in other disciplines, but the approach of the evolutionary synthesis remained influential as well 
and some proponents even strongly attacked gene-Darwinism as 'unfortunate misunderstanding by certain outsiders' 3") 
We will now treat the intemal history and the differences of these Darwinian sub-paradigms in 
detail. Afterwards an outline of some approaches developed in contrast to the radicalised gene-
Darwinian view will be given. 
4.1 From Darwin to Weismann - the Birth of Darwinism 
a) Darwin -Not a Danvinist in the Strict Sense 
Charles Darwin (1809-82)366 himself was not the founder of Darwinism, or better, not the founder 
of the theoretical building blocks which compose Darwinism. Apart from the cultural and philosophical 
influences, which may at least be seen as 'co-authors' of the 'Origin' (:> chapter 5 on the extemal 
history), nearly all components of the theory had first been proposed long before 1859: 
The general idea of an actual 'evolving' biological world, was stated in modem times earlier by 
Buffon (1749), Lamarck (1809) and Geoffroy (1818), and also, by less known authors, Erasmus 
Darwin (1794), Treviranus (1805), Tiedemann (1808) and others, and later, but still prior to the publi-
cation of the Origin, by Grant, Chambers, (the late) Owen and Spencer. H. Spencer in 1851 even calls 
it "a trite enough remark that change is the law of all things"367 . Darwin in his first edition of the Origin 
364 D . .T. Depew & B. Weber have argued that the first two of these three sub-paradigms are under ditTerent ontological 
regimes, roughly Newtonian and Bolzmrumian (see text). Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 24. 
365 E. g., E. Mayr. Darwin, Intellectual Revolutionary (198311985), p. 35; see: One Long Argument ( 1991 ), pp. 141-164; 
E. A. Lloyd. Stmcture and Cot!/imzation a_{ Evolutionary Theory ( 1993), p. viii.; D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie 
( 1990/1986), pp. 498 f. (D. Futuyma in his textbook advocates the orthodox evolutionary synthesis, only with little 
extentions ). 
366 Today libaries could be filled with books on Darwin's life ru1d influence. An overview of his biographies is given in: 
R. Colp. Charles Darwin's Past and Future Biographies ( 1989). Here I mention only two bibliographies embedding 
Darwin in a larger context: A. Desmond and J. Moore, Darwin ( 1992/1991) and P. Bowler Charles Dmwin (I 990 ). 
A rru1ge of direct sources to Darwin's personal development has been made available by the so-called 'Darwin 
industry'. Besides scholarly editions of Darwin's publications, also his notebooks and full correspondance are being 
published in exemplary editions (for some sources ~bibliography). 
P. Bowler has critisised that the focus of the Darwin industry mainly on Darwin as leading to the neglect of other 
aspects of the history of evolutionary theory. The Non-Darwinian Revolution ( 1988), pp. 14-19. 
367 H. Spencer. Social Statics ( 1851 ), p. 32. 
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was rather reserved in mentioning advocates of evolution before him 368 But since the second edition, 
Darwin himself listed over thirty-four predecessors, and he was still accused of lack of generosity. 369 
The concept of common descent has already been considered by Buffon, at least for close relatives, 
such as horses and asses, 370 and in an idealistic sense by Oken and more actually by Geoffroy, Unger371 , 
Green372, von Baer and Chambers373 
Gradualism was advocated by Lamarck and, e. g., by Meckel, Grant or Chambers374 The role of 
geographically isolated populations, which played a certain role for Darwin and later was stressed by 
the advocates ofthe 'evolutionary synthesis', had been asserted earlier by von Buchand Wagner375 
The mechanism of natural selection was largely formulated by Malthus ( 1798), and at the time of 
Datwin by A. R. Wallace as well. 376 
But it was Darwin who had the unique "brilliant mind, great intellectual boldness, and an ability to 
combine the best qualities of a naturalist-observer, philosophical theoretician, and experimentalist"377 to 
merge all those parts378 into a coherent theoretical whole around the central notion of natural selection 
and provide a great amount of empirical evidence. For these reasons Darwin indeed deserves to be 
regarded as main founder of what today is called Darwinism. 379 
But apart from not being the only founder of Darwinism, throughout most of the different intellectual 
phases of his life Darwin was not a Darwinist according to today's sense of the word (~working 
definition, p. 1 07). 
Before 1836/1837 Darwin was even a creationist of the brand of W. Paley (1743-1805), who 
believed in the fixity of species. 
However his notebooks and his autobiography show that in 1837 he adopted the belief of 
transformation380 and he quickly-though perhaps not directly (:::> p. 167)-dismissed what Mayr called 
the 'typological concept' of species and replaced it with the so-called 'biological' concept, which is 
368 D. Hull stresses Darwin's differences in his conception of science as a reason for neglecting them. Darwin and the 
nature of science (1983), pp. 63 f. 
369 J. W. Burrow. Editor's Introduction to Darwin's Origin of Species (1968), p. 27. See the 'historical sketch' in the 
editions after 1859. They were not very respectable in the scientific pantheon. 
370 E. Mayr . One Long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 23. 
371 Idem. Growth c{Biological Thought ( 1982), pp. 390-391. 
372 R. Richards, TheMeaningofEvolution (1992), pp. 74-75. 
373 !bid, pp. 133-134. 
374 !bid, pp. 54, 145. 
375 E. Mayr. One Long Argument (1991), p. 32. See DarwiJ1's Notebook D (ed. by D. Kolm, 1987), orig. p. 69. 
376 The Scottish naturalist P. Matthew already published ti1e concept of natural selection in his book Naval Timber and 
Arboriculture (1831). However, he did not work out the concept and make it a whole long argument, because, 
curiously, it seemed to him to be only 'a self-evidentfact'. 
377 E. Mayr. One Long Argument (1991 ), p. 11. 
378 Sec also: !bid, Chapter Ideological Opposition to Darwin's Five Theories. pp. 35 ff. 
379 Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) had of course come to a siJnilar solution to Darwin. Here we mainly discuss the 
more llifluential theory of Darwin himself. (But:> also p. 115.) 
380 S. Herbert ill her introduction to Darwin's Red Notebook (198011836-37) supports Darwin's own account ti1at Darwin 
indeed arrived at the concept of transformation (at least roughly) in March 1837, pp. 7-11. In his autobiography Darwin 
himself only mentions opening the first note-book exclusively devoted to ti1e question of the Origin of Species in July 
1837. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), pp. 68, 83. 
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based on the possibility to reproduce. He soon embraced a theory of common descent and of a tree of 
life381 It was only in September 1838, influenced by reading Malthus, that he adopted his concept of 
natural selection.382 One might say that, at this point of his life, Dmwin almost became a Darwinian, but 
even he first seemed to continue to believe in a teleological conception of evolution or at least speaks in 
terms of "a final cause of all this wedgings". 383 In addition, in his first unpublished systematic outlines 
of his theory, the sketch of 1842 and the 'Essay' of 1844, Darwin still saw transmutation as an 
"episodic rather than a truly all-pervasive process"384 
By 1859, when Darwin published the Origin of Species, or in full On the Origin of Species by 
Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, he had 
abandoned any teleological and saltationist concept. For 'the Darwin of the Origin', who has been the 
one of the best-known of the 'different Darwins', natural selection indeed played a crucial role and is 
even mentioned in the title ofthe Origin. However, in Darwin's theory of natural selection, his theory of 
variation and environmental elimination, Lamarckian use and disuse still played an important role in 
producing variation385 In tll.is respect Wallace was more Darwinian in today's sense than Darwin was. 
Additionally, Wallace was the first of the early selectionists to endorse Weismann' s thesis that there is 
no soft inheritance 386 
Also, most of the Victorian early followers of Darwin still believed in several mechanisms of 
evolution and favoured orthogenesis or Lamarckian evolution. Although the influence of Darwinism was 
increasing in the 1860s and 1870s, Darwinism was often not very strictly interpreted. Also E. Haeckel 
(1834-1918), the most influential early German advocate of 'Darwin's theory of descent', was at odds 
with Weismann's pure doctrine of neo-Darwinism and furthennore argued in favour of a more directed 
evolution. Even Th. H. Hux.ley and A. Gray were even less strict Darwinians than Darwin himself was. 
P. Bowler has worked out that many early self-proclaimed Darwinians were still only "pseudo-
Darwinians", and that at least many-if not most-of the post-Origin nineteenth century evolutionists 
retained a developmental, more "orderly, goal-directed, and usually progressive" understanding of 
evolution. According to Bowler not only Darwinians but often non-Darwinians also played a role in 
building up a "creation myth" of evolutionary theory, thus overestimating the immediate influence of 
Darwin. 387 
The tolerant stance of Darwin and Ius early followers in regard of other evolutionary mechanisms is 
not only due to the fact that the moral consequences of a pure theory of natural selection were so 
381 Ch. Darwin. Notebook B ( ed. by D. Kahn, 1987), orig. pp. 21, 26, 36, 97. 
382 Idem. Notebook D ( ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), 28th Sep., orig. p. 135e. 
383 !bid, org. p. 135e. See also: D. Kolm's Introduction to Notebook D. ( 1987), p. 330. 
384 P Bowler. Charles Darwin (1990), p. 99 (refering to D. Ospovat, 1981 ). Also ~ footnote 652. 
385 Ch. Darwin. Notebook D ( ed. by D. Kahn, 1987), pp. 173 ff. 
386 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 586. 
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unpalatable, but this attitude was at least partly borne out of the general ignorance of Darwin's time 
concerning the process of inheritance. Accordingly Darwin in the Origin treated the process of 
inheritance like a black box. 
In Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868) Darwin gave an account of his 
theory of inheritance, the 'provisional hypothesis of pangenesis': Particles present in all cells of the 
body, so-called 'genunules ', are modified according to use and disuse and are transported throughout 
the body. They accumulate in the sexual organs 388 Thus, especially Darwin's later theory became less 
Darwinian in assuming that the inheritance the phenotype does directly affect the genotype. 
Moreover, as Darwin worked on non-sexual plants, he also became confused again concerning the 
definition of species and returned to a rather typological definition 389 
In the The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex ( 1871/187 4) Darwin still adheres to the 
theory of pangenesis 390 He even concedes that he "perhaps attributed too much to the action of natural 
selection or the survival of the fittest"391 and because of this he also altered the fifth edition of the 
Origin. Although he even at that time did not gave up his central concept of natural selection, he at least 
gave room for sexual selection, correlation of growth, use and disuse, and even abandoned a strict 
adaptionism (~pp. 116). 
To sununarise, Darwin in opposition to modem neo-Darwinism ( ~ pp. 121 f.; p. 1 07) advocated 
other mechanisms than selection. Even in the Origin of 5'pecies, Darwin's most 'Darwinian' book, he 
is-expressed in a modem way-convinced of a flux of infom1ation from the 'phenotype' to the 
'genotype'. Darwin on the one hand still could be regarded as the main founding father of Darwinism, 
because it was he, who first gave natural selection its central place in a theory of evolution, on the other 
hand Darwin was not a pure Darwinist in the today's understanding; in our today's understanding he 
was both a Darwinian and a Lamarckian. 
b) Darwin's Biological Theory- Focus on the Individual Organism 
Darwin, because his emphasis on natural selection could still be regarded-despite the above 
qualifications-as the main proponent ofthe first 'subparadigm' of Darwinism. (For an account on the 
external influences on Darwin's theory, ~pp. 152 ff.) 
At the very heart of Danvinism in general, closely linked to the notion of natural selection, which is 
-roughly speaking-common to all different subparadigms of Darwinism and even only seldom 
questioned in the recent unit of selection debate, is Darwin's concept that natural selection works "solely 
387 P Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution ( 1988), esp. pp. 5, 16, 76 f, I 05-107, 175. Charles Darwin ( 1990), e. g. pp. 
81, 155-161, 166. Also e. g. R. J. Richards argued that most Victorian Darwinians were not materialists in the later 
sense of Darwinism, Darwin and the Emergence o.f Evolutionary Theories o.flv!ind and Behavior ( 1987), esp. p. 543. 
388 See e. g.: E. Mayr, who distinguishes two subtheories of pangenesis. Growth o.f Biological Thought (1982), pp. 693 f 
389 E. Mayr. One Long Argument (1991), pp. 29-30, 57, 69-70. See also: A. Desmond, l Moore. Darwin. (1992/1991), 
p. 189. 
39° Ch Darwin. The Descent oflvlan (192211874), pp. 352-357. 
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by and for the good of each bei.ng"392 Thereby Darwin implicitly introduces what I want to call the 
'principle of egoism'. This metaphysical principle may be stated explicitly in the following way: Any 
entity is by defmition egoistic because an entity which shows the property of caring for itself is by 
definition an existent entity and not only an epiphenomenon or a side effect of another entity. We may 
express this principle in the statement 'no entity without egoism, no egoism without entity'. We come 
back to tllis point in the more philosophical part of this work(~ pp. 406 f). 
But based on the notion of natural selection and the principle of egoism different levels of existence 
could still be proposed, like Nature or God as a whole (like in Spinoza's one substance ontology), 
ecosystems, species, groups, organisms or single genes. We will nO\N outline Darwin's theory, 
emphasising the differences of Darwin's own theory compared with Wallace's selection theory or to 
later schools of Darwinism, especially in regard to the focused evolutionary entity. 
The differentia specijica of Darwin's subparadigm of Darwinism, apart from his still present 
Lamarckian tenets, is his focus on the individual organism 393 E. Mayr claims: "The importance of the 
individual became the cornerstone of Darwin's theory of natural selection"394. 
Correspondingly, Darwin, at least at the time of the Origin of Species defined species and even 
varieties in a nominalistic way. Darwin advocated a continuous variation of fonns of the same descent. 
Type or form could be explained by common descent. Darwin at that time clearly was a nominalist and 
all genera and even species and varieties are artificial and arbitrary notions: 
"[ ... ] I look at the tern1 species, as one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely 
resembling each other, and that it does not essentially differ from the tenn variety, which is given to less distinct and more 
fluctuating forn1s. "395 
Therefore-in contrast to proponents of the later syntl1etic theory of evolution-to Darwin species 
and varieties are as unreal as higher genera are. The similarity of representatives of species and of 
genera is due to conunon descent. The species of the large genera are related to each other, in the same 
manner as the varieties of any one species are related to each other. 396 
In the 1860s, Darwin's interests have turned to botany and he came back to an at least slightly more typological 
definition of species. 397 It has been argued that he even then retained his view that evolution selects only for the good of the 
single organism398 
Only individuals are selected and only properties beneficial to individuals can evolve. Something can 
evolve,"[ ... ] only so far as it profits the individual in its complex struggle for life [ ... )".399 
391 !bid, Chapter ll, p. 91. 
392 Ch. Darwin. Origin of Species (1859), p. 459. 
393 Similar: M. Ruse. Charles Darwin and Group Selection ( 1980/89). Ruse at that time does not distinguish between 
gene-Darwi.nism and individuai-Darwinism and is hence-I think-incautious in speculating what preferences Darwin 
would have today. But: Sociobiology and Reduction ism (1989), pp. 47 f., 61 f., Mystel)' ofMystenes ( 1999), p. 126. 
394 E. Mayr. One Long Argument (1991), p. 42. 
395 Ch. Darwin. Origin of Species (1859), p. 108. See also pp. 112, 455-456. 
396 !bid, p. 11 I. 
397 E. Mayr. One long Argument ( 1991 ), esp. p. 30. :> footnote 389. 
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Since Darwin emphasised the individual and individually inherited variations, he comes to the 
conclusion that the competition mainly takes place among individuals within a population. It has to be 
conceded, that in the Origin Darwin in the one case of sterile castes of insects was forced to assume 
something like group selection.400 Despite this, the obvious essence or core of his subparadigm is the 
struggle between individuals ofthe same species: 
"[ ... ] the struggle almost invariably will be most severe between the individuals of the same species, for they frequent 
the same districts, require the same food, and are exposed to the smne dm1gers. In the case of varieties of the same species, 
the struggle will generally be almost equally severe [ ... ]."401 
In the Descent of Man-as will be shown in the next section-Darwin appears to have been only a 
bit more positive towards the concept of group selection. Although being more ambivalent on this 
matter, especially in regard of humans, Darwin still generally held a rather individualist stance. 
Darvvin's individualist view may seem a necessary pre-Mendelian view of Darwinism. But this is not 
the case. It is interesting that the eo-founder of the theory of natural selection, Alfred Russell Wallace 
(1823-1913}-who generously introduced the term 'Darwinism'402-, in many respects drew different 
conclusions. For Darwin, competition takes place among individuals within groups of closely related 
mdividuals; Wallace (a later socialist and then spiritualist) by contrast, stressed competition between 
closely related species. Darwin thought that individual competition favours only the voy fittest, whereas 
Wallace thought it eliminated those varieties that were totally unfit. Hence, the main disputes within 
Darwinism \:Vere introduced by its first proponents, Darwin and Wallace: competition versus co-
operation; individual selection versus group selection; and positive versus negative selection403 
c) Danvin 's Descent of Man -Social-Danvinism? 
In the Origin, Darwin guardedly and mysteriously forecasted that "[l]ight will be thrown on the 
origin of man and his history"404-in the Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871/1874) 
he actually applied his theory to the origin of mankind. We (1.) point out some changes in Danvin's 
biological theory, as he applied it to humans, and (2.) look how far he assumed that the theory will also 
explain, higher human faculties, culture and ethics. 
398 M. Ruse. Charles Danvin and Group Selection ( 1989/1980), pp. 41-47. 
399 Ch. Darwin. Origin o.(Species (1859), p. 348. 
40
° Ch. Darwin. Ongin o.f Species (1859), chapter on instincts. p. 258. (Because of Darwin's predominant focus on the 
individual this might be seen as an ad hoc hypothesis to explain an anomaly in his subparadigm. Still there are authors 
who mention him as introducing the concept of group selection: e. g. E. 0. Wilson. Sociobiology ( 1975). p. 106.) 
401 !bid, p. 126. 
402 A R. Wallace. Danvinism. An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection (1889). 
403 M. J. Kottler. Charles Danvin and Alfred Wallace (1985). Quoted in D. l Depew, B. Weber (1995), pp. 75-76. 
404 Ch. Darwin. The Origin ofSpecies (1859), p. 458. 
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(1.) Ambivalence about the Universality of Natural Selection 
In the 'biosociological' (~ p. 38) book Descent of Man he presumably found difficulty in confining 
himself to his own paradigm, although Darwin earlier could ''not avoid the belief that man must come 
under the same law'>405. In this book an ambivalence about the universality of natural selection and-as 
will be shown afterwards-towards the individualist focus of natural selection can be fow1d. 
On the one hand, it appears that Darwin wanted to maintain his belief of one universal law governing 
the process of evolution (:> also p. 163). Thus he stated that the development of the human being 
obeyed "the same general laws, as with the lower animals" 406 This conception was stated repeatedly in 
this work. 407 Hence, to Darwin "the difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it 
is, certainly is one of degree and not of kind. '408 
On the other hand, being concerned with the evolution of man, it seems that he had tried to a certain 
degree to change his view on the universality of the mechanisms of evolution. 
Firstly, Darwin was an exceptionally humane man, and from the time when Darwin becan1e largely a 
Darwinian in the modem sense of the word, he was shaken by the 'remorseless struggle'. His moderate 
changes of his genuinely mono-mechanistic approach might partly be due to his wish to reach what were 
morally at least bearable results. 
Secondly, Darwin's own theory had at that time already largely undennined his own deistic 
underpinnings, which might be seen as the main cause of his former belief in an ubiquitous eternal law 
of nature. 
Thirdly, Darwin's belief in the progress in nature by the simple process of natural selection (which 
was still present in the Origin) was shattered. As he himself concedes, he had to abolish his strict 
adaptationist view 409 
In fact, it seems controversial whether Darwin's account is essentially progressionist or not. For example Bowler and 
Gould have argued that Darwin's theory-although often misinterpreted by early Victorians-does not allow the concept of 
a progression of populations because they always adapt only to local enviromnents. Richards shows that in the Origin a 
belief in a progression at least based on enviromnental forces could be found and that progress was the intended 
consequence of Darwin's theory410 
These views may be reconciled if we argue that Darwin first built his pan-selectionist, pm1-adaptionist and hence 
progressionist m1d mono-mechanist theory on what was still a partly theological Paleyian basis. Darwin, at the time of the 
Origin, like Adan1 Smith, still optimistically and undiminishedly believed that by the egoistic individualist mechanism he 
found, still "all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection."411 But later on, Darwin on the 
basis of the selection theory he himself had developed, could neither sustain a theological basis for these tenets nor the 
biological claims in their wake(:> 'extemal history', pp. 162 f). 
Hence, connected with his doubts about pan-adaptionism he emphasised, more than before, a certain 
causal pluralism. He even explicitly stated that he might have overemphasised the importance of natural 
405 Ch. Darwin. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 93. 
406 Idem. TheDescentofMan (1874), Chapter IT, p. 71. 
407 !bid, e. g. pp. 43, 52, 93, 94, 928. 
408 !bid, Chapter N, p. 193. 
409 !bid, Chapter II, p. 92; :>also footnote 718. 
410 R Richards. The Meaning of Evolution (I 992 ), pp 84-90, 177 f. 
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selection412 It is still the case that natural selection was a more important mechanism of evolution of 
man to Darwin than for example for Wallace413 and Spencer414 But compared with the Origin, he is less 
Darwinian in the Descent of Man. He did not only give up his belief in adaptationism, but largely 
replaced natural selection by sexual selection. To explain variation he again employed the concept of 
use and disuse415 and now also an originally romantic concept, that of the correlation ofparts416 
Moreover, in regard to the 'object' of the mechanisms of evolution, Darwi.n-as we have seen 
above-still largely seems to have advocated selection of individuals, but is less clear about his position 
and wavered between the concept of individual selection and the additional concept of group selection at 
least in the exceptional case of the development man and morality. 
Apart from the question concerning the mechanisms of evolution, Darwin also changes his view on 
the question which entity is the 'object' of these mechanisms in this later writing. Darwin-as we have 
seen-in the Origin had focused on the individual organism as the only real entity, as the source of 
variation and as the sole agent in the struggle of life. 
In the Descent of Man he appears to be a bit more positive towards the concept of group selection, 
although he admittedly stayed ambivalent and still largely took an individualistic stance417 
As in the Origin, he clearly advocated group selection, discussing group behaviour of ants and bees: 
"With strictly social animals, natural selection sometimes acts on the individual, tlu·ough the preservation of variations 
which are beneficial to the community. A community which includes a large number of well-endowed individuals increases 
in number, and is victorious over other less favoured ones: even although each separate member gains no advantage over 
the others of the same community." 418 
But Darwin now additionally advocated the conception of group selection not only in regard to castes 
of sterile insects, but in regard to the development of mankind and the gain of mental powers 419 But 
even in regard of mankind Darwin was still wavering between his original concept of individual 
selection and an additional acceptance of group selection. Dan:vin already discussed the problem that 
egoistic individuals could override a group of more socially orientated individuals. Darwin in some 
remarks quite clearly stated a predominance of the individual level: with "the higher social animals, I an1 
411 Ch. Darwin. Origin of Species (1859), p. 459. 
412 Ch. Danvin, The Descent a._{ Man ( 1874 ), pp. 91-93. And see footnote 391. 
413 !bid, pp. 73. 
414 J. C. Green e. Darwinism As a World View. In: Science, Ideology and World View (1981 ), p. 138. 
415 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man (1874). Chapter II, pp. 47-52, see also e. g. pp. viii, 928. 
416 lbid, pp. 64-65, 91. 
417 M. Ruse argued that Darwin in tl1e Descent of Man quite clearly took an individualistic stance. Charles Darwin and 
Group Selection (1980/89), 47-52, :>footnote 393. Based on unclear sections of the original text some authors have 
interpreted this differently. E. g.: R. Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and 
Behavior ( 1987), pp. 599-60 I. A. Rosenberg. Altruism Theoretical Contexts ( 1998/1992 ), pp. 449-450. 
418 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man ( 1874), p. 94. 
419 !bid, Chapter II, p. 95, Chapter V, p. 200, seep. 203. 
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not aware that any structure has been modified solely for the good of the conununity, though some are 
f d . . ,,420 o secon ary service to It. 
However, in many cases it is not clear whether Darwin only stated his former confident belief that 
the action of self-interested individuals fighting for their own survival would also lead to the benefit of 
the group or species as a whole, or if he actually believes in something like group selection, where the 
group is an entity in its own right421 
Thus in the Descent ofMan Darwin, while abandoning pan-adaptionism and allowing some causal 
pluralism, was, at least in the exceptional case of mankind, wavering between the concept of individual 
selection and the additional concept of group selection. 
(2.) Explaining Man, Culture and Ethics? 
In correspondence with Darwin's ambivalence in regard to the universality of the evolutionary 
mechanism and in regard to group selection, there is a general ambivalence as to how far his theory of 
evolution could be applied to explain even higher human capacities. Here we only deal with the question 
in which way and how far Darwin intended to apply his theories to human beings as well; whereas the 
social influences on Darwin and Darwinism will be treated in Chapter 5 (:>particularly, pp. 173 f) 
Within the history of science, the question whether Darwin's approach to culture goes so far to be 
called socio-Darwinian, is quite controversial 422 T. H. Huxley, for example, who, like Haeckel, was 
regarded as one of Darwin's 'bulldogs', much more clearly than Darwin in his later development turned 
against natural selection and struggle for life as a prescription for human culture and ethics: "Let us 
understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmical 
process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it. "423 Scholarship has shown that Huxley 
should anyhow rather be regarded as a 'pseudo-Darwinian' 424 However, Darwin, in contrast, in the 
Descent of Man had given reason to assume that he was at least ambivalent towards the question of 
whether 'higher human capacities' could also be explained by his (modified) biological theory: 
(a) On the one hand, from time to time Darwin (the former student of theology) sounds relatively 
moderate or guarded. Darwin does not state clearly that he thought that morals and ethics ought to be 
'biologised'. This might be partly due to his social background and to the fact that he did not want to 
evoke more dismay than necessary in public and to his sincerely pious wife, Emma. Sometimes he even 
seems to refer to an independent cultural sphere and to an own inner logic of reason and religion: 
"For the moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through U1e effects of habit, the 
reasoning powers, instruction, religion, & c. than through natural selection." 425 
420 !bid, pp. 94-95. 
421 !bid, Chapter VIII, p. 370, see also p. 933 f. 
422 J. C Greene. Darwin as a Social Evolutionist ( 1977/1981), pp. 95 ff. 
423 T. H. Huxley. Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays ( 1895), p. 83. 
424 P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 68, 70, 76 f. ~ :> footnote 387. 
425 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man (1874), Chapter XXl, p. 945. 
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To refer to an inner necessity of reasoning powers may be seen rather as reminiscent of a romantic, 
structualist view, than of a Darwinian one. It seems almost ironic, that Darwin states that moral 
development relies also on religion, which he himself had involuntarily at least partly undermined426 
Moreover, as outlined before, he tried to explain the Origin of Man not by natural, but by sexual 
selection, which he had only briefly mentioned in the Origin.427 It has been argued that even this 
emphasis, to a certain extent, was forced on him in countering Wallace, who had argued that the human 
development calls for explanations above the process of natural selection. 
Sexual selection "depends on the advantage which certain individuals have over others of the same 
sex and species solely in respect of reproduction."428 The struggle is focused on the "males for the 
possession of the females" 429 The reason that sexual selection comes into being is that it serves survival 
in terms of natural selection: "It has been shewn that the largest number of vigorous offspring will be 
reared from the pairing of the strongest and best-armed males, victorious in contests over other males, 
with the most vigorous and best-nourished females [ ... ]'>'~30 Although Darwin often sounds as if sexual 
selection in principle could be reduced to natural selection, he still pointed out that practically "[ s ]exual 
selection acts in a less rigorous manner than natural selection'>'~31 . 
(b) On the other hand, Darwin sometimes seems to have taken a more rigorous biologistic stance. 
In this regard he is mirrored by parts of today's sociobiology and also by the so-called soc1o-
Darwinians'. 
Early 'socio-Darwinians' gave a naturalistic biologistic account of humm1 activity and applied Darwin's theory of 
evolution, especially his theory of natural selection also to humans. But some of them, like Spencer-like even Darwin 
himself-still believed in an important role also for acquired characteristics, so that we today would regard them to a 
certain extent also as 'socio-Lamarckians '432 
Darwin argued that genius and insanity is inherited. 433 This is according to Darwin also the case in 
regard to the intellectual differences of the sexes: 
"1l1e chief distinction in the intellectual powers of the two sexes is shewn by man's attaining to a higher eminence, in 
whatever he takes up, than can woman-whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the 
senses and hands. If two lists were made of the most eminent men and women in poetry, painting, sculpture, music [ .. .], 
history, science, and philosophy, with half-a-dozen names under each subject, the two lists would not bear comparison. We 
may also infer, from the law of the deviation from averages, so well illustrated by Mr. Galton, in his work on 'Hereditary 
Genius', that if men are capable of a decided pre-eminence over women in many subjects, the average of mental power in 
man must be above that of woman. "434 
426 Darwin might have thought positivistically-like T. H. Huxley-that religion applies to the past and not to the future. 
427 !bid, Chapter VII pp. 307-308, whole Part Ill. 
428 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man (1874), Chapter VIII, p. 322. 
429 !bid, p. 328. 
430 !bid, p. 340. 
431 !bid, p. 349. 
432 P J. Bowler Darwin (1990), pp. 169-172, esp.: 171; ~ footnote 441. 
433 Ch. Danvin. The Descent of Man (1874 ), Chapter Il, p. 41, see also pp. 81 ff. Darwin refers here like in the next quote 
to the work of his cousin Francis Galton: Hereditmy Genius: an Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences ( 1869). 
434 !bid, Chapter XIX, pp. 857 f., also p. 847. 
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Although Darwin concedes that this mental inferiority of women could be superseded; to him this is 
mainly a biological problem-a problem a breeder has with its cattle: 
"All women, however, could not be thus raised, unless during many generations those who excelled in the above robust 
virtues were married, and produced offspring in larger numbers than other women."435 
Because of this biologistic views, Darwin even sometimes takes a prescriptive 'socio-Darwinian' 
view, in the sense that he draws far-going normative conclusions from his biological conception: 
"We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elimination; we build asylums for the 
imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute poor-laws: and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of 
every one to the last moment. [ ... ]Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. [ ... ] but excepting in 
the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed." 436 
But-maybe because of his former Christian background--Darwin in this context shmnk back from 
directly calling for the abolition of the Poor Laws, as Malthus437 and Spencer438-for maybe different 
reasons-in fact did. But on other pages Darwin indeed considered that "it might be argued that the 
struggle for existence had not been sufficiently severe to force man upwards to his highest standard". 
J. C. Greene, also looking through Darwin's annotations of books and articles, has shown, that 
Darwin, at the time he wrote the Descent of Man, was to a large extent convinced that his ideas of 
struggle for life have to be applied to culture as well and in tllis sense could be said to have shared 
socio-Darwinian ideas. 439 Already Hofstadter in his canonical book on socio-Darwinism has pointed out 
that the term 'Socio-Darwinism' had been used with meanings besides laissez-faire capitalism, i. e. 
struggle between nations or artificial breeding policy.440 Bowler even pointed out that it was possible to 
associate almost every social and political position to biological 'Dmwinism '-but I think tllis had only 
been the case if we take the wide Victorian understanding of 'Danvinian' biology into account, which 
Bowler himself has illustrated. 441 Apart from this, I think Greene is right in arguing that Darwin, based 
on his biological theory, Spencer, Th. H. Huxley and Wallace on partly indeed different grounds, by 
1860 had had reached a world view focused on the idea of competitive struggle and survival of the 
fittest. 442 However, the specific way Darwin argues,-1 think-is not only due to an arbitrary con-
struction on top of his theory, but is at least partly born out of the construction of his biological theory. 
Still one might imagine Darwin even more vigorously arguing against poor laws and the like. In my 
opinion, Darwin's still detectable ambivalence in applying his original struggle-for-life-view of nature 
435 !bid, p. 861. 
436 [bid, Chapter V, pp. 205-206. 
437 :>p.180. 
438 H. Spencer. Social Statics ( 1851 ), pp. 311-329. 
439 J. C. Greene. Darwin as a Social Evolutionist (197711981 ), pp. 95-127. 
440 R. Hofstadter. Social Darwinism in American Thought ( 1955). 
441 P. J. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 152-173, esp. !55, 161, 165, 171. Evolution (1984), pp. 266 
f., also: M. Hawkins. Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860-1945 (1997). 
442 J. C. Greene. Darwinism as a World View. In: Science, Ideology and World View (1981), pp. 148-150. Even Bowler 
concedes that the struggle metaphor was at variance with a fom1erly more directed and purposeful notion of evolution, 
The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. !56, 165. 
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also to humans partly refers us to his ambivalence in regard to the universality of natural selection, his 
Lamarckian tenets and the modifications of his theory, which is vice versa connected with his attempt to 
apply his theory to mankind. In conclusion, Darwin became a 'Socio-Darwinist' not in a purely 
Darwinian sense, not even in the sense of the Darwin of the Origin of Species, but-here I agree to 
Greene-still in the sense of his own, a bit more moderate, biological theory of the Descent of Man. 
In summary, Darwin in the Descent of Man put more emphasis on use and disuse, correlation of 
parts etc. than in the Origin and he also emphasised the concept of sexual selection. Yet, Darwin 
generally can be said to have remained quite steadfast in his basic faith that natural selection and 
struggle for life play at least a crucial role, even if this theory is applied to mankind. 
Already in the Origin of Species Darwin was not a Darwinist in today's strict sense of the word, but 
still to some degree was e. g. a Lamarckist. Nevertheless, he introduced the concept of natural selection 
as a central mechanism of evolution. Besides his still vague view on inheritance etc. his subparadigm in 
the Origin is characterised by his focus on the individual organism as the source of variation, as the 
only real entity and therefore the unit of selection, of evolution and of the struggle for life 
In the Descent of Man, Darwin introduced a limited causal pluralism, but he seems still to have ex-
plained the evolution of 'lower' animals and of man by an unchanging universal set of laws. He gener-
ally estimated natural selection to be less important and also considered group selection at least for hu-
mans. Still at least in this moderated sense he applied his theories also to human capacities and culture. 
d) Neo-Darwinism: Weismann Turns Danvin 's Theory into 'Danvinism' 
At Darwin's times, the mechanisms of inheritance were still totally obscure. Linked to this ignorance 
was Darwin's problem of how variability could aJ;se on which natural selection then could act. "With 
respect to the causes of variability, we are in all cases very ignorant'>443 Correspondingly,-as we have 
seen before444 -Darwin in the Origin and even more in the Descent of Man still relied on inheritance of 
acquired characters and correlation of parts. 
August Weismaru1 (1834-19 1 4) was an ardent supporter of the theory of natural selection and since 
1882 rejected the concept of use inheritance. Because of this, George Romanes, a disciple of Darwin, 
who himself did not want to abandon the Lamarckian elements in Darwin's theory, 445 coined the tenn 
'neo-Darwinism' for Weismaru1's radicalisation of Darwin's original more moderate theory. Neo-
Darwinism later on, after the crises of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism at the turn of the century, only 
became dominant under the again quite different regime of the evolutionary synthesis. As there were 
443 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man ( 1874 ), Chapter ll, p. 41. 
444 :> 'Darwin -Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense', pp. 110 C 'Ambivalence about the Universality of Natural 
Selection', pp. 116 f. 
445 E. g.: R. J. Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 334 f. 
Part IJ. Chapter 4: Intemal Logic of Evolutionary Theories--from Darwin to Dawkins 122 
almost no original Darwinians left, people started to use 'Darwinism' for short, instead of the literally 
more correct tenns 'neo-Darwinism' or 'Weismannism' 
In Weismann 's intellectual development three main periods could be distinguished: 446 
- Already from 1868 to 1881 Weismann ardently supported natural (and sexual) selection. But 
nevertheless he believed at the same time in inheritance of acquired characteristics. Like Darwin, he 
thought that use inheritance produces the variability on which natural selection could act. 
- From 1882 to 1895 Weismann had dismissed the theory of use-inheritance and offered an alternative 
theory of inheritance. At that time he was almost totally a panselectionist on the level of the 
individual organism(~ below). 
From 1896 to 1910 Weismann deviated from his panselectionist view. Despite having found a theory 
of inheritance which made the inheritance of acquired characters impossible, he still failed to give a 
convincing account of how variation is sustained. Lacking theories of mutation and population 
genetics, he had to accept that a mere chance combination and blending inheritance could not provide 
enough variation. Hence he had to introduce other mechanisms, mainly his theory of cell selection, 
germinal selection and even a theory of 'induced genninal selection'. At this time he revoked his 
former strictly neo-Darwinian beliefs and again emphasised sexual selection and also other 
mechanisms. 
In his middle period of his intellectual development Weismann stated in his theory of inheritance, 
that there is only one direction of information flux: we today would say 'from the genotype to the 
phenotype'. Besides his theoretical considerations he also refuted inheritance of acquired characters by 
experiment: Selective breeding of the largest and the smallest individuals of pure lines, which are only 
due to environmental conditions of different height, should produce progressive results. Such 
experiments, which were conducted till the 1930s and 40s, came unifom1ly to negative results.447 
In Das Keimplasma: Eine Theorie der Vererbung (1892) he gave a full account of his theory, called 
gem1-plasma theory of inheritance, based on the cell nucleus theory of M. Schleiden, T. Schwann and 
R. Virchow. 
( soma plasm ) ( soma plasm ( 
L ) / / genu plasm ~ gem1 plasm ) •( ) gem1 plasm 
Figure 2: Flux of infonnation in Weismann's Keimplasmatheorie. 448 
446 See: E. Mayr. Weismamz and Evolution ( 1985), 296 f., and also: One Long Argument ( 1991 ), pp. 111 ff. 
447 E. Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 700. 
soma plasm 
~ 
448 E. g.: P J. Bowler. Evolution. The History of an Idea ( 1984), p. 238. K. M. Wuketits. Evolutionstheorien ( 1995), p. 57. 
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Weismann advocated a continuity of the germ plasma (Keimplasma) which, according to him, is un-
affected by any change of the soma plasma (Somatoplasma). This conceptions could not only be applied 
to the nucleus and soma of single cells, but to the relation of whole germ cells and somatic cells. 
Weismann's much more complicated theory of inheritance got, from the viewpoint of today's 
biology, something wrong. He did not approve an 'activation' theory of the gem1 plasma but a 
'dissection' theory: he thought that "the chromatin which controls them [the cells) cannot be the same in 
every cell but must differ according to the nature of the cell". 449 Here W eismann was corrected by the 
research of Spemann, Driesch and others who emphasised the role of the location of cells in the whole 
organism. Despite this, Weismann has to be regarded as founder of what was later called the central 
dogma of molecular biology: no information could be passed from the phenotype to the genotype, from 
any cell molecules to the DNA. 
By doing this he ruled out inheritance of acquired characters and also Darwin's theory of pangenesis, 
and by this the way was prepared for his version of panselectionism. In his middle period he also 
became critical towards sexual selection450 Natural selection was to him, at that period, although still 
not totally breaking with developmental constraints, almost the only mechanism of evolution. In the 
beginning this was accompanied by a belief in panadaptionism, and only after he became an ardent 
selectionist he realised (as had Darwin before him) that natural selection does not necessarily lead to 
c . 411 per1.ect10n. · 
Concerning our comparison of Darwinian subparadigms, Weismmm in his middle period-like 
Darwin in the Origin-- focused on selection (and hence evolution) only on the level of the individual, 
either seen as phenotype or as holistic system of the genotype452 
Although Weismann should be seen as clearly Darwinim1 arguing against a romantic understanding 
of a preformed 'evolution', he in a limited sense not only undennined, but continued this tradition which 
was especially strong in Germany: he applied preformationism now with a materialist spin only to the 
problem of ontogenesis and exactly by tills he made the phylogenetic preformationism impossible, which 
had been central to romantic biology and had been based on causaformalis. 
Weismann became Darwin's executor in finding a theory of inheritance which allowed an exclusive 
focus on Darwin's theory of natural selection; he radicalised Darwin's theory by ruling out causal 
pluralism still employed by Darwin himself and replaced it by his own panselectionist theory. 
449 A Weismann. Keimplasma (!892), p. 43. (Quoted in: E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), p. 702.) 
450 E. Mayr. Weismann and Evolution ( 1985 ), p. 309. 
451 [bid, p. 308. 
452 E. Mayr. Weismann and Evolution ( 1985), pp. 308-309, One Long Argument ( 1991 ), pp. 117, 130. 
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Hence Weismann with even more reason than Darwin himself, could be called a Darwinian in the 
sense of our working definition. Because Weismann focused on the individual or on the genotype as a 
whole he has been treated here under the subparadigm of individual-Darwinism. 
After Weismann had refuted romantic biology and Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters, 
his panselectionist theory had the majority of supporters during the 18 80s. 
~.2 Darwinism on :Us Deathbed 
In the 1890s the influence ofWeismann, and with this the influence of Darwinism, faded again and 
was not dominant until the occurrence of the evolutionary synthesis in the 1930s and 1940s. Victorian 
'Darwinism', asP. Bowler has shown, had anyway not been a pure form of Darwinism. At any rate, 
after the short success of Weismann 's mono-mechanistic purer brand of Darwinism, most biologists at 
the end of the century tumed against this radicalised fonn of Darvvin' s theory. This might partly be due 
to the perhaps over-ambitious attack of Weismann upon other forms of explanation. At the time 
Weismann overcame the concept of use-inheritance, he was still not able to provide another explanation 
of how variance is sustained, a necessary precondition if the mechanism of natural selection was to be 
accepted. 
Although natural selection was still one among other discussed factors of evolution-and no doubt 
still had some (subliminal) influence on other areas of human activity even at that time-, Weismann's 
attack on causal pluralism ended in a strong backlash in biology. During about 40 years the majority of 
biologists regarded themselves as followers of (a) neo-Lan1arckism, (b) a theory of orthogenesis or (c) a 
Mendelian kind of saltationism.453 
(a) Neo-Lamarckism in the narrow sense mainly focused on use inheritance. Often this term is used 
as in the broader sense as umbrella notion also for the other non-Darwinian schools. 
Sociai-Lamarckism, in the narrow and in the broad sense, was present in the works of Joseph LeConte, Lester Ward, 
the psychologist G. Stanley Hall and the playwright George Bemhard Shaw. Apart from Spencer who at least partly was an 
early 'sociai-Lamarckist' these conceptions were often linked with the goal of social refonn and state education and an 
opposition towards laissez-faire454 
(b) The conception of orthogenesis resembles the tenet of romantic biology to focus on an inner ten-
dency, a necessary unfolding of nature. This culminates in the gain of self-consciousness of nature or 
God. The concept of orthogenesis had often been combined with finalism Among the proponents of 
orthogenesis were Carl von Nagli, Theodor Eimer, Leo S. Berg, Edward Drinker Cope, Henry Fairfield 
Osbom, as well as the Jesuit and palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. In this context the vitalists 
Hans Driesch and Jakob von Uexkiill should also be mentioned, as these authors emphasised the non-
453 The division of different schools is adopted from: E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982 ), pp. 525-531. Sec 
also: P. J. Bowler. Evolution. The History of an Idea (1984 ), pp. 243-265. A canonical book on this topic, which I have 
not considered here, is P. J. Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism ( 1983). 
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reducibility of biology to physics. They referred--often in a somewhat mystical way-to vital forces. 
Driesch also reintroduced the teleological Aristotelian concept of entelecheia. Generally vitalism was 
influenced also by German Gesta/t-psychology455 Like this school they were opposed to reductionism 
and atomism. Also the process philosophy of A. N. Whitehead-although different in form and 
background-resembles this general position. 
(c) Saltationism was also already a tenet of romantic biology. Romantic biologists favoured this 
concept largely because of their belief in given fom1s. Today it might be easier to understand, if we use 
the term 'ecological niche', into which a species only suddenly could 'slip'. Saltationism traditionally 
has corresponded to the belief in an essence of a species 456 Darwin, in contrast, had favoured a species 
nominalism and an gradualist view of evolution. 
In 1900 three European biologists, among them Hugo de Vries (1848-1935), rediscovered the laws 
of heredity already developed and published in the year 1866 by the Austrian monk Gregor Mendel 
(1822-84). 
Mendel, as historians of science recently have pointed out, was not the lonely originator of modem population genetics 
'whose only associates lived in the next century', but in a historizised view Men del should be seen as part of a tradition 
founded by tl1e plant geographer and pre-Darwinian evolutionist Franz Unger, who was Mendel's teacher at Vieru1a 
University, and who had himself been influenced by A v. Humboldt and by idealist morphology. 457 
To de Vries the rediscovered laws provided evidence for the existence of sudden changes in species 
(which he named 'mutations'). Although this has not necessarily to be interpreted along the lines of 
romantic biology, in de Vries' view this also provides support at least for a saltationistic speciation as 
opposed to Darwin's gradual one. The English scientist who had coined the term 'genetics', also 
opposed Darwinism: William Bateson (1861-1926), after being influenced by de Vries, focused even 
more strongly than de Vries on evolution by mutation pressure. The first phase where Mendelism 
became influential runs from the 1900 to 1910 and is dominated by Vries, Bateson and Johannsen. The 
second phase of Mendelism beginning in 1910 was dominated by the Morgan school, focusing on more 
specific genetic questions. 458 However, even in the early times of the evolutionary synthesis e. g. the 
geneticist R. Goldsclunidt and the palaeontologist 0. H. Schindewolf (like most other German 
palaeontologists) supported saltationism. Today's palaeontological theory of punctuated equilibrium 
may in a way be seen as a revised form of saltationism459 
454 P. J. Bowler. Evolution. The History of an Idea ( 1984), p. 278-282; G. B. Shaw. Back to Methuselah ( 1990/1921 ), 
introduction; but see also: P. J. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 152-173. 
455 See L. v. Bertalanffy's (1901-1972) Kritische Theorie der Formbildung. Berlin (1928), pp. 166 ff. (cited in Woodger, 
1929, p. 484). 
456 It is not possible for me to judge here whether sa1tationism at the begi1ming of the 20th century shared this essentialist 
belief 
457 S. Gliboff. Gregor Mendel and the Laws of Evolution ( 1999). 
458 The distinction in two Mendelian periods from: E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought. (1982 ), pp. 731 ff. 
459 But ~ footnote 564. 
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Although the opposition against Darwinism was predominant till 1930, the different directions and 
disciplines were unable to build up one coherent synthesis. In 1929 the philosopher of science 
J. H. Woodger wrote the "general theoretical results which have been reached by investigation along 
the lines of physiology, experimental morphology, genetics, cytology, and the older descriptive 
morphology are extremely difficult to harmonise with one another [ ... ]. '1460 He even described the basic 
biological principles of his time in terms of antitheses, like vitalism and mechanism, structure and 
function, organism and environment, preformation and epigenesis, teleology and causation, mind and 
body. He predicted a fundamental change in biology, which would incorporate all these aspects. And 
indeed another paradigm was really in the making, although Woodger would probably have regretted 
that not all these notions found entrance in this synthesis. The so-called evolutionary synthesis was at 
least mainly a revival of a moderated fom1 of Darwinism. However, it is still difficult to decide if 
Darwinism had changed its conceptual hard core and assimilated other ideas, or if it had changed only 
its 'protective belt'. Here a middle position is held; a new subparadigm was born, which still is at least 
largely a Darwinian one, though it is in some respects less radically Darwinian than Weismmm's pan-
selectionism. Thus, if we look back, it seems adequate to state that the time between 1890 and 1930 was 
only a short 'eclipse of Darwinism', which then gained dominance again461 . 
4.3 Evolutionary Synthesis 
In 1943 Julian Huxley (1887-1975), grandson of Thomas Henry Huxley, pronounced in his book 
Evolution, the Modern Synthesis the birth of a unified, mainly Darwinian, biology. The basis of the so-
called evolutionary synthesis was built in the 1920s and 1930s and its elaboration was largely fmished 
in the 1940s and early 1950s.462 It was a synthesis of different theoretical approaches, as well as of 
different fields-which often correspond to different approaches. 
In the following four subsections the main aspects of this impressive convergence of views a.Ild the 
main characteristic of the resulting paradigm will be elaborated. The influences on this synthesis 
external to biology are worked out in 5.2. Here the internal history of the synthesis is treated. In the 
first and second section we will introduce the main contributiors and main tenets of the first and second 
phase of the evolutionary synthesis. In section three the main different features of this Darwinian 
paradigm, its focus on additional evolutionary-largely Darwinian-factors and its focus on the level of 
populations will be worked out. Finally it will be discussed whether advocates of this view were inclined 
to be more guarded in applying their approach towards man as well. 
460 J. H. Woodger. Biological Principles. A Critical Study ( 1929), p. 12. 
461 The tem1 'eclipse of Darwinism' is coined by J. Huxley, and is the title of a book by Peter Bowler. 
462 W. B. Provine mentions that all participants of a conference on the history of the synthesis agreed that a theoretical 
consensus was met at this frame of time. Epilogue (1980), pp. 399. Still, especially in France there was a resistence to 
accepting the synthesis until at least well into the 1960s. C. Limoges. A Second Glance at Evolutionary Biology in 
France (1980), pp. 323, 327. :>also the following differentiation of the two phases of the evolutionary synthesis. 
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I . . 463 I I th The synthesis generally was neither solely based on the deve opments m genetiCS nor so e y on e 
development of population thinking; it seems that both contributed to it. 464 Nevertheless the synthesis 
always has been far from being monolithic.465 
I think, one might even challenge the often held assumption that the resulting evolutionary synthesis 
has itself in its different wings or phases been purely Darwinian. 
On the one hand many proponents of the synthesis have quite clearly stated something like: "All 
known evolutionary rules can be explained by mutation and selection. ,,466 
On the other hand, it must firstly be acknowledged that population genetics was already a 
Mendelian-Darwinian synthesis (~ below) and Darwinism had to some extent to give up its own 
emphasis on the continuity of variation and hereditary change. Secondly, as we will see, Darwin's 
exclusive focus on the individual organism was abandoned, and concepts like population, isolation and 
species were developed which, according to Mayr, were in Darwin's day still rather nebulous. 467 
Thirdly, it has been argued that earlier developments in phylogenetic research, by proponents who did 
not yet see mutation and selection as the sole mechanisms of evolution, still paved the way for popula-
tion genetics. 468 Fourthly-which in my opinion is of most importance-, in the later period of the 
synthesis some tenets such as Lerner's concept of genetic homeostasis, which is rooted in rather non-
Darwinian traditions, had been incorporated into the synthesis 469 Sometimes, for example, Waddington, 
who is nonnally contrasted to Danvinism, has also been declared to have contributed to the synthesis.470 
What we call Darwinism is in any case a function of our definition and our own theoretical position 
I personally think that the notion Darwinism, especially as it expands to other fields, is used too 
broadly. Whether this also applies to the synthesis cannot be discussed here. A more precise definition 
of Darwinism would be needed (:> p. 348). For the time being, according to our working defmition 
(~ p. 107) and because the synthesis no doubt owes much to the concept of natural selection,471 here we 
will treat the synthesis simply as another Darwinian paradigm. 
In this treatment of the evolutionary synthesis I shall try to give reason to the hypothesis that the 
evolutionary synthesis was logically and historically achieved in two relatively distinct phases 472 
Although the term 'phase' should indeed indicate a logical succession, I have to concede that thev 
463 W. B. Pro vine. Genetics ( 1980), pp. 51 f. 
464 E. Mayr. Prologue (1980), pp. 28-44 (also e. g. 1982, pp. 550-570; 1991, pp. 132-140); also e. g. Wuketits, 
Evolutionstheorien (1995), pp. 59-65. 
465 Tensions could observed e. g. in: E. Mayr, W. B. Pro vine (eds. ). The Evolutionary Synthesis ( 1980). 
466 B. Rensch. Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Gennany (1980), p. 298; here quoting 
an article of his from 1943, p. 52. See also E. Mayr. Growth a_{ Biological Thought (1982), p. 514. 
467 ~pp. 113 f., 132 f.; E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), p. 2. 
468 P Bowler. L~{e 's Splendid Drama. (1996), e. g. pp. 39, 442-443. 
469 G. E. Alien instead destinguishes mechanistic, holistic and dialectical materialism within Darwinism. The Several faces 
of Darwin ( 1983 ), for a discussion of Lemer see: pp. 92 f. 
470 E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), p. 6. 
471 !bid, p. 2. 
472 Similar e. g. P. Bowler. Evolution. (1984), pp. 290-300 . 
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actually existed in parallel for a while and could in this respect also be seen as the two wings of the 
synthesis. Still, the second wing-at least for a while-gained predominance. 
E. Mayr nonnally uses the term 'evolutionary synthesis' to refer only to the proponents of the second 
phase,473 whereas other authors emphasise the contributions of the first phase474 Historical positions 
might reflect biological viewpoints, that is, which wing of the synthesis an author belongs to. In history 
and philosophy of science Mayr's viewpoint-possibly also because of his own contributions to these 
fields-seems to prevail. By arguing that the synthesis has taken place in two phases, one apprehends a 
certain unity of both views, the necessity of early contributions and-largely acknowledged and only 
recently challenged-the superiority of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. 
a) First Phase -Synthesis of Genetics and Population Statistics 
Early Darwinism had the problem of explaining how there could be enough variability on which 
natural selection could work. In particular since Weisma.tm had refuted the concept that variance is 
sustained by properties aquired during an organism's lifetime this problem became pressing and even 
challenged Darwinism in general. Natural selection would quickly weed out a.tly variance. 
Moreover, Darwin and most of his followers advocated blending inheritance, which even without any 
selection pressure, would in each successive generation lead to a diminution of individual differences. 
The variance of populations would fade and would quickly tend to centre closely around the mean 475 
The saltationistic school, at odds with Danvinism, was continued after 1910 predominantly by the 
late Mendelian Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866-1945), who had founded the work on Drosophila416 in the 
famous fly room at Columbia University. Morgan and his school stressed the independence of individual 
genes and discontinuous variation. The discontinuity given by Mendel's laws seemed inconsistent with a 
gradualist Darwinian view. 
Only the evolutionary synthesis was able to highjack this concept and integrate it as a central 
building stone for the still-largely-Darwinian framework, which at that point could explain how 
variability is sustained on a higher level, the level of population. 
The core of this synthesis was the development of population genetics, including both the genetic 
level and the level of statistical analysis of the population. In this context, the term population is defmed 
as all individual organisms which could freely interbreed with each other. The sum of all genes of such a 
473 E. Mayr often repeats his distinction and contrasts the synthesis with Fisherism E. g.: One Long Argument (199 I), p. 
144. But sometimes he concedes that his distinction is somewhat arbitrary: !bid, p. 134. Also C. H. Waddington 
Epigenetics and evolution (1953) [quoted by W. Provine. Epilogue (1980), pp. 402, 411.] focused on the importance of 
the second phase. 
474 See: W. B. Pro vine. Epilogue ( 1980), pp. 401-402. 
475 This view resembles Mayr's position. But see also P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 91 f., 106. 
476 Drosophila has become for a long time the paradigmatic experimental object of population geneticists 
The mathematical approach and the stm1dardised laboratory experiments have been criticised as Drosophilosophy-
obsession (notion of the biologist E. B. Ford). Mentioned by: M. Midg1ey. Beast and Man (199511978), p. 135. 
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population is called gene-pool. Alleles are different genes at the same locus (on the same or on 
corresponding chromosomes). 
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is the equation which builds the heart of population genetics. This 
'law or principle'477 had already been formulated in 1908 by the British mathematician Godfrey H. 
Hardy and the German physician Wilhelm Wei.nberg independently. It says that if mating between 
individuals occurs at random and there are no external influences, the relative frequencies of two alleles 
would remain constant in a gene pool. Hence, the variance of a population does not fade without any 
external cause, as would have been the case in models of blending inheritance. 
Given a diploid genetic system, where chromosomes correspond to each other in pairs. Provided that for the discussed 
gene locus (or more exactly, for the two corresponding loci), there are only two different kinds of genes (=alleles) present 
in the population. These possible gene expressions, A and a, have a relative frequency in the gene pool, p and q. In this two 
allele case the equation p + q = 1 is valid by the definition of relative frequencies. 
During (sexual) reproduction two reproductive cells, which both have a reduced (haploid) set of chromosomes, unite. 
This results again in a cell with a proper set of pairs of chromosomes (diploid set). If a random mixing of alleles is taken 
for granted ( :> below) than the probability that on an of the corresponding loci is one of the two alleles A or a corresponds 
to their relative frequencies p and q in the gene-pool. 
Hence, the allele combinations AA should have the relative frequency p x p = l, Aa should have the relative frequency 
(p x q) + (q x p) = 2 pq, and aa finally should have the relative frequency q x q = l If we now check the new overail 
relative frequency of the alleles p and q in the gene pool, we have to sum up the relative frequencies of the alleles of the 
different combinations:/ + 2pq + l= (p + q)2 Because of the definition of relative frequencies (p + q/ is equal to 1 
which is consistent with the definition that p + q equals 1. 
In conclusion, the relative frequency of two alleles in a gene pool could remain constant. The resulting combinations on 
the two chromosomes of the organisms is, as we have seen, distributed according to a binomial distribution. The Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium could be generalised also for cases of n alleles and m chromosomes and is distributed as a 
multi.nomial distribution: (p + q+ ... +nT. 478 
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium ts valid only under tl1e precondition that there is an 'ideal 
population'. A population is ideal if it is panmictic (all reproductive combinations of the same 
individuals have the same possibility); if it has an endless (or at least sufficient high) number of 
organisms; and if it is not exposed to either mutation, selection, migration, or inner isolation. The 
artificial character of these assumptions is at least partly intended, because the equilibrium provides a 
yardstick against which evolutionary change, e. g. the strength of selection, could be measured. 
Still, such a measurement is of course only valid when we do know from other considerations that all other 
preconditions are fulfilled. Otherwise the different influences would be attributed to the measured factor. 
The biologists Ronald A. Fisher (1890-1962), also an important contributor also to modem 
statistics, and John Burdon Sanderson Haldane (1892-1964) made far reaching mathematical 
contributions, based on this framework. Both believed that natural selection is the predominant force 
which causes changes in the above equilibrium and thus leads to gradual evolution. 
477 A dispute has taken place as to whether the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is a law of nature or a principle. The main 
opponents were M. Ruse and D. Hull. See: E. Lloyd. The Structure and C.'onfimzation of Evolutionary Themy ( 1994 ), 
p. 5. 
478 For example: D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbio/ogie (199011986), pp. 95 f.; H. Knodel: Linder Biologie, 1988 ( 1948), 
p.315. 
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Philosophically this perspective seems to me to be a synthesis of two extreme aspects, the 
macroscopic and the microscopic aspect. On the one hand, this view introduced the macro-level of a 
whole population (or better: 'gene pool') into the Darwinian research tradition. On the other hand, they 
have combined this with a genetic perspective. Fitness in this view becomes defined by the changes of 
frequencies of a given gene at a given locus compared with its alternative genes-its alleles-on that 
locus in a given population. Hence, fitness is now in one aspect a property of a single gene, in another 
only definable in relation to a distribution of alleles in its population. 
Fisher, in particular, did not treat the phenotypic individual organism or visible population, but 
arrays of genes. 479 Fisher largely based his work on the three assumptions which were later disputed: the 
exclusive importance of the genotype, the neglect of interactions of individual genes and the concept of 
complete random recombinations. 
b) Second Phase -Population Structure and Macroscopic Mechanisms 
The second step of the evolutionary synthesis is mainly characterised by the conceptual introduction 
of population structure into the theoretical mathematical models, which had been based on the assump-
tion of total panmictic 'ideal' populations. This was paralleled with a stronger focus on the actual 
situation in which naturalists find populations, and by an introduction of additional evolutionary factors. 
Proponents of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis, in particular Mayr, have often 
emphasised that nothing in the evolutionary writings of Fisher and Haldane could explain the process of 
multiplication of species 480 
We will now outline the contributions of only three of the main figures of the second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis, before we give a more systematic account in the following section481 
The American geneticist Sewall Wright (1889-1988), who together with Fisher and Haldane was 
one of the founding fathers of mathematical population genetics, took already the real, complex 
structure of what he called "adaptive landscape"482 into account. Wright was the first, who focused 
more on the concepts of gene-interactions483 , of subpopulations and of 'interdemic' selection. In very 
small subpopulations it is more probable that a different subset of genes becomes fixed than in the 
underlying distribution of the whole population, independent from any selection pressure. In terms of the 
probability theory this is an obvious effect and had already been recognised by Fisher, who thought it a 
deviation from the main process of natural selection. Wright on the contrary regarded this process as an 
essential part of evolution and called it 'genetic drift'. The fixation of a combination of genes in small 
479 D. J. Depew & B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 246. 
480 E. Mayr. One Long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 133; also e. g.: R. Lewontin. Theoretical Population Genetics in the 
Evolutionary Synthesis ( 1980), p. 61. 
481 I have to neglect some founders of the synthesis, like e. g. the zoologist Bernhard Rensch and George Gaylord Simpson, 
who with his book Tempo and Mode in Evolution ( 1944) brought palaeontology into Lhe new synthesis. 
482 On this metaphor: M. Ruse. Are Pictures Really Necessary? The Case ofSewall Wn.ght's 'Adaptive Landscapes' (1996). 
483 R C. Lewontin. Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis ( 1980), p. 61. But:> footnotes 484, 485. 
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populations by chance and not by natural selection, is an additional (we might say macroscopic) way in 
which variance, now not within but between subpopulations, is sustained. 
Till then this had continued to be a problem. Although the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium gave an 
answer to the question why the variation will not diminish without selection pressure, it was still 
difficult to explain how variation can be maintained if there is selection pressure. In this situation, in Ius 
'theory of shifting balance' Wright stated that genetic drift plays a central role in producing variance 
between small, interbreeding subpopulations, which are partly isolated from the total population. 
The Russian geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900-75), who had enligrated to the USA, but was 
already influenced by a Russian school of genetics based around Sergei Chetverikov, followed Wright's 
argument that drift plays an important role in sustaining variation. Even more than Wright, he 
emphasized in his book Genetics and the Origin of !)'pecies (193 7) the adaptation of whole populations, 
and that a gene's fitness is always context related.484 Presumably because of tlus Mayr has praised 
him-and not W right-as the founding father of the synthesis. 485 (W right, although mathematically also 
concemed with structured populations, did not yet focus so much on the actual populations observed by 
the naturalists. In tills sense he can be located somewhere between the first and second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis.) 
In Dobzhansky's model of 'balancing selection' (partly opposed to Wright's 'shifting balance') he 
proposed that tl1e variation witllln heterozygotes is an adaptation which allows populations to ride over 
large maladaptive valleys. In this emphasis, he mirrors his fom1er teacher Sergei S. Chetverikov who 
came to the conclusion that, "a species, like a sponge, soaks up heterozygous mutations, while 
remaining from first to last externally (phenotypically) homozygous"486 I tlunk, that the concept of 
accumulated variability, which is adaptive, not in the short but in the long run, foreshadowed the later 
anti-selectionist claim of genetic neutralism (Kimura). 487 
Mayr (*1904) worked in a sinlilar framework but in Systematics and the Origin of Species (1942) 
stressed the actual circumstances in which populations and individual organisms are found by the 
naturalist. Among the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis it was mainly he who highlighted the 
phenotypic side of the evolutionary process. This, I suppose, is due to a radicalisation of the concept of 
the context relatedness of genes, already emphasised in Dobzhansky's work. Mayr strongly advocates 
that genes "not only act but interact", tl1at there is a "harmoniously integrated" "unity of the genotype" 
and hence opposed what he has called beanbag genetics 488 Pushed to its extreme it does not make sense 
484 Th. Dobzhansky. Genetics and the Origin of Species (!951 ), e.g. p. 254. 
485 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982), p. 568. 
486 S. S. Chetverikov. On certain aspects of the evolutionary process (1926): engl. trans. (1961). Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, p. I OS, p. 178. (Quoted in E. Mayr, !bid, p. 557) 
487 The matter is actually more complicated. Ki.J.nura was vigorously criticised by R. C. Lewontin, who because of his 
emphasis on allelic polimorphism is often counted amoung the main defenders ofDobzhansky's legacy. 
488 E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), chapter 10 'Unity of the Genotype', pp. 263 f., 295. 
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any more to look at single genes or gene pools, but phenotypic individuals and populations or species 489 
According to Mayr genes mutate, organisms are selected and species evolve. 
Mayr focused on the concept of allopatric speciation and geographical isolation. Like other 
proponents of both phases of the synthesis he used a defmition of species and populations based on 
reproduction (the so-called biological concept of species), but by these conceptions he focused on 
phenotypic conditions which are, according to him, important, if not necessary, for speciation. He also 
established the recognition of a similar chance effect like genetic drift. namely the founder effect (1954). 
Genetic drift focuses on the fact that in small populations, elimination of individuals is largely due to 
chance and not to natural selection. The founder effect states the same process not in the case of existent 
small groups, but in the case of the founding of a new group; for example a pregnant bird which starts a 
settlement on a remote island49° Corresponding to his focus on the phenotypic aspects Mayr uses a term 
for this mechanism denoting the phenotypic level. 
c) Evolutionary Factors and the Importance of Populations 
The evolutionarv synthesis, although most of its proponents were self-proclaimed Darwinians. 
-especially after its second phase-had properties which had been missing in or even contradicted 
Darvvin's and Weismann's Darwinism. Although to the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis natural 
selection and also individual natural selection was still the main driving force of evolution, they 
enriched evolutionary theory with several additional factors. After this has been shown, the stress of 
the synthesis on the population level will be worked out. 
Now, mutations were regarded as source of new variability, and in a way as an additional factor. 
The Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium had explained only the stability of a given variance if there are no 
extemal influences, especially no selection. 
Mutations were now understood as sudden random changes in the nucleotide sequence of the DNA. 
Mutations provide for the emergence of entirely new genes, a concept necessary for evolutionary change 
above the change of mere gene-frequencies in a gene pool. Mutations exist on all 'levels' of the genome, 
from single base pairs of a gene (point mutations) to full chromosomes. 
The concept of mutation was originally reintroduced to biology by de Vries, who-although natural 
selection played a role in his theory-was rather a Mendelian 491 Mendelians, like Bateson favoured a 
theory of mutation pressure. Correspondingly this conception was originally rather allied with anti-
Darwinian 01thogenetic theories. But Mendelism at the san1e time also undermined the analogy of 
489 E. g.: E. Mayr. Evolution und die Vie/fait des Le bens (197!1), p. 242. 
490 A short outline of other differences between genetic drift and founder effect is given in E. Mayr. Growth o( 
Evolutionary Thought (1982), pp. 602 f 
491 See: G. E. Alien. The Evolutionary Synthesis: Morgan and Natural Selection Revisited (1980), p. 366 f 
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evolution and growth, even more than Darwin did, and separated genetics from embryology 492 Hence 
the evolutionary synthesis was able to transfom1 the concept of mutation into a process of blind 
chance493 , fitting neatly into a Darwinian frame of mind, since Darwin had also sometimes written of 
chance variation at the individuallevel 494 
Although this factor was new, one may hence argue that in principle this-transfom1ed-concept of 
mutation modernised but did not add much to the theory. 
Today the notion of a total chance character of mutation central to population genetics comes under pressure from 
genetics. In genetics one speaks of so-called mutation genes making certain mutations more probable than others. 1 
personally think, it is largely up to our interpretation, to argue whether on an imagined continuum between Darwinism and 
Lamarckism, we move by tllis insight more towards Lamarckism again. 495 
Moreover, the evolutionary synthesis in its second phase, was mainly inspired by contributions of the 
naturalists, which also statistically led to slight change in focus. The crucial point is the subdivision of 
the 'ideal' population in many sub-populations. This macrobiological concept has resulted in several 
new evolutionary factors: 
• Isolation (reproductive) is regarded as necessary precondition for the development of sub-
populations, and thus as a prerequisite for speciation. 
• Migration between partly isolated subpopulations increases the regional variability. 
• Genetic drift takes place among small populations, where mere chance can play a role in fixing 
certain gene-combinations. 
• The founder effect similarly states that the sample of genes which a founder of a new population 
contributes, influences the gene-distribution considerably. This effect is also largely due to chance 
and is understood as directionally blind. 
According to the Evolutionary Synthesis, all these factors, adding to the mechanism of individual 
chance variation and elimination, in the first place play an important role in sustaining the necessary 
variability within the population as a whole, and, secondly, enable the change of gene distribution in a 
gene pool necessary for speciation. The acknowledgement of macrobiological preconditions for 
speciation also led to the distinction of cladogenesis, branching, and anagenesis, phyletic evolution496 
Despite the novelty of the factors, they may be seen as pointing to the concept of natural selection, 
except on the level of populations. Natural selection, in its broad sense, is normally regarded as 
492 P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. I 06, 114, 117-120, 123-125. 
493 See: F. Wuketits. Evolutionstheorien (1995), p. 71. 
494 Still, the word 'mutation', which could be found seven times in tl1e Origin o.f Species, there just means change. 
495 ~ p. 148 and the section on 'Directed Variation rather tl1m1 Blind Variation- Discussion oftl1e Second Criterion', pp. 
358 ff 
496 See e. g.: Th. Dobzl1m1sky, lvfankind evolving (1962), p. 220; R Lewontin, Theoretical Population Genetics in the 
Evolutionary Synthesis (1980), p. 61. This distinction refers to the distinction between micro- and macroevolution, 
which was earlier proposed by de Vries, and is, I think, not compatable to Darwin's originally more individualistic 
approach. Hence this view has sometimes be regarded to be at odds with the essentially Darwinian programm of the 
evolutionary synthesis, e. g.: G. Masuch. Zum gegenwartigen Stand der Diskussion ( 1987), pp. 50 f 
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composed out of two sub-processes: chance variation and elimination of the unfit 497 In my opinion the 
evolutionary synthesis seems to have introduced this process on the level of populations as well. The 
factors of reproductive isolation, genetic drift and founder effect are all mainly regarded as chance 
processes which increase the variance between sub-populations. Migration and other forms of gene flux 
increase the variability within subpopulations. This parallel is not always made explicit; but, for 
example, Mayr-in disagreement with J. Huxley-has argued: "Every new species is an ecological 
experiment, an attempt to occupy a new niche [ ... ], species, in the sense of evolution. are quite 
comparable to mutations '>'~98 
But under closer scrutiny that analogy might be too simplifying, because these mechanisms also 
change the working of phylic evolution. However, I think one can conclude that despite the many 
concrete mechanisms the evolutionary synthesis was mostly perceived as only introducing a slight 
causal pluralism, which in its mechanism still essentially resembles Darwinism. Linked to these new 
mechanisms is the philosophical innovation of the introduction of the importance of the population level 
A side-effect of the application of the concept of natural selection (in the broad sense) to the population level is that 
individual organisms are not necessarily highly adapted. If organisms act for the good of the species they do not necessarily 
act for their own good. Hence the population level of adaptation may also have reduced the strong adaptionism on the level 
of individual organisms. 
Correspondingly, populations (groups of interbreeding organisms). or gene pools are at the very 
centre of evolutionary biology: "Evolution is a change in the genetic composition of populations'>'~99 
Nearly all advocates of the evolutionary synthesis have defined species in tenns of reproduction, i. e. 
the so-called 'biological' concept of species 500 Strictly speaking a definition, fitting to the second phase 
of the evolutionary synthesis, has to mention partly isolated sub-populations. Hence, in textbooks one 
will usually find a definition like: a species is "a group of interbreeding natural populations, which are 
reproductively isolated from other such groups"501 . 
Only G. G. Sirnpson slightly differs from the other main proponents of the synthesis in this respect and has defined a 
species generally differently. "An evolutionary species is a lineage (m1 ancestral-descendent sequence of populations) 
evolving separately from others and with its own unitary evolutionary role and tendencies. "502 
This predominant definition of species is linked to species realism 503 'The Species is the real unit of 
evolution, it is this changing entity, which specialises and adapts"504 The species nominalist Darwin had 
largely assumed that species are only convenient notions, which artificially describe a close similarity 
497 :> working definition of natural selection on p. I 07. 
498 E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), p. 621. E. Mayr. Evolution und die Vie/fait des Lebens (1978), p. 24 I. 
499 Th. Dobzhansky. Genetics and the Origin a_( Species (1951), p. 16. 
500 !bid, p. 262-263. 
501 G. Vogel, H. Angerrnann. dtv-Atlas der Biologie ( 1990), p. 495 (own literal trm1s. ). 
502 G. G. Sirnpson. Principles of Animal Taxonomy ( 1961 ), p. !53 (quoted in E. Mayr. One long Argument ( 1991 ), p. 28). 
503 See Th. Dobzhansky. Genetics and the Origin of Species (1951 ), p. 256. E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution 
(l963),e. g. pp. 422-423. 
504 E. Mayr. Evolution und die Vie/fait des Lebens ( 1978), p. 241 (free re-trm1slation by v. Sydow). 
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between individual organisms 505 According to the synthesis species and gene pools, unlike individual 
organisms and single genes, are long lasting. A precondition for genetic recombination in sexually re-
producing organisms is the existence of a co1mnon gene pool. Based on the outlined evolutionary factors 
the units of evolution (not necessarily of selection) are structured populations or gene pools. 
Dobzhansky goes farthest when he speaks of the 'organism-like integration' of interbreeding 
populations. 506 
This realism of species or, better, of structured populations differs of course from the classical typo-
logical species realism. 507 It is not due to what Mayr calls a typological concept, a pre-existing fonn, 
which is given externally to the species itself, 508 but it is based on a populational concept, a concept of a 
common gene pool of a species, a pool of information, a common fountain of youth, from which all 
organisms and sub-populations derive from and to which all reproducing organisms contribute. Accor-
ding to the synthesis populations and species are real, but at the same time they are the only real taxa; 
all other higher t:'lxa, like genera and so on, are in principle nothing but useful artificial conventions. 
This population realism is accompanied by gene realism and only partly by a nominalistic attitude 
towards organisms. Populations are understood as arrays of genes which mix freely. Tllis assumption, 
emphasised in the first period of the evolutionary synthesis, has never been completely superseded. A 
panmictic population is a precondition for most of the statistical tools of population genetics and is 
linked to the notion of independent and not contextually defined genes. In the second phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis this concept has statistically been dismissed only in regard to the relation between 
different sub-populations, not-as far as I can judge-within sub-populations. 
Despite this, it was an explicit conviction of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, 
especially during the years between 1950 and 1965, that there were gene interactions 509 In the wake of 
Dobzhansky, absolute fitness values of single genes were denied, and it was emphasised that fitness of 
genes depends strongly on the genetic and the environmental rnilieu 510 Mayr in particular advocated the 
importance of gene interactions and quite clearly arrived at a realist position concerning individual 
organisms, by simultaneously dismissing the focus on population genetics. Apart from him, the general 
trend of the statistical approach led, in the second phase of the synthesis as well, to what Mayr called 
"bean-bag genetics"511 , at least within sub-populations. 512 
505 
:>pp 113 C Darwin and the synthesis is contrasted e. g. in: E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), 13-14, 29. 
506 111. Dobzhansky. Genetics and the Origin of Species ( 1951 ), p. 15. 
507 E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), chapter 2-4, see also chapter 14. 
508 :::> also my concept of exformation and extemal memory, which tries additionally to reestablish some aspects of this 
historical conception; pp. 307 f., 316 f. 
509 R. Lewontin. Theoretical Population Genetics in the Evolutionary Synthesis ( 1980). R. Lewontin. Gene, organism, 
environment (1983), 277. 
510 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982 ), p. 592. 
511 Ibid., Where are we? (1959). [Quoted in Ma;'f's The Growth o.f Biological Thought (1982), pp. 558.] But see also a 
reply of J. B. S. Haldane. A defence of beanbag genetics ( 1964 ). 
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The emphasis on a gene-pool, with the concomitant assumption of largely independent genes, led--! 
presume--to the overwhelming disapproval of sexual selection by most proponents of the Evolutionary 
Synthesis. Any concept of sexual selection violates the assumption of parunixia. Correspondingly, many 
advocates of the synthesis, in particular Julian Huxley, campaigned against the concept of sexual 
selection. 513 
But, as already has become apparent, the evolutionary synthesis was and is not a monolithic block. 
Although Mayr, for example, emphasises the whole individual organism as a real entity and as a unit on 
which selection apparently works, still to him the 'unit of evolution' is the population. Other followers 
of the synthesis focus even more strongly on the population as the unit of selection514 S Wright, for 
example, states that there is also selection on the level of demes515 The importance and function of 
different levels of selection had already been a source of dispute to advocates of the Evolutionary 
Synthesis. However, it was generally agreed that events on the population level were somehow crucial to 
th fi . f . 516 e ormat10n o new species. 
The sub-paradigm of gene-Darwinism later on started to argue against the importance of the population level in general 
and group selec.tion in partic.ular. ( :> pp. 41, 126, 191) 
The focus on populations goes along with the concept that entities. mainly populations, could have 
properties which their components did not have. This emergentist belief is for example expressed by 
Dobzhansky: "The rules governing the genetic structure of a population are, nevertheless, distinct from 
those which govern the genetics of the individuals, just as rules from sociology are distinct from 
physiological ones, although the former are in the last analysis integrated systems of the latter "51 7 This 
emergentist belief is advocated, although the Evolutionary Synthesis-as we have seen previously-is 
still largely Darwinian in regard to the processes employed and indeed emphasises chance production of 
variation and differential elimination. 
Still, the emergentist attitude and the changed general conceptualisation of evolution affected m 
which way tllis school applied their biological theory to culture. 
d) Disengagement from Ideological Programmes? 
In the literature on the attitude of the Evolutionary Synthesis towards culture one could find the 
position that it was accompanied by a disengagement from ideological programmes 518 
512 In disc.ussing models of group selec.tion M. J. Wade makes the c.riticism that the underestimation of interaction of genes 
in the mainly genotypic models of population genetics biases the results. A critical review of the models of group 
selection ( 1978). 
513 S. J. Frankel. The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Themy ( 1994). 
514 W. Wieser. Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution ( 1989), p. I 0 I. 
515 S. Wright. Evolution in Mendelian Populations ( 1931 ). 
516 See e. g.: D. Young. The Discove1y of Evolution ( 1992), p. 218. 
517 Th. Dobzhansky. Genetics and the Origin of Species ( 1951 ), p. 15. 
518 E. g.: D. J. Depew & B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 13. 
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This is not the case in regard of the first phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis, which by many authors 
is designated as Fisherism. Fisher was in fact a particularly ardent supporter of positive eugenics, which 
he explicitly regarded as Nietzschean in character519 
Only with the second phase of the synthesis, especially with the works of Dobzhansky, Mayr and 
Sirnpson, a relative ideological disengagement seems to have taken place. 
I think, this ideological disengagement in the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis is, despite 
important reservations, due to two aspects of the Evolutionary Synthesis: (a) The synthetic evolutionary 
theory in its second phase advocated some properties which make an application to man less hamliul. 
(b) The evolutionary synthesis gave reason to be cautious in any direct application, and to acknowledge 
the entire dissimilarity of biological evolution and cultural development. 
(a) First, the final Evolutionary Synthesis did not support a panselectioni.st view. New evolutionary 
factors, besides natural selection working on the level of the organism came into play. Factors working 
on the macro-level of populations, like the chance processes of genetic drift and the founder effect, 
show that besides natural selection also chance plays a role in the moulding of organisms. This resulted 
in an abolislm1ent of a radical adaptionism; not all aspects of an organism are naturally adaptive. 
Secondly, in its later phase, proponents of the evolutionary synthesis largely accepted a certain 
degree of context relatedness with regard to a gene. A gene which might be maladaptive m one 
population, could in a successive gene-pool with changed gene distributions or in a different 
environment suddenly turn out to be adaptive again. 
Thirdly, the recognition of the positive importance of variation in the evolutionary synthesis 
contributed something to the abolishment of a simplifying programme of eugenics. This was mainly due 
to Dobzhansky, who had imported this view from Chetverikov's school of genetics, and who strongly 
believed in democratic plurality. The stmcturedness of a population supports variation, which on the 
long mn is itself adaptive. 
Last but not least, the focus on the population level and the possibility of group selection might have 
weakened the 'Malthusian' character, social-Darwinism had hitherto had 520 Thi.s focus on species or on 
populations was also predominant in classical ethology and even today there are influential proponents 
ofthis school like I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, who emphasises group selection at least as far as early humans are 
concerned-also giving a basis for tmly altmistic behaviour521 
The known primatologists Jane Goodall and Frans de Waal in my opinion also belong to this paradigm. They did not 
already theoretically assume umestrained and ruthless competition in groups of animals and would not easily reduce 
519 D. J. Depew & B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995), pp. 244 ff. These authors in accordance with Mayr only call the 
second phase 'evolutionary synthesis'. 
520 Here Malthus' emphasis on population growth and scarcity of recourses in combination with his general support for 
individuallaisse-faire economics is meant. For a closer discussion of such a usage, :>pp. 173 f 
521 I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt. Die Biologie des menschlichen Verha/tens (1984), p. 131. (Eibl-Eibesfeldt on the other hand also 
combines this with results of the gene-Darwinian view, and in a way already takes a multi-level-viewpoint.) 
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primate behaviour to simple gene-egoism Although their approach might be regarded as rather a descriptive one, their 
results seem to me to fit rather into the explanatory framework of the evolutionary synU1esis than into the framework of 
gene-Darwinism. 
But there had been also ethologists concerning whom it would be wrong to generalise about the 
concept of ideological disengagement. In particular, the inglorious role of one of its founders should at 
least be mentioned. But the role of the Nobellaureate Konrad Lorenz in the time ofNazism in Germany 
can be opposed to the exemplary role of the co-fOtmder of ethology Niko Tinbergen. 
There are many important questions, which could not be treated here at length: How did evolutionary theory, especially 
ti1e evolutionary synthesis, influence Nazism, with its focus on racism? Which other aspects led to the blunt racist ideology 
of 'blood and territory (Blut und Boden)'? What was the theoretical difference of most of the founding fathers of the today 
still actual second phase of the synthesis and the Nazi-biologist in Gem1ru1y ( ru1d other parts of the world)? 
Proponents of classical ethology, like K. Lorenz and N. Tinbergen, introduced the focus on populations of the 
Evolutionary Synthesis into the biological study of behaviour of animals and humru1s. By this ti1ey indeed made ti1e study of 
instinctive behaviour in animals and man popular again. Lorenz was accused because of this focus on instincts and ti1e 
'natural' aggression of humans. 522 
Still Lorenz-based on ti1e focus on the species-could also argue, that there is still something like 'species-preserving 
purposefulness' (arterhaltende Zweckmaj3igkeit) of instinctive behaviour, like ti1e killing inhibition of wolfs and dogs523 
This at least in principle left some room for something like a basis for an altruistic behaviour, at least within a species. M. 
Midgley in ti1e last decades has pointed out that this allows a much more positive approach to human biology than gene-
Darwinism (:> p. 56). Even Dawkins himself had called U1e ethology founded by Lorenz 'old benevolent regime'. 
Despite this it has to be acknowledged that Lorenz, indeed had been involved in the racist research politics of the 
Nazis. It is a dispute, how far Lorenz' involvement into 'racial hygienics' had gone, but some involvement took place. The 
Dutch zoologist Tinbergen, who had strongly opposed the Nazis, after the war helped to rehabilitate Lorenz. However, a 
huge number of biologists especially in Gem1any, but also in mru1y other countries have shru·ed socio-Darwinian racism. 
What role did biology have in this catastrophe? Neo-Darwinian explru1ations, according to Rensch, already prevailed in 
German textbooks between 1912 ru1cl 1945. Nevertheless, it was onlv slowly that accompanying sceptical remarks ru1d 
defenders of different views were overcome 524 According to Mayr, selectionist thinking began to spread in Germru1y not so 
much in the 1920s but mostly in the 1930s. 525 A proper treatment of biology in the time of Nazism would have to answer 
whether tile involved biologists belonged to the first or to second step ofti1e Evolutionary Synthesis, or whether their views 
differed from boti1 of these theories. 526 
Also the-in my view originally positive-force of Germru1 idealism and romru1ticism with its urge for unification of 
knowledge in a perverted way seems to have played a crucial role, as it was combined witi1 resurrected Darwinism. A 
treatment of this topic would have to discuss the position held by the British idealist Muirheacl in regard of ti1e ftrst world 
war, ti1at not Kru1t ru1cl Hegel, but ti1e abandomnent of ti1ese views were responsible for the highly aggressive attitude of ti1e 
Germans at that time. 527 It has been argued that materialism m1d especially Darwinism played a role for moral decay, for 
Nazism ru1d the second world war. 528 But this topic is too complicated and too importru1t for any simplifying treatment: Not 
only vitalists like H. Driesch, but also Darwirliru1s of a similar brand as Lorenz, like Tinbergen, opposed Nazism. 
Apart from these important reservations, I think it overall still appears to be correct that the new 
aspects of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, at least in Britain and the United States, have 
to some degree mitigated the social implication ofthe revival ofbiologicalneo-Darwinism. 
(b) The other aspect of the ideological disengagement of the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis 
was a critique of directly drawing conclusions from the biological evolution to cultural development. 
522 M. F. Ashley Montagu ( ed. ). Mensch und Aggression ( 1974/1969/ 1968). 
523 K. Lorenz. On Aggression ( 1967/1966/1963 ), pp. I 04 f, 206-207. 
524 B. Rensch. Historical Development of the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwimsm in Getmany ( 1980), pp. 285 f. 
525 E. Mayr. Germany (and the Evolutionary Synthesis]. Il1troduction to a chapter with articles on this topic in: Mayr, 
Emst; Provine, William B. (ed.) The Evolutonary Synthesis. (1980), pp. 281-283. See also e. g.: P. Bowler. The Non-
Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 123, 125. 
52
" See: U. Deiclunatm. Biologist under Hitler (1996 ), pp. 179-205. A very critical view emphasising the continuity in 
K. Lorenz views also after the second world war is given by: Th. J. Kalikow. Konrad Lorenz 's Ethological The01y 
Explanation and Ideology, 1938-1943 (1983). 
527 See: S M. Den Otter. British Idealism and Social Explanation. ( 1996), p. 32. 
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For example, J. Hux.ley, although writing much not only about evolution but also about ethics, 
finally rejected any simple analogy from biological evolution: 'The human situation is so different from 
the biological, that it may prove best to abandon the attempt to apply concepts like natural selection to 
modem human affairs."529 Such a rejection of a biologisation of human affairs was uttered by different 
authors of the synthesis, but could have many different reasons: 
Firstly, it might be due to developments within sociology and psychology. In particular 
behaviourism, which in an increasingly moderate form dominated psychology till the 1960s or 1970s, 
opposed any reduction of psychological phenomena to specific biological instincts or drives. 
Of course behaviourism at the same time reduced i1mer phenomena to external behaviour. Moreover, paradoxically the 
trial and error process which behaviourism employs resembles a Darwinian process(:> pp. 218 f.). 
Secondly, valid for writings after the Second World War, the traumatic experiences of Holocaust 
racism and millions and millions of war victims, has been a remaining memorial against all simplifying 
biologistic accounts. 
Thirdly,-beyond external influences-the Evolutionary Synthesis itself provided already within 
biology examples of emergentism. The dynamics of the macro-evolution is explained by some emergent 
properties (e. g. genetic shift) on the population level 530 In spite of this, the proponents of the 
Evolutionary Synthesis have always emphasised that this is fully compatible with the micro-processes of 
evolution. More adequately, they tried to steer a middle course between reductionism and emergentism. 
For example, Mayr explicitly supports the notion of emergence, Simpson refers to it as compositional 
method and Lorenz (at least after the war) uses the term 'fulguration' and refers to the ontological 
stratology ofNicolai Hartmann 531 
Corresponding with the general Newtonian background of Darwinism, some proponents still 
regarded human evolution to be governed by the same eternal set of laws as animal evolution. 532 
Accordingly their ideological disengagement has not been at all total. For example, Simpson applied the 
neo-Darwinian paradigm to man: "Man is the result of a purposeless and materialistic process that did 
not have him in mind. He was not planned."533 Huxley, despite trying to extend the Darwinian concept 
of an apparently purposeless selection of random variations into a new general world view, still saw a 
purpose in evolution534 Even Simpson, although he explicitly fought against any vitalistic and 
teleological explanations in evolutionary theory, came to the conclusion that man today is guided by 
528 R. Nachtwey. Der !rrweg des Darwinism us ( 1959), chapters I, 6, 7 see also chapter 8. 
529 J. Huxley. Introduction of the 2nd edition of Evolution: A Modem Synthesis (1963), quoted in J. C. Greene ( 1981 ), 
p. 165. 
530 :> footnote 517. 
531 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 63-64. K. Lorenz. Die Ruckseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer 
Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens ( 1973/77), pp. 44-64. For my own treatment of emergentism see pp. 262 fi 
532 :> the account of the external history of Darwinism, pp. 168 f. 
533 G. G. Simpson. The Meaning of Evolution (1949), pp. 343-344. (Quoted in Greene, below, p. 17l.) 
534 P. Bowler. Evolution (1987), pp. 309-310. 
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'interthinking' rather than by interbreeding,535 and that finally the concept of the human uniqueness 
seems to have gained the upper hand: "The best human ethical standard must be relative and particular 
to man and is to be sought rather in the new evolution, peculiar to man, than in the old, universal to all 
organisms. The old evolution was and is essentially amoral. The new evolution involves knowledge, 
including the knowledge of good and evil. "536 
Most proponents of the final synthesis on the one hand similarly seem to have abandoned any strict 
biologistic stance. They had not the intention of reviving the crude message of social Darwinism. On the 
other hand they still claimed the relevance of natural selection for the understanding of the homo 
sapiens. For example, Dobzhansky argued against a biologistic stance proposed by Darlington, but at 
the same time also criticised the "staunchest nurture hypothesis" of the psychologist Watson and the 
radical culturalism of L. White. 537 It is typical for Dobzhansky, steering a middle course, that he 
advocated that the main biological trait of humanity is its plasticity and educability, and-although he 
allows some variance-this generally holds "in all classes and races of people, in short, in the species 
H . ,538 omo sapiens. 
More work to substantiate the outlined position would be needed. But for the time being we can 
conclude that many proponents ofthe later phase of the synthesis were ideologically comparatively more 
disengaged than some early socio-Darwinians and also than some of the present day gene-Darwinians. 
4.4 '§ociobiology' as Gene-Darwinism- a New Synthesis? 
'Sociobiology' as a special Darwinian sub-paradigm, not as a discipline, has already been 
characterised by a focus on selfish genes, and by a largely gene-deterministic approach towards culture 
and ethics (:> pp. 6 ff.). Therefore here only a short comparative historical outline of its biological 
features will be given. Moreover, we will not treat tllis paradigm mainly in its own tem1s as a 
phenomenon, but use a more abstract description in order to grasp its paradigmatic core. 539 Only 
thereafter the more general, external historical background to this subparadigm will be analysed 
( ~ pp. 191 f) and then the basic assumptions of this approach will be criticised ( :> pp. 23 7 f.). 
The discussed subparadigm in tills work has been called gene-Darwinism to distinguish it from 
other approaches in sociobiology and evolutionary theory. In this section am going in detail to 
535 C. G. Greene. Science. Ideologv and World View (1981 ), p. 172. 
536 G. G. Simpson. The Meaning of Evolution (1949), p 281. (Quoted in Greene, above, p. 173.) 
537 Th. Dobzhansky. ManEvolving(l962), pp. 75, 97, 99,252,320. 
538 !bid, e. g. pp. 8, 100, 252, 320. 
539 R. Dawkins emphasised the first aspect mentioned in tl1e first sentence of the paragraph, whereas E. 0. Wilson has 
emphasised the second one. Any differences from both aspects is here tmderstoodas a deviation of the pure fonn of tl1is 
paradigm(:> pp. 38 f.). 
The proponents of sociobiology do not always regard tl1emselves as proponents of a paradigm shift. Even Dawkins 
wavered as to whether he regarded his approach as a new paradigm or only as a new perspective which is equivalent to 
the old one (Extended Phenotype, 1982/89). But Dawkins fmally made it clear tl1at his approach is intended to break 
with the old benevolent regime of classical ethology and the evolutionary syntl1esis (e. g. preface to 1989 edition of The 
Selfish Gene). Here the hypothesis is supported that there is indeed a new sub-paradigm with a certain inner cohesion. 
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characterise and defme this sub-paradigm biologically by what I will call 'germ-line reductionism', 
'gene-atomism' and (with certain a certain reservation) 'Darwinian process monism'. 
Basically the discussed sub-paradigm is a Darwinian paradigm, because-according to our working 
definition-it focuses on natural selection as the main evolutionary mechanism and does this even more 
clearly than earlier Darwinian sub-paradigms(~ below). 
The 'selfish gene' view of evolution540 could be contrasted to the organism or genome centred 
theories of Darwin or Weismann as well as to the gene-pool or population centred conceptions of the 
evolutionary synthesis. But in different respects gene-Darwinism does not break with, but radicalises 
Darwin, Weismann and the Evolutionary Synthesis. 
a) Germ-Line Reductionism 
Dawkins radicalises Darwinism with an extreme interpretation of Weismann's concept of the con-
tinuity of the germ-plasm. This interpretation leads Dawkins to the conception of genes as immortal 
survivors in the battle of life and of phenotypes as largely epiphenomenal 'vehicles of genes' or 'gene 
machines' 541 
Darwin, still partly a Lamarckian, favoured his theory of pangenesis, whereas later Weismann 
adopted a stricter neo-Darwinian approach. The Weismann barrier (~ pp. 121), of course, has also 
been central to the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis. Hence the evolutionary synthesis-like 
gene-Darwinism-was in this respect a neo-Danvinian or Weismannian theory. However, the 
evolutionary synthesis, which accepted macroevolutionary factors, interpreted the Weismannian barrier 
in a way which we could evaluate either as being less radical or less clear than the interpretation of 
gene-Darwinism. Dawkins' interpretation of Weismatm 's barrier leads him to take a harsh nominalistic 
attitude towards the phenotypic side of evolution, whether organisms or groups are meatlt. Because 
Weismann's barrier allows only a direct flux of infom1ation from the genotype to the phenotype-and 
not the other way round-, the phenotype in the view of gene-Darwinism has to be regarded as 
epiphenomenal. 
In contrast, the advocates of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis emphasised the functional 
reality of macroevolutionary phenotypic properties, like geographic isolation or founder effect 
Correspondingly proponents of the synthesis generally came to accept the reality (evolutionary causal 
relevance) of phenotypic properties of groups and some, like MayT, additionally emphasised the reality 
of the individual phenotypic organism. As far as I can judge, this acceptance of the phenotypic structure 
became dominant only in the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. This emphasis may have 
540 E. g.: R Dawkins. 1/ze Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 4 and :> footnote 56. 
541 R Dawkins. The Se((ish Gene (1976/89), pp. 11, 23 f., 254 f.; Replica tor Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), 
p. 68; The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), pp 97 f. 
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needed further theoretical clarification to prevent succeeding generations from the scourge of a 
simplifying interpretation ofWeismann's barrier. 
I will later describe in detail and discuss the radical gene-Darwinian interpretation of the central 
dogma of microbiology, i.e. what I call 'germ-line reductionism' (:>pp. 303 f). 
b) Gene-Atomism 
An aspect of gene-Darwinism which has to be disentangled from the discussed germ-line 
reductionism is its atomistic attitude towards genes. If germ-line reductionism, the sole relevance of the 
genotype, is taken for granted, an atomistic attitude additionally means that within the genotypic side of 
evolution only single selfish genes and not genomes or gene pools as whales are causally relevant58 
Genes are competing for survival and in principle they are in conflict even within a single body542 In 
tlus respect gene-Darwinism puts itself in contrast firstly to Weismann's generally holistic 
understanding of the organismic germ-plasm, and secondly to the evolutionary synthesis, whose early 
proponents focused on gene-pools and whose later proponents have focused on natural populations. 
Despite this, the single selfish-gene viewpoint owes much to earlier Darwinian paradigms. It 
generally shares a reductionistic spirit with Darwin and Weismann, although those authors did not 
extend reduction to a thorough sub-individual reductionism. 
But the atomism of Gene-Darwinism more directly finds its main source in the first step of the 
evolutionary synthesis. This synthesis of genetics witl1 mathematical models of unstructured populations 
(~ pp. 128 f), partly developed by Fisher, incorporated the perspective of separate independent genes 
in a common unstructured gene pool. Based on this Fisherian phase or wing of the synthesis, 
Dawkins-abandoning the focus on the gene-pool-still favours the idea of the primordial independence 
of single egoistic genes 543 Because of this shared gene-atomism gene-Darwinism mirrors Fisherism in a 
nominalist understanding of genomes as whales and individual organisms. 
This nonlinalism is linked to the concept of random mixing during genetic recombination and to the 
chance interpretation of the first variational step of natural selection. On an evolutionary time scale 
genomes or organisms are only evanescent confederations of approximately inmwrtal genes, and 
because of this ephemeral character tl1ey are regarded as unreal. 
According to Dawkins, neglecting the concept of a gene-pool still present in Fisherism, not 
populations but single genes are the units of selection 544 The paradigm sluft becomes obvious, not only 
in regard of the different positions of the unit of selection debate, but already in what different problems 
these approaches are interested in; whereas speciation was an important question of the second phase of 
542 R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), pp. 71-72 
543 R. Dawkins. The Se(fish Gene (1976/89), p. ix. A supporting fact is that Dawkins according to the index of his first 
three books mentions Fisher on a total of 34 pages and Dobzhansky not at all. 
544 !bid, p. 10. 
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the evolutionary synthesis, Dawkins never sununoned up much enthusiasm for 'the species problem,_s45 
Correspondingly the spotlight of gene-Darwinism is not on the Hardy-Weinberg equation, but on the 
formulas ofHamilton and Trivers 546 
As already mentioned, there are additional differences to the second step of the evolutionary 
synthesis, because Dobzhansky had emphasised the contextuality of genes and Mayr has focused on 
phenotypes as existing wholes 547 Nevertheless, also in the second phase of the synthesis, the Fisherian 
inclination towards 'bean-bag genetics' was not completely superseded. 
However, the changed emergentist attitude of the second step of the synthesis towards new entities 
and evolutionary factors, like drift and founder effect, also made the concept of group altruism possible. 
Differing from classical ethology, group selection and group altruism are anathema to proponents of 
pure gene-Darwinism 548 The rise of new textbooks in the spirit of the new sociobiological paradigm 
corresponds to an increase of a "kind of unsentin1ental, dog eat dog, language" 549 All aninlal 
communication, even within species, is now interpreted "as manipulation of signal-receiver by signal-
sender" and in terms of "arms races"550 Now generally mistrust, manipulation and exploitation is the 
normal gene-Darwinian yardstick. Every explanation which seems to confirm group altruism is regarded 
as anomalous and that in turn automatically leads to its critical reassessment 
What I have called 'gene-atomistic reductionism', or 'gene atomism' for short, that is, the concept 
that single genes are the exclusive causally relevant agents of biological evolution, will critically be 
discussed in detail in part IV. 551 
c) Darwinian Process Monism 
Finally, we will now analyse the differences of gene-Darwinism to other largely Darwinian sub-
paradigms in regard ofthe evolutionary process itself. 
Gene-Darwinism is usually a paean, praising pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism and is built on 
the metaphysics of universal Darwinism552 In this regard gene-Darwinism appears to be even more 
Darwinian than Darwin's own approach, because the major, if not exclusive, evolutionary force is 
natural selection. Darwin did still thought of use inheritance as a source for variation. Moreover, the 
545 R. Dawkins. Universal Dan11inism (1983), p. 404. 
546 In Dawkins' The Selfish Gene Hamilton and Trivers are universally quoted, whereas the Hardy-Weinberg principle is 
not mentioned at all. Nevertheless Hamilton reconsidered his early view on this matter :> footnote I 00 I. 
547 :> footnote 512 and its context. 
54
R It has already been shown in earlier sections that Dawkins denies the possibility of group selection. But he-I suspect, 
inconsequentially-accepts e. g. the mechanism of genetical drift. However, he definitely does not focus on this 
mechanism. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 33. 
549 R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 56. 
550 !bid, pp. 57, 6 I. Also: R. Dawkins & J. R. Krebs. Animal signals: infomwtion or manipulation? (1978). Historica!Jy 
the biological concept of arms races has of course further roots, but in these writings its competitive nature is very 
condensed. 
551 :> pp. 259 ff. (The argumentation of gene-atomism and genn-line reductionism may be not completely separable, but 
they may support each other and only together build the basis for the conclusion that organisms and groups are 
ephemeral and epiphenomenal. 
Part II. Chapter 4: Internal Logic of Evolutionary Theories--from Darwin to Dawkins 144 
later Darwin became unsure whether natural selection could universally provide optimal adaptation. 
Although the evolutionary synthesis, in continuation of Weismam1's neo-Darwinism, had dismissed the 
Lamarckian concept of use inheritance and also defined the variance producing step of evolution in a 
more strictly Darwinian way as a blind chance process, the synthesis in its second step still allowed a 
certain causal pluralism. To some extent it took non-adaptive evolutionary factors into account. 
Moreover, the synthesis introduced some macroevolutionary factors to explain the evolutionary process. 
For example genetic drift is based on chance fluctuations and an adaptive interpretation would need 
additional assumptions. 553 It is indeed controversial how far this causal pluralism has distanced the 
synthesis from Danvinism in its most extreme conceivable sense,554 but in any case it is clear that gene-
Darwinism again started to treat macroevolutionary factors as if they were reducible to the concept of 
natural selection. Dawkins: "[A]ll my books have been devoted to expounding and exploring the almost 
limitless power of the Darwinian principle"555 
Despite the general focus on natural selection, it should not be neglected that the rise of gene-
Darwinism was accompanied by the introduction of the concept of kin selection and the reintroduction 
of the concept of sexual selection. 
But gene-Darwinism regards the sociobiological mechanism of kin selection as a mere logical conse-
quence of gene selection. "If we accept neo-Darwinian gene-selectionism, kin selection necessarily fol-
lows. There is, indeed no need for the term kin selection to exist, and I suggest that we stop using it."556 
Since the 1960s, with the rise of sociobiology, also the concept of sexual selection as non-random 
mating became dominant again557 Furthermore, the application of this explanation to higher human 
capacities, like the intellect, has become common 558 The main proponents of the Evolutionary 
Synthesis, due to their central assumption of panrnictic gene pools, had largely abandoned sexual 
selection. Although gene-Darwinism has taken up their concept of 'bean bag genetics', it on the other 
hand deviates from another central conception of the early phase of the Synthesis. By accepting sexual 
selection indirectly the concept. of complete random combination of genes is challenged. 559 This in my 
view corresponds to the fact, already mentioned, that in regard to central equations population-
Darwinism (the 'Evolutionary Synthesis) has been built arow1d the Hardy-Weinberg equations, whereas 
552 :>pp. 207 f., 213 f.; 330 f., 340 f.. 
553 See my proposal that drift seems to be interpreted as the chance variation part of a natural selection process on the level 
of a species and also my reservations concerning this proposal, :> p. 133. 
554 This controversy obviously depends on the question of the definition of Darwinism. :> pp. I 07 and esp. 348 f. 
555 R. Dawkins. River Out of Eden (1995), p. xii. :>chapter on Universal Darwinism, pp. 205 f., esp. pp. 207 f., 213 f. 
556 R. Dawkins. Replica tor Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 67. :> also footnotes 80, 826. 
557 S. J. Frankel. The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Themy (1994), p. 182. See also: R. Thornhill & S. Gangestad. The 
evolution of human sexuality ( 1996). 
558 E. g.: M. Ridley. The Red Queen. Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature ( 1995/1993), p. 21. 
559 Later on I will argue that this aspect of gene-Darwinism has an inherent tendency also to undermine its own gene-
atomism. 
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gene-Darwinism (the sociobiological paradigm) has taken the equations of Hamilton and Trivers as its 
theoretical centre (though Hamilton himself is in his later work not a strict gene-Darwinian=> 1001 ). 
Gene-Darwinism attributes a much more active role to the gene. Gene-Darwinism, in many respects 
the pinnacle of Darwinism, appears in this regard paradoxically almost non-Darwinian. h1 my opinion 
tlus aspect of gene-' Darwinism' even has a tendency to undermine the Darwinian understanding of 
adaptation to an external environment and hence Darwinism itself However, because gene-Darwinians 
usually do not put emphasis on this subversive aspect, I will not treat it any further in this histmical 
part, but will examine it later in tl1e systematic discussion. 
Practically, the acceptance of sexual selection has not helped to tum gene-Darwinism into a 
moderate position. This might have been assumed, because Darwin in his later publications, more 
directly concemed with human evolution, tried to smooth his relatively harsh explanation of the 
evolutionary process by introducing the less cruel mechanism of sexual selection 560 But gene-
Darwinism not only additionally still emphasises the competition of single genes. but also seems to 
interpret sexual selection only as a convenient term, a mere .flatus vocis, which-like kin selection80-is 
in principle reducible to the generalised term of gene-selection, and is hence no substantial mechanism 
on its ovm. However, the resulting interpretation replaces sexual partnership by an unchangeable 'battle 
ofthe sexes' and results in a harsher view of relationship than any Darwinian paradigm had ever before 
Partnership is represented to be essentially and etemally "a relationship of mutual mistrust and mutual 
exploitation."561 The evolutionary synthesis has seen sexual behaviour "as essentially a co-operative 
venture undertaken for mutual benefit, or even for the good of the speciesl"562 
As we have seen already in the first and preceding second part of this work the rise of sociobiology 
brought not only many interesting stimulations to other subject areas, but also ended the period of 
relative ideological disengagement of biology. In the following chapter 5 we will come to the external 
historical reasons for the development of these paradigms. 
But as the influence of radical gene-Darwinism has increased, altemative approaches started to 
flourish also, which criticise especially gene-Darwitusm and even Darwi11ism in general. 
4.5 Criticism -a Better Synthesis in Sight? 
Today, at the tum to the 2l st century, it appears appropriate to pose the question of whether 
Darwinism, at least in its purest gene-Darwinian form, is on its deathbed again. Since the evolutionary 
synthesis hardened in the 1970s, criticism became influential and many alternative concepts have been 
proposed and vigorously discussed. Although Darwinism in its broad sense is no doubt the most 
560 :> pp. r1s rr. 
561 R Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 140. 
562 !bid, p. 140. 
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influential approach in biology, there has been an increasing plurality of views within Darwinism some 
which came to oppose even the originally almost unchallenged Darwinism in general. 563 
The present crisis of the hardened evolutionary synthesis resembles the crisis of the radicalised neo-
Darwi.nism between 18 90 and 193 0. That crisis at the turn at the end of the 19th century had been 
triggered by the discontent with Weismann's radicalised neo-Darwinism and its apparent inconsistency 
with new genetic findings and Mendelism. Today, at the turn of the 2nd millennium, the disputes are 
again triggered by a radicalisation. This time the Evolutionary Synthesis, especially in continuation of 
its Fisherian wing, is radicalised by what we have called 'gene-Darwinism', which in an openly 
disdainful sense also has been called 'ultra-Darwi.nism'564 The biological concepts of this Darwinian 
paradigm and their far-reaching application to culture came into conflict with traditional systems of 
morality, and also with the theoretical approach of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. As in 
the first crisis of Darwinism, a flourishing theoretical pluralism-now generally more moderate-
challenged the radicalised Darwinism. New conceptions of selforga.nisation have emerged and old 
developmental conceptions have reappeared. Punctuated equilibrium, genetic neutralism, cladism and 
dynamic systems theory challenged ultra-Darwinism and in part even Darwinism itself. If Darwinism 
had not to start to struggle for its life, it at least started to stmggle for its unity and its proper definition 
The central tenets of gene-Darwinism-exclusive focus on selfish genes, gradualism, pan-
selectio.nism and pan-adaptionism-have led to heated popular and scientific controversies. Certain 
biologists and philosophers of biology attacked gene-Darwi.nism to vindicate both the ontological and 
epistemological existence of higher genetic units, phenotypes and populations as causal relevant whales 
and even an ontological reality of ecosystems. There was a revival of a different form of saltationism565 
Moreover it has been maintained that other forces than exclusively natural selection play irreducible 
roles in evolution, i. e. chance mechanisms (drift etc.), moderate versions of Lamarckian mechanisms, 
Baldwinian mechanisms or developmental constraints. The connection of natural selection and 
adaptation has been dissociated by R. C. Lewontin, who has claimed that natural selection does not 
necessarily always lead to adaptation. (In economic terms we may say he broke with the belief in a 
biological invisible hand.) Hence all main aspects of gene-Darwinism have been challenged. 
As in the time before the Evolutionary Synthesis, it is today not clear, how a new different synthesis 
may fmally unite most of these proposals. Although there are signs of a convergence even on the side of 
563 Overviews on these new frontiers in evolutionary biology are given e. g. by N. Eldredge ( 1996/1995); D. J. Depew, B. 
Weber (1995), pp. 347-427; F. Wuketits (1995), pp. 83-156; E. Mayr (1991), pp. 141-164; P. Bowler (1984), chap. 12. 
564 N. Eldredge in Reinventing Darwin (1995), uses 'ultra-Darwinism' extensively in a meaning similar to my tenn 'gene-
Darwinism' (e. g. pp. xi, 4, 35 f.). But sometimes he uses 'ultra-Darwinism' also to denote positions, for which I would 
not use 'gene-Darwinism' e. g. referring to a still realist view of organisms and populations (p. 57; or see his p. x and 
:>my footnote 85). 
565 But :> footnote 577. 
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gene-Darwinism, the influence of their austere research programme seems to be undiminished566 One 
group advocates that the old evolutionary synthesis is generally open enough to provide a framework for 
most of these approaches. 567 The opposed group advocates a more fundamental theoretical turn, but is 
far from being united. Some of them want to expand Darwinism into a multi-level Darwinism; others 
want to supplement or even replace natural selection either by less blind mechanisms or by mechanisms 
which are not adaptive, but based on chance or structural constraints. Furthern1ore, some rather favour 
a historisation of nature replacing scientific universal rules by narratives; others favour an even stronger 
reliance on mathematics and physics in the context of the complexity revolution568 
a) New Views in Micro- and M aerobiology 
The present criticism of the gene-Darwinian subparadigm and also of Darwinism in general is 
motivated by new empirical results and new theoretical concepts. It is convenient to distinguish 
developments in microbiology and in macrobiology. 
Microbiology had already been an obstacle to Darwinism at the time of the first bloom of Mendelian 
genetics (de Vries and Bateson). Afterwards Mendelian genetics had been absorbed into the 
evolutionary synthesis by combining it with statistical models of biological populations. Also the 
discovery of the actual structure of the germ plasm, the double helix of DNA, by James Watson and 
Francis Crick in 1953, and the discovery of the biological protein synthesis at that time gave support to 
the largely neo-Darwinian Evolutionary Synthesis. 
Now, at the turn of the 20th century, genetics again seems to become an obstacle to Darwinism, 
especially for the concept of genetic atomism, but partly also for the evolutionary synthesis and thus for 
Darwinism in general. 
(1.) The neutral theory of protein evolution, firstly stated by the Japanese population geneticist 
Motoo Kimura in 1968, is based on the information redundancy empirically found in the protein 
synthesis. In this process different triplets of nucleotides encode the same amino acid, and in many 
proteins different amino acids are equifunctional. Thus, mutations in the sequence of amino acids only 
seldom lead to phenotypic change and most mutations are not 'visible' to selection. Moreover large 
566 But R. Dawkins in River out of Eden (1995) in regard of his gene-atomistic claims seems more guarded than ever 
before. Dawkins' central metaphor of this book, ti1e branching digital river of genes, refers mainly to species, not to 
single genes. Hence it appears that in this respect he almost resembles the position of the synthesis, which he had 
always opposed (e. g. pp. 4-6, 20, 29, 35. f.). But even in this respect he finally seems to come to his old conclusions 
(pp. 5, 28, 118, 121-122). Moreover-as far as I know-he has in either case never explicitly renounced his original 
gene-atornism, central in particular to his most influential book The Selfish Gene(~ also footnote 45). 
Additionally, Dawkins argues as strong as ever in favour of his other tenets of genu-line reductionism and ubiquitous 
natural selection. Gene-Darwinism is far from becoming extinct and its ordinary followers are inspired by all aspects of 
t11e original paradigm. 
567 This is mainly advocated by moderate proponents of the second phase of the synthesis, like E. Mayr in One Long 
Argument (1991), esp. pp. 147, 149, 164, and finds its result in textbooks, likeD J. Futuyma, Evolutionsbiologie 
( 1990/86), who is incorporating ti1e heterodox views into the framework of the evolutionary synthesis. 
568 See e. g. D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), e. g. pp. 315-316, chap. 15-16. 
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parts of the DNA are not read at all during the DNA-RNA-transcription. Kimura follows from these 
facts that the central genetic role of natural selection has to be reduced. Kimura's neutralism 
altematively rather focuses on the chance accumulation of mutations. 
Kimura's theory has also been connected with the conception of a 'molecular clock', assuming that the changing rate of 
an allele has its own fixed tempo. 
(2.) The operon model of the French geneticists Francois Jacob and Jacques Monod was stated in 
1961. It was an important step to show an inner organisation of the genome. It was shown that the 
expression of structural genes is controlled by regulatory genes. If a regulatory gene mutates or 
structural genes come under the regime of a different regulatory gene this can result in sudden huge 
changes of the phenotype. Although Monod counts as a proponent of Darwinism, his approach enabled 
a new far more active and organised understanding of the genome and a new form of saltationism. 
In the further development of genetics genes have increasingly been seen not as mere genetic atoms, 
but as being parts of a highly contextual and complex genetic system of functional 'checks and 
balances'. 
(3.) Microbiology also inspired attempts to revive a-comparatively moderate-version of 
Lamarck's long-discredited mechanism of inheritance of acquired characteristics. This mechanism is 
seen as an addition rather than an altemative to a selection theory. 569 
Ted Steele in 1979 proposed that RNA can in fact influence the DNA of the germ cells, just as a 
retrovirus transmits information to its host's DNA Steel proposed a process of feedback between the 
immune system-in his view working on the basis of 'somatic selection'-and the DNA. He influenced 
the neo-Lamarckian Arthur Koestler, who opposed the Darwinian passive understanding of organisms 
as mere genetic machines moulded extemally by selection (here differential environmental elimination). 
But it was argued that Steele's heretical empirical results could not be replicated. 570 A similar dispute on 
the scientific respectability of empirical results took place in regard to the results of Cairns et al. 571 
Recently Edward J. Steele, together with two co-authors, wrote the book Lamarck's Signature, where 
Ted Steele's original theory has been defended, elaborated and popularised572 
Already in the late 1950s H. Tennin, who received the Nobel price in 1975, had discovered reverse 
transcription, which is central for the replication of retroviruses. Actual gene transposition had then 
been proven by Barbara McClintock (1902-1992), also a Nobel laureate. According to McClintock's 
research, genes could be moved within a chromosome or even between different ones. These results in 
569 E. J. Steele, R. A Lindley, R. V. Blanden. Lamarck 's Signature ( 1998), pp. I, 6, 11, 23, chap. 5. A short survey of the 
precursors of U1is present Lamarckian attempt is given e. g. by P. J. Bowler. Evolution (1984 ), pp. 319-321. 
570 P. J. Bowler. Evolution ( 1984), pp. 320-321. 
571 J Caims, l Overbaugh and St. Miller. The Origin of Mutants (1988). Contra: L. Partridge, M. Morgan. Is bacterial 
Evolution Random or Selective? ( 1988); CharlesworU1, D. et al. Origin of the Mutants Disputed ( 1988). R. Lenski et al. 
Another Alternative to Directed Mutation ( 1989). [Literature of this footnote from: E. Khalil. Neo-classical Economics 
and Neo-Darwinism (1992).] 
572 E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. Lamarck 's Signature ( 1998). 
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principle may violate the central dogma of molecular biology. If the ·transposition is catalysed by certain 
states in the cell, theoretically an external influence could also have an impact on the genome, and if this 
takes place in the germ cells it would have an impact on the germ line. 
However, the work of McC!intock and the general development of genetics, for example the largely 
adaptive way in which gene transpositions work, seem to imply a much more self-organised view of the 
genome. Tllis presumably will be difficult to harmonise with the perspective of a genome build up by 
'selfish' independent genes. One can even say that a more selforganised understanding of genomes and 
organisms, even if a strictly Lamarckian theory will not turn out to be true, in some sense may rather 
rmrror the active Lamarckian or orthogenetic understanding than the originally passive Darwinian 
Macrobiology had resisted an integration into the Evolutionary Synthesis more than other biological 
disciplines, especially in its ecological and palaeontological branches. Some concepts in these disciplines 
have continuously resembled tenets of romantic biology. In palaeontology-even after Darwinism seized 
power-the concept of saltationism was still discussed (e. g. Scllindewolf, 1950 and even Simpson 
advocated 'quantum evolution'). In ecology the view of romantic science comprehending ecosystems as 
'superorganisms' in their own right, had its peak in the time of the eclipse of Darwinism, but it 
continued as a undercurrent in biology afterwards. This view has also influenced the philosophy of deep 
ecology. Today these ideas are again receiving some support. They oppose the genetic atomism and 
gradualism of gene-Darwinism. The following two approaches, which have much in cormnon, both 
focus on macrobiology, although they both try to combine their theories with microbiological evidence. 
(1 ) The theory of punctuated equilibrium, first stated in 1972 by the palaeontologists Stephen 
Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge574, repudiates the gene-Darwinian paradigm in several respects. 
Richard C. Lewontin is another persuasive critic of gene-Darwinism. He has written influential 
articles together with Gould against ubiquitous adaptation, 575 and could count as his ally. Although 
Lewontin definitely has an interesting own theoretical viewpoint and standing, and although he comes 
from the rnicroscopical side of genetics, he will here simply be treated under the same headline. 
Although Gould, Eldredge and Lewontin in their earlier publications still followed in the wake 
authors like Dobzhansky, Mayr and Wright, at the time as the synthesis hardened in particular Gould 
and Lewonti.n became critical of the synthesis itself. Here I will only briefly contrast the position of this 
three writers with gene-Darwinism, that is with 'ultra-Darwinism '564 
573 For such claims the definition of Darwinism and Lamarckism is crucial, ~pp. 348 f. 
574 N. Eldredge, St. J. Gould. Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism (1972). St. J. Gould; N. 
Eldredge. Punctuated equilibria: The tempo and mode of evolution reconsidered (1977). 
575 S. J. Gould; R. C. Lewontin. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm (1979). 
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Firstly, punctuated equilibrium turns against Datwinian phyletic gradualism and in this regard may 
be seen as a continuation of the saltationistic tradition ofpalaeontology. 576 This tradition could be traced 
back to Schindewolf and Goldschmidt, and could recently also be found in S. Lovtrup' s writings 
Although some proponents of punctuated equilibrium have distanced themselves from the traditional 
type of saltationism,577 a general saltationist leaning is obvious: According to punctuated equilibrium the 
nonnal status of evolution is one of stasis, of equilibrium and only minor change. The stasis is 
punctuated by phases of rapid change and speciation. 
Punctuated equilibrium claims that this description, opposed to gene-Darwinian gradualism finds 
empirical support by the fossil record. Darwinians in contrast have of course often dismissed the fossil 
record as not being directly conclusive, because of its assumed incompleteness. 
Although gene-Darwinism is opposed to any deviation from gradualism, already the evolutionary 
synthesis had acknowledged the phenomenon of sudden changes in evolution. Eldredge and Gould 
(1972) even turned to Mayr's writings on geographic isolation and the founder effect as they formulated 
their theory578 Even Simpson acknowledged periods of rapid change in evolution, which he called 
'quantum evolution': Mayr worked on 'adaptive radiation' 579 In recent years it was nevertheless 
especially Gould and Eldredge who emphasised that punctuated stasis is central for evolution and who 
since the 1970s have defended this claim against the rising tide of gene-Darwinism. 
The biological controversy between gradualism and saltationism could also be found in the geological dispute between 
Button's (and Lyell's) unifonnitarianism and Cuvier's catastrophism; or in history of science, where Kuhn challenged the 
conception of a continuous scientific approximation of the truth and replaced it by discontinuous phases of nonnal and revo-
lutionary science. Such parallels might indicate that actually deeper values and metaphysical commitments may be at stake. 
Secondly, Gould and Eldredge differ from the sociobiological paradigm in their claim of a certain 
autonomy of macroevolution from microevolution. This concept had also to some extent been present in 
the second phase of the Evolutionary Synthesis. 580 According to the theory of punctuated equilibrium 
speciation is the primary source of evolutionary change. 
Especially if such an explanatory autonomy is given, palaeontology could be regarded as an 
in1portant biological discipline, which has the fossil record at its disposal and hence almost exclusively 
has empirical access to the long term macrobiological evolutionary process. Gould has argued against 
the often assumed irrelevance and de facto submission ofpalaeontology 581 
Thirdly, Gould, Lewontin and Eldredge, together with the followers of the Dobzhanskyian wing of 
the evolutionmy synthesis, have opposed gene-Darwinism not only in regard of macroevolutionary 
576 This parallel is also drawn by other authors: e.g. M. Wuketits. Evolutionstheorien ( 1995), p. 93. 
577 N. El dredge. Reinventing Darwin ( 1995), pp. 100, 98, 27. 
578 N. Eldredge, St. J. Gould. Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism (1972). 
579 A tenn originally introduced by H. F. Osbom, a proponent of orthogenesis. 
580 
::;) footnote 496. 
581 St. J. Gould. Irrelevance, submission, partnership: the changing role of palaeontology in Darwin's three centennials 
and a modest proposal for macroevolution ( 1983 ). N. El dredge. Reinventing Darwin. ( 1995 ), pp. 166, 169. 
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mechanisms, but-closely linked to this-in regard ofthe existence ofmacroevolutionary entities. They, 
despite some ambivalence and restrictions, 582 have generally vindicated the existence of organisms, 
populations and species 583 According to them, evolution and also natural selection work on higher 
levels of organisation than exclusively on the level of single genes. 
Fourthly, they advocated the causal relevance of phenotypes and opposed the exclusive relevance of 
genotypes 584 In this regard they continued and radicalised the second phase of the Evolutionary 
Synthesis, in their recognition that the phenotypic population structure and-at least according to 
Mayr-the organismic phenotype are uneliminable factors of evolutionary theory. 
Besides theoretical reasons for adopting this view, a phenotypic approach is also more suitable for 
the classical methodology of palaeontologists, who only seldom had the opp01tunity to study 
palaeontological DNA. 
Fifthly, Gould and Lewontin in particular attacked the simplifying 'adaptationism' of gene-
Darwinism585 Again, by doing this, they radicalised aspects of the second step of the evolutionary 
synthesis-here Wright's concept of genetic drift-and argued that especially in speciation random 
fluctuations-as opposed to adaptations-are central for the evolutionary process. 
Finally, proponents of punctuated equilibriwn have incorporated tenets, which historically have to be 
regarded as being originally concepts of romantic biology. Inner constraints, Baupldne and an inner 
developmental necessity and direction of evolution here started to play a role again 586 This is the case 
although proponents of this approach still advocate natural selection as a very important factor of 
evolution. 
(2.) S)1stems theory of evolution stresses that entities have to be regarded as pa1ts of larger 
systems 587 This viewpoint is the opposed (or may be the complementary) view to atornism, either of a 
genetic, an individualistic or a 'speciestic' kind. If such a more holistic approach is applied to 
It has been argued that the emm1cipation of palaeontology even the other way round has been a reason for stressing the 
autonomy of macrobiology: M. Ruse. Mystery oflvfysteries ( 1999), p. 143. 
582 N. Eldredge. Reinventing Damin. (1995), pp. 138, 145,216. 
583 Ibid., pp. 105, 109, 123, 135. 
584 R. C. Lewontin. Gene, Organism and environment ( 1983). 
585 S. J. Gould; R. C. Lewontin. The Spandre/s of San Marco and the Pang/ossian Paradigm (1979), pp. 581-598. 
586 M. Ruse. Mystery a,( Mysteries (1999), pp. 137-138, 141, 144. R. J. Richards at least also sees similarities with an 
(pseudo-Darwinian) 'older nineteenth-century version' of human nature: Damin and the Emergence o.f Evolutionmy 
Theories of Mind and Behavior ( 1987), p. 546. P. Bowler. Evolution ( 1984), 324-325. 
Despite the stress on inner direction, Gould-taking natural selection still as basic process-has argued against the 
notion of evolutionary progress, which was central to the RomaJ.Jtics and the pseudo-DarwiniaJ.Js. Ruse has pointed out 
that Gould' s understat1ding of complete raJ.Jdom contingency is inconsistent with Christian religion. I would agree with 
Ruse, but I doubt that Dawkins' unmodified concept of unrestrained struggle for life leads further? See: M. Ruse. Being 
Mean to Steve (2000), p. 4. 
587 Punctuated equilibrium may also owe something to systems theory, especially the notion of a dynamic equilibrium. 
Lewontin was likewise concerned to analyse different kinds of homeostasis. However, because of their actual influence 
atJd because of the palaeontological roots of punctuated equilibrium, punctuated equilibrium is here treated as an 
approach on its own. 
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ecosystems588 , this can be seen as a demystified form (nmmally working in terms of causa ejjiciens) of 
the idea of ecosystems as superorganisms. 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy founded a general systems theory at the end of the eclipse of Darwinism. 589 
Of course this system theory in turn has older origins. Today systems theories have become influential 
again. I limit myself to distinguish three sub-schools: (a) The Austrian biologist Rupert Riedl and the 
philosopher of biology Franz Wuketits revitalised the 'systems theory of evolution' rather as a modifica-
tion of the synthetic theory than a different paradigm. Also, for example, the German biologist Bernhard 
Hassenstein (Freiburg) has reformulated processes of variation and natural selection in tenns of 
feedback loops. (b) The Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have put em-
phasis on the reintroduction of the ancient term autopoiesis and rather have favoured a radical construc-
tivist paradigm shift than only a modification of the synthesis. (c) The British scientist James Love lock 
has introduced and popularised the concept of selfregulation on the level of the whole planet earth, his 
so-called 'Gaia-hypothesis' (the historian will be reminded of the Antique concept of anima mundi) 590 
As we will see in the next section, in recent years physics, chemistry and information science also 
contributed to extend and dynamise systems theory so that it has become an even more interesting 
source for our search for a new synthesis 
b) A Multilevel Synthesis- Danvinism versus Developmentalism? 
A huge range of different micro- and macrobiological approaches are in contradiction to or at least 
different in emphasis from gene-Darwinism. Is there another synthesis in sight? Will this pluralism of 
alternative proposals be transcended? Where in the theoretical 'space', which is highly dimensional, 
non-Euclidean and itself changing, will this discourse settle and find again at least a local maximum of 
truth? 
In my view gene-Darwinism, which today plays an important role in sociobiology and in other 
subject areas, will indeed contribute to such a synthesis. But, although gene-Darwinism is a highly 
appealing theory in regard of its empirically bold predictions and its theoretically austere simplicity, it 
will not dominate future evolutionary theory. In my systematic fourth part of this work reasons for the 
inconsistency of gene-Darwinism will be given(~ pp. 240 f). The evolutionary synthesis, which in my 
opinion has at least as much to contribute to a new synthesis, would itself need to change some of its 
central basic assumptions to incorporate both gene-Darwinian tenets and its alternatives. 
If there will be a new unified theory (as an alternative to gene-Darwinism) two multi-level 
approaches appear to propose themselves: 
588 See e. g.: W. Wieser. Energetische und soziale Aspekte der Evolution (1989), p. 10 I. 
589 L. v. Bertalanfi:Y. Kritische Theorie der Formbildung. Berlin ( 1928). 
590 ~ also the list of names in small print on p. 316. 
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(l.) An approach which accepts many levels of evolution, but which, concerning the evolutionary 
mechanisms, will still remain predominantly Darwinian. This approach could be called 'multi-level-
Darwinism'. 
(2.) An even fuller paradigm shift, which not only favours a multi-level approach in regard to 
evolutionary objects, but which also abandons an exclusive focus on natural selection and introduces 
different or additional evolutionary mechanisms. We may call this 'multi-level-evolutionism', or in the 
ex.'treme specific case of a rather developmental or romantic approach 'multi-level-developmentalism'. 
Both approaches would clearly be opposed to pure gene-atomism and favour a multi-level account of 
evolution. But concerning the evolutionary mechanisms, multi-level-Darwinism and multi-level-
Developmentalism would be the extremes of a continuum. Most present actual authors would have to be 
placed somewhere in the middle on tllis continuum: Proponents of the Evolutionary Synthesis, like pro-
ponents of Punctuated Equilibrium-and even Dawkins591-all have in principle accepted that natural 
selection and chance and inner constraints do play a role in evolution. But because gene-Darwinism has 
vigorously attacked the compromise reached by the evolutionary syntl1esis, the opponents of tllis gene-
Darwinism were forced to pin-point tl1eir own alternative views more distinctly and explicitly. This may 
have ended the period in which thoughts from many different ideological and philosophical backgrounds 
had all been easily subsumed under the term Darwinism 592 (If nothing else of gene-Darwinism 
remained, this clarification would be an important lasting contribution ofthis paradigm.) 
I am going to outline these rather artificial ex.'treme options, because they could help to understand 
the possibility space in which a new evolutionary synthesis may take place: 
(1.) Multi-levei-Darwinism in biology and pllilosophy of biology tries to overcome the substance 
reductionism of gene-Darwinism, but in regard of processes remains in radical sense Darwinian, basing 
its argumentation on a selectionist argument. 
Proponents of tills approach argue that selection takes place on many levels and hence also these 
levels are real in evolutionary terms. In a frequently quoted paper from 1970, Lewontin introduced the 
term 'unit of selection ·, arguing in favour of group selection. 593 Proponents of a selectionist argument 
may, for example, maintain that the individual phenotypic organism rather than the selfish gene is an 
entity which is eventually 'visible' to selection, because selection (in the sense of differential 
environmental elimination and survival) acts on each actual organism. For the time being we will leave 
aside the discussion of possible objections 594 It is concluded that organisms hence have to be regarded 
to be real, because having an effect on entities seems to be a sufficient (if not necessary) condition for 
591 In reaction to Gould and others R Dawkins, while still holding to his gene-atomism, concedes in The Extended 
Phenotype (1982/89, pp. 30-54) that there indeed are quantitative constraints. 
592 :::> also footnote 387. 
593 RC. Lewontin. The units of selection (1970). 
594 Objections may be based on a different internal-external distinction or a stronger focus on the replication process. 
:::> the treatment of substance reductionism in chap. 8. 
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being real. There is an increasing number of biologists and philosophers who advocate a refined multi-
level e>..'tension of individualist Darwinism or gene-Darwinism 595 Some authors extend a selectionist 
argumentation even to species or even ecosystems. That an ecosystem may be doomed to become extinct 
as a whole, may gain some plausibility as we understand that if man destroys other species, he may be 
next on the list. 
Such arguments appear to be valid, only if the whole would indeed have additional properties, which 
its parts did not already had on their own; in terms of the Gestalt-psychology, if the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts; in terms of variance analysis, if there are not only main effects of the parts, but also 
interaction effects. But whether there are such effects is of course the very question of the unit of 
selection debate from the outset. We will currently not engage in this controversial and detailed debate, 
but will return to it later on (~ pp. 240 f.). At present we may simply assume that there are 
ontologically properties on different hierarchical levels, which may play a role in the being or survival 
of entities. In this sense they would be real and not reducible to or collapsible into each other. Such a 
view would indeed be at odds with pure gene-Darwinism. 
But is this view still Darwinian enough to found a position which we would dub 'multi-level-
Darwinism' in its most radical sense? (Remember: we aimed at outlining the most radical positions at 
the end of a hypothetical continuum of multi-level-theories.) Would the approach outlined before-
which in my view would indeed be an improvement compared with gene-Darwinism-be as clearly an 
Darwinian position as possible? I think not. The outlined approach, although historically clearly 
inspired by Darwinism, would mean not much more than merely stating that there are higher properties 
of entity collectives. Such a clain1 is not an especially Darwinian one. The only additional 
epistemological aspect would be that the reality of properties would be linked to their role in survival, 
that is, to the probability of a thing to be or not to be. This argumentation answers the question 'what 
entities do exist?' with 'entities which change the probability to exist exist'. This answer may be 
metaphysically interesting, may be true or false, or may be close to a tautology, but does definitely not 
encapsulate the complete essence of Darwinism. 
Natural selection indeed is usually regarded as the core of Darwinism. But the term 'selection' Is 
normally-and in this work as well-used in a weak and in a strong sense: Selection in the weak sense 
only means the second step of a Darwinian process, i. e., elimination or differential survival of entities. 
In this weak sense it has largely been used in the present section above. But this weak meaning does not 
necessarily involve notions like replicators, evolutionary lines etc. 
Alternatively, selection in its strong sense could mean the whole Darwinian process of blind variation 
of replicators and external selection. Multi-level-Darwinism as a pure paradigm should hence on many 
ontological levels refer to this natural selection in the strong sense, to a stratification of full Darwinian 
595 E. g.: E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. Unto Others (1998), pp. I 00 f.; R N. Brandon. The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of 
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processes of blind variation and external elimination (For questions concemmg the definition of 
Danvinism, ~ pp. 107, 348.) Multi-level-Danvinism in either case carries on the process-monism of 
gene-Danvin.ism. Moreover multi-level-Danvinism in its strong sense puts comparatively more 
emphasis on the first step of or the replicator side of the Darwinian process and is hence less 
concentrating on the second step concerned with phenotypes: Dawkins, who has emphasised the 
importance of replicators, regards phenotypes only as their 'vehicles'; correspondingly he argued that in 
this strong sense of selection there is only one exclusive unit of selection, i. e. that of selfish genes 596 
But in principle this replicator and vehicle argumentation may also be applied to gene-pools as 
whales, for example. Gene-pools as wholes may also be regarded as replicators which as vehicles, 
phenotypic groups, become selected (:>also already p. 133). 
Lewontin, although he coined the term 'unit of selection', should not be classified as belonging to such a radicallv 
Darwinian multi-level-approach, because he does not exclusively focus on natural selection and is one of the main 
proponents who fought against pan-adaptati.onism. 597 
The first replicational or variational step of evolution is bound to the notion of a replicator; the 
second eliminational step of evolution is bound to the notion of a vehicles (Dawk.ins) or the notion of an 
interactor (Hulli98 Here we may already detect an interesting unity of processes and objects. However, 
why use the two terms 'interactor' and 'vehicle'? On the first view these notions seem to resemble each 
other, but the interactor-terrn.inology Hull (who always has advocated the species-as-individual-view) 
seems to concede at least a somewhat more active role to the phenotype (:> pp. 217 f.). If we are in 
search for the purest version of multi-level-Danvinism, the notion of a mere vehicle seems to me to be 
more clearly and purely Danvinian-in its present radically neo-Danvinian understanding-and fmally 
more problematic. 
In the following chapters we will see that multi-levei-Danvinism tends to be extended to an all-
pervasive approach. 
In chapter 5, on the external history of Danvinism, we will see how biological Danvinian theories 
developed in interaction with non-biological Danvinian approaches. Today these theories with which 
Danvinism interacted may provide the material for a universalised multi-level-Danvinism. 
Danvinian processes found in such different areas will be focused in part Ill, with chapter 6 and 7. 
The specific non-biological theories based on a Danvinian process will be described in detail in chapter 
7. In chapter 6 we aim at unifying these accounts within a more general metaphysical approach, which I 
will call 'Process-Danvinism' (:>pp. 214 f. 218 f.). Process-Danvinism could be understood as a meta-
physics, because its ontological (and epistemological and ethical) demands are ubiquitous and exclusive. 
Interactors ( 1998/1988). 
596 Selection here is obviously meant in its strong sense, because Dawki.ns bases his focus on the gene on his interpretation 
of the full Darwinian process. 
597 :> footnote 585, 593. Also the way how he has proposed the hierarchy of Darwinian processes has itself been contrasted 
to a replicator-vehicle approach. H. Plotkin. Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge ( 1994/95), pp. 82-101. 
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Moreover it is an almost archetypal metaphysical theory because in regard of its abstractness, its 
explanatory power, its simplicity and also its connection to actual sciences. It is a theory of which meta-
physicians have long dreamt of. If the paradigm of pure gene-Darwinism declines, multi-level-Dar-
winism intuitively appears to be to be the next step, because it still shares the processes with gene-Dar-
winism, but incorporates much of the criticism against the gene-atomism of gene-Darwinism. I had to 
find out that the actual historical development had already drawn this inductive inference and already 
many contributions on (universal) process-Darwinism have been made (e. g. Campbell, Dennett, Hull, 
Munz and Plotkin) Often these proposals still sustain pan-selectionist and pan-adaptationist beliefs. 
Although I think we have to work our way through all-pervasive process-Darwinism, I think 
inconsistencies of this approach could also be shown (~ part IV, pp. 327 f., 330 f., 340 f.). Although 
process-Darwinism is in some respects indeed a wonderful approach from which much can be learned, 
and although process-Darwinism in my opinion would definitely be an improvement compared with 
gene-Darwinism, it is in my opinion still built in a too one-sided way on the Darwinian metaphor, 
focusing more on competition than on co-operation and more on the passive process of being selected 
than on the active process of selforganisation. 11l.is critique of process Danvinism will be substantiated 
in chapter 9. 
(2.) The other extreme approach of the assumed continuum of possible multi-level accounts, would 
be a far-reaching replacement of natural selection: we called it multi-level-evolutionism (evolution here 
meant in remembrance of the original connotation of the term). Natural selection on different levels 
would not any more be regarded as necessarily the only essential mechanism of evolution, to which all 
other mechanisms are in principle reducible. 
Approaches which are critical towards Darwinism could generally proceed in two ways: They may 
firstly start from a given, even radically Danvinian starting point and only thereafter try to 'reconstruct 
the ship on the open sea', 1. e. to supplement the ubiquitous Darwinian mechanism by additional 
processes, constraints etc. The other procedure would be to build independently an alternative 
conception of the unfolding of nature. In either cases, the focus could already be on the evolutionary 
beginnings or (possibly additionally) on the further evolutionary process, which, in its further course, is 
itself regarded to be a changeable object of evolution. 
My own approach in the present work starts from within radical Darwinism and then tries to show the need to extend or 
even in some respects tu transcend this paradigm, already partly concemed will-t the beginnings, but even more pronounced 
when concemed with the further course of evolution. 
We have already outlined above some specific contributions in micro- or macrobiology which have 
appeared to be at odds with Darwinism. Presently, we want to outline a multi-level-approach which also 
breaks with the emphasis on Darwinian processes. In the following two general multi-level-approaches 
598 D. HulL Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay ( 1981 ). 
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will be described, which-independent of questions of procedure-may m my v1ew contribute to a 
radical extension or even replacement of Darwinism. 
a) Firstly, multi-level-developmentalism, which in aspects was revitalised during the last decade, 
fully breaks with the predominant focus on Darwinian explanations. This approach with a focus on an 
inner structural or morphological logic is a reformed version of what we have called romantic 
biology,599 linked with terms like 'Morphogenesis', 'Rational Morphology' or 'Entwicklungsmechanik'. 
For reasons of simplicity we here also subsume other non-Darwinian evolutionary approaches which are not strictly 
romantic, but which also have opposed the sole dominance of causa materia/is and causa efficiens, like e. g. the neo-
Aristotelian or neo-Thomist teleological approach of Spaemrum and Uiw600 This is done, since different philosophical 
understandings of nature, which could not easily be ham1onised with Darwinism, have moved closer together601 
The romantic (or dynamic transcendental-idealist) tradition could be traced back to the pre-
Darwinian biology of Oken, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, the late Owen or at least to the 'romanticising 
materialist biology' of Buffon and Lamarck, who advocated at least also an active understanding of the 
organism. 599 The tradition of romantic biology was taken up in a modified way, mainly during the 
eclipse of Darwinism, by Conrad Hal Waddington, D 'Arcy Thompson, Hans Driesch and later again, 
for example, by Jean Piaget. 
Today, the biologist Brian Goodwin602 and his school explore the possibilities to revive a similar 
hierarchical theory of forms, which puts emphasis on the reality of organisms, and opposes a purely 
Darwinian approach to biology 603 
b) The second possibility of how a multi-level-theory without any or without a mam focus on 
Darwinism might be built, is linked to theories of selforganisation or dynamic systems theory. 
We have already mentioned contributions to systems theory in the last section, especially in their 
application to macrobiology (~ pp. 151). 
But there are also scientific theories not yet mentioned, which are less closely linked to biology but 
coming out of physics, chemistry or information science still have a generalist aim. Most of them 
dynamise and extend systems theory. I am only going to list some of these approaches: the theory of 
dissipative structures (I. Prigogine), the theory of synergetics (H. Haken)604, the theory of eo-evolution 
599 For a full treatment of pre-Darwinian biology ::> pp. 96 f.; for a treatment of what we called specifically romantic 
biology :l pp. 102 f. 
600 On R. Spaemann and R. Low see: R. Isak. Evolution olme ZieJ? (1992), esp. p. 145. 
601 On a Thomistic-Whiteheadiru1 metaphysics, e. g.: J. S. Felt. Proposal for a Thomistic-Whlteheadian Metaphysics of 
Becoming (2000). 
602 Goodwin did his PhD studies at Edinburgh under Waddington. 
603 G. Webster; B. Goodwin. Form and Transfomwtion. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology (1996). Although 
also the authors put themselves in the above tradition (e. g. pp. ix, 7), they also differ in some respects from the 
tradition they come from (e. g. pp. 10 f.). B. Goodwin, G. Webster; J Wayne-Smith. The 'evolutionary paradigm' and 
constructional biology (1992). 
604 H. Haken. Synergetics. An Introduction. Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-Organization in Physics, 
Chemistry, and Biology. ( 1983/1977). 
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of macro- and microcosm (E. Jantsch)605 , the theories of deterministic chaos (E. N. Lorenz & B. 
Mandelbrot), and the conception of an 'elastic' ecosystems (C. S. Holling). Other important names in 
these quite heterogeneous areas are: H. von Foester, W. Krohn and G. Kiippers 606 It is still not clear 
how or even if these theories could be integrated into a larger well defined theory, but they might be 
integrated into a dynamised and enlarged systems theory, the theory of selforganisation. 
Selforganisational approaches often have developed in isolation or in opposition to Darwinian 
approaches; or sometimes are regarded rather as a completion than an alternative to Darwinism. In my 
opinion both views are true in a certain respect Maybe the future will show that Darwinism and 
theories of selforganisation are compatible complementary parts of a future synthesis. Still dynamic 
systems theory at present is best understood as an antithesis to entity and process atomism and the 
passive understanding of entities normally found in full-blown Darwinism. 
Could selforganisational approaches clearly be distinguished from the above romantic or 
developmental approaches? It seems that theories of selforganisation have their roots rather in physics, 
whereas multi-level-developmentalism is directly linked to philosophy and the romantic tradition of 
biology. Moreover, developmentalism more openly favours the importance of form or morphology, 
whereas theories of selforganisation seem to stand in a rather mechanistic tradition. In this sense multi-
level-developmentalism appears to be the more radical alternative to Darwinism. 
But in my opinion a closer investigation may show that both approaches have quite similar roots 
which could similarly be contrasted to Darwinism. Moreover, both approaches focus on systemic 
organisation (whether it is called fonn or system) rather than on microscopic components. 
Depew and Weber, for example, have stressed that the developmentalist tradition is not at odds with, 
but has been revitalised by complex systems dynamics 607 Webster and Goodwin also tie their own 
originally more traditionally morphologically inspired approach to new approaches concerned with 
dynamic complexity608 Similarly, a German research group on 'critical evolutionary theory' at 
Frankfurt on the Main at the Senkenberg museum appears to combine aspects of a morphological 
organismic argumentation with concepts drawn from theories of selforganisation 609 
A convergence of developmentalism and theories of selforganisation has not necessarily got to be a 
surprise: morphological and field-theoretical approaches often claim not only romantic legacies, but a 
further (dynamised) Aristotelian legacy. The notion of 'selforganisation'-as often ignored-in its 
literal translation also reminds us of the Aristotelian tern1 autopoiesis. 
605 E. Jantsch. Die Se/bstorganisation des Universums. Vom Urkna/1 zum menschlichen Geist. (1988/ 1982 ). 
606 A bibliography on this topic: R. Paslack, P. Knost: Zur Geschichte der Selbstorganisationsforschung (1990). 
607 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 395 f. 
608 G. Webster; B. Goodwin. Fomz and Transfomwtion. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology (1996), p. 130 
and final chapter. 
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In this chapter we have worked out three different Darwinian paradigms and also outlined the present 
and mainly biological criticism of gene-Darwinism and Darwinism in general. By discussing the 
Darwinian sub-paradigms it becomes clear that Darwinism is itself not as united, not as easy to define 
and not as unchangeable as it is often supposed to be. In the following part we will work out the 
external influences, which moulded these paradigms, in order to reveal what additional non-biological 
theoretical background may also be at issue when we discuss these paradigms. 
609 Members of the group are W. F. Guttmann, M. Grasshoff, J. L. Franzen, D. S. Peters, M. Weingarten etc. See: 
M. Weingarten. Organsimen - Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution. Philosophische Studien zum Paradigmenwechsel in 
der Evolutionsbiologie ( 1993), pp. 2, 279 f. 
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Chapter 5: The External History of Darwinism - From Whig Biology to 
Neo/iberal Biology? 
In the present chapter a survey of the main cultural, intellectual and ideological influences on the 
formation and further development of Darwirusm will be given. This external history complements the 
account on the internal history of different Darwinian subparadigms, given in Chapter 4. It will be 
shown that the development of Darwirusm is not only due to an inner logic of biological conceptions and 
empirical findings, but also underpitmed by philosophical and methodological assumptions, which partly 
came from outside biology. 
To describe this development of the different successive Darwiruan paradigms exclusively by the 
sentence 'from Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology' appears to me rather too radical and over-
si.mplifyingly political, but I think it indeed contains a grain of truth; hence I have put this sentence into 
the headline, though only as a question. The evidence for an interaction of politics and economics with 
biology will be summarised. To accept such an interaction should not imply a mono-causal under-
standing of history, neglecting the role of inner-biological theoretical necessities and empirical evidence. 
A simple one-to-one relationship between scientific theories and external metaphysical commitments 
or values could normally not be given, because the definition of a scientific theory on the one side, the 
description of dominating values on the other side and finally the historical endeavour to establish a link 
between these sides are all three complex cultural processes 610 To acknowledge this complexity by no 
means implies that the external aspect of the history of science should be ignored; on the contrary there 
is a need to supplement the i.nternalist approach, often competently treated by scientists themselves, by a 
profound externalist approach. Although the link between a certain scientific theory and certain 
metaphysical commitments (and vice versa) will normally not be determirustic, we may still search for 
probabilistic links between them. Although Darwinism in general, in my opinion, owes much to some 
general metaphysical commitments, this might be disguised by differences between its subparadigms. 
Hence to differentiate between different Darwinian subparadigms, each (again in a probabilistic way) 
with their specific metaphysical conunitments, may help to reveal and clarify the essence of Darwinism 
and of its metaphysical conunitments. 
My external approach to Darwinism does not focus on the socio-economic background (without 
from the outset regarding this as irrelevant), but on intellectual ideas. Besides the possible influence of 
some political or socio-economic theories. I also want to give an outline of how other intellectual 
610 P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Evolution ( 1988), e. g. p. 171. :> also footnotes 387 and esp. 441. 
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currents like Newtonianism, the probability revolution and modem reductionism might have influenced 
the different Darwinian sub-paradigms. 
Evolutionism of the early modernity, as we have seen in chapter 3, already existed before the rise of 
Darwinism and had to some e>..ient been rooted in Spinoza's and his adherents' approach to give a 
un~fied account of the World and of God. Since Descartes, the picture of the World had been ripped 
into two pieces by a dualistic account, which mirrors the Christian distinction of Machina Mundi and 
Alter Deus 611 Opposed to this, romanticism and romantic biology followed Spinoza's approach, 
focusing on the active (ideal) unfolding of Nature or-in other words-on the self-realisation or 
incamation of God612 It has been argued that Buffon, the founder of what I have called 'romanticising 
materialist biology', had been influenced by Spinoza and came to a more active understanding of matter 
and evolving entities than Darwin did613 
Darwinism-as I am going to show-has interpreted the originally romantic idea of evolution along 
atomistic, mechanistic lines. By explaining evolution in tem1s of unchanging, etemal, mechanical laws 
of nature the concept of evolution was transfom1ed and placed in the respected Newtonian research 
tradition predominant at Darwin's time, especially in Britain. Newtonianism in tum could be regarded 
as a peculiar blend, on the one hand, out of the mechanicism based on the Christian notion of Machina 
Mundi, and, on the other hand, out of the atomistic, reductionistic and individualistic tenets, present in 
the increasingly nominalistic attitude at the end of the mediaeval period614 
But Darwinism at the same time undermined Newtonianism, on which it relied: God's etemallaw is 
largely reduced to a process of blind chance. God became blind. This aspect of the Darwinian revolution 
of evolution had already been foreshadowed by the development of the philosophy of will, which had 
changed the romantic approach from a purposeful unfolding of nature or God, to a blind development of 
the universal will. To Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) in his work The World as Will and 
Representation (1818) the will is the general driving force of the development: everywhere: "the will 
[ ... ] is obviously at work [ ... ] but in blind activity."615 This concept is radicalised by today's gene-
Darwinian paradigm, which in some respects could be regarded as pinnacle of pure and radicalised 
Darwinism. In this paradigm God is 'a blind watchmaker'. Still, in my opinion, this biological world-
view also bears the seeds to partially undermine itself, and even Darwinism in general. 
But first we start with Darwin, who brought the conception of a largely blind evolution into the 
realm ofthe respectable Newtonian research tradition. 
611 :> pp. 80 f, pp. 86 f 
612 :>'Idealism & Romanticism- the Dynamic Trial of a Unification', pp 89 fi 
613 :> pp. 94 ff 
614 :> pp. 82 ff 
615 A Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation (1818, trans. 1883), p. 118. 
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5.1 Darwin- A Malthusian Synthesis of Romantic and Newtonian Thought 
The biological precursors of Darwin, who had already formulated the building blocks of Darwin's 
theory of descent without combining them into a coherent whole, have already been mentioned in 
chapter 4 on the internal history of Darwinism 616 Here I will try to give an account of the external, more 
general influences which moulded and constrained the composition of Darwin's theory as a whole. 
It has been argued that in the times of Darwin there was a certain (scientific) Zeitgeist in Britain 
which made the development of Darwinism more probable there, than, for example, on the European 
continent617 This is supported by the fact that Darwin and Wallace, who concurrently developed 
roughly the same theory of evolution by natural selection, were both British. 
Alternatively, one may argue, that the empirical evidence for the Darwinian theory was over-
whelming and because of the expanding British empire, naturalists, who sailed the world, were often 
British. The conception of geological transformation at Darwin's time had anyway become largely 
accepted in many countries, and the fossil findings provided striking empirical evidence for evolution618 
Darwin and Wallace had the extraordinary opportunity of getting insight from an enormous amount of 
empirical evidence. Darwin's voyage on H. M. S. Beagle (1831-36) around the world and Wallace's 
journey to the Amazon and Malay Peninsula gave them both the possibility to observe related species on 
different islands. 
Although empirical argumentation surely played a role, it also is plausible that this argumentation 
had to be complemented by a certain Zeitgeist in Britain. In France and Germany the concepts of 
romantic and Lamarckian biology with their claim of evolution and ideogenesis had been common much 
earlier than in Britain619 In France and especially in Germany there was at this time a huge number of 
competent professional biologists 620 Additionally, it would be wrong to assume that these biologists 
were completely isolated from the new empirical findings from the new colonies. Since the founding of 
Litmaean school of taxonomy many biologically educated explorers from different countries had the 
same opportunities as Darwin and Wallace; in Germany Humboldt, Leichhardt and v. Muller, for 
example. But still the theory of evolution by natural selection was not developed in these countries. 
Additionally, the biographies of Dam,in and Wallace show similar influences. For example, both were 
entrenched with a Newtonian ideal of science, both read Lyell during their travels, both were exposed to 
romantic or French materialist proposals of evolution and both read T. R. Malthus' Essay on 
616 :l 'Darwin- Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense', pp. 110 ff 
617 J. C. Greene. The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection ( 197111981 ), e. g. pp. 49, 54. 
S. S Schweber. The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing ( 1995), pp. 36-38, also stressing the Scottish 
influences on Darwin. 
618 For example, Herschel, as Darwin met him already in 1936 in Cape Town, had already written a letter to Lyell, 
criticizing Lyell for not grasping the implication of his own theory of gradually evolving landscapes for the successive 
appearance of new species. Mentioned in: A. Desmond, J Moore. Darwin ( 199211991 ), p. 185. 
619 :l pp. 96 ff. Also: E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 388-391. 
620 E. Mayr. The Growth o_{Biological Thought (1982), pp. 389. 
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Population. Thus, it seems to me to be a reasonable working hypothesis to accept that the intellectual 
milieu m Britain has played a role in the parallel development of the theories of Darwin and Wallace. 
In the next three sections I will give reason for the claim that for Darwin three external influences 
were of special importance: a) Romantic and the 'romanticising materialist' concept of evolution; 
b) Newtonian thought, which provided the general pattern of a mechanical, universal explanation, and c) 
economic thought, especially of Malthus (but also of A. Smith), which gave to this synthesis the specific 
Darwinian spin. 
Of course, the influences on Darwin were much more complex and diverse. For example, Darwin, 
after reading Comte, noted that he generally agrees with Comte's positivistic approach621 But given that 
the manifold of influences on Darwin needs to be structured I think the three described schools could be 
regarded as corner stones of Datwin' s philosophy. 
Before we come to discuss these influences, I have to concede that the claim of any synthesis of Newtonism and 
Romanticism at first glance might appear absurd. As already outlined, Newtonian thought and romantic thought were 
traditionally two opposed currents. Moreover, Darwin got beyond both Newtonism and Romanticism: Darwin firstly 
abandoned the strictly nomothetic character ofNewton's laws, accepting a probabilistic law and by this turned against the 
Newtonian (in a sense still Platonic) world view of an unchangeable eternal world. Darwin secondly rejected most of the 
metaphysical presumptions which had been at the very heart of romanticism. His theory is not based on ideogenesis, but is 
a mechanistic theory based exclusively on causa efficiens. It is only reasonable to speak of Darwin's synthesis of 
Newtonian and Romantic thought if we see it-like most syntheses-as a partial synthesis which also changes the adopted 
aspects of the synthesised schools. 
a) Romanticism and Romanticising Materialism 
Only quite recently some historians of thought claimed that one "of the most significant and 
distinctive features of the positivist historiographic tradition has been its denial of the positive 
contribution of Romanticism to science." 622 It has already been shown that romanticism generally had a 
larger impact on the development of modem science than had often been assumed. 623 This also holds for 
Darwinism, although some of today's neo-Darwinia.ns tackle history anyway with surprising 
ignorance624 Historians increasingly see Darwinism not only as breaking with romantic biology and 
with what I have called 'romanticising materialist biology', but as continuing at least some aspects of 
these traditions. 625 Darwin's concept of evolution, despite using different explanatory mechanisms from 
his predecessors, was itself no creatio ex nihilo. 
Even in the time before romanticism, in the late enlightenment, the general idea of development or 
evolution gained more and more influence. For example, the pre-critical Kant, independently followed 
621 Ch. Darwin, Notebook M (1838, 1987, ed.: P Barrett), orig. pp. 69-70. See also e. g. A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin 
(199211991), pp. 260-261. 
622 E. Richards. The Romantic gestation of nature (1990), p. 130. See also: P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution 
(1988), pp. 5, 19, 29, 31, 48 f. etc. 
623 ~ the sections 'Idealism & Romanticism - the Dynamic Trial of a Unification', pp. 89 f. and 'Romantic Biology -
Oken, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, (late) Owen', pp. l 02 f. 
624 ~ footnote 199. 
625 E. Richards. The Romantic gestation of nature ( 1990). See e. g. also: P. Bowler. Charles Darwin ( 1990), pp. 17-32. 
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by Laplace, proposed in 1755 a hypothesis on the dynamic fom1ation of planets, the so called Kant-
Laplace nebular hypothesis 626 
Nevertheless, since the 'romanticising' materialist and romantic idealist movement (:> pp. 89 f., 
96 f., 1 02 f.), the concept of universal development became central to philosophy as well as to science. 
In particular, in biology a romanticising materialist biology and romantic idealist biology spread the 
idea of evolutionism. 
I treat the influences of these two different-partly opposed-schools of thought together, because 
both made Darwin at least prepared to finally outgrow his belief in the fixity of species and than 
motivated him to work out his-quite different- explanatory account of evolution. Moreover, both 
schools had been influenced by Spinoza. Correspondingly the (romanticising) materialist school, 
advocated a more active notion of matter and had a fim1er belief in progress than Darwin had. The 
idealist school had an belief in the necessary progressive unfolding of form. Moreover, despite the 
differences in their reception especially in England627, both schools for example in the early evolutionary 
debate in France were allied in the persons of Lamarck and Geoffroy against Cuvier. Also after 1859 
both schools became allies against Darwinism628 
Although it is credible that Darwin indeed long believed in the fixity of species, the notion of 
evolution was at any rate 'in the air'. The theories of Lamarck, Geoffroy and some German romantics 
were known-also in Britain. Grant, Knox, Green and later Chambers and even Owen were clearly in 
favour of these concepts, although Owen became cautious in publishing them. Although Darwin's 
intellectual starting point indeed was indeed an Paleyian-Nev.rt:onian understanding of the world, it 
would be wrong to neglect the influence of the Pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories, both of 
romanticising materialist and romantic biology. 
Darwin, like most of his generation, read Romantic poetry. Darwin in his youth and also in the time 
he adopted his belief in evolution took much delight in reading poems of Byron, Scott, Coleridge, 
Shelley and Wordsworth 629 The romantic poets in a poetic way have expressed ideas also advocated by 
Romantic biology630 
Charles of course knew of the evolutionary speculations of his famous grandfather Erasmus and read 
his medica-evolutionary book Zoonomia while studying medicine at Edinburgh (1825-27). Although 
Charles at that time presumably was not transmutationalist he greatly admired Erasmus' work and he 
even himself concedes in his autobiography that hearing early in life of such evolutionary views may 
probably have moulded his own-of course different-account631 Being the grandson of the known 
626 l. Kant. Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels ( 1755). 
627 A Desmond, J. Moore. Danvin (1992/1991 ), see also footnote 653. 
628 P Bowler. Darwin (1990), chapter 9, esp. p. 167. 
629 Ch. Darwin. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), pp. 33, 69, 100. 
630 :> footnote 248. 
631 Ch. Darwin. Autobiography (ed. by F. Danvin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 38. 
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early evolutionist and poet Erasmus Darwin surely played a role in putting the spectes question on 
Darwin's agenda. 
Erasmus has to be classified as a romantic biologist or at least as a romanticising materialist 
biologist. Erasmus favoured the belief in the improvement of species by their "own inherent activity"632 
D. King-Hele, who has edited Erasmus' letters, writings and life, has even argued that Eras m us' 
writings did not only resemble the writings of the romantic poets, but that he directly made his mark on 
Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats and also on Goethe. 633 Coleridge for example, a good 
friend of the romantic biologist Green, thoroughly knew Erasmus' works. And, Darwin although finally 
turning strongly against Erasmus' approach631 , kept his work in mind as he himself adopted a concept of 
evolution. After re-reading the Zoonomia, he even took this title as opening heading of his Notebook B, 
his first notebook mainly on species transmutation634 
In his second year at Edinburgh, Darwin was under the tutelage of the transformist Grant. Grant was 
mainly influenced by a Lamarckian view of evolution; to a certain extent only he was also influenced by 
romantic biology (e. g. by Geoffroy) in adopting the theory of recapitulation 635 Grant advocated that 
species have certain life cycles. His transformist leanings were evident in his papers in Jameson's 
Edinburgh Philosophical Journal. 636 Grant and Charles Darwin-the grandson of Erasmus Darwin-
became closely acquainted. Darwin also helped Grant with observations on tl1e larvae of molluscs and 
sea-mats, which played part in Grant's evolutionary attempt to show homologies from people to polyps, 
and Darwin even had to look something up in a publication of Lamarck for him 637 Once, as they were 
walking together, Grant "burst forth in high admiration of Lamarck and his views of evolution" 638 
Although in his autobiography Darwin assumed that listening in silent astonishment to this position was 
"without any effect" on his mind, 638 it certainly suggested this research topic to him639 
Generally, most idealist or materialist evolutionists in Britain had a predominantly Scottish, mostly 
Edinburgh, training. 640 Knox, gave lectures on Comparative Anatomy fully based on the principles of 
'Autenrieth, Goethe, and Geoffroy' exactly in the years, when Darwin was at Edinburgh. 641 Darwin did 
not hear Knox's extra-academic lectures himself, presumably mainly because he was disgusted by 
632 E. Darwin. Zoonomia ( 1794), vol. I, p. 505, quoted by D. Kahn inCh. Darwin. Notebook D (ed. by D. Kahn, 1987), pp. 
170. 
633 D. King-Hele. Erasmus Darwin and the Romantic Poets (1986), esp. pp. 275-280. 
634 Ch. Darwin. Notebook B, commenced about July 1837 (ed. by D. Kahn, 1987), orig. pp. 1 f., also Ko1m's introduction, 
pp. 167-168. 
635 R. J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution (1992 ), pp. 71-72. 
636 A. Desmond. Robert E. Grant: The SoCial Predicament ( 1984), pp. 200. 
637 A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991), pp. 37-39. 
638 Ch. Darwin. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p 38. 
639 SeeP. Bowler. Charles Darwin (1990), p. 21 (refering to P. R. Sloan. Darwin's Invertebrate Program, I 826-1836. In: 
D. Kahn (ed.): The Darwinian Heritage. Princeton Univ. Press: Princeton, NJ (1985), pp. 71-120). 
640 Ph. Rehbock. Transcendental anatomy (1990), pp. 11, 32 f.; see e. g. also: A. Desmond. Robert E. Grant: The Social 
Predicament (1984 ), pp. 195-202. It has also been argued that generally 'the Scottish enlightenment inquiries on the 
nature of tl1e social and economic order were evolutionary in outlook'. S. Schweber. The Wider British Context in 
Darwin's Theorizing (1985), pp. 35-38. 
641 !bid, p. 41. 
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dissecting anyway 642 But Knox' lectures were the largest anatomical classes in Edinburgh, even in 
British history,643 and it seems improbable that Darwin, who took an active part in the naturalist 
societies, should never have heard about his ideas. Even the respected R. Jameson, curator of the 
University's Natural Museum, to whose course Darwin went, had-anonymously-published a paper in 
praise of Lamarck's mechanism of evolution.644 Darwin, who had almost stopped studying medicine, 
took part in two naturalistic societies, which were among the most probable places in Edinburgh to find 
students or lectures concemed with these topics. One was the Plinian student society, founded originally 
by Jameson, at that time penetrated by radical students. To the other, the Wernerian Natural History 
Society in Jameson's room in the museum, Darwin was regularly brought by Grant as his guest. Knox 
had already become a member of this society in 1821. 645 
At Cambridge, while studying theology Darwin mainly strengthened his Newtonian understanding of 
science(:> pp. 168 f). Still, Darwin also read A. v. Humboldt's Personal Narrative with great interest 
and later on as he published his Journal of Research modelled on Humboldt he even sent him a copy. 
Humboldt delightedly answered his letter, mentioning that, for him, Erasmus Darwin had been a source 
of inspiration.646 
On the H. M. S. Beagle, Darwin had leisure to examine Lamarck's Histoire nature/le des animaux 
sans vertebres and he found in the second book of Lyell 's Principles of Geology a full presentation of 
Lamarck's theory of evolution and also an outline of Serres' and Tiedemann's concept of recapitulation 
of the embryological development through stages of lower animals. Despite Lyell's disapproval of these 
theories, he substituted nothing in their place647 
Although Darwin-like Lyell-seems not to have become convinced by these evolutionary concepts 
of his time inunediately, all these ideas probably played a role in preparing him for his later conversion 
to evolutionism. And indeed, at least in the early part of the period between March 1837, when Darwin 
actually converted to the belief oftransformism of species, and before September 1838, when he arrived 
at his theory of natural selection, passages in his notebooks indicate a understanding of evolution which 
could be attributed to some romantic brand of evolution. For example, Darwin directly after adopting 
642 A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991 ), pp. 42-43. 
643 Ph. Rehbock. Transcendental anatomy ( 1990), p. 40. 
644 A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991), pp. 40, 42. 
645 A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991), p. 37. Ph. Rehbock. Transcendental anatomy (1990), p. 37. 
646 Humboldt to Darwin 18th Sept 1839. In: The Correspondence of Charles Darwin, Vol. 2 (1986). Darwin in his early 
notebooks mentions Humboldt repeatedly. S. Herbert. Introduction to Darwin's Red Notebook (1980/1836), p. 16. 
Hurnboldtian science combined Romantic holism, emphasis on large-scale phenomena and aesthetic sensibility with a 
new enthusiasm for meticulous empirical description and measurement Humboldt, in his younger years wanted to write 
'a history and geography of plants or historical infonnation on the gradual dispersal of plants over the whole globe' 
(1805). Humboldt's later works were mainly devoted to present distributions, but I can not judge how far his early 
intentions are still recognicable in these works. The pre-Darwinian evolutionist Franz Unger is also nonnally placed ~1 
Humboldt's research tradition. 
See: S. Gliboff. G. Mendel ( !999), pp. 219-220; E Mayr. Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982 ), p. 442. 
647 See: D. Hull. Darwin and the nature of science (1983), pp. 68-70. 
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his belief in evolution claims that evolution works 'per saltum' 648 Moreover, in this period he also 
studied not only Cuvier, but also Geoffroy's Principles de philosophic zoologique (published 1830)649 
The historian Richards has argued that Darwin's very early reflections on transformation largely 
followed a romantic concept of embryological-zoological recapitulation. Thereby Charles Darwin 
followed in the footsteps of his grandfather Erasmus Darwin and found confirmation of his views in an 
article of Serres, a disciple of Geoffroy650 Moreover, Martin Barry's representation of von Baer's 
treelike conception of the vertebrate and invertebrate archetypes and their development ( 183 7) might 
have inspired Darwin's conception of common descent65 i 
T11e theory of common descent, to Darwin, as earlier presumably to GeotTroy, was so useful because it acknowledged 
the evidence of two opposed schools. It firstly acknowledges the unbridgeable difference of species, which had been 
advocated by essentialists, like Cuvier and, at that time, by Owen (with whom Darwin rubbed shoulders), at least in a 
'horizontal' sense. lt secondly acknowledges the concept of ·vertical' transmutation. 
Even later on, as Darwin in 1842 and 1844 prepared first systematic unpublished fommlations of his 
theories, he, like some romantic and some former essentialist authors, fonnulated a theory of periodical 
change, as a "compromise between static creationism and a totally dynamic model of natural change"652 
According to Desmond and Moore the discussion of revolution and of Lamarckian transmutation 
took already place on the streets, as by the mid-forties transmutation was moving "out of the shabby 
dissecting theatres, [ ... ] into the drawing-rooms"653 This was partly due to Robert Chambers anony-
mously published and joumalistically written book Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, which 
made a romantic understanding of cosmic self-development and progression of nature accessible to a 
larger public654 According to Chambers evolution could be seen as a continuous divine creation. 
Anyway, evolution was in the air, long before Darwin published his Origin. But to Darwin the 
materialist Lamarckian notion of evolution in the air smelled like the gun powder of the excesses of the 
French Revolution. Presumably mainly because of this, Darwin-himself silently thinking about 
evolution-distances himself from Grant and even witnessed a conspiracy against his old teacher Grant, 
which was only the first attack in a larger war against him655 This was the case, although Darwin, in 
respect of the source of variation, stayed a Lamarckian throughout his life656 But also the other, the 
648 S. Herbert (ed.): Red Notebook ofChar/es Darwin (1980/1836), p. 65 (orig. p. 130). 
Darwin's early views on species change are recorded in the red notebook and the 'transmutation' notebooks B, C m1d 
D. These and other notebooks have been transcribed and edited by P Barrett, P Gautrey, S. Herbert, D. Kohn, S. 
Smith (ed.): Charles Darwin's Notebooks, 1836-44 ( 1987). 
649 Ch. Darwin. Notebook B (ed. by D. Ko1m, 1987), orig. pp. 110 f. 
650 R. J. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution ( 1992), pp. 92 f. 
651 !bid, pp. 108 f. 
652 P. Bowler. Charles Darwin (1990), p. 99 (refering to D. Ospovat, 1981 ). Also :> footnote 384. 
653 A Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991), p. 320. 
654 See new edition: R. Chmnbers. Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation {and Other Evolutionary Writings). Ed. by 
J. A. Secord (1994/1844 ). 
655 A Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991 ), pp. 199-203, 274-276. A Desmond. Robert E. Grant: The Social 
Predicament of a Pre-Darwinian Transmutationist (I 984 ). 
656 :> 'Darwin- Not a Darwinist in the Strict Sense' on pp. 110 f 
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idealist romantic, notion of evolution seemed from Darwin's Newtonian viewpoint too obscurantist to be 
scientifically respectable. 
The emphasis of history mainly on the break in the transition from romanticism to Darwinism, 
underestimates the continuity in the belief of evolution. This might partly be due to the overbearing 
importance Darv.rin awards to a causal, Newtonian explanation. Darwin indeed in many respects was 
opposed to some idealistic explanations. Moreover his theory of natural selection undermined romantic 
biology, which might have caused evolutionists like Knox and Owen to oppose this theory of evolution. 
The "unity of type", a concept central not only to advocates of a fixity of species but also to dynamic 
romantic biology, "is" as Darwin pointed out in his Origin "explained by unity of descent"657 Also 
because the quickly abandoned static essentialist school of biology shared some notions with romantic 
biology, it might have been easier to underrate the impact of the second school. 
Although Darwin totally tra.nsfonned the conceptions of romantic and romanticising materialist 
biology, he started not from blank paper, but was prepared and influenced also by the hotly discussed 
theories of evolution of his day. 
b) The Impact of Newtonism -Darwin's Process-Monism 
Nearly 200 years after Newton's Principia (1687) Darwin's Origin (1859) extended Newtonism to 
biology. Darwin indeed became the 'Newton of a blade of grass' (Kant) and he at the same time also 
strongly modified, changed and maybe even undermined the generalised Newtonian approach. 
Darwin-like Wallace-has developed his theory in an intellectual milieu with strong Newtonian 
underpinnings: 
William Paley's (1743-1805) Natural Theology (1802), which Darwin enthusiastically read658 at 
Cambridge, where he studied to become a priest, was utterly Newtonian in its spirit. From our today's 
viewpoint this might appear paradoxical, because to us science-and hence Newtonism-often is 
conceived being opposed to theology. But Paley indeed was a creationist in a quite Newtonian sense. To 
Paley, as for Nev.1on-but not for the romantics-the universe ought to be seen as world machine. 
Accordingly, in the beginning of the Natural Theology, Paley describes the world with the metaphor of 
a clockwork. Putting himself in contrast to Kant, Paley, like Descartes, advocated that even organisms 
are machines. But according to Paley organic machines are perfected to such a high degree, that we are 
forced to postulate the most skilful creator we can imagine, that is God. 
The original association between Newtonism and Natural Theology based on the Christian-Platonic 
notion of machina mundi had been pointed out already (:> pp. 81 f.). The concept of machina mundi 
657 Ch. Darwin. Origin of Species (1859), p. 233. 
658 Letter to J Lubbock, 22 Nov. 1859: "I do not think I hardly ever admired a book more than Paley's Natural Theology" 
In: The Correspondence of Charles Darwin. Vol. 7. (1991), p. 388. Ch. Darwin. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 
1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 47. 
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was increasingly changed from a Platonic to a mechanistic sense. But its original link to the design 
argument for the existence of God stayed a powerful driving force in the development ofthe increasingly 
mechanistic sciences (~ pp. 83 f). 
It has even been argued (in the tradition of Weber and Merton), that, perhaps due to Puritanism, the 
link of the new sciences and theology in natural theology had a particularly strong impact in Britain 659 
However, it is undisputed-also maybe due to the Cambridge Platonism660-that both Newtonism and 
Natural Theology became very influential, especially in England. In Paley's time, particularly at 
Cambridge, Newtonian science had become predomina.nt661 
In Darwin's time Paley, although already dead, was still one of the most important natural 
theologians. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, despite a then growing fear of deism, England's natural 
theology was still in bloom, in particular in the natural sciences community at Cambridge. And in this 
community the young Darwin, really studying 'arts' in order to become a priest, spent most of his 
time662 Darwin, coming to Christ College, moved apparently into the san1e room where Paley had 
lived. 663 Darwin had to read other works of Paley for his exams, but although he was not a very 
ambitious student, he read Paley's Narural Theology voluntarily and 'with delight' even after he 
finished his exams-and it was one of the few books he read at Cambridge which made a permanent 
impression on him 664 
Paley does not only leave to Darwin his Newtonian mechanical understanding of Nature, but, by 
this, the belief in an unchangeable law of God. "As it was in the beginning, it is now, and even shall be: 
world without end" (Gloria). In an irony of history this seems present in today's claims of a universal 
Darwinian Metaphysics. Moreover, Darwin, as personified secularisation, in the time of the Origin still 
preaches largely with w1broken zeal, not only pan-selectionism, but the metaphysical optimism of 
physicotheology, panadaptionism665 Although Darwin's own theory had not only finally discredited the 
fixity of species, but later on made him an agnostic and shattered his optimism, Darwin's work at that 
659 See: R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurzeln der okologischen Krise ( 199111990), pp. 36-40, 43-47. These authors regard 
optimistic Puritan (Calvinist) and Anglican denomination as most inclined to develop the argument of natural design 
(also p. 30). The Lutheran (evangelical) Protestant denomination had been less prone to adopt the design argument, 
because of its pessimistic emphasis on the original sin and its emphasis on faith as opposed to predetermination 
(pp. 25, 27, 29, 37). 
But the Grohs also annotate that there were also Catholics (p. 51) who argued in favour of a ( deistic) natural theology 
based on the new sciences. Additionally, they concede there were many reasons external to science and religion, 
especially the optimism linked with the increasing importance of Britain (p. 37), for the flourishing of natural theology 
in Britain. 
660 E. g.: H. More. An Antidote Against Atheism (1652). 
661 See e. g.: D. Knight. Romanticism and the sciences ( 1990), p. 14. R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurzeln der 
okologischen Krise (199111990), esp. chapter 'Nattirliche Theologie und mechanistisches Weltbild'. D. J. Depew, B. 
Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995). pp. 99-102. 
662 For an account of the complexities and details of Paley' s reception at Cambridge: The Reception of William Paley 's 
'Natural Theology' in the University of Cambridge ( 1997). 
663 A Desmond, J Moore. Darwin (1992/1991), pp. 63-64. 
664 Ch. Darwin. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 47. 
665 ~pp. 330 f, 340 f. 
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time-cynical as it may be-still could at least partially be regarded to have been in the venerable 
tradition of a physico-theology, explaining and justifying the necessity of the natural suffering666 
Another important implicit Newtonia.11 influence on Darwin was Charles Lyell (1797 -1875), who 
had carried on Button's work to introduce Newton's idea of gradual change (of e. g. the gradual change 
of the direction of the movements of the planets around the sun) to geology. In Lyell's Principles of 
Geology (three volumes, 1830-3, 1872 the 11th ed.) he expounds a theory of geological change not 
based on a sudden and violent, but on a gradual change. So he took position as a 'uniforrnitarian' 
geologist, opposing the 'catastrophists'. Darwin had read the Principles on the Beagle and later Lyell 
became Darwin's academic mentor667 
French saltationism and catastrophism might have been associated with the excesses of the French revolution, although 
they have earlier been advocated by the rather conservative biologist Cuvier. It can not be assessed here, how far such 
sentiments played a role for dominance of (geological) gradualism in Britain. 
More explicitly Newtonia.11 was the influence of the fruned astronomer John F. W. Herschel (1792-
1871), who was presumably England's most important 'philosopher of science' in the 1830's. I think D. 
Hull has been right in claiming that the "Darwinian revolution was as much concemed with the 
promotion of a particular view of science as it was with the introduction of a theory on the 
transmutation of species. "668 
In the English speaking world, Philosophy of Science had become a largely independent and self-
conscious discipline not much earlier than in the time of Darwin. Hull has argued that there has been 
two camps: Darwin tried to continue in the vein ofHerschel, Lyell and John Stuart Mill, whereas Owen, 
Forbes and Agassiz followed in the (modified) Kantian wake ofWilliam Whewell 669 In contrast to this 
view, Ruse has pointed out that, despite differences in the metaphysical aspects of science, Herschel a.11d 
Whewell were not only close friends, but differed little with respect to 'methodological' questions. Not 
only Herschel, but Whewell as well paid a lot of respect to the Newtonian research progrrun670 
However tllis may be, we will mainly focus on the less controversial views ofHerschel here. 
Herschel, in a Newtonian ma.I1ller, demands that science should not only search for mere empirical 
correlations but to explain true causes (vera causae), in terms of cause and effect. Still, like Newton, he 
did not think that this might rule out God, indeed, rather ilie contrary. In his view to state that there is 
something not causally explainable, would mean that there is no God, because the Creator works 
through these 'intermediate' or 'secondary' causes. 
Darwin, as an undergraduate, had read Herschel's Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural 
Philosophy (1830). 
666 Examples for this general tradition of natural theodicee are given in R. Groh, D. Groh. Religiose Wurzeln der 
okologischen Krise ( 1991/1990), p. 56. 
667 E. g.: M. J. S. Hodge. Darwin's general biological theorizing (198511983), pp. 44-48. 
668 D. Hull. Darwin and the nature of science ( 1983), p. 65. 
669 !bid, esp. pp. 66, 70. 
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Dan.vin, still at Cambridge also knew Whewell quite well and Whewell at the time Darwin retumed from his travels 
seems to have supported Darwin's scientific career. How far he represents an Newtonian or non-Newtonian influence on 
Darwin could not be assessed here. 
Since his travels Darvvin also knew Herschel personally. Moreover both were active members of the 
London Geological Society. Darwin reread parts of the Preliminary Discourse in 183 8, when he was 
going to build a theory based on the concept of natural selection. His theory of natural selection should 
fulfil the criteria set up by Herschel 671 Among many aspects, Darwin in his theory hoped to provide 
vera causa in the sense of Newtonian 'secondary' causes, of eternal mechanisms. Still, to Darwin's 
disappointment fmally not only Whewell, but also Herschel and Mill dismissed his theory. 672 
In his Descent of Man Darwin generally mentions Newton explicitly as the individual who achieved 
highest status on the scale of the evolution of human mental capacities; and it is also not by chance that 
Darwin mentions the eternal law of gravity in the last sentence of the Origin 673 
Let us now have a general look in which respect Darwin took over Newtonian thought? What is 
Darwin's Newtonism like? The main and most important feature is that Darwin stated one universal 
law which mechanistically governs the world of organisms, as the material world is governed by eternal 
Newtonian laws. As the effect of gravity on stars and on a falling apple could be explained by the same 
laws, all the special creations of animal species should in Darwin's view be explained by one universal 
mechanism. Even before Darwin adopted his characteristic mechanism of evolution, he writes in his 
notebooks: "Astronomers might formerly have said that God ordered, each planet to move in its 
particular destiny.- In same manner God orders each animal created with certain form in certain 
country, but how much more simple, & sublime power let attraction act according to certain laws such 
are inevitable consequen let animal be created, then by the fixed laws of generation, such will be their 
successors.-"
674 This mechanism later got its final shape by the influence of Malthusianism, but the 
main Newtonian ingredient is the early deep belief in a mono-mechanistic eternal explanation. This 
explanation should have no historical or spatial constraints. One mechanism or one set of laws should 
rule the whole of evolution and should rule in all regions of the earth and on all planets where there 
might be life (although, as far as I know, Darwin did not state this in regard of other planets, he 
certainly would do this today). Although Darwin had, as has been shown, stepped back in the Descent 
of Man from his radical adaptionism he still largely upheld his mono-mechanistic creed. Throughout 
time variation had been introduced "by the same general causes, and governed by the same general and 
670 M. Ruse. Darwin's Debt to Philosophy (1989/1975), pp. 12-13, 18; 14, 23. 
671 See: D. Young. The Discovery o_f Evolution (1992), pp. 114-115, 120. 
672 D. Hull. Darwin and the nature ofscience (1983), p. 66. M. Ruse. Darwin's Debt to Philosophy (1989/1975), p. 30. 
673 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man ( 1874 ). Chapter IV, p. 194 (implicitly: p. 947). Origin of Species ( 1859), p. 460. 
674 Cb. Darwin. Notebook B (ed. by D. Kolm, 1987), orig. pp. 101. 
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complex laws as at present. "675 Giving a universal account of evolution is also Romantic, but to give a 
mechanistic law is obviously rather Newtonian. 
But Newton's influence goes further: Newton favoured a passive understanding ofmatter676 Matter, 
on which no force impinges, will only act according to its inertia. Hence, the natural movement is 
straight and not circular, like Aristotle had believed for celestial bodies. Apart from its inertia, the cause 
for its movement is externally given. To Darwin-if we focus on his theory of natural selection-
organisms are not actively adapting but are adapted by the external force of natural selection. This 
opposed the Buffon/Lamarckian view of active matter and organisms (~ pp. 96 f.). 
This parallel between Darwin's theory of natural selection and Newton's model of a law bound 
system of matter in motion has been more fully elaborated by Depew and Weber. According to them, 
species could be compared to objects, say planets moving around the sun, which have a certain inertial 
tendency, but at the very same instant they are pulled back by the external force of gravity. 
Organisms-without any force acting on them-would tend to reproduce similar organisms, but natural 
selection, like gravity, is acting upon them, causing them to go off this tangent, causing them to 
transfonn. 677 Moreover, the "Newtonian construction of the action of the force as occurring 
incrementally in in:finitesin1ally small steps is also present in Darwinism. "678 
Notwithstanding this parallel, it is still important to see that at the same time as Darwin found a 
w1iversal law which might meet the Newtonian standards for theories, he also transcended the 
Newtonian framework. In following Herschel 's Newtonian idea of giving a universal causal explanation 
for the whole process of evolution, Darwin had to pay the price in accepting only a probabilistic law. 
(Cf. Maxwell on gases, also 1859). Involuntarily Darwin turned against Herschel's idea of vera causae 
as necessary, nomothetic laws. To Darwin's disappointment, Herschel did not approve his theory of 
natural selection, but as Darwin was told, condescendingly called Darwin's mechanism of evolution 'the 
law of higgledy-piggledy'. 
Darwin had dynamised the conception of nature by introducing on a second level a fixed, ahistorical, 
eternal mechanism in a Newtonian way. "God was, for Darwin then, still the traditional good and wise 
creator, but one never working in so many separate acts of interference, always through the natural 
consequences of a few initial enactments of general laws: as with planetary orbits and the law of 
gravitation."679 But differently from the Platonic conception the advocated unchanging background of 
the changing world, is not provided by a universe of eternal forms, but by one blind process of 
675 !bid, Chapter II, p. 94. 
676 This passive understanding of matter was a central aspect ofHegel's critique of Newton. K.-N. llunig. Hegels Deutung 
der Gravitation ( 1989), pp. 55 f. See also: M. Jacob. The Newtonians and the English Revolution ( 1976). 
677 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), pp. 9, 89. 
678 S. Schweber. The Wider British Context in Darwin's Theorizing ( 1985), p. 49. 
679 M. J. S Hodge. Darwin's general biological theorizing ( 1983), p. 48. 
Part II Chapter 5. Extemal History of Darwinism- From Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology? 173 
overproduction and elimination. Later, it will be shown that it is disputable, to accept a historisation of 
nature, but to oppose a historisation of its evolutionary laws (:> pp. 353 ff., esp. 395 ff.). 
In conclusion, it appeared adequate to me to call Darwin the 'Newton of a blade of Grass'680 , a 
phrase Kant had introduced. Kant himself was convinced that there could in the strict sense never be 
such a Newton of a blade of Grass; there could never be an adequate explanation for organisms only 
using causal explanations 681 In this thesis it will be argued that there is still a need for an Einstein or an 
modernised Aristotle of a blade of Grass. 
c) Thomas Malthus, Adam Smith- Influence of Economic Thought and 
Practice 
When discussing the external history of Darwinism an often-discussed characteristic of Darwin's 
theory (and of the later following neo-Darwinian theory) should also be considered; it is its closeness to 
some central aspects of political economy and social practice of Whig individualism, competition and 
laissez-faire economy. This sort of economy was favoured by A. Smith, Malthus and Ricardo, the then 
influential British school of 'political economy', and since the middle 1830s these theories had partly 
become bitter social practice in Britain. The theory of natural selection, according to J. C. Greene, came 
"naturally to Englishmen" of that time, steeped in this tradition of 'political economy', and corres-
pondingly it "is no mere coincidence that all of the men who arrived at some idea of natural selection in 
the first half of the nineteenth century-one thinks of William Wells, Patrick Matthew, C~1arles Lyell, 
Edward Blyth, Charles Darwin, A. R. Wallace, and Herbert Spencer-were British."682 A closer 
scrutiny shows that these formulations of 'natural selection' differ considerably in how far they focus on 
the struggle of individuals 683 But a certain resemblance appears to remain. However, I do not base my 
argument on these parallels. Instead I concentrate on Darwin's theory of natural selection in particular. 
Though 1 shall, of course, not claim that Darwin's theory is merely a projection of the concepts of 
laissez-faire capitalism onto nature, it will be shown that it is apparent that Darwin's theory, in some 
respects, is similar to and was actually inspired by economic thought. 
There are two ways to discuss a resemblance of theories of quite different subject matter. Firstly one 
might work out that there is a structural similarity, an analogy. Secondly actual direct influences, a line 
of descent, a homology, may explain this similarity. If no direct influence could be found, it is 
reasonable-as in the romantic search for convergent lines of evolution-to search for indirect 
influences, intellectual resonances, or otherwise for common influences from a third source, in short, 
reasons to claim that these homologies are due to something which was in the air, which was necessary 
680 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), p. 113. 
681 I. Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft (1799/179311790), p. 338. 
682 J. C. Greene. The Kuhnian Paradigm and the Darwinian Revolution in Natural Selection (197111981 ), p. 49. 
683 P. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution ( 1988), pp. 41 f. See also: Evolution ( 1984), p. 155. 
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at least at a certain stage of the Zeitgeist 684 I am firstly going to outline the general analogy of Darwin's 
theory and some basic tenets of early 'political' economics, which still forms the basis of neo-classical 
economics. Then, in more detail, I discuss the analogy and actual influence of the theories firstly of 
Malthus and then of Smith. Finally, we come to discuss the impact of the actual contingent social 
situation of Darwin's time. 
It has often been stated, and I think to a certain extent rightly, that there is a striking general 
analogy of theories of (Neo) classic economy and (Neo) Darwinian biology 685 The agents in the 
competition on the free market are, according to the_ main Smithian presumptions, rational individuals 
maximising their own benefit. Like them, organisms in Darwin's Origin are necessarily egoistic 
individuals, which tend to maximise their own reproduction. In both cases resources are scarce. This 
implies economic competition on the free market-or struggle for existence between organisms. The 
competition is severest between individuals or firms offering similar products, or between most similar 
organisms. Both views focus on competition and both introduce, what I have called 'principle of 
egoism', mainly on the level of the individual. 
Now I come to the discussion of the more specific theory of Malthus. The analogy between Malthus 
and Darwin, and the actual influence of Malthus on Darwin will be discussed. Darwin himself in the 
Origin described his theory of natural selection as "the doctrine of Malthus applied ·with manifold force 
to tl1e whole a.nin1al and vegetable kingdoms" 686 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834), also a Cambridge educated Newtonian clergyman687, in his 
Essay on the Principle o.f Population, as It ~ffects the Future Improvement o.f Society ( 1798, 1803, .. , 
6th ed.: 1826) stated as a law of nature that human population increases in a geometrical (exponential) 
progression, whereas the food production of the land can increases only in an arithmetical (linear) 
way 688 This, according to him, naturally results in a necessary scarcity of resources,689 in famine, 
misery, war and pestilence, which act as 'positive checks' of population growth. Correspondingly, 
Malthus thought that it was and would never be possible to build a society where all citizens "should 
live in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure", an argument which is in his view "conclusive against 
the perfectibility of the mass of mankind" 690 
684 Tllis methodology is paralleled by my theory of exfonnation, ~ pp. 307 f 
685 This idea has largely been discussed. The idea newly has been elaborated by the economist E. L. Khalil, who criticises 
both paradigms in a similar way. Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Historical 
Thinking (1993), pp. 22-72. 
686 Ch. Darwin. Origin of Species (1859), p. 117. 
687 To Mal thus God is acting by eternal and general laws. R. Malthus. Essay on the Principle of Population (1798, I st 
ed.), e. g. pp. 159, 353. 
688 R. Mal thus. Essay on the Principle of Population (1798, I st ed.), pp. 14, 18 f., 21. 
689 Ibid, e. g. 291. 
690 Ibid, p. 17, ~also e. g. footnote 735, but pp. 395-396. 
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Before Malthus' time, poor laws had been instituted in Britain to partially remedy the distress of the 
poor of each parish. Malthus wrote against these poor laws691 • "The poor-laws of England tend to 
depress the general condition of the poor", because of an increased price for food, a more than 
proportionate increase of population of the poor, and an increasing laziness of the fancied rich 692 
Malthus even went furthec "A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get sub-
sistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and ifthe society does not want his labour, has 
no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At 
nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him."693 Thus, instead of arguing that we should 
directly strive to prevent or alleviate misery, Malthus recommended a harshening of the conditions of 
life of the poor. "Dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful"694 Although he tried in the more 
academic second edition of his Essay to soften some of the most remorseless conclusions of the first 
edition, he still held an extremely critical stance towards welfare. 
Because of such a position today one is inclined to call Malthus a pre-Darwinian social-Darwinist 
Darwin was born only eleven years after the publication of the first edition of Malthus' Essay. Accor-
dingly, historians, like, for example, Robert M. Yow1g, have emphasised that Darwin's view of nature 
arose naturally out the social debates centred on Malthus' works. 695 Darwin, as we will see later, read 
Malthus and rubbed shoulders with important Malthusians. Here the structural resemblance is impor-
tant. Darwin's and Malthus' works resemble each other in the concept of a necessity of overpopulation, 
which leads to a general scarcity of recourses and to a struggle for existence. Malthus also provided a 
mathematical formulation, suited to Darwin's Newtonian understanding of science. Moreover, Darwin's 
belief that individual struggle for existence leads to progress seems to resemble at least Malthus' general 
Whig belief that individual competition leads by an invisible hand to the common good. 
Internal historians(:> pp. 107), like E. Mayr, have pointed out that Darwin's theory was at least not 
primarily a socio-economic theory, although also Mayr concedes that the reading of Malthus' was of 
some importance for Darwin. 696 
P Bowler tried to steer a middle course, accepting that Malthus provided an important step to 
Darwin's theory of natural selection, but arguing that Dar.vin's and Malthus' view still differed con-
siderably697 Malthus indeed impressed Darwin by his emphasis on an inevitable 'struggle for existence' 
in general and by the resulting concept of scarcity of resources for the species as a whole. Both 
691 !bid, pp. 74-99, esp. 98. 
692 !bid, pp. 83; 76, 77, 78. 
693 !bid, p. ?. 
694 Ibid. p. 85. 
695 See: P. J Bowler. Malthus, Darwin and the Concept o.fStntggle (1976), p. 635, Young, R. M., Darwin's Metaphor 
(1985). A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (1992/1991 ), pp. 267 f., 413-414. 
696 E. Mayr. Darwin, intellectual revolutionary ( 1983), p. 33. See: One long Argument (1991 ), pp. 69 f. 
697 P. J Bowler. Ma/thus, Darwin and the Concept o.f Struggle (1976), pp. 631, 636, 637; similar: Evolution (1984 ), 
pp. 96-97, 162-164; The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 34 f.; Charles Darwin (1990), 82-84. Also: M. l S. 
Hodge: The Development of Darwin's general biological theorizing (1985/1983), pp. 56 f. 
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emphasise pressure of the environment on populations always tending to expand.698 But, in Bowler's 
view, Malthus did not-like Darwin-advocate a struggle on the individual level as a basis for change 
or progress 699 The distress of the poor should be held disgraceful, not because poor persons with 
superior ability should win in the struggle for existence relative to others, but because the general 
situation should prevent further birth of children and should be a stimulus for the lazy. 700 
These differences between Darwin's and Malthus' position, seem in my opinion to be valid; though I 
would less stress their importance. Bowler is right, that differential survival is on the individual level 
clearly less central in Malthus' Principle of Population than one would suspect if Mal thus had taken a 
strict 'socio-Darwinian' position. Still, there are some passages, where Malthus in the context of the 
overpopulation problem and of the Poor Laws draws not only distinctions between few· rich and the 
mass of the comparatively poor, but also within the rather poor. Malthus distinguishes f1rstly the 
unemployed very poor of the workhouses, who "cannot in general be considered as the most valuable 
part" and secondly the "more industrious, and more worthy members", whose part is diminished by the 
former. 701 Moreover, Bowler himself concedes that Malthus in later editions recognises at least some 
struggle for existence within species 702 and generally there is also according to Bowler "no doubt that 
Malthus assumed modem society operated on a basis of self-interest and competition. "703 I think, 
Darvvin, in some respects came to share with Malthus a political view critical towards any state 
intervention and welfare: 704 
"The advancement of welfare of mankind is a most intricate problem:" "if he is to advance still higher, it is to be feared 
that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would sink into indolence and the more gifted men would 
not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase though leading to many 
and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be open competition for all men" 705 
Bowler worked out, that Malthus did not, at least not explicitly, favour the differential elimination of 
the unfit, i. e. of the poor, and that he may have hoped that their disgraceful situation would encourage 
'slothful mankind' to work706 Nevertheless Malthus accepted and demanded such a situation of the poor 
and accepted even their starvation-of course in the service of achieving a higher good707 
Moreover, the other structural similarities of Mal thus' demographic and economic theory to 
Darwin's theory make it clear that it was only a little step for Darwin to transform Mal thus' theory into 
698 P. J. Bowler. Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle ( 1976), p. 637, 647. 
699 !bid, pp. 634, 636, 639. Similar: E. Mayr. One Long Argument ( 1991 ), pp. 80-82. 
700 !bid, pp. 636, 642; 641 the first reason is not mentioned by Bowler, but ~ footnote 692. 
701 R. Malthus. Essay on the Principle of Population ( 1798, I sl ed. ), pp. 84. 
702 P J. Bowler. Malthus, Darwin and the Concept o.f Struggle (1976), pp. 638, 647. 
703 !bid, p. 639. See also: Evolution ( 1984 ), p. 164. 
704 For a more detailed analysis of Darwin's view ~ the section on the Descent o.f Man, pp. 115 f In the Descent of Man 
Darwin in fact is in some respects more guarded than in the Origin. This is in a way mirrored by the moderating 
attempts of Malthus' 2nd edition of the Essay, where he puts at least some more emphasis on education 1md self-
introduced restrictions, with the hoped result of postponing marriage and reproduction etc .. 
705 Ch. Darwin. The Descent of Man (1874), Chapter XXI, p. 945. 
706 P. J. Bowler. The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 37-38. 
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his own-albeit different-theory of natural selection. The parallel concepts of natural population 
pressure, of scarcity of resources, of a general struggle for existence, and of the opposition against poor 
laws are striking. Already convinced of evolution anyway, prepared by empirical facts and by his 
population thinking derived from animal breeders, all these tenets-combined with a public conception 
of Malthus as a proponent of a politics of free labour market and individualistic laisse:faire - were 
missing links for Darwin's formulation of his own specific theory of individual natural selection 708 
The above parallels are not only analogies but at least partly homologies: the concepts are not only 
similar, but in fact Malthus' approach had been the most in1portant external influence on Darwin's 
theory of natural selection. 
Apart from Darwin's statement in the Origin. Darwin also stated in his autobiography that he got 
the idea for his theory of natural selection on the 28th September 183 8 while reading the sixth edition of 
Malthus' Essay on Population709 : 
"[ ... ] fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement Mal thus on Population, 
and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on, from long-continued observa-
tion of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would 
tend to be preserved and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the fonnation of new species. Here, 
ti1en, I had got a U1eory by which to work". 710 
The reading of Malthus had no doubt shaped the similarities of Darwin's and Malthus conceptual 
core. To acknowledge the importance ofMalthus for Darwin's theory of natural selection is in my view 
not in contradiction to Hodge's or Bowler's argumentation that the reading ofMalthus provided only an 
important step to Darwin's causal theory of evolution 711 
Apart from this, Maltims, famous for his strict opposition to the poor laws, ironically also influenced John Maynard 
Key1us ( 1883-1946), normally regarded as a moderate left wing economist, who supported active intervention of the state in 
the case of an economic crisis. Tllis influence is not based on Malthus' theory of population, but on !lis view that cyclical 
crises in economy are caused by tmderconsumption. 712 Malthus thought that, for example, the post-Napoleonic War distress 
was caused by a deficiency in effective demand. This brought hinl into conflict witi1 his friend David Ricardo (1772-1823), 
who upheld the so-called Say's Law, stating the impossibility of a general underconsumption and who for this different 
reason followed Smith's theory of govem.mental non-interference. However, we are here concemed witi1 Malthus' writings 
on population, which effected a laissez:faire politics. 713 
Darwin had personal ties to outstanding Malthusians of his day and anyway, Malthus' "name was 
on everybody's lips, as either Satan or Saviour."714 Darwin, as Desmond and Moore have pointed out, 
was in contact with relatives and still living friends of Malthus' circle. But more important was that 
707 See Malthus' almost romantic and almost evolutary theodicee, at the end of his book. R. Malthus. Essay on the 
Principle of Population (1798, l st ed. ), pp. 354 f 
708 ~ pp. 113 f. 
709 The date refers not to his autobiography, but to his notebooks. Darwin's entries on Malthus at least start on this day. 
Ch. Darwin. Notebook D ( ed. by D. Kahn, 1987), orig. 134 f. See also p. 678. 
710 Idem. Autobiography (ed. by F. Darwin, 1887, Charles' org.: 1876), p. 83. 
711 M. J. S. Hodge: The Development of Darwin's general biological theorizing (1985/1983), pp. 52-54. See also: E. Mayr: 
Darwin, intellectual revolutionary (1983), p. 37. For Bowler's argumentation ~section above. 
712 Some signs of a cyclical ti1eory could be found already in his Essay on the Principle o.f Population ( 1798), pp. 31 f. 
713 See: H. Landreth. History o.f Economic Theory ( 1976), pp. I 08-111. D. Winch. Malthus ( 1987), p. 9. 
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Charles' brother Erasmus seemed to be close to marrymg Harriet Martineau, well known for her 
popularisation ofthe writings ofMalthus. 715 After he came back from his travels Darwin was delighted 
to join regularly their dinner parties at Erasmus' house, a hive of evolutionary and Malthusian ideas. 
Here Darwin was imbued with Malthusian ideals of overpopulation, competition and free trade. 716 
Adam Smith (1723-90) could be considered as another economic influence on Darwin's thought. 
With his main work, the Wealth of Nations (1776), the Scotsman and professor of Moral Philosophy is 
regarded as the reputable founding father ofWhig economics, which before Darwin's days had already 
extended the Newtonian paradigm to economics and combined it with radicalised enlightenment indi-
vidualism. Smith favours capitalist self-interest, competition, and natural consumer preferences as 
mathematically describable forces leading to optimal prosperity and freedom. 
The foundation of laissez-faire economics coincides with the general founding of economics as an 
independent subject, because now philosophy and politics did not have to define the purposes of the 
economic development beforehand; instead economics was now regarded as a self-sustained machinery, 
which had to be examined as a separate science. Although the school of Smith and the early economists 
in his wake is usually called 'political economy', because till then economy was regarded as serving 
politics, it would be more appropriate if this school would rather be called the first 'non-political' 
economics. 
There are many structural parallels of Darwin's and Smith' approach: 
(a) Smith has to be regarded as one of the modem founders of what has here been called the 
'principle of entity egoism' on the level of the individual. Economic agents, capitalists, descriptively do 
act-and in Smith view even should act-out of self-interest We have already shown that Darwin had 
also applied the principle of egoism on the level of the individual organism. 
(b) Smith favoured capitalist free competition and the notion of unrestrained competition was central 
to Darwin as well. To Smith any intervention by govemment is almost certain to be injurious. Still, of 
course, the competing agents were, to Smith as to other early liberal thinkers, still bound to basic moral 
rules. 
(c) The concept of 'division of labour' was introduced by Smith into economics. Darwin applied this 
idea to biology, where it was one source for his idea of speciation with of common descent. 
(d) The confidence of Smith in the self-interest of egoistic individuals is also at least to some extent 
present in Darwin's work. To Smith the sole maximisation of one's own interests is not wicked, as Plato 
had thought, and will not lead to the collapse of society, but the other way round: it will achieve, as if 
effected by an 'invisible hand', the wealth of all members of a nation. This is mirrored by Darwin's 
714 A Desmond; J. Moore. Darwin (199211991 ), p. 197. 
715 !bid, pp. 153,201,216. 
716 !bid, pp. 216,218. 
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belief, largely present in 1859, that most organismic properties are adapted, and that these adaptations, 
of species and ecosystems, could be full explained by the egoistic striving of single organisms for their 
own survival and reproduction. In a letter to Lyell, who was critical of Darwin's non-progressive 
mechanism of evolution, Darwin still wrote: "If I have a second edition, I will reiterate 'Natural 
Selection', and, as a general consequence, Naturallmprovement."717 As he wrote the Descent of Man, 
this belief in only the level of the individual and in the process of natural selection as the sole 
evolutionary factor had partly crumbled: 
"[ ... ]I was not however, able to annul the influence of my former belief, then almost universal, that each species had 
been purposely created; and this led to my tacit assumption that every detail of structure; excepting rudiments, was of some 
special, though unrecognised, service. Any one with this assumption in his mind would naturally extend too far the action 
of natural selection [ .. .]"718 
Besides the structural similarities, the actual iJ~jluences of Smith' optimistic Whig individualism on 
Darwin is less direct and striking than the influence of Malthus-still it is quite plausible. 
Desmond and Moore have argued that the general Darwin-Wedgwood family background was a 
'world of wealthy Whiggism'. Not only at liberal Edinburgh, but also later on-despite other 
influences-Darwin stayed imperturbably a Whig. 719 Cambridge was less a bulwark of 'High Church 
Thoryism' than Oxford was. Many of Darwin's friends from the (new) scientific establishment, like 
Babbage, Henslow, Herschel, Lyell, Sedgwick and Whewell, were moderate Whigs. Darwin, on the one 
hand, had argued with staunch Tories, like FitzRoy, and on the other hand shared his "family's 
abhorrence ofthe 'fierce & licentious' radicals" 720 
Neve1theless, many of Darwin's moderate scientific Whig friends remained critical of his radicalised 
Malthusian solution of the species problem. They at least partly looked for a more lawful, inherently 
progressive and fmally also more harmonious solution. Darwin's theory pleased only some aspects of 
the shared Victorian, and especially Whig, ''cluster of respectable values: a gospel of work, a trust in 
self-help, a belief in thrift, and a sense of duty as the foundation of character."721 Although individual 
effort (opposed to biological determination), 'moral reformation' and the concept of a resulting harmony 
was to them inseparable from improvement, they indeed also shared a belief in liberalisation and 
individual competition. But like Smith many Victorian religious Whigs still optimistically believed in a 
final harmony of self-interest and common good. Bowler has speculated that Smith may have played a 
role to give Darwin's theory the individual spin, which, as he has stressed, is not explicitly present in 
Malthus' writings on population.722 Darwin in fact read some books of Smith. Furthermore, he stated 
717 Darwin to Lyell, 25u' October 1859. In: The Correspondence ofChar/es Darwin, Vol. 7 (1991), p. 358. 
718 Ch. Darwin. Descent of Man. Chapter ll, p. 92. :> also pp. 116 f. 
719 A. Desmond, l Moore. Darwin (1992/1991), pp. xv, 24, 93, 139. 
720 Jhid, e.g. pp. 90, 93, 104-105, 120, 139, 199,212. 
721 A. Briggs. Victorian B1·itain ( 1998), section on Victorianism. 
722 P. J. Bowler. Evolution ( 1984), p. 162; Charles Dmwin (1990), p. 84. 
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that he acquired the concept of division of labour from Henri Milne-Edwards, who in turn 
acknowledged that he got this idea from Adam Smith. 723 
In conclusion, it is plausible to assume that Darwin was also inspired by Smith's hopeful belief, 
shared by many Whigs, that individual self-interest finally also leads to the achievement of the common 
good. Despite this, Danvin not only took a strongly individual stance, but, based on it, also for a while 
retained a strong belief in the progress and adaptation of a species. Nonetheless, Darwin came to 
undermine this optimistic belief of the mid Victorian Whigs: competition for Darwin does not lead to the 
well-being of all members of a species, but only to the surviving ones 724 Moreover Darwin played a role 
in undermining religion, on which much of the optinusm of the Victorian ethos was based. 
Another often mentioned reason why Darwin was prepared for a mainly Malthusian solution of the 
species problem was the social situation in Britain.725 
When Darwin came back from his voyage on H. M. S. Beagle, while he still was wrestling to build a 
theoretical structure to bring order into the massive amount of data he had accumulated throughout his 
travels, Britain fell into a deep economic depression. 
Moreover, the rapid growth of population in early and nliddle Victorian period, the time when 
Darwin formed his theory and published the Origin, seemed to be consistent with the Malthusian 
population doctrine, although the abolishing of the Poor Laws seems not to have had much overall effect 
on the growth of population. Only in the late Victorian period there was talk not about overpopulation, 
but about underpopulation as well. 726 
But also for another reason it could be said that Darwin was returning to a "Malthusian world-
Malthus's words had finally been acted on: the old outdoor charity had been scrapped, and the poor 
made to compete or face the workhouse. "727 Malthus had largely god-fathered the Poor Law 
An1endment Act in 1834, which had ended the relief for all but the most destitute. 728 F. Engels wrote 
that the New Poor Law had been "constructed as far as possible in hannony with the doctrine of 
Malthus, which is yet more barbarous than that of laissez-faire, because it interferes actively in cases in 
723 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 82; see also M. Ruse. Mystery of Mysteries. Is Evolution a 
Social Constroct7 (1999), pp. 241-245. 
724 P . .T. Bowler. Evolution ( 1984), pp. 94-98, 158. The Non-Danvinian Revolution (1988), p. 37. 
725 E. g. J. Browne states the different influence of colonialism, which I do not follow here. Biogeography and empire 
(1996), p. 305. 
726 See: A. Briggs. Victorian Britain (1998), section on population. 
727 A. Desmond, J. Moore. Darwin (199211991 ), p. 196, also p. !54. 
728 D. Winch. Malthus ( 1987) pp. 13, 16.- According to W. Peterson, Malthus (1979), pp. 114 f, Malthus influence was 
only an indirect one and Malthus also was critical towards the New Poor Law, because it was still working within 
parishes, although to him the 'whole business of settlements [ ... ] is utterly contradictory to all ideas of freedom.' 
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which the latter is passive."729 Bet\veen 1837 and 1842 this in combination with the additional crisis led 
. . d . 730 to enormous !TI1Sery; nots an starvatiOn were common. 
That this social situation prepared Darwin could partly be regarded as the 'social resonance' of 
Malthus' theory: Mal thus ideas on population had affected the Amendment of the Poor Laws, which in 
tum had the effect that the economic crisis resulted in extreme and widespread pauperism. In this 
unconstrained capitalism Danvin indeed could have seen Malthusian principles at work and was 
perhaps prepared by these circumstances to adopt the theory of natural selection from Malthus and even 
in principle to apply it also to human society. Thus society at the time of this economic crisis and 
pauperism seemed to confirm Malthus' principles in regard of humans, although-ironically-one can 
see these principles at least partly as a cause of the misery and not only the explanation ofthem: 
Today's demography takes a rather critical stance towards a pure Malthusian approach and is hence closer to the 
position ofMalthus' opponent Johmm Peter Sussmilch (1707-1767): Contrary to the Malthusian principles there actually 
has been generally more additional production of food than average population growth-even in the case of most 
developing countries. Moreover, especially in many 'developed' countries with a welfare system, like for exmnple, 
Gern1m1y after the Second World War, the poor were treated not treated in a disgraceful way as Malthus demm1ded; but the 
population growth has been comparatively small, in Gennm1y for example even negative. Herwig Birg maintains a 
demographic theory of transfomzation according to which the birth and death rate changes corresponding to the social 
transfonnation of a society. 
The biologist and eminent writer Emst Ulrich von Weizsacker also emphasises the high correlation of poverty and the 
increase of population. According to him, this makes it evident that an increase in population is strongest where children 
are needed for individual survival, because there is no pension scheme. 
Thus the consequences of Malthusim1 theory, to make the human stmggle for survival more severe, is diametrical from 
the consequences, which-! think-have to be drawn from these empirically supported concepts: welfare is not necessarily 
an obstacle to the reduction of growth in populations, indeed it nught even be one precondition mnong others allowing for 
the reduction of population growth731 
Hence, it appears to be correct that Darwin is not only directly intellectually influenced by Malthus' 
and Smith's ideas, but also by the contingent state of the society in his time, which again had been 
influenced by economic theories. Although it is wrong to neglect the differences between socio-
Darwinism and the originally more optimistic view of, for example, Adam Smith, one can see the point 
which Karl Marx made as early as 1862 in a letter which he wrote to Friedrich Engels: 
"It is remarkable how Darwin recognises an10ng beasts and plants his English society, with its division of labour, 
competition, opening up of new markets, 'inventions', and the Malthusian struggle for existence. It is Hobbes' bellum 
omnium contra onmes" 732 
It could be summarised that Malthus' emphasis in his Principle of Population on overpopulation, 
scarcity of recourses and the general struggle for existence, and also the Smithian optimistic belief in the 
fmitfulness of individual competition, had in many ways influenced Darwin's theory of natural 
729 F. Engels. The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844 (1845), quoted in Winch, Malthus (1987), p. 71 
See generally also: R. L. Meek. Marx and Engels on Malthus ( 1953 ). 
730 It would be interesting to analyse-following a Keynesian viewpoint-whether the abolishion of the old poor laws in a 
cynical way reduced the demm1d and hence had itself been a factor in triggering the crisis. 
731 H. Birg. Der abeifullte Planet. Lebenserwartung, generatives Verhalten und die Dynamik des Weltbevolkerungs-
wachstums (1993). Studieneinheit 27, pp. 25-37. E. v. Weizsacker. Erdpolitik. Okologische Realpolitik an der Schwel/e 
zum Jahrhundert der Umwelt (1990), pp. 114-115. 
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selection. We have worked out the structural similarities between Malthus and Smith, on the one hand, 
and Darwin on the other. We also traced the ways in which these 'political' economists have actually 
directly influenced Darwin. Additionally it has been shown that they, especially Malthus, also 
influenced Darwin via 'social resonance': Malthus inspired the amendment of the old Poor Laws and 
this was at least one of the reasons for the deterioration of the situation of the poor in the 1830s, which 
in turn gave support for Darwin's belief that the Malthusian principles were actually at work in society 
Darwin transformed these-at least partly more optimistic-theories of the 'political' economists 
into his own different theory of natural selection. This theory then was not only applied to biology, but 
exported back, via various forms of socio-Darwinism, to politics and economics. 
We will show that this 'cross-fertilisation' has also gone on in the further development of evolu-
tionary theory. Interaction of theories from different subjects areas is, of course, in principle not 
negative. However, such an interaction reminds us, like other externalist explanations in history of 
science, that some aspects of a scientific construction of the world may be also due to historically 
contingent factors. For example, the focus on individuals in Darwin's Darwinism, has for various 
internal and external reasons been shifted in the evolutionary synthesis. Of course, what is seen as 
contingent is a function of our present systematic position. Moreover, there was an interaction of 
internal and external reasons for Darwin to adopt his theory. Still to find external reasons, which are 
contingent, might also inspire our systematic discussion. Also the method of ruling out criticism of the 
basic presumptions in one of these fields by referring to the other field developed in interaction, becomes 
suspect. 
Writing on the external influences on Darwin's theory, it seems correct to regard his theory not only 
as a synthesis of romantic and Newtonian ideas, but also one out of Malthusian and Smithian concepts. 
Besides the also valuable internalist argumentation, we-treating its external history-also have to keep 
in mind that Darwin in some respects undermined not only romanticism and Newtonism, but also the 
optimistic and harmonic aspects of Victorian Whiggism. Only in this limited sense, Darwin's 
Darwinism could be regarded as a form of Whig biology. 
d) God- a Blind and Brute Creator? 
The atomistic Platonism of the Newtonian search for causal natural explanations and eternal divine 
laws, at least in its Darwinian synthesis, finally turned against Christianity. 
Darwin banned causa forma/is and causa finalis from biology and explained the world in terms of 
causa materia/is and causa efficiens. The Darwinian paradigm overcame the concept of Platonic, 
Aristotelian or Kantian forms or ideas. To Darwinians there are no necessary morphological types, no 
embranchements and no regulative idea of whales which are both their own cause and effect. 
732 K. Marx. 18th June, 1862. In: R. L. Meek. Marx and Engels on Malthus (1953), p. 173. 
Part IT. Chapter 5. External History of Darwinism- From Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology? 183 
Darwinism, in a strict sense and not a Victorian misconception of it, also implies no necessary inner 
logic, no direction and no purpose of evolution-not even as a mere regulative idea. In the Newtonian 
system of matter in motion, there were only eternal 'atoms' and eternal laws pertaining their movement 
But Newton could still think of God, not of an intervening God, but of a God, who governs by 
harmonious laws, which need neither revision nor supervision. As we have seen, Darwin had similarly 
adopted a rather deistic stance, before he adopted his theory of natural selection, assuming that God 
does not actively interact with the world, but acts through secondary causes, Newtonian eternal and 
universal laws of nature. To assume that God is concerned with the "long succession of vile Molluscous 
animals", Darwin thought anyway to be "beneath the dignity ofhim"733 
Since Darwin combined the Newtonian concept of eternal laws and matter in motion, m a 
Malthusian way with the romantic idea of evolution, it inevitably resulted in a catastrophe for religious 
thought. One of the traditional proofs of God's existence was the perfection of the world (the fourth 
proof of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae, or Paley's mechanist proof).-How could a merciful, 
good God use such a cruel, blind and wasteful mechanism to create the world? Paradoxically, Darwin in 
his search for certain, eternal and ubiquitous "laws of harmony"734 finally adopted the law of natural 
selection; and by adopting this mono-mechanistic account harmony metaphysically became based on 
and explained by struggle. The hopeful Christian credo ''As it was in the beginning, it is now, and even 
shall be: world without end" (Gloria)-if in this context applied to man as well-leads to its most 
cynical or unhappy conclusion: "To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! Beyond the power of 
man. "
735 Wilberforce might indeed have grasped that this is at least an inclination inherent to 
Darwinism. Nietzsche, for example, whose philosophy is by some regarded as strongly influenced by 
Darwinism and at the same time a reaction against Danvi.nism, was forced to believe that "The total 
nature of the world, is [ ... ]to all eternity chaos" 736 And it was Nietzsche, who at least as a diagnosis for 
his present age coined the phrase: "God is dead."737 
Darwin himself still held a belief in a creator, and even some years after he adopted his theory of 
natural selection he still struggled with its implication; possibly for psychosomatic reasons he became ill 
and finally became an agnostic. In Darwin's theory the Platonic element of Newtonian thought is 
reduced to only one universal and eternal mechanism; which is itself not harn10nious, but wasteful and 
cruel. Hence it appears preferable to become an agnostic-to regard Darwin's mechanism as a 
733 Ch. Darwin. 16u' Aug. 1838. Notebook D ( ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p 37. 
734 Ibid. org. p. 36. 
735 TIL R. Mal thus. An Essay on the Pn·nciple of Population (1798), p. 98 ( ~ also footnote 690). 
736 F. Nietzsche. Diefrohliche Wissenschaft (1882), p. 109. R. J. Hollingdale. Nietzsche. The Man and His Philosophy 
(1965), pp. 88-90. Nietzsche also retained at least some belief in Lamarckism. Still, paradoxically, his critique of 
Darwin's and Spencer's theory (both more Lamarckian themselves, than almost any of today's Darwinians) seems to 
emphasise that Darwin still fmally vindicates the values of Victorian England. Spencer, still drawing 'a line of hope' of 
an eventual reconciliation of egoism and altruism, even more clearly was adopting the decadent 'herd values', which 
Nietzsche castigated. See also: L. Call. Anti-Darwin, Anti-Spencer: Fried rich Nietzsche 's Critique of Darwin and 
'Darwinism' ( 1998). 
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'secondary cause', put in place by God, as Asa Gray in fact still tried to believe, was finally doomed to 
failure 
If God had created this mechanism, which leads to a purposeless, unchangeably cruel and wasteful 
development, lacking any direction, he would not be the benevolent God of Christianity: in this 
framework God becomes a blind and brute demiurge. 
5.2 Evolutionary Synthesis- Tltnermodynamics and the lP'IlliHosophncan 'Zeitgeist' 
The evolutionary synthesis, the second Darwinian sub-paradigm we have discussed here (for its 
internal history ~ p. 126), was externally influenced (a) in its first phase by models imported from the 
probability revolution, especially from thermodynamics, and (b)-more speculatively-by the change of 
the more general philosophical Zeitgeist, episteme, nous or logos in the second quarter of the 20th 
century, corresponding to the changing positivist attitude in philosophy. 
a) The Influence of Thermodynamics 
There is an impressive structural similarity between population genetics of the first phase of the 
evolutionary synthesis and thermodynamics 738 
To start with, both approaches explain macroscopic phenomena by the behaviour of large numbers 
of identical microscopic, unconnected components. Fisher, the arch-proponent of 'bean-bag genetics' 
during the first phase of the evolutionary synthesis, focused on independent genes in an an10rphous, 
ideal gene-pool, as if they were molecules moving independently in an ideal gas, modelled by 
thermodynamics. Both currents mainly draw from the theory of probability to explain macroscopic 
effects. In order to save some aspects of the originally deterministic Newtonian research programme the 
introduction of probability theory was necessary. This was necessary for pragmatic reasons to manage 
the complexity of phenomena which had to be explained, but perhaps also for deeper reasons-even 
today the three body problem has no classical solution. 
Thennodynamics describes the macroscopic phenomenon of temperature as the average kinetic 
energy of the molecules in a gas. Similar, evolutionary change is understood as the average change of 
gene frequencies. In thermodynamics, energy is transferred between molecules as a result of collisions. 
By assuming that all combinations of molecular motion are equally likely, it can be concluded that this 
transfer continues until a statistical uniformity or thermal equilibrium is achieved. This probabilistic 
tendency, called entropy, is stated in the second law of thermodynamics. Transferred into the language 
737 K. Jaspers. Nietzsche (195011935), p. 247. 
738 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995). (See also e. g. E. A. Lloyd. The Structure and Confimwtion of 
Evolutionary Theory (1993), p. 4.) 
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of Fisherian population genetics, equilibrium is the state of the best possible adaptation, where no 
selection pressure is left. 739 
Fisher's radical adaptionism was discarded in the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis, mainly 
by Wright, Dobzhansky and Mayr. They, as we have seen, rather focused on interaction effects of gene 
loci and the structure within populations, which are now regarded to be necessary for speciation and for 
providing the variance for evolution. Moreover, some macroscopic mechanisms had to be introduced 
into this framework. This second phase is generally regarded as the fmal realisation of the evolutionary 
synthesis and for a good while it gained almost unquestioned dominance in biology. Despite these 
changes many aspects of the statistical view ofthermodynamics were taken on board. 740 
Depew and Weber have shown that Fisher's theory was not only structurally analogous to the 
probabilistic and atomistic spirit of thermodynamics, but that Fisher was actually influenced by the 
probabilistic revolution . Besides being impelled by the eugenics-driven biometrical research progranm1e 
of Galton; Fisher-under the tutelage of the physicist James Jeans-was also directly in1bued with the 
spirit of Maxwell and Boltzmann. In the 1860s and 1870s they had introduced the probability revolution 
in their formulation of statistical thermodynamics. It still needed almost a half century till the 
probability revolution in its mathematical fonnulation reached biology. 
Maxwell and Boltzmann thought that they would extend the Newtonian concept rather than replacing 
it. They related the phenomenological gas laws concerned with temperature, pressure and volume, to the 
microscopic probabilistic concept of collisions of molecules. But, by doing this, they also undermined 
the classical Newtonian detemunistic framework and introduced a rather statistical view. By the time of 
Wemer Heisenberg, and Niels Bohr, the interpretation of probability changed from a mere epistemolo-
gical one, to an ontological one. Although the models of Fisher resembled thermodynamics and not 
quantum mechanics, Fisher adopted those models with an objective interpretation of probabilities 741 
b) Impact of the Philosophical 'Zeitgeist' and the Development of Logical 
Positivism and Logical Atomism? 
The general Zeitgeist might also have had an impact on origin and establishment of the evolutionary 
synthesis. 
Such a broad hypothesis is of course highly problematic. The assumption that there was a general 
Zeitgeist tends to neglect the differences of various schools and cow1tries at a certain time. Moreover, 
the notion of a general intellectual climate is too wide-ranging to be supported here. Any such approach 
739 This far going analogy is especially peculiar because entropy generally leads to a decline of order, whereas evolution in 
this sense leads to an increase of order. (On 'bean-bag genetics', seep. 128.) 
74° For the differences and similarities ofthe second phase ofthe synthesis,:> p. 130. 
741 Paragraph: D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995), pp. 243-273. (They are partly referring to M. J S 
Hodge. Biology and Philosophy (including ideology): A Study o.fFisher and Wright. 1992.) 
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is doomed to be relatively speculative. Still, in my view it would be worth neglecting the possibility of 
more general and indirect influences only for methodological reasons. 
Hence I want to steer a middle course; on the one hand I dare to embark into this speculative 
discussion, on the other I want to delimit its scope in several ways. In the first place the investigation is 
limited mainly to philosophy. Other interesting parallels, like that of the development of psychology, can 
only be mentioned742 Focusing on this 'philosophy of biology' I have had to leave aside whether in this 
period there had even been a 'politics or economics of biology': Has there been a direct political 
motivation for the way the evolutionary synthesis had been shaped? It would be interesting to examine 
the hypothesis that the proponents of the second step of the synthesis (stressing the relevance of groups) 
had been motivated by social commitments of whatever ilk (Haldane, for instance, sometimes took a 
socialist perspective.) Moreover, I limit my investigation to only Britain and the US, because these 
countries seem to me to have been the main-although not the sole-birth countries of the evolutionary 
synthesis. Finally, I only point to what is, in my opinion, an intriguing paralleL I leave open how these 
sides are causally linked, whether this analogy is due to direct or indirect influences or whether this is 
due to inherent developments on both sides or to shifts in the e)l.'ternal culture or whether they are mere 
chance coincidences. 
Firstly, we will return to the philosophical climate which was rather metaphysical when Darwinism 
was on its deathbed. Secondly, we are going to discuss the parallel of the atomistic positivism of the 
first step of the evolutionary synthesis, i. e. Fisherism, on the one hand, and the philosophy of logical 
atornism, on the other hand. Thirdly, we will outline the parallel development in the second step of the 
evolutionary synthesis and in analytic philosophy, both advocating a less atornistic and a more 
contextual approach. 
(1.) Philosophy at the Time of the Eclipse of Darwinism 
We have already shown that Darwin himself had been influenced by Newtonism and positivism. 743 
He shared the positivists' belief in the crucial explanatory role of science. Although Darwin came from 
a Christian background and was guarded (not wanting to be recognised as a radical), he de facto 
established a materialistic theory of evolution which undermined teleology and formal causation in 
biology. In the 1870s-the heyday of early Darwinism and pseudo-Darwinism-positivism, materialism 
and empiricism were not only biologically, but also philosophically most influentiaL When Darwinism 
was at the height of its powers, even psychology was directed by the promising prospects of a biological 
perspective, founded on the theory of evolution 744 . The decay of Christianity, the increasingly indifferent 
or critical attitude of science towards religion, and, even more pressing, the importance of eugenic ideas, 
742 See e. g.: L. D. Smith. Behaviorism and Logical Positivism ( 1986). 
743 :> pp. 1 68 f and footnote 621. 
744 L. S. Heamshaw. A Short Hist01)' of British Psychology 1840-1940 (1964), p. 120. 
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and the prevalence of a general biologistic attitude, led to a sharp parallel reaction m philosophy, 
psychology and biology: 
Despite earlier influences of idealism in Britain ( :> pp. 102 f.), objective or absolute idealism 
became pre-eminent in British philosophy by the rnid-18 80s, although some late Victorian theorists still 
continued in a Darwinian and Lamarckian vein to apply concepts of biological evolution (partly even in 
semi-idealistic way) to society and ethics 745 The main proponents of idealism in Britain were 
T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley at Oxford and J. Ellis McTaggart at Cambridge746 British idealism was 
to some extent motivated by the search for a religion and an ethics, "which would be less vulnerable to 
[ ... ] Darwin" and at the same time "nobler [ ... ] than Benthamite utilitarianism"747 Although earlier, in 
the days of an unchallenged high church, idealism was hailed as a danger for Christian faith, and indeed 
idealism and not utilitarianism finally broke down the authority of the clerical party even in Oxford, 
idealism was revitalised as the remaining promising saviour of the spiritual world against mere 
materialism. In social regards the idealists favoured a more harmonious community in the face of 
increasing fears about the fragility of the society 748 
Although philosophers in Germany had already partly abandoned this position, idealism gained 
influence almost all over the world as, for example, with the work of Josiah Royce in the United States. 
Likewise different non-Darwinian persuasions blossomed, such as Bergson's conception of life and, later, Whitehead's 
conception of processes and Husserl' s pure phenomenology. Despite the huge differences between these approaches many 
of these schools were opposed to reductionism, materialism and naive realism. Moreover, communism, philosophies of life 
and pragmatism gained influence in tius time. The general philosophical situation is, of course, more complex and a 
differentiated assessment of these schools can not be provided here. 
Based on ti1e general speculative and metaphysical attitude just mentioned, Bergson's concept of Creative Evolution in 
particular appears not only to have played a pivotal role during the 'eclipse of Darwinism', but also in the re-establishment 
of Darwirnsm later on. Bergson always stressed the irreducability of ti1e 'elan vital' and-although hin1self partly 
influenced by Darwinism-generally aimed at developing "a non-Darwinian evolutiornsm that made room for religion, 
albeit not for orthodox Christianity"749 Nevertheless the concept of indeterrninistic progress, creativity and ti1e openness of 
evolution, favoured by ti1is non-Darwinian philosopher, in tum also seems to have influenced some proponents of the 
largely Darwinian evolutionary synthesis750 
In biology the pre-eminent anti-atornistic metaphysical tendency in philosophy is mirrored by the 
eclipse of Darwinism, which started about 1890 and by particular alternative theories such as 
morphological, orthogenetic and early saltationist approaches. Besides some inherent biological 
problems within Weismann's neo-Darwiniru1 perspective, this metaphysical tendency presumably played 
a role in the moral reaction against this radicalised mono-mechanistic explanation of evolution 
(~ p. 124) and in the promotion of different evolutionary factors. 
During a similar period psychology too was divided into various groups with different philosophical 
and methodological commitments: there were Gestalt psychologists, structuralists, functionalists, early 
745 S M. Den Otter. British Idealism and Social Explanation ( 1996), pp. 1-2, 88-119 (chapter 3 ). 
746 The cradle of British Idealism was primarily Oxford. See: !bid, 36-44. 
747 T. L S. Sprigge. Idealism, p. 667, in: Rout! edge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), vol.4, pp. 662-669. 
748 S. M. Den Otter. British Idealism and Social Explanation ( 1996), pp. 5, 13, 17, 27, 44. 
749 A R Lacey. Bergson. In: T. Honderich. Oxford Companion to Philosophy ( 1995), pp. 88-89 
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behaviourists and vanous brands of depth psychologists. This turmoil certainly had some bad 
consequences, but it served the aspiration of preventing the dominance of a simple psychological 
b. I . 1s1 10 og1sm. 
In philosophy, biology and psychology, at least some of the schools were united in their opposition; 
still, all failed to construct a consistent, accepted and lasting synthesis. 
(2.) Parallels of Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism to Fisherism? 
In the 1920s, after the First World War, logical atomism and logical positivism gained influence. 
Logical atomism has been developed particularly by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and-the early-
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Logical positivism has been developed by Moritz Schlick (1882-
1936), Rudolf Camap (1891-1970), Otto Neurath (1882-1945), Car! Gustav Hempel (1905-) and 
Alfred J. Ayer (1910-89). These two approaches differed in some respects but were united in their 
interest in mathematical or scientific explanations, and their conunon opposition to the endless 
controversies of traditional metaphysics. 
Although both these related groups of philosophers saw things differently, the rise of logical 
positivism and logical atomism in some aspects paralleled the rise of the evolutionary synthetic theory. 
These parallels are described best with the progranunatic notions positivism and atomism: 
o Atomism: Although Fisher also worked with the notion of populations, Fisher's 'bean-bag genetics', 
as we have seen, is obviously a strongly atomistic theory(~ pp. 128, 184). 
According to the logical atomism of Russell and the early Wittgenstein we describe the world in a 
language built of propositions. These propositions can be analysed into elementary independent 
atomic propositions, which are connected to compound complex propositions by logical operators. 
These atomic propositions are, according to logical atomism, the only real entities-besides logic-
in the sense that they are, in the empiricist interpretation, the immediate connection to our sense 
experiences. In the atomistic vision of Wittgenstein's Tractatus these facts can be combined, for 
example, in a disjunctive way, but this component is not real on its own, but reducible into its 
components. "Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their 
constituents and into the propositions that describe the complexes completely. "752 
Not all Logical Positivists or members of the Vie1ma Circle were atomists, on the contrary, they 
regarded atomism in the sense of a supposed structure of the world as a metaphysical view, hence a 
view they want to get rid of Even in Logical Atomism, although claiming ontological relevance, 
logical atoms of course need not to be chemical atoms. Logical Positivism and Logical Atomism 
were not two totally separated movements. Wittgenstein although officially no member of the Vienna 
Circle, at least for a time, was closely associated with that group. Moreover later the Circle engaged 
750 Personal conununication with Prof. Dr. Peter Bowler. 
751 L. S. Heamshaw. A Short History of British Psychology 1840-1940 (1964). 
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in intensive discussions ofWittgenstein's Tractatus. Although, for example, Neurath challenged the 
assumption of Carnap and Schlick that basic propositions must express private experience, as being 
inconsistent with the required intersubjectivity of science, most Logical Positivists at least epistemo-
logically also wanted to reduce complex propositions to simple ones, to basic protocol sentences 753 
However, early evolutionary synthesis and at least logical atomism treat their different basic building 
blocks as context-independent elements, as atoms, and regard their combinations essentially as 
unreal. 
e Positivism: The synthetic theory of evolution is certainly a highly scientific empirical and 
mathematical theory. Especially in its first phase there was a strong emphasis on mathematical 
fornlUlations of the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. For both theories atoms are cmmected in a 
mathematical way, although the apparatus of course is different-in one case formal logic, in the 
other probability theory. 
Moreover, the modern synthesis resembled models of physics (:J above). This corresponds to the 
tendency of the Vienna Circle and of Logical Positivists to regard physics as the paradigmatic 
science. The evolutionary synthesis has also distanced itself from the more metaphysically orientated 
biology of the period of the 'eclipse' of Darwinism. Similarly, the philosophy of logical positivism 
was a revolt against the general metaphysical turmoil and the still-influential idealism.754 If Fisher in 
his main writing 755 does nearly not quote any philosophers, not even the Logical Positivists, this, in 
my view, does not falsify his assumed positivist background. Logical Positivism, though also being 
concerned with questions of logical analyticity, to a large e),.'tent accepted and even favoured the 
autonomy of science. 
Additionally, biotic and scientific evolution were both understood as two-step processes; the 
production of new mutations or theories was regarded as if they "just come from the sky", while the 
methods for testing them, the second step, was regarded to be "highly rigid and predetermined". ~ 1140 
The outlined parallel, of course, has its Limits. The biological and philosophical schools are in many 
respects utterly different, even opposed. Fisher's topics were evolution and survival, Logical Atomism 
and Logical Positivism were concerned with epistemological problems and the ideal of truth 
Additionally, Fisher-although distancing himself from philosophy-was central in founding an 
ideologically engaged biologistic research programme, whereas for instance Russell, like Moore, was a 
752 L. Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus ( 1966/1922/1921 ), 2.020 I. 
753 C. f: M Friedman. Logical Positivism.p. 793. In Rout/edge Encyclopedia (1998), vol. 5, pp. 789-795 
754 A l Ayer. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century ( 1992/1982), pp. 19-86. (Although Russell in his early period for 
example advocated a platonic atomism.) 
755 R Fisher. The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection ( 1930). 
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proponent of an ideological disengagement of philosophy, especially a disengagement from a biologistic 
h 756 researc programme . 
Despite such differences, both currents in different subject areas represent a positivistic and 
atomistic approach, and (only) in tllis respect it may not only be historical contingency that 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus (the English translation in 1922) and Fisher's On dominance ratios (1922) 
were botl1 published at a similar time. 
Hence, it appears that the growth of Fisherism-despite all differences-was externally made 
possible not only by the existence of the new models imported from them10dynamics, but by the 
increasingly positivistic and atomistic conviction of the time, linked in philosophy to logical positivism 
and logical atonlism. 
(3.) Contextual Turns in Philosophy and Biology 
After tl1e Second World War analytical philosophy underwent a huge change, known as the linguistic 
turn, expressed in the works of Gilbert Ryle, John L. Austin, J. R. Searle and the later Wittgenstein. 
This tendency in analytic or now linguistic philosophy criticised the approach built on prepositional 
atomism and on formal logic. Still, its proponents mostly did not go the whole way back to adopting a 
traditional metaphysical system. The philosophy which was dominant in the English speaking world 
from about 1945 to 1960, dismissed its focus on the formal (logical) language and only replaced it by a 
focus on the ordinary language, where propositions are regarded to be highly context dependent. 757 
These developments are nlirrored by aspects of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis 
Despite also shifting the emphasis to more contextuality of genes, the proponents of tllis phase or wing 
of the synthesis likewise did not return to an Aristotelian or an idealist philosophy and did not advocate 
notions like teleology or orthogenesis. Their approach has been closely linked with Darwinian-
Mendelian population genetics. They only stressed the contextual dependence-here of genes-and, in 
this respect also resembling ordinary language philosophy, they put more emphasis on the 'ordinary' 
observations of naturalists and on tl1e actual situation populations are found in. Although the early 
proponents of the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis had published their works in the late 1930s 
till the late 1940s, tllis way of tllinking only gained acceptance, roughly speaking, at the end of the 
Second World War. 758 
756 Moore in his Principia Ethica (19941!903) criticises the naturalistic fallacy, also of H. Spencer's Evolutionism 
(sections 29-35). After the World War II and "the welter of conflicting fanaticisms", a scientifically truthful approach 
was seen by Russell as one of the few unifYing forces. History of Western Philosophy (199l/6l/46), p. 789. Despite 
Moore's early ethical theory and Russell's political engagement, this general attitude of logical positivism also finally 
led to a neglect of normative discussions. Only recently, analytical philosophy is marked by an increasing interest in 
questions of morality. J. Nida-Riimelin ( ed. ). Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen von Adorno bis v. 
Wright ( 1991 ), pp. XXIII-XXIV. 
757 E. g.: A. Quintan. Analytic philosophy (1995), p. 30. 
758 According to E. Mayr this view reached general acceptance in about 1947, although there were still few adherents of 
Fisherism till the 50s. The Growth q{ Biological Thought ( 1982 ), pp. 568-569. 
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Apart from this possible int1uence of the changing philosophical climate in the English speaking world, obviously also 
many other external events may have had an impact on the second phase of the synthesis. The ideological disengagement, 
the acceptance of a moderate dualism and an accepted autonomy of culture presumably played a role in its own right. A 
fuller treatment would also need to take the developments of sociology, psychology and of society itself into account. 
On the whole, there seems to have been a striking parallel development in biology and philosophy 
even at the time of the evolutionary synthesis, although this theory claimed to be philosophically neutral. 
During the eclipse of Darwinism, and then during the first and second phase of the evolutionary 
synthesis there are parallels first to British Idealism, then to logical positivism and ordinary language 
philosophy. It seems probable that this parallel is not only a mere coincidence, but is presumably due 
either to similar challenges in the fields or even to a direct interaction of these approaches. 
5.3 Gene-Darwinism-Reductionism Generalised 
A radical "gene's-eye view of Darwinism" became explicit-after the earlier partly similar 
Fisherism-in the 1960s759 and gained influence from the 70s till today. 
The main biological claims of sociobiology have already been worked out (~ pp. 6 ff.). In the 
chapter on the internal biological history we tried to gain a deeper understanding of what I called gene-
Darwinism and which I regard to be at the very heart of many approaches in sociobiology. In that 
chapter we also compared gene-Darwinism within biology to other Darwinian sub-paradigms (:> pp. 
140 ff.). Now the intellectual influences on gene-Darvvinism external to biology will be discussed. 
The creative, rebellious spirit of the 1960s and 70s made it generally possible to break with 
traditions. In these years one not only sought for new ways to live, but also for new ways in which to 
interpret life scientifically. E. 0. Wilson's war-cry to biologise culture, Dawkins' radicalisation of the 
gene's viewpoint of evolution, but also the somewhat antagonistic claims (:> pp. 145 f) of, for 
example, R. C. Lewontin would not have been possible in the conservative 1950s. Because of these 
extremely different tendencies, it is especially difficult to speak in this time of a predominant paradigm 
in the sense of a uniform Zeitgeist or an approach dominating biology as a whole760 
Soon even some biologists levelled the charge against gene-Darwinism that it is not only warranted 
by timer-biological support, but that it is also based on external hidden ideological or metaphysical 
col11111itments. For example Lewontin and Levins, former colleagues of Wilson at the University of 
Chicago,-who are also themselves not free of commitments external to biologi61-loudly opposed 
gene-Darwinism and its application to man. Instead of a synthesis of sociobiology with sociology, they 
favoured the synthesis of population genetics with ecology. Against "the agitated background of the 
759 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene ( 1989 ed. ), p. ix. 
760 Hence I have to stress once more that I use the term sub-paradigm rather with the meaning of school and only want to 
emphasise its abstract character, its incommensurability and its inner coherence. 
761 I do not want to deny that the criticism of Darwinism and gene-Darwinism has inevitably some cultural or ideological 
aspects. See e. g. M. Ruse. Mystery of Mysteries (1999), pp. 162-167, 142-146. However, here I focus on the external 
history of gene-Darwinism. 
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Vietnam War, in protest against which Lewontin resigned from the National Academy of Science, 
Levins and Lewontin formed the Science for the People, and later the Dialectics of Biology Group, to 
oppose genetic reductionism (=mechanism), atomism (=individualism), and determinism(= social and 
political passivity)"762 
It is difficult to assess historically how far metaphysical or ideological reasons, external to biology, 
were actually central in formulating the gene-Darwinian sub-paradigm in question, because this area of 
the history of science is still comparatively young. I agree with Ruse that it would be too easy to argue 
directly, that, for example, when the white southerner Wilson talks of 'slave species' of ants he is 
thereby showing solidarity with the antebellum South (cf. also Darwin's Origin). Nevertheless-and 
tllis has also been conceded by Ruse-it has also some plausibility that despite a biological basis for 
such ways of speaking, describing ants as 'invaders' and 'colonisers' with 'caste systems' seems to be 
not completely value free Ruse in regard of Dawkins points out that a repugnance towards religion-in 
this respect Dawkins differs from Wilson-from the outset may have played a role in formulating his 
position. 763 But even in this case it seems to me that a closer treatment would be needed to decide 
whether tl1e detectable repugnance is a cause or a symptom ofDawkins' gene-Darwinism. 
Still being in the wood, one cannot see it for the trees. Generally the historiography of gene-
Darwinism is still too young and compared with Darwin's Darwinism there is not yet an as accepted 
canon of literature concerning its intellectual and social history. 
Despite such historiographic problems I will at least present some hypotheses of nline as to what the 
four main external theoretical influences on gene-Darwinism and its universal application within 
sociobiology may have been: firstly,-and completely uncontroversially-a direct legacy from 
Fisherism; secondly, a neo-romantic urge of the 1960s and 70s for interdisciplinarity; thirdly, a tide of 
reductionism and materialism in Anglo-American philosophy: and fourthly, further conceptual 'imports' 
from econonlics. 
a) The Different Biological Legacies of the Schools of Evolutionary Biology 
A continuation of existing traditions certainly played an important role for all of the currently 
opposed theories. Gene-Darwinism continues and radicalises Fisherism, which had been dismissed by 
the proponents of tl1e second phase of the synthesis. 
Contrariwise especially Gould and Lewontin, are in some respects continuing and radicalising the 
approach of Dobzhansky, Mayr and Wright, in their emphasis on macroevolutionary autonomy (genetic 
drift, founder effect) variability and heterozygote superiority. They even partly advocate concepts, 
linked to the notion of structural constraints, which were central to romantic biology. 
762 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (I 995), p. 375. 
763 M. Ruse.lvfyste1y of Mysteries (1999), pp. I 87- I 91, 239; pp. I 31-134. 
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Today's situation is even more heterogeneous and the proponents, for example, of orthogenesis, 
systems theory or modified neo-Lamarckism again have their own precursors (:d pp. 145 f) 
Here tl1e Fisherian tradition, from which gene-Danvinism draws, is at least mentioned, because it is external to gene-
Daf\1\'inism; all the same it is internal in respect to the history of biology as a whole. Thus these int1uences are discussed 
more extensively in the chapter on internal history of biology(~ pp. 140 f). 
b) A Misled Neo-Romantic Aspirationfor Un~fication and lnterdisciplinarity 
A force which might have influenced sociobiology, gene-Darwinism and their wide application was a 
(possibly misled) let us say 'romantic' aspiration for unification and interdisciplinarity, present in the 
new Zeitgeist of the 1960s and 70s. 
There are of course many different ways as to how one may describe the spirit of the rebellious 
youth of 1960s and 70s. For example, one may argue that at this time a materialist revolt of the body 
and sexuality against culture took place; or, the other way round, that it was a revolt of an authentic 
spirituality against the materialism 'after the gold rush' of the 19 5Os. 
Even if we would assume that the student movement has been incarnated in the critical theory of H. Marcuse, M. 
Horkheimer and Th. Adomo-a blend out ofHegelian, Marxist and Freudian thoughts-things do not get much easier. 
This general ambivalence appears to be mirrored by the flourishing of a wide range of directions in 
biology. The easiest plausible way to link these two sides, would be simply to link on the one hand gene-
Darwinism, as the reductionist core of present sociobiology, to the materialistic aspect; and on the other 
hand the new introduction of some tenets of romantic biology to the generally rather non-materialistic 
aspects of that time. Such a description may be valid as a rule of thumb, but I think the mapping of 
these approaches could not be done as simply as this. 
Here we are concerned with the ex1:ernal background especially of gene-Darwinism. Gene-Darwinism 
as we have shown is clearly a quite reductionist and materialist position, 764 but I am going to argue in 
the present section, that in certain ways it has also been influenced by what we may call the romantic 
aspects ofthe 1960s and 70s. 
The much more obvious thesis, that gene-Darwinism is linked to reductionism and materialism, is 
discussed in the next section. Actually we will not discuss this tendency as an aspect of the Zeilgeist, 
because it is easier to pinpoint a parallel to the development of the academic Anglo-American 
mainstream philosophy of that time(::;) pp. 196). 
But before, my less intuitive hypothesis will be developed that the romantic aspects of the movement 
of the 1960s and 70s paradoxically influenced gene-Darwinism and not only its quite diverse biological 
antitheses (from a strictly romantic morphological approach, to something like Lewontin's materialist 
approach of dialectical biology). It will become clear that the current opposition of these two directions 
does not need to imply a complete historical isolation of each of them. If such a view on this matter 
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would be supported by further evidence, tlus would parallel the recent acknowledgement that the non-
romantic mechanistic account of Darwin owed something to romantic biology(~ pp. 163). 
I will now outline how tl1ree attitudes of the movement of the 1960s and 70s resembled the 
metaphysical comnlitments we have found central for the original romantic science (:> pp. 89 f): i e. 
an organic and not mechanistic approach, a dynamic rather than static approach to society and science, 
and-here of most importance-an aspiration of unification and interdisciplinarity. 
Firstly, the movement of the 1960s and 70s, like romanticism at the turn of the 19th century, could 
be regarded as a revolt of feeling and freedom against the sole predominance of a mechanistic 
rationality. This movement was at least ambivalent towards the enlightenment, wluch in its positivist 
disenchanted form, tends to undermine its own originally liberating aspects, neglecting ethical concerns 
and being dominated by a cold exploitive manipulative 'instmmental rationality' (Zweckrationalitat), 
which rigidly serves only self-preservation as the remaining absolute overriding goal 765 
The 1960s and 70s aspired a more holistic or organic understanding of the world-often also 
inspired by East Asian religions, like Buddlusm-and contrasted its own intellectual desires to the 
alienating, individualist and capitalist 'Western rationality'. 
This aspect of the 1960s/70s rather seems to be at odds with gene-Darwinism, which even tries to 
treat moral behaviour in terms of mathematical formulas and which compared to an economic school 
would resemble a totally unrestrained version of neo-classic economics 766 . As far as there was a holistic 
non-individualistic attitude in the 60s and 70s, this attitude will instead have inspired the flourislung of 
alternative biological movements, for example, as concerned with ecological questions(:> pp. 145 f). 
Nevertheless, youthful opposition towards the technical sterility of the 1950s may have contributed 
to the setting of the sociobiological agenda. As subconscious mind or universal love were discussed in 
public, tl1e darker and brighter sides of the human nature were also discussed under the new heading of 
'sociobiology', which from its very start was concerned with questions of aggression, sexuality and 
morality. As we have seen before, neither sexual behaviour nor sexual selection was a main topic under 
the sober regime of the evolutionary synthesis. 
Secondly, the political and social movement and the student rebellion optimistically hoped that 
everything was changing, or was at least changeable. Processions of demonstrators hoped that the 
relations between the sexes, between nations and between economic agents could be newly invented. The 
1970s-despite a critical attitude towards mere technical progress-shared witl1 romanticism a belief in 
dynamics and in social progress 
764 ~pp. 140 f., but see also pp. 250 f.. 
765 M. Horkheimer, Th. W. Adomo. Dialektik der Aujklarung. 1988 ( 1947). This book is not an rejection of enlightemnent, 
but it is argued that enlightemnent needs to be protected and enlightened about its own inl1erent barbarian tendencies. 
766 ~pp. 197, 232. 
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This belief was presumably one of the reasons why the biological evolutionary discourse (in all its 
different deviations from the orthodox), as the prototypic discourse of change, became publicly 
important and was extended to the social sphere. In this sense also the romantic aspirations may have 
set the agenda for sociobiology. Despite this, the way sociobiology and especially gene-Darwinism 
worked on the topics of this agenda were in contrast to the original aspirations. Sociobiology and gene-
Darwinism had the very reactionary aspect of denying changeability and emphasising a given human 
nature. Moreover the evolutionary mechanism were still largely regarded as something external and eter-
nally given. Gene-Darwinism has continued not a romantic, but mainly a mechanistic approach, which, 
in a lingering echo of deism and a materialistically transformed Platonism, still bases its argumentation 
on almost eternal material and on an eternal and external-almost God-given-force, that is selection. 767 
Thirdly, -and for our concerns of most importance- the spirit of the I 960s and 70s was driven by 
a romantic urge to unify the separate. Generally old boundaries and borders, in politics, human 
relationships as well as in science, were criticised. The border of the private and the public sphere was 
threatened. (The private is political!) In some respects the spirit of unification went even further than 
during Romanticism, when it only had led to the unification of national states(~ p. 91). The protest 
movement of the sixties and seventies was explicitly anti-nationalistic and was committed to the idea of 
international companionship and universal peace. Especially during the Vietnam war, it became a 
movement for universal peace against national imperialism and egoistic capitalism. 
Within science, this urge for unification, the aspiration to join the separate, had the consequence that 
more emphasis was put on interdisciplinarity. Correspondingly the strict border bet\veen cultural and 
natural sciences was challenged-and biology was close to this border. This border could be seen as a 
result of the Cartesian division of the world in res extensa and res cogitans (~ pp. 86 f). which then 
had been challenged by the romantics (:,pp. 89 f, 102 f). Of course also materialist and positivist 
approaches have, now in a clearly bottom up way, continued the programme of disciplinary 
unification, 768 but this quite radical, finally physicalist, programme was often carried out in a simplified 
way (and left no room for values etc.). Hence it has either naturally provoked criticism or problematic 
historical consequences. 
After the Second World War a cultural compromise in the demarcation of these 1:\vo realms again 
had become nearly universally accepted. Biology worked in a Darwinian framework, but was marked by 
a comparatively ideological disengagement in regard of cultural questions (:> pp. 136 f). Psychology 
and sociology regarded learning as a mechanism in its own right and human culture as a distinct strata. 
'Omnis cultura ex cultura '-whether one was a follower of a mechanistic or a holistic approach, 
767 As argued elsewhere in this work, gene-Darwirusm also bears the seeds of transcending a purely extemalist view of 
Darwinism. 
768 Hence scientific uruficalion in this sense became a central objective of modem science. In physics, for example. one 
aims at a so-called 'general unified theory' (GUT) or a 'theory of everything' (TOE). 
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culture was again largely regarded as a thing sui generis 769 C. P. Snow (1959) referred to this-I think 
basically Cartesian-split of intellectual life into nvo polar groups, with literary intellectuals at one pole 
and scientists at the other as "the two cultures", with biology no\V on the side of the sciences. This gap 
between the t\vo cultures was increasingly felt to be a "gulf of mutual incomprehension" and a cause of 
1 1 . 770 mutua para ys1s. 
In the 1960s and 70s it once more became possible, probably also due to the generally romantic 
unifying aspirations of this time, to question this division. But in different intellectual milieus, this 
interdisciplinary approach led to different results. On the side of the arts the sciences have been made an 
object of the flourishing disciplines of cultural and intellectual history. On the side of biology 
mterdisciplinarity led not only to a possible increase in the use of metaphors 771 , but to an 
universalisation of biological evolutionary accounts 772 and hence-opposed to the approach of the 
arts-to a stronger acknowledgement of the biotic aspects of the human nature. Thus the romantic 
aspiration of the 1960s and 70s to join the separate may have also catalysed the new, finally non-
romantic, rather mechanistic sociobiologist synthesis of the biotic and the cultural world. 
In conclusion, the agenda of sociobiology to give an evolutionary explanation to the social 
(especially sexual and moral) behaviour even of humans, has plausibly been influenced by the neo-
romantic aspirations of the 1960s and 70s: firstly by an interest in shedding light on the darker and 
brighter aspects of human life, secondly, by the goal of giving an evolutionary account of these matters 
and thirdly, by the aspiration to give an interdisciplinary account. 
The transformation of Darwinism to gene-Darwinism, which in an atomistic way worked out (and 
altered) the neo-romantic agenda of a unified evolutionary explanation of the biotic and cultural world, 
could in my opinion only be understood, if we additionally take materialism and reductionism into ac-
count, partly present in the general spirit of the time and which clearly became dominant in philosophy. 
c) 'Naturalistic Turn'- Reduction ism and Materialism in Philosophy 
In the 1960s and 70s analytical philosophy, especially influential in the English speaking world,773 
turned away from the semantic approach mentioned before (:> pp. 185 f.) 774 Instead a materialist, 
naturalist view started to hold centre-stage. 775 
769 J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, proponents of evolutionary psychology, describe this view as the 'Standard Social Science 
Model'. The Psychological Foundations of Culture ( 1992), pp. 24-49. 
770 C. P. Snow. The Two Cultures and A Second Look (1959/1963), e. g. pp. 3, 4, 9, 50. 
771 Metaphorical language is normally regarded as a hallmark of romanticism . E. Richards. The Romantic gestation of 
nature. 1990, p. 131. Although metaphors are actually generally used in science ('spin' or 'flavour' in physics or 
'natural selection' in biology) for example Dawkins had the special will and gift to use metaphors ('selfish gene', 
'puppet', 'vehicles', 'blind watchmaker' etc.). 
772 E, g, H. Krings, a German philosopher, mentioned the neo-Romantic character of a w1iversal evolutionism which 
became increasingly influential during that time. Evolution und Freiheit ( 1984 ), p. 168. 
773 In Gennany, for example, analytical philosophy, although of increasing influence, was still far from being dominant 
even in the 1990s. Tllis becomes clear in a guide which the author has eo-published with the contributions of 200 
German philosophy professors: M. v. Sydow, St. Rabanus, P. Steinfeld. Studienfuhrer Philosophie (1996). 
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This development is especially striking for the philosophy of mind: Quine proposed a more natura-
listic approach to epistemology 776 D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of Mind (1968) or D. 
Davidson's Mental events (1970) influentially developed a physicalist and reductionist perspective. One 
might say that the eliminative materialism of the Churchlands is a recent radicalisation of the materialist 
approaches of that time. However, such attitudes-perhaps not always voluntarily- paved the way for 
a far reaching denial of inherent properties and purposes of culture also influential in sociobiology. 
Within psychology as well the minimalist movement-despite a growth of alternative approaches-
reached its peak in the years when gene-Darwinism started to come into full bloom. Complex intentional 
activities were analysed as chained sequences of atomic bits ofbehaviour.777 
Reductionism, especially in philosophy and philosophy of science, presumably will not only have 
paralleled the reductionism in gene-atomistic Darwinism, but also may have influenced it. Gene-
atomism is-according to Mayr's terminology778-a 'proximate' reductionism. Another even more 
important fonn of reductionism is an 'ultimate', here functional one, claiming that there is only one 
relevant existing mechanism, i. e. selection. Some present philosophers like D. C. Dennett, himself 
coming from philosophy of mind, take the latter view. 779 
As the reductionism of gene-Darwinism in its sociobiological application definitely had a repercus-
sion on philosophy, sociology and ethics (:> pp. 48 f., 205 f), it also seems plausible that the reduction-
ist attitude dominant in philosophy may likewise have influenced the reductionism of gene-Darwinism. 
d) 'Import' of Economical Concepts- Gene Capitalism? 
Milton Friedman was awarded the Nobel price for economics in 1976, the same year Dawkins 
published his seminal book The Selfish Gene. 
It is doubtful that Friedman, as ardent supporter of pure capitalism, had been directly influenced by 
what we have called gene-Darwinism, i. e. a gene-atomistic and germ-line-reductionist Panglossism780 ; 
but it is striking that both of these approaches became popular at about the same time. Leaving aside the 
question whether Friedman was influenced by this school of Darwinism especially, he was 
774 Also e. g. A Quinton. Analytic philosophy ( 1995), p. 30. 
775 D. Cooper. f·Vorld Philosophies (1996), pp. 459 f 
776 W. v. Quine. Epistemologv Naturalised ( 1968/1969), esp. p. 90. 
777 R. J. Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolurionmy Theories of Mind and Belzavior ( 1987), p. 539. 
778 E. Mayr uses the tenns 'proximate questions', which asks for a physiological explanation of a trait, and 'ultimate 
question' which asks for an evolutionary explanation. 
779 D. C. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995). But functionalist views, as in the case of H Putnam, need not 
necessarily to result in materialism. For example, a mental state of pain can be realised on different physiological 
grounds. This seems to be valid even within the machine metaphor: Computer programs can (sometimes) run on 
different operating systems and different hardware. 
780 The notion Panglossism indicates a radical adaptionist view, either in a religious, teleological or secularised fom1, for 
example in Darwin's Origin. In Voltaire's Candide (1759) Dr. Pangloss states total adaptationism for teleological 
reasons ( :> footnote 783). 
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unquestionably influenced by Darwinism in general 781 Moreover, this approach was equally combined 
with a very reductionist individualistic approach. 
This should not indicate that Friedman himself adopted a biologistic stance: His approach did not fo-
cus on the reduction of economy to neurology, but he adopted the Darwinian mechanism and applied it 
as the natural order of economy. In this sense he could be seen as what I am going to call a 'process re-
ductionist', advocating 'process-Darwinism', rather than as a 'substance reductionist' (:> pp. 237 f). 
Friedman indeed adopted the notions of natural selection, competition and survival of the fittest from 
evolutionary biology. He believed that increased competition automatically leads to adaptation. The 
general belief in an overall positive result of the individual's pursuit of selfish interests, although purged 
of all religious and moral overtones, goes back to Adam Smith's belief in the invisible hand and his 
optinlistic foundation of laissez jaire capita.lism (:> p. 178). Friedman defended the claim of rational 
maximisation of profit based on the concept of natural selection. But the Panglossian belief that natural 
selection and competition necessarily leads to adaptation-also held by Darwin in his middle period782-
has become criticised within both biology783 and economics784 . 785 
Like Malthus, who had strongly influenced the reduction of the Poor Laws (:> p. 180), Friedman 
had a strong impact on politics. As the leading protagonist of the politics of a highly competitive 
unrestrained market economy and the abolition of almost all government intervention, he became the 
counter-player to Keynesianism. In the 1980s he god-fathered the economic politics of R. Reagan in the 
United States, M. Thatcher in Britain and A. Pinochet in Chile. 
Tllis Friedmanian politics led in these countries to a decrease of the intlation rate, but also to an extraordinary rise in 
the unemployment rate and to a decline in production 780 
Sinlilar to Friedman's plan of the abolition of almost any state intervention, gene-Darwinians 
theoretically abandoned (or at least neglected) all macroevolutionary mechanisms, which had before 
been emphasised by the largely Darwinian evolutionary synthesis. M. Ridley, a writer in the field of 
sociobiology, shows how interwoven biological and economical thoughts are: "Society is composed of 
competing individuals as surely as markets are composed of competing merchants; the focus of 
economies and social theory is, and must be, the individual. Just as genes are the only things that 
replicate, so individuals, not societies, are the vehicles for genes "787 If we also allow ourselves such 
simplifying associations between approaches in biology and economics, the evolutionary synthesis 
781 G. M. Hodgson. Economics and Evolution ( 1993 ), pp. 199, 201, 208 (on Friedman and Darwinism). 
782 Darwin had left this tenet behind by the time he published the Descent ofMan (!>footnote 718). 
783 A canonical paper on this topic is: S. J Gould, R C. Lewontin. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian 
Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme ( 1979). 
784 See e. g.: G. M. Hodgson. Economics and Evolution ( 1993). 
785 For the differences of this biological and the original economical approaches :> p. 175. For a general overview of 
different critiques ofPanglossism :> pp. 197-213 ( :> also footnote 781 ). 
786 P.-H. Koesters. Okonomen verandern die Welt. Wirtschajtstheorien die wzser Leben bestimmen (1982), Han1burg: 
Gruner & Jahr, pp. 283-300. 
787 M. Ridley. The Red Queen (1995/1993 ), p. 11. 
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appears to be linked with a social market economy, whereas gene-Darwinism would be associated with 
unrestrained neo-liberal economics. Herewith I do not want to deny inner-biological necessities, but I 
agree with Midgley, that gene-Darwinism as an economic metaphor is "biological Thatcherism [ ... ] 
celebrating evolution as a ceaseless crescendo of competition between essentially 'selfish' individual 
organ1sms"788 
It has to be conceded that Dawkins' gene-Darwinism, unlike Darwin's individual Darwinism, argues 
even sub-individually. In this regard it is even more reductionistic than Darwin's Darwinism, but-
although likewise arguing against any true within-group-altruism-gene-Darwinism at least in a limited 
phenotypic sense allows in principle the existence of unselfish behaviour. Still, its seems to me, that 
gene-Darwinism could metaphorically be linked to the Chicago School of Economics, because the 
proponents of explicit or implicit gene-Darwinism have always emphasised the contrast to the 
'benevolent' synthesis and they regarded the assumption of an unrestrained selfishness of organisms as 
a good approximation to the truth 789 
It appears to me that gene-Darwinism in the early 1990s gained even more influence (despite the 
discussed parallel growth of subversive approaches). as after the end of the Cold War also the temper of 
the age in the West and East for a while became emphatically individualistic, egoistic and competitive. 
In conclusion, Darwinism in general has not only influenced Friedman, but combined with 
Friedman's especially reductionist anti-interventionist approach, it indeed resembles the denial of group 
altruism also present in gene-Darwinism. 
Besides the general parallel of Friedmanian economics and gene-Darwinism, also specific biological 
'imports' of economic language or models could be detected. 
The language of sociobiology is interspersed with economical analogies. The originally economic 
concept of the division of labour has already long been imported from biology and has continuously 
been used in the whole tradition reaching from Darwin to also Wilson and Dawkins 790 
Sociobiology adopts the metaphors around the notion of 'investment', which is generally used in its 
explanations of apparent 'altruism', i. e. kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Here the language of 
costs and returns is prevailing. Any parental behaviour is now called investment "which increases the 
probability the offspring's chance of surviving [ .. ] at the cost of the parent's ability to invest in other 
offspring". 791 
788 M. Midgley. Beast and Man (1995/1978), p. xvi. 
789 R. Dawkins, :::> footnote 64; G. C. Williams, ~ footnote 53. 
790 M. Ruse. The Mysteries of Mysteries. 1999, pp. 241-245, 180. 
791 This has been the case at least since R. Trivers article Parental investment and sexual selection ( 1972 ), where he gener-
alised the notion of investment as it has been used before. See e. g. K. Grammer. Signale der Lie be ( 1998/95), pp. 45 f 
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Even more arresting is Dawkins' way of speaking, for example, of the 'casino' or 'stock market' of 
evolution. 792 Dawkins in The Se~fish Gene takes an outspoken view of unrestrained gene capitalism in 
which the atomistic, egoistic genes are the only agents. 
However, in later publications, Dawkins also speaks of maximising DNA as the true Darvvinian 
"utility function", which lends itself to an economic treatment and in its result is very different from 
"maximizing the economic welfare of the species or population" 793 But "God's Utility function, as 
derived from a contemplation of the nuts and holds of natural selection, turns out to be sadly at odds 
with such utopian visions" and is necessarily based on an "uncoordinated scramble for selfish gains" 794 
Moreover a further explicit adoption of specific economical theories took place. J. Maynard Smith 
embraced the mathematics of the The01y of Games 795 This theory had been developed by 
J. v. Neumann and 0. Morgenstem (1944) and as a mere mathematical theory indeed appears to be 
neutral. Nevertheless, its application presupposes certain metaphysical commitments: especially the 
validity of the axiom of entity egoism has to be assumed on a certain basic level of explanation796 
Maynard Smith himself has cautiously speculated about cmmections between his increasingly reductionist theoretical 
approach and his political increasingly critical attitude towards Marxism. 797 
Generally game theory is at least in its simple applications concerned with basically competitive 
'games', or more generally, with conflicts 798 A mathematical theory only can be applied if its axioms 
are applicable. The axiom of entity egoism, here the egoistic goal to win a game, is no doubt usually 
valid in cases like roulette or checkers (where the rules of the game nmmally make players fulfil these 
axioms). For gene-Darwinism, where the principle of entity egoism is assumed to work on the level of 
single genes, it of course appears consistent to introduce this principle on the gene-level. But this is not 
self evident and needs a theoretical and empirical discussion. A cautious application of game theory 
may indeed shed light even on the evolution of morals, 799 but it should be realised that supporters of the 
evolutionary synthesis, like E. Mayr, would, for example, not have taken the axiom of gene egoism as a 
default explanation. In their view the burden of proof in the unit of selection debate would rest rather on 
the selfish gene approach than on the population approach (~ pp. 130 f.). 
Although the incorporation of economical models has no doubt enhanced the complexity of 
sociobiology, still the basic question which the philosopher in particular has to pose, is whether the 
792 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89). pp. 55-56. 
793 ldem.;RiveroutofEden(l995),pp. 106-107,118. 
794 !bid,; pp. 121-122. 
795 See especially: J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the Themy of Games. 1982. 
796 However, without having worked on Maynard Smith's account in detail, I think that his concept of evolutionarily stable 
strategies may well be interpreted to transcend gene-atomism in its most austere sense; :> p. 46. 
797 J. Maynard Smith. Shaping Life (1998), p. 43, also p. 45. 
798 A J. Jones. Game Theory: Mathematical Modes of Conflict (1980). (Actually Neumann and Morgenstem also treated 
co-operative games, but they are more complicated and are less often found in the evolutionary literature.) 
799 E. g.: M. Schefczyk . Die Evolution der Kooperation Perspektiven und Grenzen spieltheorelischer !vfodelle ( 1996). 
Part II. Chapter 5. External History of Darwinism- From Whig Biology to Neoliberal Biology? 201 
principles on which this edifice is build are always applicable-this means whether they are true, useful 
and ethical(:> pp. 237 f.). 
Sociobiology, in its radical version, claims that models of game theory can also explain human 
moral behaviour. But it is highly problematic, whether the axiom of total entity egoism-either on the 
level of the gene or on the level of the individual-is in particular always applicable to human moral 
behaviour. It totally neglects the fact that humans appear to be able to act morally, not only because it is 
from time to time also profitable, but because it is good. Game theorists may translate this into their 
language. 'Entity egoism' does not always have to be a valid axiom. The pay-off for humans can 
sometimes lie not in the maximisation of their own profit, but in being intrinsically moral, that is in 
following an external end in itself. Expressed in different words closer to traditional philosophy we may 
say, that the essence of being human-which is indeed not always realised-is to live not only to 
survive, but to live to be good (~ pp. 406 f.). 
Whether such an critique is theoretically possible will be discussed at length in the last part IV 
Summary: Biology as 'Geisteswissenschaft'? 
In the current chapter 5 of part II on the external history of Darwinism, it became clear that all Dar-
winian sub-paradigms, we had distinguished in biological respects in chapter 4, have also been exter-
nally influenced by the intellectual developments of their time. These influences reach from the applica-
tion of theoretical tools of other disciplines, over a striking parallel to the mainstream development in 
philosophy, to an interaction for example with economic theories and commitments. 
Firstly, theoretical or mathematical tools had been adopted from other disciplines. For example, 
concepts of the 'probability revolution', partly developed in them10dynamics, with some relay had been 
applied to what I have called the first step and also the second step of the evolutionary synthesis. 
Another example would be the mathematical theory of games applied in present sociobiology. 
Secondly, we have worked out that the rise and fall of the discussed Danvinian sub-paradigms has in 
some central respects been paralleled by the development mainstream philosophy at least in the English 
speaking world: Darwin's Danvinism-compared with earlier romantic or essentialist biologist-
already mirrors the increasingly secularised theism of universal laws of nature dominating his time more 
and more and the rise of positivism, materialism and mechanicism. Moreover, his individualism could 
also be found in utilitarian approaches at about that time. Correspondingly the decline of Darwinism at 
the turn of the century is paralleled by a bloom of idealist philosophy. Another tide of a much more 
technical Danvinism corresponds also another tide of positivism in philosophy, now logical positivism. 
But above these bold parallels in the climate of philosophy and biology there are also further more 
detailed parallels. We have worked out that strict logical atomism in philosophy has been paralleled by 
Fisherism in biology. Fisherism, the first step of the evolutionary synthesis, also treated genes in a gene-
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pool in an very atomistic way. Because of this Mayr dubbed this school 'bean bag genetics'. As the 
second, final phase of the evolutionary synthesis differs from the first one mainly in its 
acknowledgement of genetic conteA1: and of the evolutionary importance of naturally observable groups, 
we analogously find the 'linguistic turn' away from propositional atomism towards ordinary contextual 
language in the mainstrean1 of analytical philosophy. Gene-Darwinism in its radicalised revival of 
Fisherian genetic atomism is then paralleled by the increasing influence of materialism and reductionism 
in the philosophy of that time. Matters are not quite as simple as described here-for example, it might 
paradoxically be the rather romantic aspect of the 1960s and 70s which was interested in 
interdisciplinarity and which finally has contributed to the generalisation of the atomistic approach of 
Gene-Darwinism. Moreover, I only have shown general parallels of the biological or philosophical 
climate, without elaborating how these parallel developments actually have influenced each other. 
Thirdly, we have found interactions of biological thought, in particular with economics. Darwin was 
influenced by Malthus and in turn has influenced economical thought. Further I think we have shown 
that gene-Darwinism, not only imports economic ideas and often uses economic language, but, at least 
as a metaphor, depicts the world in Friedmanian terms ofunrestrained neo-'liberalism'. 
It is difficult for a historian of science-and especially if he originally is a philosopher-to simplify 
these much more complex interactions in an adequate way. Although this is not the only concern of this 
work, I hope to have taken enough care in this chapter to substantiate the claim that in any discussion of 
the biological paradigms, more may be a topic of discussion than isolated biological questions. 
I am the last one who would want to deny that there are inner-biological necessities and Inner-
biological evidence. Moreover I am fully in awe of and respect of the scientific enterprise of creating 
objective and culturally neutral knowledge! 
But in fundamental disputes of biology and other sciences, it is not only ethical implications which 
have to be considered. Even in regard of the very premises of the theory in question, much more may be 
at stake than mere inner-biological or inner-scientific assumptions. I think we should not simply claim 
that all science is ideology-in its worst or best sense. In some aspects it is ideology, in others it is not. 
But anyone who wants to claim that a specific theory is to a certain extent based on ideological 
commitments firstly has to take on the painstaking work of disentangling its internal and external 
history, secondly has to show alternative theoretical options and thirdly has to argue why these scientific 
theories and their corresponding background ideologies have to be preferred. 
Nevertheless, particularly in basic controversies or in phases of a scientific revolution, even science 
is and has to be also partly a Geisteswissenschaft, a cultural science, an art. With such an intention the 
label 'sociobiology' would indeed get a new meaning. 
Based on the shO\vn interactions with other subject areas it became apparent, that non-biological disciplines also 
employ Darwinian processes as theoretical core. We will in the following part embark into the search for a metaphysics of 
process-Darwinism build out of theories found in different subject areas. 
Part Ill. Universal Darwinism 
"Some indeed attribute our Heaven and all the worlds to chance happenings, 
saying that the vortex and shifting that disentangled the chaos and established the cosmic order 
came by chance " 
203 
Aristotle (transl.), The Physics, 11, 4, l69a 
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ln this part the philosophical position of Universal Darwinism will be developed. I will provide 
evidence for the claim that Darwinism, as special kind of Evolutionism, has already conquered many 
areas of the academic and popular world view. I will explain some of the (often implicit) philosophical 
arguments which seem to support this approach. 
ln chapter 6 I am going to outline the metaphysics, the basic conceptual structure, of Universal 
Darwinism. I shall distinguish two types of Universal Darwinism, Biologistic Darwinism with the 
prototypic example of gene-Darwinism, and Process-Darwinism, which is not biologistic but still only 
based on Darwinian processes. 
In chapter 7 an outline ofthe 'phenomenology' of universal Darwinism will be given. Actual theories 
from different subject areas will be described, which make an exclusive use of Darwinian Processes and 
which thus could be regarded as building blocks of process-Darwinism. Our historical treatment of the 
interrelations of Darwinism \vith other academic disciplines builds the basis of this systematic treatment 
oftheories with a process-Darwinian core. 
For example trial-and-error-psychology-albeit build as a protective dike against Darwinian biologism-could be 
regarded as an approach built around a Darwinian process. Moreover falsificationism, a predominant theory of scientific 
justification, or aspects of neoliberal economic theory share structural similarities with Darwinism. The concepts of trial 
and error, conjecture and refutation, mutation and selection may serve as a possible basis for an ideology of universal 
Process Darwinism. 
Since gene-Darwinism has been treated earlier as a phenomenon and as abstract theory, both 
chapters ofthis part will mainly focus on the development of process-Darwinism. 
At the beginning of the third millennium after Christ the theory of the concept of the survival of the 
fittest, whether one follows gene-Darwinism or process-Darwinism, is almost as ubiquitous as the 
concept of 'God' was 1000 years ago. 
The development of w1iversal Darwinism will be a prerequisite for its partial criticism in part IV of 
this work. 
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Chapter 6: Darwinian Metaphysics-Biologistic and Process Darwinism 
h1 this chapter we are concerned with Darwinism as metaphysics, because, firstly, the theories in 
question claim relevance for many (if not all) subject areas and secondly because they are abstract and 
not directly affected by experience or empirical tests. They will shape the implicit premises of empirical 
hypotheses, but as part of a complex theoretical system they will neither be directly verified nor 
falsified. Nevertheless these concepts could be made the object of a rational discussion both within 
special sciences and within philosophy in general. 
There are two types of 'Universal Darwinism'.800 I am going to call them 'Biologistic Darwinism' 
and (Universal) 'Process-Darwinism '801 
To define these terms it is necessary to distinguish between substances and processes. This 
distinction mirrors not only tlle subject-predicate or noun-verb distinction of most languages, but is an 
almost ubiquitous aspect of (Western) common sense ontology. The substance-process distinction is 
historically based on the traditional conceptual antagonism of being-defined as an antithesis of 
becoming (Parn1enides )-and of becoming-defined as an antithesis of being (Heraclitus). 802 Today tills 
distinction is, par example, inherent in evolutionary biology on the one hand in the words 'genes' and 
'species' and on the other hand in the words 'natural selection' and 'genetic drift'. 
Instead of 'becoming ' I am using the specific tem1 process which nonnally refers to ordered forms 
of becoming, because here we are interested in explanations; and explanations by definition are always 
concerned with some form of order. 
I am using the specific tern1 substance as an antonym of 'becomings', because the possible 
alternative general notions 'being' or 'entity' (ens) are in their broad sense also used to include 
becomings. 
Nevertheless the tem1 substance carries two problems with it. Firstly substance is often understood in the sense of 
essence, which is not necessarily opposed to process but rather to accidemia. Indeed we may think of an essential process. 
The essential process of Darwinism, for example, is natural selection. Similarly, essence traditionally implies lastingness. 
But processes may be lasting as well, following e. g. Newtonian physics both substances and processes are regarded to be 
etemal. Hence substance understood as essence is not always opposed to the notion of a process. 
800 The tenn 'Uni versa! Darwinism' is used by R. Dawkins, Universal Darwinism ( 1983) and e. g. by H. Plotkin, Darwin 
Machines and the Nature of Knowledge ( 1994/95), pp. 59 ff 
801 Within the specific area of evolutionary epistemology M. Bradie in Asserting Evolutionary Epistemology (1986) 
proposed a different distinction. He proposed the two classes of 'Evolutionary Epistemology of Mechanisms' and of 
'Evolutionary Epistemology of Theories'. Roughly speaking the fanner tem1 corresponds to Bio1ogistic Darwinism and 
the latter to Process Darwinism. This distinction has been adopted c. g. by W. Bechtel, Towards Making EvolutionOI)' 
Epistemology into a Truly Naturalised Epistemology ( 1990). 
I do introduce a difterent tenninology, frrstly, to denote specifically Darwinian approaches, secondly, not to be limited 
to epistemology and thirdly, because the term 'mechanism' in the present context would misleadingly refer to an 
approach based on processes instead to a biologistic approach. :> also p. 218. 
802 See: J. Mittelstrass. Werden (1996), p. 659; also :> p. 77. 
Part ill. Chapter 6 Darwinian Metaphysics - Biologistic and Process Darwinism 206 
Secondly, substance in its modem meaning has a connotation associated with a materialist atomistic ontology. In this 
sense the substance of a table is not its 'tableness', but exclusively its causa materia/is, its constituting matter, i. e. wood, a 
mixture of water m1d certain carbohydrates-finally its constituting elementary particles. 
Here the term 'substance' should only be understood as antonym of process and therefore should 
imply neither an essentialist nor a materialist metaphysics. Substance should, for example, denote 
atoms, chairs, duck-rabbits, minds or theories, whereas gravity, natural selection or the event of running 
can be considered as processes or forces causing processes. 
Employing the existing antagonism of being and becoming for descriptive reasons should not imply 
that I advocate its metaphysical truth. On the contrary, I rather sympathise with the position of process 
philosophy that 'an actual entity is a process'. It might turn out that the being of 'things' is identical 
with a continuous processes and vice versa that continuous processes are identical with the being of 
things 803 But based on the substance-process distinction we could subsequently understand biologistic 
Darwinism and process Darwinism more explicitly as specific Darwinian cases of two more general 
types of Reductionism. 
Subsequently I will not distinguish between reductionism and 'e/iminativism '. For simplicity reasons I shall also not 
always distinguish between reduction of theories and reduction of entities. Reduction in the present work is nom1ally used 
in ti1e sense of what I shall call 'downward reduction', corresponding to the intentions of tile physicalist research 
programme(::> pp. 240 f). 
Biologistic Darwinism is a Darwinian form of Biologism. Note the difference between Biologistic 
Darwinism and biological Darwinism, which does not need to deny the existence of higher ontological 
strata. Biologistic Darwinism is universalised biological Darwinism. The 'ism' in biologism implies its 
universalisation or the reduction of all higher ontological layers. 
Hence biologism, like physicalism, advocates a certain form of 'substance reductionism ': Higher 
ontological levels, psychological, social and cultural entities should (proximately or ultimately804) be 
reduced to biological entities. Mental and social substances should be reduced to biotic substances. In 
this view our cognitive 'apparatus' is finally nothing but a physiological entity, which must have 
evolved solely according to the laws of biology (and physics). 
Biologism is not necessarily Darwinian. We can also conceive a Lan1arckian biologism, although 
Lan1arckism more than Darwinism may tend to accept the autonomy of culture805 Hence Darwinian 
biologism does not only employ substance reductionism but also an inner-biological Darwinian process 
reductionism. 
Process-Darwinism should only be defined by an exclusive use of Darwinian processes. Darwinian 
processes the other way round should not imply process-Darwinism as long as also other processes 
803 ::>e. g. pp. 324, 353, 397. 
804 ~ footnote 778. 
805 The prevailing biologism of the 1920s was actually not always a Darwinian but partly a Lmnarckian one. If romantic 
m1d Lmnarckian biology would replace or modify pure Darwinism(::> pp. 145 f). This hence would not necessarily 
result in an abolition ofbiologistic attitudes towards culture. 
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build an essential part of the ontological inventory in question. Process-Darwinism in regard of 
substances may employ substances on levels above biology, but each process fmally has to be reducible 
to the Darwinian process of natural selection (~ p. 1 07). 
Process-Darwinism can either be used in the sense of Universal Process Darwinism (UPD), which 
denotes Process-Darwinism as world view, or in the sense of a Particular Process Darwinism (PPD), 
which denotes Process-Danvinism-the exclusive application of Darwinian processes-in a certain 
subject area. 
Process Darwinism is a special Darwinian case of what we may call 'Processism · or (universal or 
particular) process reductionism. To introduce the clumsy tem1 'Processism' appears pardonable to me 
because of the analogy to the different types of substance reductionism (physicalism etc.). Processism is 
not concerned with the reduction of 'things' to lower ontological substances, but with the explaining of 
all processes by one process or one class of processes. 
Besides UPD there are also other approaches which have favoured a universal process reductionism. 
For exan1ple dialectical philosophy either in its idealist (Hegel) or materialist (Marx) version have 
tmiversalised the one process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 
Biological Darwinism-like any Darwinism-in its strict understanding always implies process-
Darwinism (but not vice versa). This is the case because the essence of Darwinism itself is the exclusive 
usage of the process of natural selection 
Before discussing biologistic Darwinism and process Darwinism in detail, I shall discuss the 
epistemological problem of induction at the logical centre of Darwinism in general and hence of both 
outlined types of a Darwinian metaphysics. 
6.1 Problem of Induction-Necessity of Blind Variation & External Elimination? 
a) Danvinism Seen as Universal Principle 
In a Darwinian Metaphysics-either gene-Darwinian or process-Darwinian-natural selection Is 
often understood to be more than a quasi-physical force, it an1ounts to an all-powerful principle. 
Such a claim can either rest on an "extrapolation" of an empirically found hierarchy of selection 
processes "to all knowledge processes"806 or on logical or metaphysical considerations. Examples of the 
empirical basis will be outlined only in the following chapter, whereas the logical argumentation linked 
to the problem of induction will be outlined in the next section of the present chapter. In the present 
section some striking examples of a universalisation of Darwinism will be documented, without treating 
their justification in detail. 
806 E. g. D. T. Camp bell. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1974 ), p. 421; Donald T. Camp bell, Blind Variation and Selective 
Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes 1987 (1960), p. Ill. (From the viewpoint of Universal 
Darwinism the term 'extrapolation' would in my opinion not be appropriate. :> pp. 208.) 
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Dawkins has claimed that Darwinism is not only empirically but theoretically "probably the only 
theory that can adequately account for phenomena that we associate with life." Other explanations are 
"in principle incapable of [ ... ] explaining the evolution of organized, adaptive complexity."807 For 
exan1ple Lamarckian "aquired characters are not always improvements. There is no reason why they 
should be, and indeed the vast majority of them are injuries." Dawkins argues in principle against 
instmctivism and in favour of selectionism: "Even if acquired characters are inherited on some planet, 
evolution there will still rely on a Darwinian guide for its adaptive direction"808 
Campbell generally argued that a Darwinian process, ''a blind-variation-and-selective retention 
process", "is fundan1ental to all inductive achievements, to all genuine increases in knowledge, to all 
increases in fit of system to environment. "809 "Considered as improvements or solutions, none of these 
variations has any a priori validity." According to him "at no stage has there been any transfusion of 
knowledge from the outside, nor of mechanisms ofknowing, nor of fundamental certainties."810 
Campbell concedes that there could be shortcuts of these processes. But these shortcuts are completely achieved 
"originally by blind variation and selective retention, and contain their own blind variation and selective retention concept 
on some level. "811 
These two formulations of universal Darw·inism, might be regarded as a cynical interpretation of the 
biblical teh.'t: "What has been is what will be, and [in regard of processes] there is nothing new under the 
sun" (Ecclesiastes, l :9). 
b) The Problem of Induction (Hume and Popper) 
Although not every advocate of the outlined generalised Darwinian approach will be aware of it, 
these claims have a deeper and older philosophical grounding, which has to be taken seriously. Besides 
important empirical questions, the logical core of universal Darwinism is the proposed purely negative 
'solution' to the problem of induction. 812 lf any possibility of 'sight' is theoretically deemed to be 
impossible, if any possibility of induction in its broadest sense is denied, it will be shown that only blind 
Darwinian mechanisms remain to explore the unknown. 
The problem of induction goes at least back to Hume (:> p. 86), who realised the logical problem to 
warrant causal laws like any claims about unobserved instances, based on an actually finite number of 
observed instances. According to Hume "there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove that those 
instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience. "813 
807 R. Dawkins. Universal Dmwinism ( 1983), pp. 403, 404. 
808 !bid, p. 409, also p. 408. 
809 D. T. Can1pbell. Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes 
( 1987/1960), p. 91; identical: Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), p. 421. 
810 Idem. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1974), pp. 415, 411. 
811 Idem. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1974), p. 421. Blind Variation and Selective Retention (1987/l960), p. 91. 
812 For other central theoretical aspects ~ also pp. 324 f. 
813 D. Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40; 1888, 1978), Book 1, part III, section VI, p. 89. 
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If we would adopt an extreme Humean position and we would self-referentially apply this view to this claim 1tself, tl11S 
claim might be also regarded as an unwarranted inductive generalisation of empirical knowledge. 
Although Hume did not solve the problem of induction, generalisation or extrapolation on logical 
grounds, he stayed convinced that human thought and science strongly relies on induction and that we 
actually do and have to regard some general theories as more valid than others. This tension between 
missing logical justification and heuristic mental necessity of a theory of induction could be called 
Hume' s general problem of induction 814 
Popper restated Hume's problem of induction along the lines of simple modem fom1al logic. 
Universal (Jawlike) empirical claims of knowledge, like 'all strawberries are edible', can never be 
completely verified on the basis of evidence, as long as not all instances, all strawberries, have been 
tested. There is-as almost everyone will agree-no necessity, why we should not suddenly come across 
a counterexample of a poisonous strawberry. But Popper goes further than this: Since induction could 
never have the security of deductive logic, every inductive methodology is strictly speaking not logical 
and hence not valid at all. Hence Popper radicalised Hume in arguing that there is no general problem of 
induction, because there is no induction at all. Moreover, Popper has stressed that a single counter-
evidence, a poisonous strawberry, is-logically-conclusive to refute or falsify the proposition in 
question. Hence Popper-also inspired by biological Darwinism-concludes that scientists in a process 
of conjecture and refutation can and do only try to falsify laws and never try to verify them. Tlus 'logic 
of discovery', which as we will see resembles a Darwinian process, was mainly worked out in the field 
of theory of science, but it was intended as a universal logical principle 815 
Quine called tllis approach 'negative doctrine of evidence'. Evidence does not serve to suppmt a 
hypothesis, but only to refute it816 (In our more general context we may think not only of theoretical 
intellectual h:ypoilieses but also of 'biotic hypotheses', i. e. varieties of organisms.) 
In my opinion ilie basic assumptions of thorough (universal) Darwinism can be and have to be 
qualified to a further extent. Following a truly negative doctrine of evidence, one would not only deny 
any flux of infonnation from the external to the internal, but one would additionally deny any internal 
reasoning or improvement of infonnation or, to speak in a Kantian way, any synilietic truth a priori. 
This additional precondition naturally corresponds to the actual historical opposition of iliis school to 
the Kantian concept of synthetic truth a priory. It implies two additional more radical core assumptions 
of (Ulliversal) Darwinism (:> also pp. 348 f). A denial of any induction and internal improvement, a 
learning process indeed has to be a Darwinian process, which in its first variational step is blind and in 
its second eliminational step is caused externally. Only with this additional second justification-as far 
814 K. R Popper distingushes Hume's logical and empirical problem of induction. Objective Knowledge (197911972), esp. 
1.2, 2.26-2.29. 
815 K. R Popper. My Solution of Hume 's Problem of Induction ( 1974 ), Objective Knowledge ( 1979/1972 ), l, 2; Logik der 
Forschung (1966/1934). :>pp. 229 f 
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as I know, nonnally not fonnulated explicitly-radical Darwinism seems to become justified. If we face 
the totally new and we have to step into the dark and our guesses are necessarily blind, the corrections 
of our guesses will be necessarily external (~ next section). 
c) Towards a Critique of a Falsificationist Necessity of Universal Darwinism 
In the current section I am not yet concerned with a full criticism of the outlined metaphysical 
foundation of Universal Darwinism (~ part IV), but I want to point out that this view has not remained 
unchallenged. 
Kant did not only follow Hume in attacking dogmatism, but also opposed Hume's sceptical despair 
concerning the logical justification of causal laws. Kant favoured the rational a priori existence of a 
principle of causality. Moreover-in contrast to the above Darwinian metaphysics-he advocated the 
possibility of a (critically limited) synthetic reasonable extension of the a priori (or empirically) 
. 817 given. 
Within a more pronounced empiricist approach, Mill developed the inductivist Method of Agreement 
and Difference which had been developed earlier by Scotus, Ockharn, Grosseteste and even Aristotle. 
But also later, within the Vienna Circle-already versed in modern fonnal logic-, Popper's 
falsificationism was challenged and stood in antithetical opposition to the influential inductivist 
approaches. Camap and Reichenbach in particular advocated that hypotheses have truth probabilities, 
according to their positive degree of confinnation. 
It is neither possible to elaborate nor to access these alternative approaches here. Instead, I want to 
mention some objections which have been made directly in reaction to Popper's 'negative doctrine of 
evidence', which in the extended outlined version could be regarded as a possible basis of a Dmwinian 
metaphysics. 
Quine, who partly shows sympathy for Popper's way of arguing, also pointed to a flaw if Popper's 
logical argumentation is taken as basis for a general negative doctrine of evidence. Quine firstly pointed 
out that on the grounds of deductive logic a negative doctrine of evidence is not reasonable for 
existential statements like 'some strawberries are edible'. On the contrary, for existential statements 
supportive evidence is decisive and negative evidence does contribute as little as positive evidence does 
in the case of universal statements. But because science is nonnally concerned witl1 universal laws, he 
concedes that this argun1ent might not be a refutation of a predominantly negative methodology. 
Secondly, Quine argued that complex propositions with multiple quantification are logically not directly 
falsifiable. Hence to Quine a general negative doctrine of evidence also becomes questionable818 
816 W v. 0. Quine. On Popper's Negative Methodology (1974), p. 218. 
817 I. K<mt. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. (178111787), B pp. 19 f., 127-128, 232 f, 786-797. 
818 W. v. 0. Quine. On Popper's Negative Methodology (1974), pp. 218-220. 
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Putnam criticised that if there "were no suggestion at all that a law which has withstood severe tests 
is likely to withstand further tests", no theory would be more verified than another one, and "science 
would be a wholly unimportant activity". Science actually seeks for predictive power. According to 
Putnam, Popper could only argue the way he does, because-against Popper's own views-Popper's 
theory of corroboration is a theory of induction819 Similarly Lakatos argued that, understood properly, 
Popper's approach-albeit conjectural- implies a 'thin' metaphysical principle of induction 820 
Secondly Putnam, in its results similar to Quine's logical second argument, urged that theories in 
fact are not directly falsifiable: instead of their central claims often only less central 'auxiliary 
sentences' become rejected 821 Lakatos' treatn1ent of theory development stresses that the core of a 
theory is protected by a belt of auxiliary sentences and hence could not directly be falsified by 
contradictory observations. 
It is an essential feature of the argumentation of Quine, Putnam and Lakatos that m a complex 
situation-not limited to simple protocol sentences-a falsificationist approach is neither descriptively 
nor normatively the philosopher's stone. 
My own criticism of universal Darwinism in the subsequent part IV shall build on this way of 
arguing. Nevertheless, I want to point out here that the Darwinian critique of induction does indeed 
make a valid point-although may be a tautological and trivial one, which in my view is finally not at 
odds with inductive methodology. If newness is strictly defined as the totally unknown we will by 
definition not know anything at all about it. (This differs, for example, from the situation in which we 
are entering a dark room, where we would still at least know something about gravity and we would 
have the rough idea that a room has a limited seize etc.). Provided that we could think of the totally 
unknown-it almost seems to be a non-thought822- any strategy to explore it would a priori have the 
same value (this is a precondition for our understanding of the term 'unknown'), and in this sense any 
strategy could indeed by definition be interpreted as a process of blind variation and external 
elinlination. That the totally unknown by definition could not be known in advance is true, tautological 
and trivial. 
Although this true-if tautological-claim has too seldom been acknowledged, it is worse that this 
claim even is more seldom separated from a claim which, in my opinion, is indeed controversial. 
Although the unknown is of course by definition always unknown, the only reasonable problem of 
induction is whether the new, the yet unobserved, is always completely unknown and whether the 
apparently new always needs to be explored by the same simple blind mechanism. Is it legitimate to 
819 H. Putnam. The 'Corroboration' a/Theories (I 974), esp. pp. 222-223. 
820 I. Lakatos. Popper on Demarkation and Induction (I 974 ), pp. 256, 261. 
821 H. Putnam. The 'Corroboration' of Theories, (I 974), esp. pp. 226-237, but also see: K. R. Popper. Putnam on 
'Auxiliary Sentences', Called by Me 'Initial Conditions' (I 974 ). 
822 It could be argued that the totally new or unknown could in principle not be a matter of explanations, otherwise it 
would not be totally new or unknown. See similar: R. Spaemmm, R. Jsak. Evolution ohne Ziel? ( 1992 ), p. I 54. 
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assume that the sun will rise tomorrow? Such questions opened the dispute on induction and inductivists 
only have hoped that there is a solution to such a problem. Could we legitimately claim to know 
something about what had not been directly observed before, could we infer from observed to 
unobserved instances, is it justified to generalise, to extrapolate, to synthesis or-to put it boldly-to 
reason in a bottom up way? If induction supports that the sun will rise tomorrow, it will-of course-
never have the same degree of security as strict, deductive reasoning. 823 Although I welcome the 
fallibilist claim that our (scientific) knowledge always remains vulnerable, tllis in my opinion does not 
require a research programme of strict blindness and falsificationism. 824 I am going to argue that 
knowledge (intellectual or biological knowledge) in facing the new is neither necessarily blind nor 
omniscient; instead there are different degrees of sight ( :> particularly pp. 3 61 f). 
Following Quine's, Putnam's and Lakatos' arguments, complex systems of (biological or 
intellectual) knowledge do not logically need to function according to a falsificatimlist methodology of 
discovery. In the fourth part of tills work I shall argue that not everything new to a theory (or to an 
organism) is necessarily totally unknown, in the sense that only blind trial and extemal elimination is the 
only possible mechanism to explore it. I am arguing against the view that the world on the relevant 
levels of explanation is a priori limited to the one and only search algorithm of a strictly Darwinian 
process. I am going to argue that guesses logically, and empirically already in the biological layer, 
neither need to be blind nor to be extemally selected. If an orgrulism, for example, literally has the 
capacity of sight, it can see new paths even if these paths have never existed before. Of course, this 
capacity might have evolved based on the existence of other paths in the phylogenetic history of that 
orgrulism. Nevertheless it seems that generalisations (inductions) may play a crucial role even in 
biological evolution. The organism may also perceive streets and cars which did definitely not exist in 
the evolutionary history. An 'epistem-ontology' which only reduces this to old pattems (despite the 
importance of such an explanation) and limits itself to an inevitable blind trial-and-error process, would 
I trunk neglect this essential tendency for ope1mess to new possibilities. 
Although I conceded tl1e above developed (tautological) principle of blindness, I think our 
metaphysics should stress something else: I will argue that the biological and cultural evolutionary 
process should rather be understood as an evolving process itself whose rules are changing and which 
may partly even be changeable for us. On the relevant explanatory level there is no principle of 
conservation of blindness and wastefulness, but the possibility of progression towards sight. Newly 
evolved forces may gain some autonomy and direct evolution in a different direction. For example moral 
beliefs may direct human, cultural (and even biological) development into a direction which is not 
always opportunistically adaptive, but in accordance with religious or philosophical principles. 
823 I think it was Strawson, who argued that inductive inference is inductively valid just as deductive inference is 
deductively valid. 
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After developing the metaphysical background to Universal Darwinism and a sketch of my critique 
of this approach, we now come back to the two types of universal Darwinism, biologistic Darwinism 
and process-Darwinism. 
6.2 Biologistic Darwinism- Gene-Darwinism as its Prototype 
The Darwinian paradigm of gene-Darwinism could be seen as today's most influential representative 
of a theorv of Darwinian Biologism825 
Generally many of its proponents claim that psychology and social sc1ences should become 
biologised (~ pp. 42 f). Although this Darwinian paradigm could not yet be counted as accepted basis 
for all social science, it can already be detected as an assumption in a wide range of subject areas. 
Gene-Darwinism is a prototypic reductionist theory, because, even compared with other largely 
Darwinian paradigms, it continues the reductionist programme in regard of substances and processes 
most radically. 
In regard of substance reductionism gene-Darwinism within biology vigorously advocates the 
reduction of all other explanatory levels like organisms, groups, gene-pools and ecosystems to only one 
unit of selection. TI1e ultin1ate Reality is built by single egoistic genes only. Earlier we distinguished the 
germ-line-reductionism and the gene-atomism inherent in such a claim(~ pp. 141 f.) 
In regard of process reductionism gene-Darwinism is presumably the most radical example of pure 
Darwinism. In contrast to Darwin's Darwinism and even to the synthetic theory, gene-Darwinism is 
purged from all remaining non-Darwinian aspects and advocates a minimalist Darwinian process 
monism (~pp. 143 f.). It is only natural selection, which 'drives' evolution 
Firstly, processes especially on the level of populations. like genetic drift or founder effect, which 
have been emphasised by proponents of the second step of the evolutionary synthesis, are not clearly 
strictly Darwinian as a process of atomistic trial-and-error. These processes are clearly less emphasised 
by gene-Darwinism-like the level of population is in general. If these processes are not explicitly 
rejected, they are regarded either to be comparatively irrelevant or reducible to natural selection. 
Secondly, the new processes which paradoxically have been newly advocated in the gene-Darwinian 
parent discipline of sociobiology, are, according to gene-Darwinism, finally reducible to natural 
selection. Sociobiology has distinguished new types of selection, especially kin selection and selection of 
reciprocal altruism(:> pp. 43 f.). Although-as mentioned in the referred section-it might be possible 
to argue that these mechanisms gain a certain autonomy, I think that gene-Darwinism regards them as 
mere applications of one fundamental selection principle. Dawkins pronounces that we should move 
"towards giving up the term 'kin selection' as well as group selection and individual selection. Instead 
824 It appears possible to me that both seemingly apposed positions partly may only use a different terminology and may 
somehow be reconcilable. 
825 On gene-Darwinism and sociobiology ::> pp. 36 f., 140 f., 191 f., 205 f. 
Part Ill Chapter 6: Darwinian Metaphysics- Biologistic and Process Darwinism 214 
of all these we should substitute the single tern1 'replicator selection'. Evolutionary models, whether 
they call themselves group-selectionist or individual-selectionist, are fundamentally gene-selectionist."826 
Thirdly, sexual selection as alternative process to natural selection has been revitalised by gene-
Darwinism and sociobiology. The evolutionary synthesis, for reasons mentioned earlier, has neglected or 
denied its existence. I very much appreciate this revitalisation, but I think that gene-Darwinism still does 
not regard sexual selection as a proper noumenon. (a) Sexual selection is normally not understood as a 
new emergent process with a certain autonomy, but at most as a short-cut version of natural selection. 
(b) Sexual selection is not (yet) integrated into a general theory of process emergentism. 
Although I indeed think that the more active understanding of the genes and even the proposed or 
revitalised mechanisms also bears germs for the transcendence of pure Darwinism(~ pp. 145, 348 f), I 
think gene-Darwinism both in regard of substance reductionism and in regard of process reductionism, 
could, at least in its own understanding, serve as a prototypic example of Darwinism. 
6.3 Universal Process Darwinism- a New Alkahest 
Today, the general idea of a universal-not necessarily Darwinian-evolution is widely accepted. 
Nature and culture is described in an increasingly evolutionary and dynamic way. 827 Today's physics 
teaches us that even the structure of atoms, stars and the basic physical forces are not static, but 
changing, unfolding or emerging in time. Palaeontology provides us with an account of the changes of 
the biotic world. History tells us about the development of culture and politics. History of philosophy 
and history of science is concerned with the development of techniques, theories and disciplines, telling 
us something about the change of nous. Despite this unanimous appeal to evolution, different schools 
and disciplines strongly differ on how to interpret this process of evolution. 828 
Universal Process Darwinism (UPD, ~ pp. 153 f., 205 f.) is a world view that Darwinian Processes 
could provide an adequate exhaustive explanation not only for biology, but for any subject areas, where 
evolution occurs. This approach results in a 'nested hierarchy' 829 of Darwinian Processes. 
I define a Darwinian Process as the process of natural selection in the broad sense, which we have 
already identified as the conceptual core of today's Darwinism 830 Natural selection in the broad sense is 
a two step process355 of blind production of entities and their environmental elimination. This 
826 R. Dawkins. Replica tor Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 62. :> also footnotes 80~ 556. 
827 E. g.: I. Prigogine. From Being to Becoming. Time and Complexity in Physical Science (1979). K. Gloy. Das 
Verstandnis der Natur (1995), pp. 224-5; J. Gotschl. Zur philosophischen Bedeutung des Paradigmas der 
Selbstorganisation ( 1993), pp. 66-73; G. Vollmer. Evolutionare Erkenntnistheorie ( 1975/1990), chapter C 'Un.iverselle 
Evolution'. 
828 Like Darwinism, different ph.ilosophical, developmental or selforgan.isational theories likewise claim to have a quite 
universal scope,:> e. g. pp. !52 f. 
829 D. T. Campbell. Evolutionary Epistemology (1974), 419 f.; Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative 
Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes ( 1987/1960). 
83° For our working definition of Darwinism :> p. I 07, esp. footnote 354. Correspondingly Darwin himself was not a strict 
'Darwinian', :> pp. 11 0 IT. 
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algorithm356 has adequately been described by D. Camp bell as a process of "blind-variation-and-
selective-retention". 831 
This definition of a Darwinian process may need further clarification. What does 'blindness' and 'selective retention' 
mean? To build up a position worth attacking, we will once more examine and clarify this definition(:> p. 324). 
Particular theories of Process Darwinism have actually not only been proposed for biological 
evolution but also, for example, for the inunune system, for operant conditioning, for the selection of 
theories and even in economics (~ pp. 218 f.). Here Darwinian Processes are dominating particular 
subject areas. 
Both as a collection of theories and as a general approach, process Darwinism has gained influence 
Important steps towards UPD have been made by Campbell, Hull, Dennett and, in a way also, by 
Dawkins, who radicalised the biological discussion as well as contributing to a two level process 
Darwinism of atomistic genes and memes.832 Lewontin's notion of the unit of selection, though himself 
rather critical of an exclusively Darwinian metaphysics, has also contributed to the flourishing of this 
school 833 Other proponents ofUPD are, for example, H. Plotkin834 and, in some respects, P. Munz. 835 
As already mentioned UPD is defined by its Darwinian process reductionism. The concept of 
Darwinian Processes is regarded to be the 'alkahest' -the alchemists' universal solvent. 'Dennett ·s 
dangerous idea' appears to be a prototype of an abundant application of Darwinian Processes as well as 
of the reduction of all processes to Darwinian ones. Though Dennett told me in a personal discussion 
that he would not interpret his position as radical process reductionism, I would still hold that his book 
Darwin's Dangerous Idea has to be seen as a prototypic example for process reductionism (in type, not 
in token). 836 According to Dennett the Darwinian algoritlm1 could be seen as universal acid which eats 
through all traditional concepts. 837 The algoritlun could be applied to everything; "all exist as fruits of a 
single tree, the Tree of Life, and the processes that have produced each and every one of them are, at 
bottom, the san1e." Dennett concludes, on the last page of Darwin's Dangerous Idea, that there "is no 
831 D. T. Campbell. Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory ( 1990), p. 7. 
832 ~pp 60 f. 
833 :>pp. 153 f., esp. footnote 597. 
834 H. P1otkin. Darwin Machines and the Nature C!f Knowledge ( 1995/94 ). 
835 P. Munz. Philosophical Darwinism. On the Origin C!fKnowledge by Means C!fNatural Selection (1993), pp. 144, 153, 
but pp. 167, 169. 
836 Dennett and I had a longer discussion in a train to London, after he had given a talk at the conference of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy at Reading in 1996. Drawing the parallel between processes and objects I argued in favour of 
something like process emergentism ( :> pp. 324 f.). Although he denied thorough process reductionism, he was also 
critical of process emergentism. I would interpret in hindsight that he-maybe surprisingly-was not convinced of 
thorough substance reductionism and advocated that Darwinian processes-despite being critical of group selection-
indeed took place on different levels. Nevertheless, he did argue in favour of what I call process reductionism, i. e. the 
reduction to one type o[ process. 
837 D. Detmett. Es geht auch ohne Gott und Geist. Darwins atzende Idee zetfrij3t die letzten lvfythen. Als Sinn des Lebens 
bleibt nw· Neugier und die Lie be zur Wahrheit ( 1996). Also: Darwin's Dangerous Idea ( 1995), pp. 61 f[ 
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denying, at this point, that Darwin's idea is a universal solvent, capable of cutting right to the heart of 
everything in sight. "838 
As physicalism claims that all entities (substances in contrast to processes) could finally be 
completely reduced to elementary particles, or as gene-Darwinism claims that all biological or even 
cultural 'substances' could be reduced to the action of selfish genes, process-Darwinism claims that all 
evolutionary processes-biological and cultural-could be reduced to the ultimate processual unit of 
natural selection. The Creator had been as lazy as could be imagined. According to the metaphysics of 
Process Darwinism natural selection is the unchangeable processual atom of evolution, and all other 
evolutionary processes in essence are nothing but these processual atoms (:> pp. 207 f.). 
Dawkins has contributed the general notion of a replicator to this approach, which he claims to be 
central to any process of natural selection. Dawkins has abstracted the logical essence of 'genes' and 
generalised it (although Dawkins within biology remained a gene-Darwinian). Replicators are "any 
entity in the universe which interacts [ ... ] in such a way that copies of itself are made"839 
I also think, perhaps even more strongly than Dawkins, that the notion of a replicator could be 
regarded to be a unifying central notion of Darwinism. (Although I differ from Dawkins in thinking that 
this notion also points beyond Darwinism. For details ~ also pp. 252 f) 
1. The concept replicator somehow leads to the concept of a evolutionary line of replicating entities 
and slightly changed entities. The notion of an evolutionary line is not new and other proponents of UPD 
have claimed that this is a necessary component of a Darwinian process (besides blind variation and 
'natural' elimination) 840 But from this it can be concluded that drops of water and planets are excluded 
from being objects of Darwinian processes, because it would be difficult to define what a evolutionary 
line based on replication should be. Tllis is the case although drops of water and planets may vary and 
be selected and even evolve according to some law of nature. 
Drops of water and planets may even lawfully increase or decrease in number. Still it is difficult to think of them being 
copied. I will agree that copying is an important emerging property. However, a certain kind of evolution seems to be 
excluded by this definition, which on 'higher' evolutionary levels may also wrongly be ignored. 
2. The notion replicator (almost) entails the two other nonnally acknowledged features of a 
Darwinian processes, blind variation and natural elimination (:> pp. 252 f.) "In practice no replication 
process is infallible, and defects in a replicator will tend to be passed on to descendants "841 The 
differential elimination of these varying entities even under most sin1plest circumstances seem to follow 
I think that the notion of a replicator indeed could serve to conceptually unify all three components of a Darwinian 
Process. Simple replicators may imply natural selection. Natural selection may even imply replicators. But I am going to 
838 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 63 f., 51 I, 521. 
839 R. Dawkins. Replica tor Selection and the bxtended Phenotype (I 978), p. 67. 
840 E. g.: D. I-I. Camp bell. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1974 ), p. 421; Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative 
Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1987/1960), p. 92. 
841 R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 67. 
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argue that there is the possibility that new more complex replicators have come into being which are linked to less wasteful 
mechanisms, which for reasons of clarity should not be called Darwinian Processes. 
3. The concept of a replicator, at least in Dawkins' works, is closely connected with an assumed 
ontological primacy of replicators. In the biological context this is expressed in his germ-line reduc-
tionism, the claim that selfish genes (in his view the sole replicators) have exclusive evolutionary reality 
whereas phenotypes, like organisms or groups, are only their ephemeral and epiphenomenal vehicles842 
David Hull in his early writings took a rather 'organicisf or 'holist' stance and opposed the radical 
substance reductionism of gene-Darwinism. Together with Michael Ghiselin he has even vindicated the 
existence of species as individual wholes or-for short-as 'individuals' 843 
Nevertheless, in an irony of history, Hull seems to have become an ardent supporter of Darwinian 
process reductionism. Extending the unit of selection argument to other entities than atomistic genes, it 
paradoxically was he, who gave respectability for a larger audience to the claim that all evolutionary 
processes are Darwinian processes. 
Hull distinguished two classes of evolutionary entities, replicators and interactors. Thereby he 
adopted the notion of a replicator and also the genotype-phenotype distinction from Dawkins' replicator-
vehicle distinction (which in turn could be regarded as a materialist reformulation of the Platonic 
distinction of mundus intelligibilis and its expression in the recognisable mundus sensibilis). Hull, 
replacing the term 'vehicle' by the term 'interactor', still appears to struggle against an epiphenomenal 
understanding of what Dawkins called vehicles. According to Hull there are two units of evolution, one 
unit of replication and one unit of interaction. Whereas the replicators, are the exclusively information 
carrying entities which form lineages, the interactors are units which are interacting and which are 
selected by the external environment. 844 
New questions arise: How far is an interactor truly differing from a vehicle? Do we have to opt 
either for vehicles or interactors in general, or is this a domain-specific question? Although Hull's 
position appears very Darwinian in style, it is questionable whether his replicator-interactor position 
should be regarded to be as neo-Darwinian as Dawkins' replicator-vehicle position is. 
In the following chapter we '.'.rill discuss particular theories of Process Darwinism especially in the 
fields of psychology and theory of science, which might be incorporated into larger Darwinian phalanx. 
UPD results in a world view, where genes, organisms, humans, ideas and companies are all at war and fighting for sur-
vival. It is a ra.dicalisation of Hobbes' homo hominem lupus est. In the fourth part of this work, it will be worked out why 
such a view, despite its simplistic appeal-at least as an exclusive and complete world view-becomes self-contradictory. 
842 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), e. g. pp. 15-20 (:.? also e. g. footnote 944 ). Dawkins later extended his 
concept of a vehicle. The Extended Phenotype (1982/89). 
843 M. Ruse. David Hull through two decades ( 1989), pp. 3-4, 8, 12; M. T. Ghiselin. A radical solution to the species 
problem (1974). D. Hull. Individuality and Selection (1980). 
844 D. Hull. Individualitv and Selection ( 1980). D. Hull. Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay ( 1981 ). (Hull still often 
uses 'units of selection' for 'units of evolution'. This might be due to the different narrow and broad meanings of 
'selection',:.? p. 107.) 
~~----------
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Chapter 7: Process Darwinism in Particular Subject Areas 
7.1 Darwinian Epistemologies and Darwinian Philosophies of Science 
a) Darwinian Biological Epistemology and Darwinian Process Epistemology 
The two general types of Universal Darwinism, (Universal) Biologistic Darwinism and Universal 
Process Darwinism, could presumably best be exemplified in the areas of epistemology or psychology, 
where both analogous classes of a Darwinian Biological Epistemology and a Darwinian Process 
Epistemology are especially apparent. 845 
Epistemology, as opposed to ontology starts its investigation not directly with the question 'what is the case' but 
indirectly with the question 'what cm1 we know'. Nevertheless, epistemology has always more or less directly interacted 
with ontology. 
A Darwinian Epistemology can either be grounded on the conception that our percipient and mental 
capacities are massively moulded by Danvinian biological evolution, or could be based on the appli-
cation of Darwinian process not only ·within biology but also in regard of trials, thoughts and theories. 
'Darwinian Epistemology' should not be conflated with 'Evolutionary Epistemology'. Although the 
term Evolutionary Epistemology-with its pleasing alliteration-has been made popular predominantly 
by Darwinian thinkers, 846 it would be inadequate to equate Evolutionary Epistemology exclusively with 
Darwinian Epistemology: 
Evolutionary Epistemology firstly could be understood as m1 epistemology which puts emphasis on how the biological 
or historical situation cmne into being. Being is understood based on its becoming; diachronic understm1ding sheds light on 
synchronic understm1ding. In this sense the antonym of evolutionary epistemology would be systematic epistemology. In 
this interpretation Evolutionary Epistemologies need not to be Darwinim1 but could also be Lamarckim1, Hegelian etc. 
Secondly, the term 'evolution' especially in a philosophical work could be understood in its traditional sense, meaning 
the unfolding of a preformed potential structure, interpreting the whole nature bv the metaphor of embryological develop-
ment. In this sense evolutionary epistemology would almost be an antithesis ofDarwinim1 Epistemology(:> pp. 89)1 
Thirdly, Evolutionary Epistemology could simply refer to the 'fact' of biological evolution. As long as there is dispute 
about the mechm1isms and interpretation of biological evolution this understanding need not to be synonymous with 
Darwinim1 biological epistemology. TI1e premiss of biological pan-Darwinism is neither m1 obvious logical necessity nor 
favoured in this work. 
A generally biologically inspired approach to epistemology is not new (whether directly biological or 
only adopting biological processes). Particularly since Danvin a number of important thinkers, like 
Baldwin, Bergson, T. H. Huxley, James, Mach, Peirce, Poincare, Sinm1el, Spencer and von Uexktill 
have contributed to such an epistemology: but according to Campbell most of these approaches kept a 
845 On M. Bradie's tem1inology :> footnote 80 I. 
846 D. T. Campbell. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1974 ); G. Vollmer Evolutiondre Erkenntnistheorie (1976). 
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critical distance from a purely Darwinian epistemologyR47 Under closer scrutiny I think it may even tum 
out that some of the apparent advocates of a Darwinian Epistemology are also not appropriately 
labelled as pure Darwinians. 
We are now going to outline the classes of Danvinian Biological Epistemology and Darwinian 
Process Epistemology. 
Darwinian Biological Epistemology is a discipline or an approach which explains questions 
concerning epistemology by referring to the biotic stratum which is in turn understood in a Darwinian 
way. For the moment we leave the Darwinian aspect of such an epistemology aside. The term 
'biological' in Biological Epistemology can be understood in a twofold way, either it could specify the 
part of epistemology which is meant (thereby accepting other aspects or approaches), or it could be an 
exclusive characterisation of epistemology (thereby excluding, for exan1ple, transcendental or 
sociological epistemology). 
Biological epistemology, understood as a part of epistemology, appears to me to be the legitimate 
discipline. One may object that it is generally a more valuable task to seek other explanations, for 
instance, to unveil a securer aprioric foundation of knowledge, to take subjective phenomena as true 
starting points, or to investigate the social construction of knowledge. I think as long as (prima facie) 
such epistemologies are also accepted and as long as we also keep a critical distance from biological 
'facts', an acknowledgement of our biological nature is an essential part of epistemology-even if it 
turned out that this human nature is a tabula rasa. 
Biological epistemology, understood as biological characterisation of epistemology, is a sort of 
biologism, which, of course, is disputable. If biologistic epistemology is also Darwinian this results in a 
full sub-theory of the already discussed Biologistic Darwinism. As proponents of sociobiology have 
claimed that ethics should become biologised, here the biologization of epistemology would be 
advocated. In its purely Darwinian version this would imply that all our mental and epistemic capacities 
(like our visual cortex etc.) are explainable by their evolution by natural selection. In such a view even 
"language is no different from other complex abilities such as echolocation and stereopsis" and "the 
only way to explain the origin of such abilities is through the theory of natural selection." 848 
Like evolutionary theory in general, Darwinian biological epistemology has often wrongly been 
conceived as being monolithic. But authors actually vary considerably in their evolutionary assumptions 
and how far their position could be called biologistic and Darwinian. Although most authors of a bio-
logical epistemology definitely advocate at least a partly Darwinian position, even most founders of the 
847 D. T. Camp bell. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1974 ), pp. 437-441. 
848 St. Pi.nker, P. Bloom. Natural Language and Natural Selection ( 1990), p. 708. Quoted in D. Dennett Darwin's 
Dangerous Idea (1995), pp. 384 fi 
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discipline have not been as purely Darwinian as today's gene-Darwinians are (~ pp. 143). Instead of 
developing their epistemological position I will mention their position in regard of evolutionary theory. 
Biological epistemology has a long history, at least reaching back to the pre-Darwinian schools of 
evolutionism. Danvin-no pure Darwinian in its today's definition-also contributed to this field. 
Important steps to an at least partly Darwinian Biological Epistemology have been made by K. Lorenz. 
He even contributed to a more general selection theory. 849 However, it should be noted that Lorenz in 
many respects also took an opposed position to today's radical and purely gene-Darwinian view(~ pp. 
136 L 151 f.). 
Biological epistemology, then, has been elaborated especially by the philosopher and physicist 
G. Vollmer in Evolutiondre Erkenntnistheorie (1976) and in Was konnen wir wissen? (1988). Vollmer 
favoured hypothetical realism. In regard of the employed evolutionary theory Vollmer was sympathetic 
towards the 'valid' moderate Darwinism of the evolutionary synthesis 850 However, it seems to me that 
Vollmer in tllis early writings was not so much concerned with the differences between more or less 
Darwinian paradigms, but more generally tried to argue and exemplify that our epistemological capa-
cities have evolved and hence should be made object of an evolutionary (biological) epistemology. Al-
though Vollmer supported the 'valid' evolutionary theory, he even conceded its incompleteness. 851 But 
from a conference in 1996, where Vollmer chaired a workshop on the evolution of morality, I had the-
indeed fallible-impression that he has now become inclined to swim with the tide of gene-
Danvinism. 852 
Another now classical book on biological epistemology is R. Riedl's Biologic der Erkenntnis 
(1979). Riedl was also orientated towards the synthetic theory, which he regards as 'no doubt 
completely valid' but still also incomplete853 Riedl, like, for example, Wuketits, advocates a moderate 
systems theoretical extension of the synthetic theory(~ pp. 151). 
Maturana and Varela have also on system theoretical grounds in El arbor del concocimiento (1984) 
rather stressed their opposition to the Darwinian assumption of an externally given environment to 
which organisms are adapting. Their epistemology instead proposes a radical constructivism of 
organism and environment. 
J. Barkow's, L. Cosmides' and J. Tooby's anthology The Adapted Mind (1992) is a landmark for 
the reintroduction of biological evolution to psychology and for providing empirical evidence for this 
849 K. Lorenz. Die Rackseite des Spiegels. Versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen Erkennens (1973), p. 294. 
850 G. Vollmer. Evolutiontire Erkenntnistheorie (1976), e. g. pp. 58, 64. Was konnen wir wissen? Beitrdge zur 
Evolutionaren Erkenntnistheorie; Band I. Die Natur der Erkenntms. Band 2. Die Erkenntnis der Natur (1988), e.g. 
Bd. 2, p 4. 
851 Idem.; Was konnen wirwissen? (1988), Bd. 2, pp. l-3fl. 
852 On the conference of the AGPD 1996 in Leipzig I as a listener critically commented on E. Voland's Moral durch 
Manipulation? Ein evolutionares Szenario (1996). An interesting discussion arose, where Vollmer in my view rather 
adopted Voland's thorough gene-Darwinian position. But I can not judge whether Vo11mer had converted to full-blown 
gene-Darwinism or whether he only valued a certain but limited acknowledgement of the gene-level. See also 
G. Vollmer. Moglichkeiten und Grenzen einer evolutioniiren Ethik (1993), esp. pp. 122, 125-126, but p. 112. 
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approach. Tooby and Cosmides argued that explanations of biological evolution had been ignored 
because of the exclusive dominance of cultural explanations in a 'Standard Social Science Model'. 854 
Most of the articles of this anthology already strongly adopt Darwinian explanations on the gene level. 
This is also the case for Cosmides' and Tooby's O\vn theory of human rationality855 , which was 
subsequently radicalised by Gigerenzer. 856 Nevertheless there are still differences within evolutionary 
psychology. Cosmides and Tooby (as important proponents of evolutionary-biological-psychology), 
for example explicitly opposed the strict reductionism of gene-Darwinism857 
The linguist N. Chomsky is also often wrongly conceived to be 311 advocate of a radically Darwinian 
biologistic epistemology because he has proposed that the ability to develop the universal generative 
gran1mar is due to an innate disposition. It should be noted that Chomsky himself maintains critical 
distance from the ultra-Darwini311 can1p. 858 
In my opinion 311 acknowledgement of a biological basis of knowledge is definitely a merit. But even 
apparently Darwinian theories are not as unified as they are often supposed to be. One ought to be 
cautious; nothing less is at stake than human nature and how much room is left for culture. 
Some cases of a (mainly Darwinian) biological epistemology seem uncontroversial. For exan1ple the 
r311ge of electromagnetic waves which our eye could recognise, roughly con·esponds to the range of light 
rays passing through the atmosphere. 859 Nevertheless even here some problems remain: 
The correspondence of visual receptivity and atmospheric window seems to be most easily explainable by a Darwinian 
epistemology and in turn seems to support this view. Such a result would not contradict my position developed later, 
because I will not turn against any Darwinian explanation, but against pan-Darwinism. Here a Darwinian explanation 
seems especially suitable, because an adaptation to a given environment is evident. Nevertheless even here things may turn 
out to be more complicated. 
Firstly, although adaptation to an external enviromnent is a common necessary characterisation of Darwinism, it is not a 
sufficient one. Adaptation was also advocated by utterly different authors, like Paley and Lamarck. One may object that 
their approaches are no more viable today. But does this imply that Darwinism remains as only option? If our evolutionary 
theory advocated a more active organism and a less blind evolution-and in these respects rather resembled Lan1arckism-
then I think it would be inappropriate to call this a Darwinian theory(:> pp. 348 f.). 
Secondly, even in the given example it could be questioned whether the envirmm1ent is indeed extemally given. For 
example bees are receptive to a range of higher frequent electromagnetic waves, seeing no 'red' but additionally 
'ultraviolet' light. 
Thirdly, biology in its further course may develop an improved definition of Darwinism to distinguish between more or 
less Darwinian sub-paradigms (:> pp. 348 f). It may turn out that not all these approaches are purely Darwinian. The 
fitting between atmospheric window and the receptivity of most animals, does not directly decide whether we should 
advocate group or gene selection, saltational (punctuated) or gradual evolution. If these theories are not all equally 
Darwinian, then adaptation would not necessarily imply the purest Darwinian paradigm of them. 
From the philosophical viewpoint it seems more controversial if some authors generally equate ideas 
a priori. advocated from Plato to Kant, simply with innate ideas. With this idea in mind Darwin 
853 R Riedl. Strategie der Genesis ( 198411976), p. 27. 
854 J Tooby, L Cosmides. The Psychological Foundations ofCu/ture (1992). 
855 L. Cosmides, J. Too by. Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange ( 1992 ). 
856 G. Gigerenzer. Domain-specific reasoning ( 1992). 
857 J. Horgan. Die neuen Sozialdarwinisten (1985), pp. 82, 86. 
858 D. Detmett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), chapter 'Chomsky contra Darwin'. 
859 G. Vollmer. Evolutionare Erkenntnistheorie (1976), e. g. pp. 45-49, 97-100. H. v. Ditfurth. !m Ar~fang warder 
Wasserstoff(1972/1981),pp. 97-JOl,Abb. 7. 
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predicted that Plato would be rehabilitated, while Locke would be degraded. Preformed ideas are 
interpreted as being innate. Today Darwinian and other schools of biological epistemology follow in this 
wake and thereby take aspects of transcendental and sociological epistemology by storm. Haeckel ex-
plicitly interpreted the a priori of Kant in the sense of innateness, Lorenz later made this claim famous 
and many authors have followed in their footsteps 86c' Whoever is right, it should be clear that such an 
interpretation is not in accordance with the intentions of Kant himself. Kant in the Critique of pure 
Reason explicitly argued that concepts a priori are not simply innate concepts, but-independent of 
whether they are inherited or learned-they are logically necessary preconditions for understanding 861 
Darwinian Process Epistemology is the other sub-class of Darwinian Epistemology. Based on 
process Darwinism the ontological inventory of this sub-class is again not limited to biological entities 
(substances), but applies Darwinian processes in higher ontological strata. In regard of processes this 
epistemology is confined to Darwinian processes. 
Despite differences in emphasis as to what subst:mces should actually be regarded as being real, 
there is a consensus that tl1ere are roughly at least three ontological strata where Darwinian processes 
do work. 862 
Firstly, Danvinian processes are working within the biotic layer. From the viewpoint of pure 
Darwinian orthodoxy a Darwinian process is the only evolutionary mechanism in this layer. In this 
respect Darwinian Process Epistemology is identical with Darwinian Biological Epistemology. timer-
biological multi-level-Danvinism (~pp. 153 f.) is also in line with Process Darwinism, and-although 
it is at odds with pure gene-Darwinism-it may also be regarded as a case of biological Darwinism. 
However, in the present section we are rather concemed with supra-biological layers. 
Secondly, it has been argued that Darwinian processes were working within the individual 
psychological stratum and could even provide an exclusive explanation for the heterogeneous mental 
and behavioural phenomena. Donald T. Campbell, based on the older theory of opera11t conditioning, 
elaborated that, for example, creativity, pattern recognition and visual perception could all be 
understood solely on the basis of Darwinian processes. Later on he also integrated these approaches 
with a Darwinian approach of theory development into a generalised selection theory 863 
Thirdly, it has been claimed that Darwinia11 processes also were working in the cultural stratum, 
based on to the evolution of logoi or memes, like words or poems, thoughts a11d theories (~ pp. 60 f). 
Dawkins has proposed memes as general atomistic units of the Darwinian evolution in the cultural 
860 K. Lorenz. Kants Lehre vom Aprion·schen im Lichte gegenwdrtiger Biologic ( 1941 ), p. 99. G. Vol!mer. Evolutiondre 
Erkenntnistheorie (!975), pp. 91, 126-31; P. Munz. Philosophical Darwinism (!993 ), pp 151-153. 
861 I. Kant. Kritikderreinen Vernull[t. pp. B 167, 168. 
862 Similar: H. Plotk.i.IL Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge ( 1994 ). 
863 D. T. Carnpbell. Adaptive Behaviour from Random Response (!956); Evolutionary Epistemology (1974); Blind 
Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (!9871!960); Epistemological 
Roles for Selection Theory ( 1990). 
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sphere. In the field of theory development other earlier and more elaborated proposals have been made. 
Already T. H. Huxley's and E. Mach's views on theory development were affected by Darwinism. More 
recently it was especially Popper and, to some extent, S. Toulmin who have elaborated a Darwinian 
theory of theory development. 864 
Kulm is also sometimes discussed in an evolutionary context and he seems to share with Darwinism in its strict sense 
that there could be no absolute progress, since he regards different paradigms to be incommensurable. Nevertheless Kuhn 
should not be regarded to be a Darwinian, since his view of theory development is essentially not gradualist but 
salutatorian. 
These approaches, as seen already, became more and more integrated into a general theory of 
process-selection. As epistemology it has been stressed that all these processes are processes of 
knowledge acquisition. Often neglected, even the economic concept of competition-sometimes 
interpreted as resembling a Darwinian process-has been understood as a discovery procedure. 865 All 
biological, psychological and cultural evolutionary phenomena should be explainable as a leaming 
process of blind-variation-and-selective-retention. As evolution is regarded as a process of exploring 
possibilities, as a process of leaming, first in the biotic, tl1en in the mental and the cultural sphere, 
Darwinian Process Epistemology more than other epistemologies is conflated with ontology. Ontogeny 
in its broadest sense is knowledge acquisition. Ontology is Epistemology and vice versa. 
In my opinion such an argumentation could be taken as an exan1ple for a tendency of Darwinism to 
undenlline and transcend its own materialistic roots. Here process Darwinism suddenly looses it affinity 
to traditional mechanistic materialism and rather resembles a neo-Platonic, a Christian or a Schellingian 
idealism, where nature is understood as a process of 'intellectual' unfolding. As will afterwards appear, 
I share a view of evolution as intellectual process. Correspondingly, how the epistemological problem of 
induction may bear on ontological questions is discussed. Nevertheless, I will also stresses the 
differences of ontological strata and an unfolding of the process of unfolding itself Darwinian 
processes, although important concepts, in my approach are not understood as the final solution to our 
themy of knowledge. 
Nevertheless an equation of ontology and epistemology raises fundamental problems. This is especially the case in a 
Darwinian framework, where biological, psychological or cultural knowledge is a Darwinian adaptation and blind 
adaptation to an external environment is knowledge. Such an approach would tend to dismiss anything which does not aim 
at short-term survival, but at sustainable survival because short-sightedness is a defining aspect of Darwinism. Moreover, if 
survival is made the only yardstick moral and aesthetic reasons would not be appreciated as autonomous as they should be. 
A position with such inclinations is I think neither true nor-to fornmlate it in a self-refuting way-adaptive. Finally, we 
should not forget the disastrous example of the Nazis, who claimed that everything is true which is adaptive for the race, 
justifying an anti-intellectual and anti-religious attitude and a racist selection progrmmne. Hence, I think tl1at if 
epistemology and ontology are equated, the further characterisation of such an 'epistemontology' would be vital. 
In the following sub-sections two prototypic examples of Darwinian Process Epistemology will be 
elaborated. One is in the psychological and one in the cultural area, that is operant conditioning and 
864 St. Toulmin. Human Understanding (1974), pp. 394-406. :>pp. 229 (especially on Popper). 
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Popper's falsificationism. As we have seen already and as we will see in the next section there are also 
other ways how Darwinism has been applied in different subject areas 866 There is not only a complex 
unit of selection debate in biology, but also one in process-Darwinian branches of psychology and of 
cultural science. 
However, the chosen exan1ples were influential and have preceded the general formulation of Process 
Darwinism by Camp bell, Dawkins, Hull and Dennett. Both treatments show a different irony of history: 
Behaviourism, though built as a bulwark against biologism, paradoxically adopted Darwinian processes 
as central mechanisms. Popper advocated an actually Darwinian theory of falsification and was led by 
this very theory to attack Darwinism. 
b) Operant Conditioning- Learning as Danvinian Process? 
The conception of trial-and-error learning was introduced into psychology by Edward Lee Thorndike 
(1874-1949) and was later continued under the label of operant (or instrumental) conditioning, which 
was particularly promoted by the American psychologist Burrhus Frederic Skinner (1904-90). Operant 
conditioning, together with classical conditioning, formed the theoretical core of psychology and be-
haviour therapy during the second wave of psychological behaviourism from after World War II to the 
early 1970s. To achieve a further theoretical unification it was even considered whether classical con-
ditioning, as second pillar of the behaviourist theory of learning, could at least partly be understood as 
being reducible to operant conditioning 867 Provided that there are no additional 'higher' processes of 
learning, such a reduction would imply that trial-and-error psychology would not only be one of many 
legitimate psychological theories, but only the very core of the psychology of learning and hence of 
psychology as whole. 
In the present section I want to point out three parallels between trial-and-error-psychology and 
Darwinism. Firstly, the mechanisms proposed are strikingly similar. Secondly, both schools are in a 
similar respect tautological. Finally, I should suggest and subsequently develop, that biology in its 
future course might-despite all differences-take a historical turn as psychology has, replacing a mere 
trial-and-error theory by more complex mechanisms of learning. 
1. Behaviourism not only rejected the flourishing biologistic instinct theories but paradoxically also 
established a theory which in regard of processes could justly be called a 'Darwinian' theory 868 
The metaphysical or methodological confinement to behaviour forbade the flourishing speculations 
of philosophical schools and psychoanalyses as of physiological and instinct theories, 869 around the turn 
865 F. A. Hayek. Competition as a Discovery Procedure (1978/1968). Hayek even mentions 'a tiial and error' process of 
'cultural selection'. The Atavism of Social Justice (1978/1976), p. 67. In general :> pp. 232 f 
866 For different psychological applications of Darwinian processes see: D. T. Campbell. Evolutionary Epistemology, 
(1974), pp. 422-327. 
867 See e. g.: J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich. Lern- und Gedachtnispsvchologie (1977), pp. 55-60 
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of the century. A rigorous or even rigid scientific standard was established which made it possible to 
show that based on trial-and-error learning even animals like dogs, pigeons and rats were not completely 
driven by instincts, but could to a large extent modify their behaviour due to a given environment. But 
as behaviourism restricted itself only to the external, i. e. directly observable behaviour m a given 
situation, the internal became neglected. In principle any first person account was excluded. Moreover, 
although operant conditioning complemented classical 'respondent' conditioning and hence seemingly 
was concerned with a more active aspect of behaviour, this theory was still placed within the 
behaviourist framework of the 'empty organism' and was actually limited to simple, rather passive 
processes 870 Despite advanced experimental designs the construction of more complex inner 
mechanisms, whether inherited or learned, actually became neglected. The only learning process that 
remained after the dust of the earlier theoretical turn10il had settled was trial-and-error learning. 
Trial-and-error learning resembles the Darwinian two step process of blind-variation-and-selective-
retention. In trial-and-error learning the trials, like mutations, could be broken down into small units, 
which retain their identity871 A pigeon in a 'Skinner box' which needs to push a button to get food 
shows a variety of different trials in a random way. This corresponds to the first step of the Darwinian 
process, the process of blind-variation. 
It is assumed that any behaviour (here the pushing of a button) correlated e. g. with food will be 
reinforced-only, of course, if the pigeon is hungry or, empirically speaking, if it had been deprived of 
food. Generally it is argued that behaviour which has an approximately simultaneous positive outcome 
is reinforced, i. e. it becomes more probable to occur again. The trials which failed to have such effects 
tended to become ex-tinct, like less favoured genes or species. This aspect of trial-and-error learning 
corresponds to the selective-retention step of natural selection where different trials are selected 
according to their adaptation to a given environment. The theory of operant conditioning-like Dar-
winism-stringently advocates that the 'evolution of individual behaviour' takes place in a gradual way 
and in this respect differs, for example, from Gestalt-psychology. 
In the same way that biological Darwinism has emphasised that the Procrustean law of natural 
selection is in a Newtonian way universal and immutable throughout nature, proponents of psychology 
based on operant conditioning-with only little reservation872-have also tended to advocate an 
exhaustive applicability of trial-and-error-learning equally for flatworms, rats and humans. 
868 This has also been stressed by the recent tide of process-Darwinism: H. Plotkin. Darwin Afachines and the Nature of 
Knowledge (1995/1994), pp. 73 f., D. Campbell. Epistemological Roles for Selection Theory ( 1990). 
869 E. g. B. F. Skinner. The Behavior of Organisms ( 1938), pp. 4, 44. Contingencies of Reinforcement ( 1969), pp. 75-78. 
870 
"I do not mean that there are no originating forces in spontaneous behavior but simply that they are not located in the 
environment. We are not in a position to see them, and we have no need to." B. F. Skitmer. The Behavior of Organisms 
(1938), p. 20. 
871 B. F. Skililler. The Behavior of Organisms (1938), p. 33. Contingencies of Reil!(orcement ( 1969), p. I 06. 
872 Idem. The Behavior [!(Organisms (1938), p. 442. 
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Thorndike's approach finally ftmdamentally resembles Darwin's treatment of phylogenetic purpose, 
moving the explanation of an adaptation from the future to the past and abandoning the original 
meaning of concepts "like purpose, intention, expectancy, or utility"873 
Nevertheless it may of course be objected that the outlined analogy is not valid in every respect For example the 
·extinction' of a behaviour is not as irreversible as the final extinction of a species. 
2. Both psychological trial-and-error learning and biological natural selection have been criticised for 
being tautological in a similar respect. 
One ofthe main claims of the DarNinian research tradition is that natural selection leads to 'the sur-
viva/ of the fittest'. It has often been pointed out that this claim (not natural selection as a whole) has re-
gularly been understood in a tautological way, because fitness is naturally defined by survival: The ulti-
mate test for the fitness of an entity (gene or organisms etc.) is whether it survives. But such a definition 
leads to the proposition that the survivor will survive, an indeed undemably true but empty tautology. 
To avoid this problem alternative definitions of fitness have also been proposed. Fitness for example 
could be defined by the probability of long term survival. In this case the clain1 'survival of the fittest' 
will no longer be tautological-but also no longer always true. Short term adaptations do not imply long 
term adaptations. The dinosaurs became extinct, and humans try to achieve the same result today. The 
charge of tautology needs to be taken seriously. 
This does not imply that the claim that a Danvinian two step algorithm leads to evolutionary change is tautological 
Nevertheless, I think that strict (but non-tautological) pan-adaptionis!TI-------<iespite claims of many Darwinians---could not be 
warranted. (On the tautological aspects ofDarwinism, :>pp. 330 f.) 
I11 operant conditioning an analogy to the tautology of 'survival of the fittest' could be found in 
Thomdike's law of effect or Skinner's principle of reinforcement: "If the occurrence of an operant its 
followed by presentation of a reinforcing stimulus, the strength is increased. "874 The likelihood or 
strength of a behaviour is increased if it becomes reinforced. But the explanans is in turn defined by the 
explanandum Reinforcement is nonnally defined by an increased likelihood or strength of a shown 
behaviour. The resulting proposition 'the likelihood of a behaviour is increased, if the likelihood of a 
behaviour is increased' is once more logically true, but not helpful. If the likelihood to be (here of a 
behaviour) is equated with survival than this claim becomes structurally similar to the above claim of 
'the survival of the survivor'. 
Nevertheless, besides their mere different level of application, other differences between both claims remain. The 
proposition 'the likelihood of a behaviour is increased, if the likelihood of a behaviour is increased' is not the direct but 
rather the dynamic and probabilistic equivalent of 'the survival of the survivor'. But to use the terms 'increase' and 
'likelihood' may not make an essential difference and also 'survival of the fittest' might be understood in a dynamic and 
probabilistic way. 
It appears to be more relevant that fittest seems to refer to the past, present or future, whereas reinforcement seems to 
refer the past and present only. Furthermore the superlative 'fittest' has an emphatic connotation of the very best, which is 
873 Idem. Contingencies of Reinforcement ( 1969), p. I 06. 
874 Idem. The Behavior of Organisms (1938), p.21. 
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less so in the case of the law of effect. Finally, the law of effect often treats the probability of one behaviour, whereas 
'survival of the fittest' treats the differential survival of different entities. 
If the mentioned differences turned out to be essential, then the discussed propositions could not both completely he 
tautological. Despite this problem, I hope to have shown that both claims have, at least partly, to be interpreted as an 
tautology of the 'survival of the survivor'. Further comparative investigations are needed. 
In the field of operant conditioning attempts have also been made to avoid the charge of tautology 
and to re-defme reinforcement 875 I am not going to discuss these altemative definitions, but I would tend 
to suggest that some of them may mirror the chances and problems of the refined definitions introduced 
to avoid the mentioned biological tautology. 
3. I finally want to suggest that Darwinism may follow the fate of trial-and-error theory to be 
complemented or replaced by a different paradigm which allows also less blind and more complex forms 
of learning or evolving. 
We have seen that the theory of operant conditioning while denying biologism paradoxically 
introduced the blind and gradual Darwinian mechanism into psychology. The theory of operant 
conditioning stayed dominant in psychology till the early 1970s and often was advocated as a universal 
(ubiquitous and unchanging) explanation of teaming. Also in this respect it resembled the orthodox 
Darwinian claims to provide a universal explanation ofbiological 'learning'. 
But already while still being orthodox the theory of conditioning-like Darwinism-kept being 
challenged by remammg heterodox schools, like, for example, Piaget's stucturalist developmental 
psychology. 876 Also, for example, remaining Gestalt-psychologists favoured a sudden process of 
understanding, an Aha-Erlebnis, and hence advocated what we may call a saltational theory of teaming 
Likewise in the history of science there are continuous disputes how far discoveries are gradual and saltational. What 
happened as the fmnous anecdotal apple fell on Newton's head or as Darwin read Malthus?877 
In psychology much of the extemal criticism was first advocated in a less radical form from within a 
transformed version of the original orthodoxy. Nevertheless (and despite the radicalisation of the 
orthodoxy by Campbell) as mainstream the paradigm of behaviourism and trial-and-error learning 
finally became replaced by the paradigm of cognitive psychology. 
Already Bandura, still rooted in behaviourism, criticised the sole behavioural 'adaptation' to an 
extemal environment and stressed a 'reciprocal detenninism' of enviromnent, person and behaviour878 
Moreover one increasingly acknowledged further complex psychological entities and processes, like 
875 H. Westrneyer. Kritik der psychologischen Unvemw!fi (1973) quoted in J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich. Lem- und 
Gedtichtnispsychologie ( 1977), pp. 115-124. 
876 E. g.: J. Piaget. The constnJction of reality in the child (1953). 
877 Darwin himself wrote of a sudden insight while reading Malthus on the 28Ul September 1838. Correspondingly it was 
often advocated Umt Darwin was an intellectual revolutionary. E. g. E. Mayr. Darwin, intellectual revolutionary (1983). 
Nevertheless even Mayr sometimes argues that "Darwin had been gradually conditioned". E. Mayr. One Long 
Argument (1991 ), p. 78. (~ footnotes 709-711) 
In my view it seems wrong both to assume that Darwin had no predecessors but only a sudden ingenious idea and to 
describe the rational combination and trm1sforrnation of theories as a mere act of' gradual conditioning'. 
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cognitive maps, the information content of situations, concept learning, metacognitions and the (rather 
teleological) concept of expectations. These concepts partly complemented, partly contradicted the stnct 
assumptions of trial-and-error psychology. Important early contributions to an initiation of a 
psychological paradigm shift have e. g. been made by R. Rescorla and E. Tolman. 
ln a similar way as after many years of dominance orthodox trail-and-error-psychology became 
questioned and replaced by an approach which also took 'higher' mechanisms into account, I think the 
biological trial-and-error theory of Darwinism might also be urged to drop its universalism and 
acknowledge a certain evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. 
In psychology there is also of course still good evidence of the simple learning processes of trial-and-
error learning, from flatworms to humans. Nevertheless, simple trial-and-error processes do not seem to 
suffice for an exhaustive explanation of all learning processes. Learning does not proceed unchanged 
from flatworn1s to humans. 
Instead of emphasising a mere paradigm shift from behaviourism to cognitive psychology, it would 
be preferable to stress that the current paradigm partly encloses older approaches and advocates the 
unfolding of mechanisms which indeed finally necessitate an almost opposed approach to learning. 
In 1949 Harlow already had shown that rhesus monkeys could 'learn the learning' and acquire new 
learning mechanisms transferable to other situations. The learning of a discrimination task at first 
proceeded gradually, but the monkeys in later experimental series showed that they had aquired the 
ability to solve a problem suddenly 'by insight'. Stressing insightful behaviour-now clearly interpreted 
as learned-has to be, interpreted as rehabilitation of the Gestalt-psychologist Kohler 879 However, here 
the apparent change of the learning process itself is remarkable. 
Kendler and Kendler have subsequently shown that young children more easily learn to identify a 
second concept if only a few properties of that concept are changed and not a full reversal shift of all 
properties is required; the converse is true for older children 880 Whereas the learning of younger 
children appears to be consistent with ordinary conditioning theory, the learning of older children 
appears to require an additional theory of mediation, which is maybe based on, but is not, I think, 
reducible to this original theory. It has also been shown that not all animals that could be conditioned 
are capable of such reversal learning; for example M. E. Bittermarm 'has shown recently that some 
species of fish are not capable of reversal learning. 
If such a perspective of an unfolding manifold of learning mechanisms were extended to all acknow-
ledged mechanisms of cognitive psychology (in a way in part opposed to the original behaviourist con-
cepts), the theory of universal trial-and-error learning would not be replaced but transcended by a theory 
878 A. Bandura. The self system in reciprocial detem1ination (1978). Quoted in H. M. Traulner. Lehrbuch der 
Entwicklungspsychologie (1991), pp. 140-145. 
879 H. F. Harlow The fomwtion of leaning sets (1949). See e. g.: J. Bredenkamp, W. Wippich. Lem- und 
Gedachtnispsychologie (1977), pp. 154-157. 
880 T. S. Kendler; H. H. Kendler. An ontogeny of optional sh(ft behavior ( 1970). 
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of the learning of learning. Trial-and-error-mechanisms may be existing simple learning mechanisms, 
but this would not be the end, but the beginning of a theory of learning. In the further course of this 
work I am going to argue that biological Darwinism might be similarly transcended by a more truly 
evolutionary metaphor of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. (~ pp. 353 f.) 
c) Popper's Falsificationism- Science as Danvinian Process? 
Sir Karl Raimund Popper's (1902-1994) falsification theory of knowledge in some respects 
resembles a Darwinian process. The process of conjecture and refutation turns out to be a process of 
blind-variation -and-selective-retention. 
Apart from Popper's approach other recent metascientific works are also based on a metaphor of biological evolution. 
According to Toulmin scientific disciplines evolve like biological species. But I think closer scrutiny shows that the bio-
logical analogy to Toulmin's approach would rather be Lamarckism than Darwinism. Richards who, in the wake of Camp-
bell, proposes a selectionist view for the historiography of science, only uses Darwinism as a loose analogy. In my under-
standing his metaphor would have to be located somewhere between what I call Lamarckism and Darwinism. 881 
Basing his position on the Humean problem of induction, Popper in Logik der Forschung (1934) 
criticised the prevailing view that science is fundamentally inductive882 Alternatively he advocated his 
theory of falsification, based on the logical argument that strictly one contradiction could prove a theory 
to be wrong, whereas no theory could ever be totally verified and not even verified at all. According to 
Popper in principle there is neither a guaranty nor even a higher probability that new phenomena will 
support old generalisations. 
Popper nevertheless offered a theory of corroboration. This theory has been interpreted as re-introducing a crypto-theory 
of induction through the back door. 883 
At the latest in Objective Knowledge (1972) I think Popper also admitted that the strict argument 
derived from formal logic is not applicable; otherwise practically no theories which could be regarded as 
acceptable would be left at all. Even in the case of the prototype of a mature science, physics, its central 
theory of relativity or of quantum physics both show some anomalies 884 But Popper is not only inspired 
by this logical argument; he is also directly influenced by Darwin, whose books he had read before he 
started to write philosophical texts.s85 Popper himself advocated that the development of knowledge 
'from the amoeba to Einstein' could largely be seen as a Darwinian process. 
The "growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'; that 
is, the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, at eveiJ' moment, of those surviving so far in their struggle 
for existence; a competitive struggle which eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit. [ ... ) The tl1eory of knowledge 
which I wish to propose is a largely Darwinian theory oftl1e growth of knowledge. From the amoeba to Einstein, the growth 
881 R. J. Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (1987), pp. 578, 581, 592. 
882 K. R. Popper. lvfy Solution of Hume 's Problem of Induction ( 1974 ); ~ also pp. 208 f. 
883 I-I. Putnan1. The 'Corroboration' of Theories (1974 ), esp. pp. 222-223. I. Lakatos. Popper on Demarkation and 
Induction (1974), pp. 256, 261; :>footnotes 819,820. 
884 For critical aspects of applying Popper's logical argumentation to complex phenomena, see also: W. v. 0. Quine. On 
Popper's Negative Methodology ( 1974 ). :> footnotes 818. 
885 K. R. Popper. Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (1972), p. 67. 
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of knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our problems, and to obtain, by a process of elimination, something 
approaching adequacy in our tentative solutions." 886 
"In order to make the method of selection by elimination work, and to ensure tl1at only the fittest theories survive, their 
struggle for life must be made severe for them."887 
Popper's concept of conjecture and refutation is a Darwinian two step process of blind-variation-
and-external-elimination (~ pp. 348 f). In regard of the first step, it has often been advocated that 
Popper interprets "scientific discovery as fundamentally an accidental occurrence, a chance mutation of 
ideas"888 Those aspects which do not appear to be chance trials are due to a (blind) re-application of 
older knowledge889 In regard of the second step these blind trials are tested against nature or the real 
external world. 
Although these parallels are far reaching, I also want to mention that Popper partly stepped back: 
a) The tree of biological evolution branches more and more, growing up from one common stem, 
whereas the tree of human knowledge springs from countless roots, which tend to unite into one com-
mon stem. b) Human knowledge is regulated by the idea of truth rather than by the idea of helping us to 
survive 890 c) In the second step of the Darwinian process, the agent who eliminates is not nature, but the 
scientist or the scientific community. It is questionable whether one should equate the scientific 
community with '(natural) selection', because one may argue that than any cause for the selection of an 
entity, i. e. for its being or not being, could inappropriately be called 'natural selection' (~pp. 348 f, 
384 f). 
Hence Popper seems to be more cautious than some modem Danvinian epistemologists, nevertheless 
it is not disputable that the concept of a process of cm~ecture and refutation has mainly been inspired by 
the concept of a Darwinian process. 
It is paradoxical that Popper, in particular, imported a concept of a Darwinian process into the 
theory of science: By deriving the pivotal criterion of falsifiability in its refined form not from logic but 
from Darwinism, he cannot help applying this criterion to Darwinism itself But the Darwinian concept 
of 'survival of the fittest' often understood as 'the survival of the survivor' is at least partly tautological 
(~ pp. 226, 330 f, 340 f) and thus Darwinism did not fulfil his (Darwinian) criterion of falsifiability 
It was indeed Popper who pointed out that a ''considerable part of Darwinism is not of the nature of an 
empirical theory, but is a logical truism. "891 But as Popper wanted to build up a normative 
metascientific approach-to him theories ought to be constructed in a falsifiable way. Popperians need 
to criticise unfalsifiable aspects of Darwinism. Nevertheless I think that Popper himself based the 
nonnative aspect of his methodology on exactly the tautological belief that a 'Darwinian process' leads 
886 !bid, p. 261. 
887 K. R. Popper. The Poverty of Historicism (1957), p. 134. 
888 R.l Richards. Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theon·es of Mind and Behavior (1987), p. 576 
889 K. R Popper. Campbell on the Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge ( 1974 ). 
890 Idem. Objective Knowledge (1972), pp. 262-4. 
891 [bid, (1972), p. 69. 
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to the 'survival of the fittest'. Only on this basis could he assume that the Darwinian process of 
conjecture and refutation ultimately leads to the growth of knowledge and an approximation to the tmth. 
If alternatively fitness is not defined tautologically in terms of momentary survival, it is not guaranteed 
that natural selection implies survival of the fittest If Popper had applied this insight not only to 
Darwinism but to his own theory of theory development, the assumed best approximation of the tmth by 
a Darwinian process would, I think, have become doubtful. Thereby the descriptive basis for Popper's 
normative claim would largely have been lost. 
Lakatos may also have pointed to a similar problem when he moaned that Popper never answered the question "Under 
what conditions would you give up your demarcation criterion?"892 
Popper not only charged Darwinism with being partly tautological, but he also tried to refom1 it 
along the lines of the Baldwin effect The alterations in the executive organs must follow alterations in 
central organs. In a way he reintroduces a moderate form of orthogenesis and Lamarckism within a 
largely Darwinian framework. 893 But if this insight were transferred back to his process-Darwinian 
theory of science, a unmodified falsificationist theory would be incomplete. 
In summary, I think that the Darwinian core of Popper's own theory becomes inconsistent if his 
theory becomes applied to itself. 
7.2 Other Components of Process Darwinism 
The Darwinian processual monism was not only transferred to the fields of psychological learning 
and the theory of science, but was also applied in different ways within biology and also in other fields 
such as, for example, economics. 
a) Antibodies and Neurones 
The prototypic inner-biological field of applying a Darwinian process is evolutionary biology. The 
Danvinian process has often been applied only on one level. For example, gene-Darwinians claim that 
the gene is ultimately the only level of selection. But we have already outlined the more moderate multi-
level-approach, applying Darwinian processes on many levels, for example, on the level of groups. 
Whereas processes of Darwinian theories of evolution are normally concerned with the germ-line, in 
biology Darwinian processes of somatic selection have also been proposed, e. g. for the neural 
development and the immune system. 
From the viewpoint of universal Process Darwinism these processes will be regarded as the san1e 
algorithm or heuristic as Darwinian evolution itself, nested upon the prin1ary Darwinian process. Such 
nested algorithms evolved by chance and simply have never been eliminated. 
892 I. Lakatos. Popper on Demarkation and Induction (1974), pp. 245, 246. 
893 K. R. Popper Objective Knowledge (1972), p. 278. 
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But actually somatic theories of selection have often been opposed to pure theories of genn-line selection894 Somatic 
theories at least ontogentically are concemed with aquired characters895 Theories of somatic selection are Danvinian on a 
certain level, but might have quite non-Darwin.ian results on another. l will not discuss here whether these theories should 
hence indeed be regarded to be Danvin.ian. Only later I will generally discuss inconsistencies of an approach of nested 
Darwinian processes (~pp. 327 f.). 
In addition to his theory of selection of individual organisms Weismann after 1895 postulated a 
theory of somatic selection of cells, tissues and organs, as postulated already by Roux, and proposed a 
theory of 'Germinalselek:tion', claiming a struggle among 'determinants' for nutrition available within 
the germ plasm.896 
Here I can only briefly touch upon a Darwinian approach to the functioning of the immune system. 
The immune system for a long time was thought to work according to purely Lamarckian instructional 
mechanisms. It was thought that the immune response of the antibodies is not very wasteful but a 
flexible variable reaction informed by antigens. In contrast, the presently widely held theory of 'clonal 
selection' is normally understood along Darwinian lines. The theory was proposed by N. K. Jeme and 
elaborated by F. M. Bumet, who coined the term 'clonal selection' 897 According to this theory the 
immune system in a first step blindly produces a vast abundance of cells which produce specific 
antibodies (immunoglobulins). These cells preexist before their first antigenic encounter. If an antibody 
is 'selected' by an antigen, its mother cell becomes multiplied in a process of cloning898 EvenT. Steel, a 
main present proponent of scientific neo-Lamarckism-on the level of the organism-, advocates 
somehow a somatic selection theory on the level of the antibodies. 899 
However, following process-Darwinism this secondary algorithm of an inunune 'reaction' is 
identical with and iterating the primary algoritlm1 of evolution, i. e. natural selection. 
b) Danvinian Economics? 
The structural similarity of some aspects of neo-classical economics and neo-Darwinian biology has 
recently been newly acknowledged. 900 
In our historical treatment we already came across structural similarities of (neo-)classical 
economics and (neo-)Darwinian biology. Such resemblances appeared to be due partly to a direct 
historical interaction of Darwinian biology with Smithian, Malthusian and Friedmanian economics, and 
partly to an independent yet similar development of both subjects, growing in a similar intellectual 
894 E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. Lamarck 's Signature (1998), e. g. p. 101. 
895 P. Medawar and Bumet were awarded the No bel price in 1960 for the discovery of' aquired inununological tolerance'. 
896 E. Mayr. Weismann and Evolution ( 1985), p. 321. 
897 See: F. M. Bumet. The Clonal Selection Theory of Acquired Immunity ( 1959). E. l Steele, R. A. Lindley and R. V. 
Blanden give a historical sketch. Lamarck 's Signature (1998), pp. 95-102, esp. 95. 
898 It might be questioned whether this 'selection' should properly be called 'natural' or extemal, because the organism 
itself actively contributes much more than in nonnal natural selection to create this process ( :> pp. 384 f). 
899 ~ p 148. 
900 See some critical comparisons, e. g. of: E. L. Khalil. Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1992); G. M. 
Hodgson. Economics and Evolution ( 1993). 
Part JII. Chapter 7: Process Darwinism in Particular Subject Areas 233 
environment on the same fertile Newtonian soil. Here I shall give only a simplified, idealised account of 
these comparisons(~ pp. 173 ff., 197 f.). 
Economists following in Smith's wake of classical economics till today mostly applied what I called 
the 'principle of egoism' on the level of individuals and favoured unrestrained competition. Individuals 
strive and even ought to strive only to maximise their own benefit. Darwin adopted the principle of 
egoism in his middle period and likewise applied it on the level of single organisms. 
Darwin first conceived his concept of natural selection as he read Malthus' Essay on the Principle of 
Population. Malthus' influence on Darwin has been much discussed. The Darwinian concepts of 
unconstrained growth of population, of scarcity of recourses, and of struggle for life definitely owed 
much to Malthus, who also counts as one of the founders of neo-classical economics. Although Malthus 
also firmly advocated that dependent "poverty ought to be held disgraceful "901 , he like Smith still 
optimistically held that egoism, competition and struggle would finally lead to the good of all and not 
only to the survival of the fittest 902 Notwithstanding such differences, I have shown earlier that some 
parallels of classical economics with Darwinian economics remain to be striking. 
With few exceptions the application of the principle of egoism on the level of the individual (or of the household) 
dominated mainstream economics since Smith. This was consolidated by the rise of neo-classical economics after 1870. But 
other explanatory levels had also been proposed. In economics there is an old 'unit of explanation' or even 'unit of 
selection' debate. Even a substantial autonomy of macroeconomics has been proposed, e. g. by Keynes. Additionally a 
macroeconomic approach resulted naturally from new methods like national income accounting903 
In the 1970s the microfoundationalist approach was advocated with new vigour and for a while 
forced back the concept of a certain autonomy of macroeconomy. Friedman, without taking a biologistic 
stance, has explicitly adopted the central concepts of natural selection, competition and survival of the 
fittest from Darwinian biology as building blocks of his microfoundationalist approach. Specifically he 
shared with gene-Darwinians a Panglossian brimming with natural selection, which led him to his 
normative demand of severe competition (~ p. 197) Similarly Hayek-though not strictly a neo-
classical economist-strongly emphasised the universal necessity of competition and even also 
mentioned a trial-and-error process of cultural selection. Moreover he demanded the abandoning of the 
'atavistic concept' of social justice. 865 Becker and Hirshleifer-inspired by gene-Darwinism-have 
advocated an account of the biological evolution of the 'rational economic man', providing the 
bridgehead for the 'principle of egoism' and the maximisation of profit, as is predicted by neo-classical 
. 904 
econormcs. 
901 R. Mal thus. Essay on the Principle of Population ( 1798, 1st ed.), p. 85~ ~pp. 174 f. 
902 P. J. Bowler. Malthus, Darwin and the Concept of Struggle (1976). For more ~footnote 697. 
903 G. M. Hodgson. Economics and Evolution ( 1993), pp. 236 f, 259 f. 
904 G. S. Becker. Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiology (1976). Hirshleifer, J.~ Economics 
from a Biological Viewpoint (1977). Natural Economy versus Political Economy (1978). Evolutionary Models in 
Economics and Law: Cooperation and Conflict Strategies (1982). See: G. M. Hodgson. Economics and Evolution 
(1993), pp. 28-31. 
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But let us step back for a moment. Not every 'evolutionary economics' is necessarily Darwinian 905 
Many seemingly Darwinian approaches may only have been inspired by certain aspects of Darwinism, 
but, according to our stricter defmition of a Darwinian Process, should not properly be called 
'Darwinian' economics. 
We should distinguish two different Darwinian approaches to economics. There is one Darwinian 
economics which is biologistic and focuses on the biological nature of humans (this theory is a 
component of universal biological Darwinism) and another Darwinian economics which focuses on the 
Darwinian process of natural selection (a component of Process Darwinism). 
It is possible and even probable that the predictions of these two types of Darwinian economics are 
not compatible. Biologistic Darwinism may result in a psychology where rationality is understood as 
being adapted to stone age conditions, whereas an economics of process Darwinism in some versions 
presupposes a perfectly rational optimising economic agent as a conditio sine qua non (:> pp. 327 f). 
If theories of economic Darwinism are scrutinised more closely interesting problems arise. Are we 
indeed concerned with an irrational trial-and-error-mechanism? Is there an equivalent to blind overpro-
duction of economic products, agents and firms? What entity has to be regarded as selector? Is the 
selector 'natural'? Should we call selection by humans exogenous, like Darwinism claims that natural 
selection is exogenous? Which entities are the w1its of economic evolution, genes, individuals, social 
groups, firms, global companies or countries? Is economy in some regards autonomous from the biotic 
world? 
It is even questionable whether 'real existing capitalism' could be interpreted in a Darwinian way. E. g. the tendency to 
build global companies may contrarily be interpreted as a tendency to build large co-operative and pla1med entities. 
It is not within the scope of this work to discuss these problems of Darwinian economics separately, 
but in part IV a general discussion of universal Darwinism will be given.906 
Darwinism-in a historical variety of meanings-combined with several different ideologies has actually influenced 
econmnics and politics in many more ways than could have been mentioned here. 907 In the present section we were only 
concerned with the interaction of Darwinism with neo-classical economics. 
In this context it also should be mentioned that in politics Thatcherism and Reaganomics was inspired by Friedman, 
who explicitly had imported some central concepts from Darwinism ( :> pp. 197 f., also pp. 1 80 f.). 
Also later after the collapse of the 'real existing socialism' in Eastem Europe the only remaining utopia seemed to have 
been the harshening of the economic struggle for existence on all levels. According to the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, countries, primarily in the Third World and East Europe, during the early 1990s 'liberalised' 
some hundred economic laws 908 I do not intend here to argue tl1at this was plainly wrong. But since then even known ad-
vocates of a market economy have pointed out that this predominant tendency may go to far and that a totally unconstrained 
capitalism and a resulting pauperisation of large parts of the society may become tl1e true enemies of an 'open society' 909 
905 G. M. Hodgson provides a classification of a variety of different approaches to evolutionary economics: Economics and 
Evolution (1993), pp. 39 ff. 
906 For a biologically informed critique of economic Darwinism: G. M. Hodgson, Economics and Evolution (1993). pp. 
234-250. E. L. Khalil, Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1993), pp. 36-57. 
907 P. J. Bowler ( 1988, 1984), J. C. Greene (1977/1981 ), M. Hawkins (1997), R. Hofstadter (1955); :> footnotes 439-442. 
908 Spiegel. Allein der Markt regiert (1996), p. 85. 
909 G. Soros, a Hungarian multi-millionaire, formerly influenced by Popper, now criticises boundless capitalism. Die 
kapitalistische Bedrohung (1997). See also a reply of C. C. v. Weizsacker, Die populistische Herausfordenmg ( !997), 
who also acknowledged parallels of economics and Darwinism, but criticised a still exaggerated welfare ideology. 
-----------------------------------
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Conclusion - the Universal War of Entities 
Worse than the worst of Hobbes' dreams, the wonderfully simple metaphysics of Universal 
Darwinism forces us to believe in an ontology of total war. Entities are by definition egoistic and strive 
to outstnve each other. Panglossism is explained by Panbellicism. The reason for any apparent harmony 
is an eternal and omnipresent struggle, a truly bellum omnium contra omnes. 
Two types of Universal Darwinism have been proposed: Universal biological Darwinism (biologistic 
Darwinism) reduces all entities and processes of culture to Darwinian biology. In its most radical gene-
Darwinian version genes have replaced God as the puppeteer, pulling the strings from within our bodies. 
Universal Process Darwinism-on which we have focused in the present part-has a slightly richer 
ontological inventory. There are not only genes, but possibly also genomes, gene-pools, organisms, 
groups and species; and even cultures, theories and economic firms may be accepted as causal agents. 
Nevertheless there is only one mechanism: blind-variation-and-ex."temal-retention (~ p. 349). The 
relentless struggle continues on all existing levels. The existence of entities even appears to be defined 
by the their egoistic struggle for life. Other entities are mere means and sometimes not regarded to be 
essentially real. Antibodies, organisms, the economic man, but also friends, ideas and theories are all 
fighting only for their own survival. 
Whether biologistic or process Darwinism, it seems tl1at Darwinism has replaced tl1eism as a 
universal explanation: everything exists not because of God's creation, but because of the eternal 
unchangeable mechanism of natural selection. 
It seems hopeless to try to transcend the state of nature culturally, because either culture essentially 
does not exist, or culture is condemned to work according to the same brute and blind mechanism. 
Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, dressed in a more respectable Newtonian mantle, seem to celebrate their 
ultimate victory. Will and life are blind and the world is necessarily and exhaustively bad (or 'value-
free'). From a more traditional viewpoint it appears that existence is indeed a mistake and we are living 
not in the best, but in the worst of all possible worlds. 
The blind and irrational aspect of life are now declared to be universal; neither in nature nor in 
culture a preordained, rationally and ethically ordered logos remains. The romantic urge for unification 
( ~ p. 193) which challenged Des cartes' dualism is now not formulated in the way of traditional 
idealism or traditional life philosophy, but in a materialistic, mechanistic and largely atomistic way. The 
long-accepted Cartesian cultural compromise had been based on the contrast of machina mundi and 
alter deus: of an atomistic and causal world of physics and biology, and a teleological world of culture, 
ethics and purpose. As historically sketched the modem alter deus, the free human subject, finally has 
become incorporated into the mechanistic vision of machina mundi. The enom10us project of tile 
Christian disenchantment of Nature(:> p. 80) has not only achieved the eradication of polytheism, but 
Also e. g.: The Group of Lisbon. The Limits of Competition (1995). 
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finally turned against Christianity itself and even against the remaining secularised humanism. Gene-
Darwinism and even process-Darwinism may be seen as the final nails in the coffin of the free alter 
deus. According to modem gene-Darwinism, humans are nothing but gene-machines. Even according to 
the already much more moderate process-Darwinism nature and culture are blind by definition. 
Even today Universal Darwinism is, in my opinion, paradoxically sustained by the theistic concept of 
universal laws, eternal ideas of God. Whereas the Darwinian blind understanding of evolution 
undermined any essence and purpose, gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism are surprisingly them-
selves based on the almost last remaining island of Platonic statics, on a probabilistic but itself etemallv 
unchangeable mechanism, natural selection. As it was in the beginning, it is now, and ever shall be: a 
world of unrestrained and ruthless competition. 
In this part we were concerned to develop versions of Universal Darwinism, not at least to make it 
accessible, disputable and worth attacking. A mere stigmatisation of these approaches would ignore 
their positive aspects, which may even partly serve as seeds to transcend this paradigm itself It would 
indeed be an tribal conception of science to think simply of two opposed theoretical camps fighting 
against each other. There is a dynamics of theories, where we indeed have to decide what theory we 
prefer, but thesis and antithesis are not only opposed, but often mutually dependent. Moreover the 
intentions of developing a theory may sometimes differ from its final implications. 
Even gene-Darwinism, the pinnacle of Darwinian materialism, mechanicism and reductionism, could, in my view, be 
seen as a turning point towards a metaphysics based rather on information than on matter. TI1e infonnation of genes, not 
their incorporation by particular molecules is crucial to gene-Darwinism (~ pp 250 f.) 
Although in this part we aimed at developing a metaphysics of Darwinism we have already found 
some cracks within this position. These inconsistencies are more systematically treated in part IV. As 
the different approaches inspired by Darwinism have fortified each other, I think the criticisms uttered 
in different subject areas may also support each other. 
Part IV: Transcendence of Gene-Darwinism and Universal Darwinism 
Part ~V: Transcendence of GeneaDarwinism 
and Universal Process Darwinism 
"A civilisation which cannot burst through its current abstractions is doomed to sterility 
after a very limited period of time" 
237 
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (1926/1925) 
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A Critique of Universal Darwinism, covenng particularly gene-Darwinism but also process-
Darwinism,910 needs to be written. This became clear as much from the unbearable ethical tendencies, 
which these world views appear to have, as from their inconsistencies,911 such ·will be addressed 
systematically in the course of this fourth part. A first account will be given of how these metaphysical 
frameworks should be transcended. It appears to me that the current scientific and philosophical 
discourse concerning Universal Darwinism, though in some respects quickly progressing, in others is 
trapped by a set of mutually supporting asswnptions, which need to be challenged in paralleL if a 
preferable theoretical position should be reached. 
I use the term 'transcend' (from Latin transcendere, to go beyond) to indicate that my criticism 
methodically does not start the discussion from an alternative viewpoint, but from within the 
metaphysics of Universal Darwinism. By criticising these dangerous, but also unifying and innovating 
ideas from within, we still try to go beyond this position. 
I am also using the old-fashioned word 'transcend' to indicate the belief that by attacking the 
metaphysical system of Universal Darwinism we may also learn something from traditional meta-
physical systems. I am advocating this without approving a generally backward-looking approach. New 
problems often do need to be solved in new ways, but after much of the metaphysical lumber had been 
cleared out by analytical philosophy (at least in the English-speaking world), two points, I think, should 
be realised. Firstly, the remaining scientific world view-as it also becomes clear in this work-itself is 
based on some highly general, empirically not directly testable, and in this sense metaphysical as-
sumptions(~ e. g. pp. 11 f.). Secondly, also some concepts have been abandoned, which we require to 
resist a metaphysics of Universal Darwinism. While we should try to retain the achieved clarity of 
analytical philosophy, I think, we should realise again that we are only 'dwarves on the shoulders of 
giants'; but surely these dwarves-we-now have to try to see further than the giants have ever seen 
before. 
This present criticism of mine will focus on two main classes of reductionism, which have been 
shown to be at the very heart of the two strands of Universal Darwinism (:> pp. 203 f.), specific types 
of substance reductionism and process reductionism. 
Gene-Darwinism, today's most radical fonn of Universal Biologistic Darwinism, has been char-
acterised by an extreme biological substance reductionism, advocating what I have called 'gene-
atomism' and 'germ-line reductionism'. The selfish gene view of evolution is also tied to the principle of 
entity (gene) egoism. Moreover, also gene-Darwinism is characterised by a radical form of process re-
ductionism, i. e. Darwinian process-monism, according to which the process of mutation and 
elimination is the only real evolutionary mechanism. Modern nominalism indeed has reached another 
heyday(:> pp. 140 f., 191 f., 213 f.). 
910 These terms have been introduced earlier, :::> pp. 203 f 
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The other class of theories which could be subsumed under Universal Darwinism is Universal 
Process Darwinism. Universal Process Darwinism, contrary to Universal Biologistic Darwinism, allows 
the emergence of new entities like biological species, theories or economic companies, but still denies 
the emergence of new evolutionary processes. Universal Process Darwinism is hence characterised only 
by process reductionism, advocating that there is only one essential process in both biotic and cultural 
evolution, the Darwinian process of natural selection.(:> pp. 214 f.) 
In the following discussion substance reductionism and process reductionism will be criticised in two 
separate sections. Alternative accounts, which only can be outlined, are presented where they would 
replace the related types of reductionism. 
911 ~ esp. pp. 47 f., 229-235. 
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Chapter 8: Transcendence of Substance Reductionism 
In this chapter, I argue that the substance reductionism, which is employed in gene-Darwinism, leads 
to fundamental theoretical problems. 
Generally speaking, the discussion of reductionism, particularly of substance reductionism, seems to 
be a modernised version of the mediaeval Dispute about Universalia. Do general entities or tern1s (uni-
versals like 'species', 'genera' etc.) exist before and out of particular things (ante rem), do they exist in-
separably within particulars (in re), or are they mere convenient abstractions (in intellectu I post 
91° 
rem)? " 
In today's philosophy of biology this dispute is concerned with the question of the unit of selection, 
or more generally the unit of explanation. Different largely Darwinian subparadigms, as we have seen, 
employed quite different types of substance reductionism ( :> pp. 107 f.). Darwin himself during his 
middle period, at the time when he wrote the Origin, believed only in the existence of single organisms; 
only later did he put a little more emphasis on groups and even returned to a typological definition of 
species. In Fisherism, the first step towards the evolutionary synthesis, the evolutionary relevance of 
single genes and whole gene pools was advocated. Proponents of the second step of the synthesis added 
the essential importance of the phenotypic population structure. Gene-atomism and germ-line 
reductionism of gene-Darwinism, often found in sociobiology, supposes that single selfish genes are the 
sole agents of evolution, the rest are gene machines, vehicles, or mere means to the genes' end. The 
impressively meagre gene-Darwinian ontology, with which we are concerned here, claims to cover all 
apparently existing things, including complex forests outside of us, up to the moral beliefs inside us. 
To approach the critique of substance reductionism of this genetic kind, we must first discuss 
problems of (entity) reductionism in general and then get closer to the specific problems of genetic 
substance reductionism. 
8.1 Problems ofPhysicalism and Reductionism in General 
a) The Difference between Explanation and (Downward) Reduction 
If 'reduction' is defined in a very general way, some sort ofreductionism seems to be unavoidable. 
The core of the notion of reduction (Lat.: reduce re) is to trace something back to something different. 
This seems to be linked to the indispensable notion of 'explanation'. An explanation has something to do 
with restating a phenomenon in different words, which are tl1emselves understood better. 
912 A broad collection of classical and modem texts conceming the dispute about universals is: I-I.-U. Wohler. Texte zum 
Universalienstreit, 2 vol. (1994). 
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But the tem1 'reduction' in philosophy of science today is normally not used so generally. In the 
wake of logical positivism primarily downward, rather than upward or horizontal, reduction is implied. 
With this geometric metaphor I presuppose an hierarchy of complexity: from particle physics, atomic 
physics, chemistry, biology up to sociology. Within the vertical dimension it is not nonnally upward 
reduction but downward reduction that is desired, resulting in a physicalist ontology. DO\:vnward 
reductionism, here often for short 'reductionism', is the epistemological process of explaining whales by 
their parts. I use the epistemological notion of 'downward reductionism', roughly associated to the 
ontological notions of 'atomism', 'materialism' and 'physicalism'. 
Although the generally reductionist research programme has brought a gam in downward 
consistenc/13, three sorts of problems have to be faced and will be discussed subsequently. Firstly, the 
resulting physicalism provides us with an ontology which itself casts doubt on the materialistic 
assumptions on which it is built. Secondly, its premiss that whales are nothing but their elements will be 
called into question. Thirdly, genetic reductionism, although originating from the same current of 
thought comes in contradiction to strict downward reduction, and demands a different frame of thought. 
b) Problems of Modern Physicalism with Traditional Materialism 
If downward reduction (especially in its eliminative form) is strictly applied, we end up m an 
'atomistic' physicalism. If a whole is nothing but its parts, an ecosystem is nothing but its organisms, a 
society nothing but its individual members, thoughts are nothing but neuronal activity pattems, a person 
is nothing but organs, these organs ultimately are molecules, molecules are atoms, atoms are hadrons, 
and hadrons nothing but elementary particles, then we indeed would have to concede, that there is 
nothing but elementary particles. 
Such an understanding of part-whole relations seems to be the core of materialism, and particularly 
physicalism, which advocates that only microscopic physical entities (and some etemallaws of nature) 
are real. According to this view the whole is not only constituted by its parts, but it actually is its parts 
and nothing but its parts. This view has been linked to a 'billiard ball-concept' of matter, figuring 
matter as solid and independent bits. Although this concept was strongly inspired by physics, the 
confirmed concepts of modem physics (relativity and quantum physics) paradoxically have broken with 
this 'billiard ball picture'. 914 
a The 'particles' of physics are not particles in the classical sense, opposed to fields of forces, but are 
themselves entities which have properties of both particles and waves. After the problem has arisen 
that light, traditionally a wave, also had properties of a particle (Einstein), it soon became apparent 
vice versa that matter could be described by wave equations (L. V. de Broglie, E. Schrodinger) 
913 Mostly high level terms have been made consistent with low level terms. Though this is of course positive, it becomes, 
I think, one-sided if this is done at the expense of upward consistency, for example denying-without much 
resistance-the existence of whole strata, like the cognitive world (e. g. qualia). 
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Also experimentally this counter-intuitive wave-particle dualism can easily be made apparent. For 
example in two-slit experiments single electrons which have passed through slits could be detected 
individually at the end of their route (as particle), but it could also be shown that 'particles' each 
behave differently depending on whether one or two slits are open, as if each would have passed 
several slits (like a wave actually does). According to the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation 
(N. Bohr, W. Heisenberg), the orthodox view today, reality can be ascribed only to a measurement 
and the wave-particle dualism does not reflect an inadequacy in present scientific knowledge, but is 
in this sense fundamental reality. Hence, elementary 'particles' are ontologically no longer only 
understood as 'billiard balls', but also as waves and distributions of probability 915 
• The Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg) states that it is impossible to precisely specify certain 
quantities simultaneously, like the position and the momentum of a particle. In contrast to classical 
physics an electron can no longer be said to be at any precise point at any given time. The Copen-
hagen Interpretation understood tllis indeterminacy ontologically. Despite a strong opposition to this 
interpretation (A. Einstein, M. Planck) this opinion is nowadays still favoured by most physicists 915 
Q The Uncertainty Principle likewise shows (and measures) the dependence of physical facts upon 
observation. 
" The finding of new elementary 'particles' is an ongoing process. In the elinlinative-materialistic 
sense it is not clear (and even improbable) whether today's elementary particles, and hence the basis 
of our ontology, does strictly speaking 'exist'. Moreover, in principle it is not clear whether there is 
an explanatory bottom, a level of basic elements, which could ever be reached . 
., E = mc2 expresses the equivalence and, in principle, even the convertibility of energy and matter916 
• According to the theory of relativity the distinction of particles and space could not be sustained. 
Particles influence the space in which they move. 
If we accept the truth of modern physics and dismiss the 'billiard-ball' model of matter, it nlight still 
not be logically necessary to abandon materialism and (eliminative) downward reductionism as well. 
But in several respects they lose most of their intuitive appeal: 
(a) The concept of fields is not materialistic. It is doubtful if a resulting ontology, where 'matter' and 
energy are convertible and where 'matter' is not only described by particles but by waves, probability 
distributions or fields, should still be called a materialistic position. Although it is of course possible to 
stipulate the definition of matter in a new way, I think this is not reasonable from the vantage point of 
914 Similar: M. v. Sydow. A Discussion of Paul M. Church/and's Neurocomputational Perspective ( 1993 ). 
915 Cf: C. F. v. Weizsacker. A~fbau der Physik (1985), pp. 490 f. 526 f.; also e. g.: A J. Leggett. Physik. Probleme-
Them en - Fragen. Easel, Boston, Berlin: Birkhauser ( 1989), pp. 216 f.. 
916 Also the less intuitive aspect of this Einsteinian prediction recently has been confirmed. In a Stanford particle acceler-
ator a huge amount of energy was used to create matter (less than one atom). U. Sclmabel. Wamm ist etwas? ( 1997). 
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the history of thought. The concept of fields is in my understanding rather reminiscent of Antique 
hylemorphism, of the Aristotelian kind, than of pure materialism. 
(b) The concept of higher strata would not be materialistic. Proponents of the 'billiard ball concept 
of matter' will be inclined to believe that the whole is nothing but its parts. Who alternatively thinks in 
tenns of fields, forms or 'Gestalten' will presumably be rather inclined to think of whales as something 
more or something different from their parts. In this view it appears more appropriate to understand 
properties not only as being determined by the parts, but by their structure. Bohr, for example, in regard 
to two-slit experiments has always stressed the particle-wave individuality, which could not be 
decomposed into parts. This still may not be conclusive for an ontology of strata above particle physics. 
Additionally, the particularly modem physical theory of synergetics has favoured properties on the level 
of whole systems (H. Haken). It is doubtful whether a position which allows such higher partly 
autonomous explanatory levels, can still be called 'materialistic'. 
(c) Scepticism concerning the 'thing in itself is rather associated with theories opposed to 
materialism. In regard to epistemological questions materialism is at least historically correlated with 
realism. But modem physics rather appears to oppose any strong version of realism. If we accepted the 
physicalistic belief that physics is cardinal also for epistemology, then the uncertainty principle as well 
as doubts about the indivisibility of 'elementary particles' (and thus about their reality) would, I think 
support at least a limited scepticism concerning the 'thing in itself ('Ding an sich') But a sceptic 
attitude towards our empirical knowledge has particularly been a hallmark of idealism. 
(d) Matter is in an epistemological sense not simple. Materialism historically tried to base our 
philosophy on obvious experiences of the physical world. Modem physics at a first glance is a paradigm 
case for the success of a research programme of exhaustive downward reduction of complexes into 
simples. But the conception of a simple idea and of a simple ontological entity has become dissociated. 
The search for ontological simple indivisible entities actually resulted in concepts of entities which are 
epistemologically not simple, but complex in the sense of being non intuitive. In this sense materialism 
has lost the advantage of epistemological simplicity. 
(e) The actual complexity of the world casts at least a pragmatic doubt on the full feasibility of the 
materialistic research programme. Even if it would in principle be possible to explain every whole 
completely in terms of its parts, this programme of reduction might get into difficulties. Not even the 
three body problem is exactly solvable (not even in the relatively sin1ple mathematics of classical 
dynamics) and only a single drop of water contains more than a million million billion atoms. 
c) Logical Problems of the Modern Understanding of Substance- Is a Tree a 
Million Matches? 
The scientific question of reductionism in the 21st century is bound up with very old philosophical 
difficulties, concerning the concepts of substance and accident. The concept of substance had already 
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been central in Antique and scholastic philosophy. In its Cartesian twist it became crucial to the modem 
era. Today the concept is still with us, for example, in the search for elementary particles or single 
'egoistic' genes. 
Substance traditionally has been regarded as (the concept of) a being which does not need another 
(concept of a) being for its own existence. A substance is unchangeable, indivisible and independent. It 
is what is constant and what continuously w1derlies the changing flux of phenomena. This is the core of 
the notion throughout two and a half millennia. (In a way tllis is the unchanging substance of the notion 
substance.) This is already found in Plato's concept of underlying eternal forn1s or 'ideas'. Equally 
Aristotle regards substances mainly as the underlying form (eidos) of actual beings.917 
Also Descartes' notion of substance retained these meanings, but was not W1derstood in the sense of 
causa forma/is, but more and more in the sense of causa materia/is. I will call this understanding of 
substance the 'modern understanding', because its predominance starts at the beginning of modem 
philosophy with the Cartesian notion of res extensa (although substance was still sometimes understood 
differently). The concept of res extensa led to the 'billiard ball' model of simple bits of matter and to 
downward reductionism. Now the concept of substance denotes unchangeable elements constituting a 
whole, strictly speaking, only the smallest eternal bits of matter. This modem understanding of 
substances can be spelled out as the complete immanence of properties of the whole within its single 
material parts. Elements are defined not only historically, but also logically prior to the whole, and they 
are assumed independent and not defined by the relation in wllich they are involved. In such a world 
there are, in principle, no new wholes, since there are no wholes. There are only new configurations 918 
But configurations do not have any causal impact themselves. 
Elin1inative Downward Reductionism transposes this ontological idea to epistemology. The whole 
has no own (relational) properties, which could not be explained by properties of the single elements. 
This modem understanding of substance could be regarded as the fundament of ontological or 
methodological individualism and atomism, present in many areas of physics, psychology and economy 
etc. Without getting involved in this topic in detail, this philosophy seems to me to be even embedded in 
some seemingly neutral instruments, for example classical test theory which presupposes the 
independence of all test items. In our context this modem understanding of substance has a pivotal role 
for the gene-Danvinian focus on single genes (~ pp. 140) 
In this context, the current debate, concerning the question of eliminative materialism and 
reductionism versus emergentism, fulgurationism 531 and supervenience919 is of interest, but a full 
917 Aristotle. Metaphysics. 7u' book. (It is only not clear whether this eidos is something individual or general.) 
918 L Wittgenstein. Tractatus logico-philosophicus ( 192211921), 2.027; ::> footnote 752. 
919 See, for example: E. J. Lowe. Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism (2000); J. Kim. Mind in a Physical World 
(1998); A. Beckerrnmm. Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction (1992); J. Kim. 'Downward Causation' ill 
Emergentism and Nonreductive Physicalism (1992); R. v. Gulick. Nonreductive Materialism and the Nature of 
Intertheoretical Constraint ( 1992 ). W. Krohn, G. Ki.ippers ( ed. ). Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, 
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treatment of this lively dispute, mainly concerned with the mind-body problem, would have extended the 
scope of this work. Moreover, it appears to me that most disputants unanimously start from a modern 
understanding of substance (as causa materia/is) and only discuss whether systemic properties are 
acceptable on this basis. Often the presupposition that there are constituting elements is not questioned. 
Instead it is only considered whether there are emergent properties, what character such properties 
might have and whether they could have causal relevance (downward causation) 920 
My discussion of this problem starts from the opposite direction. It is not the possibility of the 
existence of emergent properties, but the possibility of the exclusive existence of basic elements (sub-
stances in the modern sense) that is questioned. But, first I have to make clear why there is a problem at 
all because the intuitive concept of emergent properties appears questionable, of one starts with the 
modern understanding of substance. 
Emergent properties prima facie appear to be unproblematic. If elements are combined, they might 
form new relations and we might experience a new phenomenon. Tllis holds for all sorts of subject 
areas. For example, if two people meet, they have the possibility of chatting; but-w1Surprisingly-
neither of them could (if they are sane) chat on their own. 
This has also been stressed by synergetics, a new school or discipline of physics, which in my 
opmton implicitly modifies the modem understanding of substa.nce921 We take one class of the 
ontologically simplest bits of matter as an example. Three quarks (or antiquarks) could form a hadron 
(or antihadron), the smallest compound bits of matter. An example of a hadron is a proton or a neutron. 
The system of a hadron has the property to be in different energetic states, although the single 
elementary particles do not have this property 922 On the next level of complexity, an atom, built by up 
to 350 constituting parts (protons, neutrons, electrons), has again many new properties. New properties 
may not only emerge by adding new elements to the system, but also if a mere relational change of an 
identical set of elements occurs 923 This becomes apparent e. g. in the different prope1ties of physical 
isomers (nuclei, which are identical in regard of their number of protons and neutrons, but have a 
different radioactive decay) or in chemical isomers (molecules, which consist of the same chemical 
elements, but whose atoms are arranged differently). But the phenomenon of structural properties seems 
Organisation zmd Bedeutung ( 1992). J. Kim. The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism ( 1989); P. Bieri. ( ed.) Analytische 
Philosophie des Geistes ( 1981 ); J. A. Fodor. Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a W01*ing Hypothesis) 
(1974). 
920 But, for example, ~ footnote I 02 9. 
921 H. Haken is the nestor of synergetics. See his Synergetics, Nonequilibrium Phase Transitions and Self-Organisation in 
Physics, Chemistry and Biology (1983). There is also a Springer series on synergetics published by him. K. Stierstadt, 
Physik der .Materie ( 1989), is an excellent textbook on physics in general, written from the viewpoint of synergetics. 
922 Epistemologically hadrons are even prior to quarks, not that they have been known earlier, but in the sense that Quarks 
could never be observed themselves. We only observe that hadrons get into different energetic states and infer the 
existence of quarks, because we have to assume an internal structure of these hadrons. 
923 Moreover, one could distinguish two types of properties of a system: 'collective' properties, which build an average of 
the properties of the parts (e. g. compressibility of an ideal gas), and' co-operative' properties, which are mainly 
determined by a certain interaction of the parts (e. g. polarizability). 
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Entity Reductionism (Physicalism, Gene-Atomism, Germ-Line-Reductionism) 246 
to be even more general. I think, one might also conceive phase transitions m this way, e. g. the 
transition of H20 from ice to water to gas, or in principle also any chemical reactions. In all cases the 
elements remain (broadly) the same, only energy changes. Elements primarily change partners or change 
their structural position, but this results in completely different properties. 
The appearance of new phenomena seems to be too obvious to be clisputed, but the crucial question 
is how to explain the nature of these phenomena. 
Eliminative materialism or downward reductionism can be seen as ontological or epistemological 
expressions of a position, both of which advocate ( 1.) that in principle there is nothing new924 and (2.) 
that apparently 'new' phenomena should be theoretically completely explainable by their old elements. 
According to this conception society is nothing but its individual members and humans are finally 
nothing but basic material elements. 
Dawkins, distinguished radicaliser and populariser of a gene-Darwinian biology, but philosophically not particularly 
well versed, apparently regards downward reductionism as the only possible fom1 of explanation925 
( 1.) The first of the above assumptions about the impossibility of newness could be stated in 
different words. The actual and changing world is not the real World based on eternal substances. This 
still mirrors the Platonic concept of eternal ideas (iMcn) and the scholastic clistinction of a changing 
world (mundus sensibilis) and a real eternal world (mundus intelligibilis). (:> p. 83) 
Although an assertion of an impossibility of newness seems quite daring-especially after we have 
shown above the intuitiveness of emergent phenomena-l think there is logically, or at least 
heuristically, an argument in favour of this view. If we equate 'new' with 'unknown', and 'old' with 
'known', then it should become obvious, that we always have to understand the unknown by the known, 
hence the new by the old. Any phenomenon which would be radically 'new', would not be 
understandable. Thus, the assumption that the new is in fact old (if we do not want to call it a miracle 
or actually give up trying to explain it) seems strangely to be a necessary precondition of any 
understanding (in a way, a truth a priori)926 Here I do not cliscuss tllis argument any further, which 
unites the traditional and modern conception of substance, but concentrate on the second position, 
which is specific to the modern conception of substance. 
(2.) The second assumption at first glance only restates aspects of the first. There is nothing new, the 
new is the old and the new has to be explained by the old elements. 
But the second assumption almost silently introduces another aspect, which I shall oppose. Now, the 
new should not only be explained generally by the old or the known, but by old or known elements. We 
again face tl1e modern understanding of substance. Substance is seen as composing bits of matter. 
Causa materia/is has supplanted causa forma/is-or, I think, one nlight also say causa relationalis. 
924 Cf.: R. Low. Die Entstehung des Neuen in der Natur ( 1984 ), p. 58. 
925 R. Dawkins. The Blind Watchmaker (198611991 ), pp. 11-15. 
926 Cf.: I. Kant. Kn.tik der rein en Vemunft ( 178111787), 'Grundsatz der Beharrlichkeit der Substanz' and A 206/B 251. 
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According to this modem understanding of substances there is eternal matter, but no eternal form or 
relation; a whole has no explanans apart from its elements. The form, the structure or the relations of 
the compounds are understood as being epiphenomena and conceptually have to be woven separately 
into each element composing that compound. Positively this makes causes locatable. But is a 
conception, according to which all phenomenal properties are reduced to separate basic elements, 
viable? 
With this question we come back to the task (instead of arguing positively in favour of higher level 
explanations) of challenging the assumption that reality is in principle understandable in terms of basic 
elements. 
In the following argument I aim to show that such a conception is not free from fundamental 
difficulties. I shall argue that it is in1possible to explain an apparent property, apparently given on the 
level of a system, only by referring to its constituent elements (substances in the modem sense), without 
making use of notions like form, relation or higher level explanations. 
If we were to collect all compounding atoms of a human, we would of course not yet have created a 
human. A supporter of causa forma lis may interpret this simple fact as support for the conception that 
not only matter but also form is a necessary causal factor. A supporter of an approach exclusively 
based on causa materialis would of course not directly surrender. Whereas the former would argue that 
the form or, here understood synonymously, the specific relations between the elements have an 
independent role in explanation, the latter would have to build the confining conditions under which a 
'higher' property appears into the concepts of each basic component. 
But if one tries to do this, an aporia of reductionism becomes apparent. The confining conditions for 
an element to produce a certain property are necessarily related to other entities, to the constellation of 
the relevant system. The properties of water become apparent only if oxygen (under certain conditions) 
builds a compound with hydrogen atoms. The relation can not be eliminated. 
A relation R is a two place predicate which has to connect at least two entities, a and b (or the 
concept of these entities). The reductionist might argue that it is possible to restate the property P of the 
relation Rab, on the side of entity a with a proposition, like 'the entity a, if in a certain relation R to b, 
has a certain property P', and on the side of entity b with the proposition 'the entity a, if in a certain 
relation R to b, has a certain property P'. 
I want to argue, that according to such a redefinition, both entities, a and b, would, against our 
intention, not be defined as substances in the strict sense any more. 
(a) As we have seen, it is a crucial aspect of the notion of a substance that it is '(a concept of) 
a being which does not need another (concept of) being for its own existence'. 
But the redefinition of the entities a and b does not eliminate the relation. The relation is still 
mentioned in the definition of the entities as a constraining condition for showing certain prope1ties. 
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Moreover, now a would even need to incorporate b within its own definition! Oxygen, for example, 
would be defmed as an entity which, if in a certain relation to two hydrogen atoms, shows the properties 
of water. Thereby, the entity a is not at all defined independently, but it is by definition related to the 
other entity b. Furthermore the entity b is in turn also related to a, and this proceeds ad infinitum This 
implies that each definition would become self-referential, since the entity which is used in the 
redefinition (a part of the definiens) is in turn related to the entity which is to be defined (the 
definiendum). Self-reference is in my view an interesting property, but it is definitely an unintended one 
from the viewpoint of a reductionist. However, the idea of the independence of the substance is not 
fulfilled. Hence, an understanding of substances as independent basic elements, appears to me generally 
to be self-refuting and inconsistent. 
(b) A second aspect of a substance is usually that it is simple. The simplicity of unrelatedness has 
been discussed above. Reductionists with only a weaker concept of substance (maybe claiming that 
alternative concepts also end up in aporia) may still refer to a prima facie appeal to simplicity. It 
appears at least epistemologically simple, if all properties are located in final elements. Although we of 
course daily make use of the concept of components (just as we make use of whales), I want to show 
that a radical application of this idea is not reasonable. Taking up the line of argument from the last 
paragraph, a thorough reductionist redefinition of entities, would paradoxically finally force us to 
incorporate the whole world into the definition of each entity. Oxygen builds compounds not only \vith 
hydrogen but with many other elements, which would have to be incorporated into our definition. Not 
enough, these compounds would have to be extended to large systems to integrate, for example, 
properties of humans, like walking or thinking, in which water definitely somehow plays a role. One 
would have to consider all such higher level properties. Even the sober biologist Mayr mentioned that a 
through reductionist account-instead of accepting emerging entities-would, strictly understood, force 
its advocates to adopt pan-psychic or hylozoic theories of matter (if they do not simply deny phenomena 
like thought) 927 It would also follow, that all elements and constraining relational conditions which are 
involved in producing such properties or processes would have to be incorporated into the definition of 
oxygen as well. In a general downward reductionist epistemology all other elements would also have to 
be defined likewise. Hence if a certain element were not yet directly part of this definition of oxygen, it 
would definitely in a secondary, tertiary etc. way (via the defmition of hydrogen etc.) be integrated. 
Hence, it follows from taking reductionism to its true conclusions that the whole world - \vitl1 all its 
elements and its higher properties - would finally have to be incorporated into the definition of each 
single element! 
Such an result would be totally opposed to the original idea sought after by the independent 
definition of basic elements. Concerned with the aspect of simplicity, we see how the apparently 
927 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982), p 64. 
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beautiful simple concept of (downward) reductionism, explaining all phenomenal properties of 'higher' 
systems in tem1s of 'lower' systems, quickly degenerates into a highly complicated and inconvenient 
philosophy. Even if it were in principle possible to transfer all properties of the known compound 
entities into the concept of elementary particles (which is of course actually not done), then these 
concepts would become loaded with an infinite bulk of conditions under which potential properties are 
shown. 
(c) Finally, it follows that the concept of the unchangeability of substances can not be sustained I 
am not concerned with our factual knowledge that hydrogen itself only becomes stable in a certain stage 
of the evolution of the universe (one may circunwent this problem by referring to currently basic 
elements). I am concerned with the rather logical problem that the relationships, which are part of our 
definition change in time, as nature, history and also our knowledge of these processes develops. For 
example, the definition of the basic components of genes, the nucleotide bases adenine, guanine, 
cytosine, and thymine, would not only have to integrate the possibility of replication, but also sexual 
reproduction (of which it builds the basis) as well as this present thought of mine. 
In conclusion, an ontology built exclusively out of single substances-in the sense of causa 
materia/is-bears huge difficulties. Three defming criteria of elementary 'substances' could not be 
sustained. Above all (a), a material substance seems not to be definable without relation to other 
entities, it could thus not said to be independent from other entities Secondly (b), the resulting view 
seems far from being epistemologically simple, and thirdly (c), the definition of a substance changes 
throughout time. 
It is not within the scope of this work to elaborate a positive alternative account on this general level. 
Here it should be enough to have pointed out that metaphysical problems weight heavily upon the 
seemingly simple modern notion of substance and its epistemological counterpart of downward 
reductionism. To assume from the outset that the whole is nothing but its parts, is at least no less 
problematic than assuming properties on the level of a system. Although not trying to elaborate an 
alternative on such a general level, in specific areas I still shall contribute in the further course of this 
work to the rehabilitation of a modified Aristotelian aetiology, by introducing some ideas which may 
help to render causa forma/is more acceptable. Nevertheless, I want already here, without making use 
of explicitly Aristotelian concepts show how the concept of downward reductionism as the only possible 
form of explanation might be transcended. 
I conceded that one may need to explain the new by the old, the unknown by the known. But given this premiss, how 
can one conceive an explanation which is not completely downward reductionist. Although (downward) reductionism is an 
in1portant way of explaining the new by the old, there are, I think, other fonns of explanation as well. 
I want to distinguish at least four types of explaining the new by the old. The first two types could be called 'analyses' 
since they are concerned with a closer scrutiny of the details of the entity in questions. Besides an (a) analysis of elements 
(downward reductionism), there is, I think, also an irreducible (b) analysis of the relations of these elements. The other two 
types of explanation may be called synthesis, since they explain by taking the larger context into account. There is (c) a 
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synthesis with analogous (external) cases and (d) a synthesis with external conditions or causes. I do not discuss whether 
these explanations are types or aspects, or whether in an analyses synthesis always plays a part and vice versa, etc. I only 
want to give an impression that there are aspects of an explanation going beyond downward reductionism. 
Additionally I give examples for each of the two latter points, which may appear more opaque. (c) Chemistry, a field 
which has often served to provide examples for downward reductionism, could also illustrate the concept of a 'synthesis 
with analogous cases'. Chemistry has not only derived its knowledge of the elements by an analysis of its components, but 
also by analogies with other elements, which had become systematised in the periodic table (186911870 by Mendeleyev 
and Meyer). Only from such analogies could 'new' elements and their properties be predicted. (d) An example for a 
'synthesis with external conditions' could be the 'Cor.iolis force'. If we must explain the direction of a whirl in a wash-
basin we could only reach a sufficient understanding, if we actually take the rotation of the whole earth into account. 
The consequences and problems of such an alternative account could not be accessed here. I only proposed this 
classification to show that there are types or aspects of explanation which are often ignored by staunch reductionists. ::>925 
d) The Inconsistency between Biologism and Physicalism- Genes or 
Information instead of Quarks? 
This section firstly sets out to show that a gene-ontological approach, despite being biologically 
downward reductive, is itself in contradiction with strict downward reductionism, i. e. physicalism. 
Secondly, the notion of a replicator is introduced as the specifically gene-Darwinian justification for 
stopping reduction at the explanatory level of selfish genes. Thirdly, closer scmtiny of the notion of a 
replicator reveals that the very notion of a replicator-against the intention of the gene-Darwinians-
undennines a materialistic account, and proposes an ontology which is built on form and infonnation as 
opposed to matter. 928 I shall argue that the resulting informational or semiotic ontology paradoxically 
undermines the inner-biological reductionism of gene-Darwinism from which this view derived. 
(1.) Biologism on the one hand is inspired by general downward reductionism, defining cultural 
phenomena in terms of biological phenomena. On the other hand biologism comes into contradiction 
with thorough downward reductionism, which would finally result in physicalism. In principle, 
downward reduction should not stop until it has reached the lowest possible level of explanation(:> pp. 
243 f.). Leaving my earlier general objections aside, taken as a general philosophy, any wholes would 
have to be determined in terms of their parts, till we reach the final a-toms, the smallest non divisible 
entity, or, still more modern, the elementary particles of physics. 
The ambivalent relation of biologism to downward reductionism also holds for gene-Danvinism as a 
prototypic biologistic approach ( ~ pp. 140 f., 191 f., 240 f.). Advocates of a gene ontology on the one 
hand are notoriously enthusiastic about substance reductionism: ecosystems, societies, gene-pools, 
organisms and genomes are regarded as mere epiphenomena, and single genes are regarded to be 
essentially the only real biological (and sociological) entities (:> pp. 42 f.; 259 f.). On the other hand 
this downward reductionist account suddenly stops at the 'bottom' of the biological sphere, at the 
explanatory level of single selfish genes. Despite a particularly strong inner-biological reductionism, this 
approach is still inconsistent with thorough reductionism. Later on, the assumption of genes as the only 
unit of explanation, denying all larger units, will be challenged (:>pp. 258 f.). Presently, we have to 
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grapple with the problem of why genes themselves are not too large as units of explanation, provided 
that one favours a downward reductionist account. 
An advocate of gene-Darwinism might object to this reproach for being inconsistent "vith thorough 
downward reductionism, that he or she still subscribes to downward reductionism, but that any 
reduction has to be done in pragmatic and viable steps. In the long rw1, the gene will also be reduced to 
biochemistry, etc. 
I would oppose such an interpretation of their enterprise, since it is apparently inconsistent with the 
claims and scientific practice of this school. I think, gene-Darwinians tmly believe in the existence of 
genes. Normally promoters of this approach, as we saw, contrast the reality of genes with the 
epiphenorninality of genomes, groups and ecosystems. This contrast would not be reasonable if genes 
were ultimately supposed to be as unreal as groups are believed to be. The entire debate concerned with 
the unit of selection would be misconceived, if in principle all levels were not real anyway, i. e. there 
would finally be no entity which is replicating or which is being selected, but only chemical reactions. 
Additionally, assuming that there were no theoretical framework in biology, it would not be obvious 
why so much attention should be given to genes, any DNA molecules. Plain downward reductionism 
should proceed continually. If one only wanted to proceed in the reductionist quest pragmatically step 
after step, one would also from time to time use levels above or below the level of single genes. 
Explanatory levels above the level of the gene (e. g. individual animals, genomes etc.) are indeed sometimes employed, 
but these explanations are consistently used as provisory or short-cut explanations only. I see also no general tendency that 
in this paradigm explanations are increasingly given on a sub-genetic level. Gene-Darwin.ians (though seldom geneticists) 
do not, of course, deny the existence of bio-chemical or subatomic reactions, but they do not focus on them. They might use 
a 'deeper' explanatory level to explain aspects of the gene-level above (for example to show how X-rays could cause 
random genetic mutations), but they will always be interested, not in the chemical reaction itself, but in the higher 
explanatory level of the survival of genes. 
If advocates of gene-Darwinism only claimed that larger units have to be explained by smaller ones, 
resulting in physicalism, and there had been a book called 'The Selfish Gene Pool', 'The Selfish 
Genome' or 'The Selfish Quark', this would presumably not have triggered the same paradigm and the 
same dispute. 
I conclude, that advocates of gene-Darwinism do attribute to genes a stronger degree of reality than 
would be justifiable on the ground of plain downward reductionism. 
(2.) Now it is our task to show that supporters of a gene-ontology might even within their generally 
reductive framework, have reason to stop reduction at the level of what is called replicators. 
Whatever such an explanation might look like, I think, one cannot deny that any such explanation is 
by definition in contradiction with an exclusively downward reductionist approach. This exception may 
undermine the downward reductionist approach and it would become more plausible that explanatory 
928 This section was first presented as a talk at the post-graduate philosophy seminar ( eldos) at the University of Durham 
under the title: Gene-Darwlnlsm, Form and lf'!{ormatlon (22"0 Sep. 1999). 
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levels above selfish genes became accepted. Still it would also be possible-albeit implausible-to 
accept only one new entity or process which could not be reduced to physics. We have to look for an 
explanation which might justify the special treatment of 'selfish genes' without already at first glance, 
being incoherent with the remaining reductionist attitude of the gene-Darwinian paradigm. 
Many gene-atomists in fact do not ponder questions of this rather metaphysical kind: why reduction 
should stop at this explanatory level, or why it is at least pragmatically convenient to stop at this level. 
They-as we have seen-usually simply proceed in this way. 
I think, the extraordinary centrality and the irreducibility of the gene in gene-Darwinism is linked to 
certain aspects of the notion of a replicator. "What is important about the gene is just that it has a 
certain combination of logical features. It is a replicator" 929 Dawkins in particular has made the 
importance of this notion explicit. I agree with Hull, that Dawkins has in this regard committed an act of 
metaphysics 930 Dawkins defines a replicator as "any entity in the universe which interacts [ ... ] in such a 
way that copies are made"931 The notion of a replicator is, I think, indeed general enough (like 
Aristotle's notion of anima), to also serve as a criterion to divide the inanimate world of physics and 
chemistry, from the animate world of biology and sociology. 
It may be odd to assume that Dawkins, a renown ardent downward reductionist, should be regarded as a defender of the 
autonomy of biology. I do not !mow, whether he ever explicitly argued in this way, but his writings, in my opinion, suggest 
that he would have to support such a view, especially his emphasis on and his definition of the notion replicator, but also 
his neglect of physical and chemical evolution. 
Anyway, given that gene-Darwinism has to justi(y ru1 explanatory level of genes above physics, I think, no other 
argument is provided by this paradigm. Hence, in my view advocates of a gene-ontology-if they were more concemed with 
these philosophical topics-would have to argue this way. 
Before we come to jusfijj; why a replicator could count as unit of explanation, not reducible to 
chemistry or physics, we should pause and consider whether the notion of a replicator might be a one-
sided starting point of an inquiry. Although the main part of this work is dedicated to criticising gene-
atomism and genn-line reductionism, I generally agree that the metaphysical (abstract and general) 
notion of a replicator is helpful for establishing the autonomy of the life sciences. Nevertheless, I 
concede that the notion of a replicator has a downward reductive leaning. 
Even if we were to adopt my later informational interpretation of a replicator as the basis for reconstructing the 
autonomy of the life sciences, we should be aware that this starting point still may have a reductionist leaning. A 
replicator-and hence of the origin of life-is nonnally imagined merely as being a molecule, presumably RNA or DNA 
The concept of a replicator is normally a single entity ru1d not a system or a part of a larger whole, say a cell. 932 A definition 
of life based on replicators not only excludes stars and volcanoes trom the animate world (a consequence we may 
welcome), it may also have a general tendency to neglect larger systems like ecosystems etc. 
1 think it would make a difference to take the notion of a metabolism as starting point for the life sciences. The Nobel 
laureate M. Eigen has proposed the concept of a hypercycle with a stronger focus on systems, on the structure of the 
phenotype and maybe even on change without proliferation. I do not want to exclude ti1e possibility, tl1at tl1e two concepts 
929 J. L. Mackie. The Law ~(the Jungle (l978), p. 459. 
930 D. Hull. Units of Evolution: A Metaphysical Essay ( 1981 ), pp. 30. 
931 R Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 67.. See: The Selfish Gene ( 1976/89), p. 15 
932 Cf. e. g.: Ch. v. Guttenberg. Biologie als Weltanschauung (1967), 63-64. 
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may be made coherent. 933 Since I am trying to transcend gene-Darwinism trom within, I only mention this slightly different 
starting point, without elaborating upon it. 
Also in regard to processes, the notion of a replicator is in my view linked with a position, which takes Darwinian 
processes at least as starting point ( ::> the following argument b) and hence might exclude a strong understanding of 
developmentalism. 
For the time being we may ignore this possible one-sidedness. Why should a replicator count as a 
unit of explanation, not being reducible to chemistry or physics? I give two answers. The first answer 
(a) would emphasise properties of whales, and is not be worked out at detail, because it somehow states 
a position opposed to downward reductionism. The second answer (b) resembles better the reasons why 
gene-Darwinians actually hold this position. The second answer, however, replaces the problem rather 
than solving it. I do not think it is necessarily inconsistent with my first one so, instead I am going to 
show that-involuntarily-it hinges on arguments of the first answer. Linked to this, it will also be 
shown why the notion of a replicator undermines a strict materialist account. 
(a) A replicator, in my view, is a system of chemical components, and relations between them, with a 
certain relation to its surrounding. Only the whole system with its relations has the property of copying 
itself Simpler entities, even, for example, 'organic' molecules do not have this property of copying 
themselves. My general critical account of radical downward reductionism has already been given, and 
does not need to be repeated here. 
(b) A replicator, in the view of gene-Darwinism, may have acquired its special status, because of its 
link with Darwinian processes (~ pp. 216 f.) 934 Despite my critical stance towards any exclusive 
Darwinian metaphysic, I have to draw attention to the fact, that the simplest notion of a replicator is, I 
think, indeed linked with the simplest notion of evolution, 1. e. Darwinian evolution. Imagine the 
simplest thinkable atomistic replicator in the primeval soup. This replicator, like every replicator, is 
defined by the process of copying. But tlus first replicator will copy either quickly or slowly, accurately 
or inaccurately, witl1 huge or little variance, and hence this process of proliferation is, I concede, as 
blind as possible (on blindness ~ pp. 358 f.). The proliferated replicators lack (nearly) any structure of 
their own and are not part of a larger whole and could, as far as it is possible, be regarded as being 
externally selected. This simple notion of a replicator leads within the limits of even our strict definition, 
to what we have called a Darwinian process(:> pp. 348 f). 
Following this line of argument, regarding the existence of a replicator as the dividing line between 
biology and chenlistry appears obvious. Gene-Darwinism, implicitly following this argument, 
accordingly regards the resulting property of evolving replicators and the corresponding process of 
natural selection as irreducible topics of biology. 
933 Cf.: R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1989176 ), his added footnote to p. 14 on p. 269. 
934 Also R. Dawkins points out (without elaborating it) that the notion of a replicator implies the notion of natural 
selection. River Out of Eden (1995), pp. xi-xii 
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Although I also want to draw this conclusion, I think that this quite Darwinian argmnent, defending 
the reality of replicators, leads it on further, and fmally undermines its own roots. The argument hinges 
on assumptions, which, if spelled out in detail, undermine the materialistic legacy of this approach. 
Firstly, even if we accepted the presupposed evidence of the existence of Darwinian processes (as I actually do) the 
above argument has only replaced the problem rather than solving it. In a regress a gene-Darwinist replaces the problem of 
the irreducibility of a replicator to mere matter in motion by the problem of the irreducibility of natural selection to mere 
matter in motion. 
Secondly, given that the notion of a simple replicator implies a Darwinian process, it does not follow that the other way 
round the existence of Darwinian Processes also implies the existence of simple replicators. This depends on how both 
notions are defined. It might indeed be reasonable to defme these notions in a way that they imply each other. A 
disadvantage of a resulting strict definition of Darwinian processes might be that drops of water and planets-also 
somehow 'evolving'-would be excluded from the scope of a Darwinian metaphysics. However, such a definition, in my 
opinion, would, surprisingly, tend to undermine Darwinian process-monism. Each new 'higher' biological object, accepted 
in our ontological inventory, while refuting pure gene-atomism, would be a candidate to undernline Darwinian process-
mon.ism as well. 
Thirdly, if we had accepted the equivalence of a simple replicator and a gene-Darwiniru1 process, the notion of a 
Darwinian Process emphasises-besides blind variation-a second step of external selection. This reference to the external 
world (though a relationship in a quite limited sense) may be cmcial to why this process could not be reduced to its internal 
parts. In my proposed classification of explanations this would be a 'synthesis with external causes' (type 4). But if this is 
the hidden reason to resist downward reduction in tllis specific case, this reference to external causes may also be necessary 
for many other explanations, undennirung downward reduction.ism generally. 
Fourthly, this kind of external relationship appears not to suffice, neitl1er to sustain the irreducibility of a replicator nor 
to characterise a replicator. External selection alone, in the mere sense of surviving or not surviving, being or not being 
(depending on the external circumstances), could also be applied (in an almost tautological way) to drops of water and 
planets. Hence, this either undermines the discussed account, or we need an additional characterisation to differentiate 
between drops of water and replicators. 
Following this line of argument, the notion of a replicator, although itself intimately linked to gene-
Darwinism, either directly undermines gene-Darwinism or requires that we find another aspect of the 
notion of a replicator, which renders genes irreducible, but does not transcend gene-Darwinism. In the 
following subsection I show that the other aspect of the notion of a replicator, the reference to the 
sameness of the copy, generally tends to undermine a materialistic approach. 
(3) In the following subsection it is shown that the concept of a replicator, which was needed to 
justify stopping the eliminative quest at the level of the gene, involves (a) the concept of a catalyst, i. e 
a concept of an entity which changes the probabilities that a certain entity emerges and involves (b) the 
concept that the copied entity could not only be described in material terms, but that the identity of the 
replicator and the replica could only suitably be described in terms of form (eidos in a very simple 
rather Aristotelian than Platonic sense) or information. 
We take Dawkins' definition that a replicator is "any entity in the universe which interacts [ ... ] in 
such a way that copies are made"931 as a starting point. But our task is not finished by giving this 
definition; in my opinion the essential metaphysical quest only starts at this point! What property of a 
replicator makes it such a special entity that we are entitled to take it methodologically, or even 
ontologically, as a reason for an autonomy of the life sciences? We will (a) discuss what it means to 
'interact' and (b) what it means to 'be a copy'. 
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(a) What do we mean in our definition of a replicator, when we are concerned with its first defining 
aspect, that of interaction? 
The first explication of this term would be that by interaction we mean some causal interrelation of 
two objects. (Here I will not dwell on the Humean problem of causality.) 
But, by interaction, we, of course, do not mean the mere existence of a certain entity at the same time 
its copy emerges. This is not as trivial as it seems, because we know since Newton that the gravity of 
any body interacts in principle with every other body. Gravity as a special form of interaction 
diminishes over distance, but is in principle not limited by distance. But if we accepted gravity as an 
interaction in our sense, any structural identical entity (as far as it has mass) would count as a 
replicator, when a new structural identical entity emerged (existing already before, within the distance of 
the speed of light). Obviously, such a proposal would be absurd. But why? Presumably, because an 
interaction is not enough to count as interaction proper. An ex1remely weak long distant influence within 
other, almost infinite, stronger influences is not enough. 
Moreover, we would neither accept all and every case of chemical interaction, taking place as close 
distance electromagnetic interaction. As a thought experiment we can look at a real experiment. Since 
the work of F. Wohler (we also may think of Stanley Miller), we know that 'organic' molecules like 
urea can be produced in normal chemical reactions. Urea, chemically speaking CO(NH2h. consists out 
of the 'inorganic' components, two times N, five times H, one C and one 0. We assume that in 
Wohler's test tube another molecule of CO(NH2h 'by chance' was around already when the new 
molecules of CO(NH2) 2 emerged. We assume that this first molecule of urea even chemically interacted 
with one of the inorganic components, say with the hydrogen, shortly before a new molecule of urea was 
composed. Would we then be entitled to call the first molecule a replicator? Would we be entitled to 
deny that Wohler has himself produced 'organic' molecules out of inorganic ones and to claim that it 
was the 'replicating' organic molecule which has been in the test tube before? No, I think not! If the 
interaction was not 'essential' for the emergence of the new molecule of urea, and (expressed the other 
way round) if the emergence of this molecule had taken place 'independently' of this old molecule of 
urea anywa/35 , the interaction of these two molecules, would not qualify the first molecule as a 
replicator (and hence Wohler's honour remains undiminished). 
Hence, the actual presence of a causal interrelation is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for qualifying as an interaction proper. The sufficient condition is that a replicator by its presence has 
(to a relevant extent) to enhance the probability of the emergence of the identical entity (the replica). 
The notion of a replicator demands that this entity is 'actively' contributing sometlling to this emerging 
new whole. Without the existence of a replicator, the probability that single elements become 
compounded into the entity in question, simply by hitting on one another (or what one may call chance), 
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would be lower. In short, a replicator is an entity which has the property that its existence enhances 
(perhaps without changing itselt) the probability of the emergence of the (structurally) same entity. 
Although the aspect of 'enhancing the probability of an entity to come into existence' appears to me 
to be philosophically particularly interesting, this is obviously not an exclusive property of replicators. 
In chemistry any catalyst also has the property of altering the probability, the rate or the velocity of a 
reaction (without itself undergoing any essential chemical change). 
In this philosophical work, I am not interested in chemical catalysts for their own sake, but rather in 
a generalised notion of a catalyst, i. e. any entity which changes the probability of the creation of other 
entities, without being altered itself By introducing such a notion we, no doubt, enter upon interesting 
but difficult ground. Besides the chemist's endeavour to look for the reactional mechanisms of catalysis, 
a metaphysics of catalysis appears to be needed. 
Which entities could count as catalysts in the generalised sense? What does it mean to change the probability of the 
elements to build a component? How could this notion of a catalyst be made coherent with the deterministic understanding 
of causality of (classical) physics? Are we entitled to use in our definition of a catalyst the complex notions of probability 
and counterfactuals? 
Back to our main line of argun1ent. We have found that the notion of a replicator involves catalytic 
properties, to enhance the probability of the emergence of the identical entity. This appears to me to be 
in contrast to a simple notion of matter in motion. Tllis also plays a role in the next section, where we 
focus on an additional property of replicators: unlike mere catalysts, such as enzymes, they are seU~ 
referential. 
(b) The second notion wllich plays an important role in our definition of a replicator is the notion 
of a 'copy'. Besides interaction, tllis involves a notion of sameness. 
Replicators are enhancing the probability that a copy is made of the same entity, which enhances 
the probability that a copy is made of the same entity, which enhances tl1e probability that a copy is 
made of the same entity... Subject and object of this process of copying are in some respects 
identical. A notion of identity is needed, which links the subject and the object of the catalytic process. 
I am going to argue that even a notion of informational identity is needed, which would change the 
focus from matter to structure or form (Greek: eidos) and which, historically, has been almost the 
antithesis of matter(:> pp. 76 f.) 936 
The concept information should here be understood in a cmmnon sense way, and not be interpreted in the specified and 
specialised way of Shmmon's information theory or of semiotics. Later on, I shall introduce the tenn 'fonnation' which is 
less burdened with given meanings (~pp. 307 f.). 
935 Whether we are entitled to argue in terms of counterfactuals or not is not my topic here. Our actual usage of the notion 
of a replicator entails such a complex concept. 
936 For a similar antagonist understanding of matter m1d information, see e. g. G. Webster, B. Goodwin. Form and 
Transformation (1996), p. 4. 
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But what do I mean by informational identity. For my purposes I want to distinguish two 
dimensions of identity: a) Selfsameness and sameness937: b) material and formal identity. The notions 
are made clear in the further course of the argument. 
Obviously the notion of a replicator essentially involves something different from selfsameness. 
Herewith we mean that the replica is spatially distinguished from the replicator. The notion of 
selfsameness (material or formal) is already a precondition of any concept of an entity existing at 
different points of time! Hence, in regard to the first mentioned dimension the differentia spec~fica of 
a replicator is the catalysis not of the selfsame but of the same entity. 
Does this already imply informational identity? Not necessarily. If we think of a replicator for 
example as merely a fragment of DNA, the sameness of form, structure or (in)formation-at this 
point used equivocally-seems to be inextricably linked with material sameness. The compounding 
elements, the nucleic acids, are the same in the replicator and the replica. Hence one might argue that 
the formal sameness is only due to the material sameness, or, put differently, that formal sameness is 
reducible to material sameness. Ockhan1's razor (i. e. theoretical parsimony) would demand us to 
abandon the additional notion of (in)formational sameness. 
This objection would be invalidated if are able to give an example, where formal (informational) 
sameness is not entangled with material sameness, and hence could not be generally reduced to 
material sameness. Keeping up to Dawkins' generalised definition, that a replicator is 'any entity in 
the universe which interacts [ ... ] in such a way that copies are made', it is in fact easy to find such an 
example. In our Lebenswelt we are today provided today with a subject area which has become 
almost prototypic for the notion of information itself i. e. the notion of software. A computer virus, a 
bit of software, obviously fulfils this general criterion for being a replicator. 
Our definition of a replicator implies that computer viruses are also alive, although of course not in a greater sense than 
a biological virus is. 
A computer virus produces copies of itself in a computer network. Such copies could also be made 
to a compatible, but different, computer system, with a different operating system, different 
underlying semiconductors, and different material basis (like silicon, gallium arsenide, or optical 
circuits). 
Based on this example, it should become clear that the essence of the property of copying is (or at 
least could be) the copying of the form, the structure or information, not that of its material elements. 
The notion of a replicator, does in principle not require the sameness of the underlying material 
elements! Hence, formal or informational sameness, opposed to the material one, does play an 
indispensable role in defining the notion of a replicator. 
937 In German there are the tenns 'das Selbe' and 'das Gleiche' to express this distinction. 
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In conclusion, a replicator can be regarded as an entity which catalyses the building of an entity 
(i. e. it enhances the probability that such an entity is built) which is informationally, not necessarily 
materially the same as the replicator. Thereby we have in my view already left or transcended a strict 
materialistic ontology. In the dispute about universalia the nominalists have claimed that universals 
("the sort of thing which can be wholly present in distinct individuals at the same time"938 ) are mere 
abstractions, which allow us to order intellectually the changing flux of experience. Formal sameness 
would normally be interpreted by a materialist as a mere nominalist abstraction (universalia in 
intel/ectu), whereas material sameness would be regarded as real. Opposed to this it has been shown 
that the property of form is required. Although I would concede that ontological and epistemological 
issues can never be completely disentangled ("Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind."939), the need to introduce fonnal sameness appears to be rather ontological. 
In any case it appears plausible that, if we should adopt an informational or semiotic metaphysic, 
it would undennine the reductionism of gene-Darwinism within biology and sociology. The notions of 
form and information may in this case also justify other levels of being. But although this becomes 
more plausible, it is not necessarily conclusive. At least in principle materialistic downward 
reductionism might be replaced by a similar 'informational downward reductionism'. Thus, in 
addition to our general criticism of reductionism, the following sections on gene-atomism 
(~ pp. 258 f.), on germ-line-reductionism (:> pp. 303) and on process reductionism (~ pp. 324) will 
challenge more specific aspects of gene-Darwinism. 
ln conclusion, if gene-Darwinism tries to justify the actual stopping of its reductive quest at the 
level of single genes, it has to introduce the notion of a replicator. But this notion of a replicator, 
closely linked with gene-Danvinism, has been demonstrated not to be based on the notion of matter, 
but on notions of form or information. If this holds true, then an at least partly informational or 
semiotic metaphysic needs to be elaborated. On such grounds it might be easier to vindicate the 
existence of higher ontological levels, like organisms or groups, or even psychological states or 
culture. 
8.2 Genetic Reductionism 1: Gene Atomistic Reductionism and Its Transcendence 
Leaving the general problems of substance reductionism behind me, I will now discuss the specific 
problems of genetic reductionism, as advocated by today's gene-Darwinism (~ pp. 140 f., 191 f.) 940 
938 J. Bigelow. Unlversals (1998), p. 543. According to Bigelow universals do not have to be 'universally' present in all 
entities, but they are "characteristically the sort of ti1ing which some individuals may have in common, and others may 
lack." 
939 I. Kant. Kritik der reinen Vemunft. p. A 51/B 75. (:>also p. 74.) 
940 This needs to be done cautiously, since some critics-iliough correctly recognising reductionism as a general hallmark 
of ti1is paradigm-have sometimes slightly misinterpreted its specific type of reductionism. 
For example, L. Frith in Sociobiologv, ethics and human nature (1992), I iliink correctly, criticised the biologistic 
reductionism of sociobiology. But, firstly, she, in my view wrongly, attributes an individualist view to this paradigm 
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Genetic reductionism could be regarded as being composed out of two different reductionistic tenets: 
firstly, the reductionism of gene-atomism, the veneration of the single, independent, selfish gene; and, 
secondly, germ-line reductionism, an extreme interpretation of the Weismannian 'central dogma of 
molecular biology', an interpretation venerating the genotype and dismissing the phenotype as a mere 
vehicle 
If one follows a replicator-vehicle distinction941 , gene-atomism is a position that exclusively states 
that single genes are the replicating entities, and germ-line reductionism is the position that organisms, 
groups, species and ecosystems are mere vehicles of the true agents of evolution, the genetic 
l . 94° rep 1cators. " 
a) Gene Atomism -an Empty or a Wrong Claim 
Gene atomism claiming that there are no other ontological and epistemological levels despite the 
level of single selfish genes (~pp. 142 f.). 
From a historic perspective this view could be contrasted against essentialistic (:>pp. 78, 98 f.), romantic(:> pp. 89, 
102 f) and even Kantian biology(:> pp. 87, 98, f.), which all emphasised that whales are highly relevant for the existence 
or interpretation of parts. Additionally, gene-atomism also turns against other mechanistic accounts of evolution, like the 
evolutionary synthesis, which has largely focused on properties of populations ( :> pp. 130 f). Today, gene atomism is a 
prominent view, but it is increasingly challenged by approaches which advocate many levels of evolutionarily relevant 
entities(:> pp. !52 f). 
Gene atomism advocates that single genes, small genetic fragments, are the only real units of 
(biological) evolution. Different levels of replicators are discarded. According to gene-Darwinism it is 
essential that a tmit of evolution or selection is a replicator (this guarantees its stability) 943 For the tin1e 
being, we are not concerned with the replicator-vehicle distinction or the phenotypic versus genotypic 
debate, i. e. with the phene-versus-gene, individual-versus-genome, group-versus-gene-pool debate. 
Instead, we engage in the gene-versus-genome-versus-gene-pool debate, which is only concerned with 
the genotypic side 944 
(p. 150). The paradigm is indeed opposed to the existence of groups, but treats individualism only as an approximation 
of the truth; correctly the hard-core principle of gene-Darwinism, predominant in today's sociobiology, is the sub-
individual selfish genes' viewpoint. Secondly, she states U1at sociobiologists treat family units in the same way as 
society and environments (p. 151 ). This also gives a too simplified impression. Although it is true that families like 
single organisms are seen in a nominalistic, reductionistic way, they are based on tl1eir relatedness, according to the 
tl1eory of kin selection and understood to be much more real than otl1er groups or ecosystems. 
941 For Hull's modifications and Dawkins' later extension of his own primordial tern1inology :> p. 217. The distinction 
itself will be discussed in tl1e section on germ-line reductionism ( :> pp. 303 f.). 
942 R. Dawkins draws this distinction in a similar, but different, way. The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), p. 82; sometimes 
a link of these two arguments becomes apparent, p. 95. 
943 E. g.: R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection ( 1978), p. 69. 
944 According to R. Dawkins, one of the most passionate supporters of gene atomism, there may be a hierarchy of vehicles, 
not ofreplicators. He even claimed that tl1e individual-versus-group debate is only concerned with vehicles and assumes 
tl1at his gene-atomism-what replicators are concerned-is not questioned. Cf: The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 254, 
The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), p. 82. Nevertheless, Dawkins, at least half-heartedly, discusses U1e question of 
gene-pool-selection. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 114. 
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Are single selfish genes essentially the sole (biological) replicators? Or is it in principle possible to 
regard larger genetic units as replicators as well, like compounds of genes, whole genomes or gene pools 
of organisms, groups, species or ecosystems? 
In traditional terms this could be reformulated as the question of what is the genetic 'substance' and 
'accident' of evolutionary change. Gene-atornism, linked to the modem understanding of substance, 
seeks this substance of evolution exclusively within smallest genetic bits(~ pp. 243 f.) 
The claim of the selfishness of small genetic fragments results from two assumptions. Firstly, according to what I have 
called the 'principle of egoism' (~ e. g. p. 114), every substance (at least, if It has active powers) 'cares' only for itself 
Based on this principle, one may generalise the term 'selfish gene' to any--active-substance and call them more generally 
'selfish entities'. The second assumption of gene-atomism is that the only genetic substances are single genes At tl1is point 
we are only concerned with the latter assumption. 945 
I regard the gene-atomistic claim as either (1.) empty or (2.) wrong: 
(1.) The notion gene is microbiologically closely linked to the discovery of deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA). In that context a gene is conceptualised as a strand of DNA, a short pattern of information, 
coded in the simple alphabet of the nucleotide bases, adenine, guanine, cytosine, and thymine. According 
to this understanding a gene is frequently equated with a piece of three nucleotide bases (a triplet), 
which often codes an amino acid, those components from which proteins are build. It is also often 
restricted to those triplets, which actually code amino acids (codons). Sometimes a 'gene' also refers to 
a DNA-sequence which is the basis for an RNA-transcription or a polypeptide. 
However, Dawkins and other protagonists of the gene-Danvinian paradigm, as we have seen, have 
favoured exclusively single 'atomic' genes as replicators 946 Although this at first glance seems to be a 
radical claim--any larger genetic units, genotypes and gene-pools become excluded-, it may well turn 
out to be an almost empty statement if the adopted definitions of a gene are taken into consideration. 
In contrast to the microbiological understanding, a gene here is usually defined in evolutionary rather 
than primarily chemical terms. Williams defines a gene as "any hereditary information for which there is 
a favourable or unfavourable selection bias equal to several or many times its rate of endogenous 
change"947 Dawkins (referring to Williams) defines a gene as "any portion of chromosomal material 
which potentially lasts for enough generations to serve as a unit of natural selection"948 But given such 
a general notion of a gene, it then means almost nothing to claim that the gene is the sole unit of 
(replicator) selection. The question 'what is the entity which lasts through generations and could count 
as replicator?', is answered with 'the entity (defmed as 'gene') which lasts through generations and 
could count as replicator'. This is evidently true-but only because the answer tautologically repeats the 
question. The formulation only tacitly introduces a second criterion for being a unit of selection. Besides 
945 Although I think that the principle of egoism bears some truth, I do not regard it as being generally true(~ pp. 406 f.). 
946 But ~ also p. 39. 
947 G. C. Williarns. Adaptation and Natural Selection ( 1966), p. 25. 
948 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene ( 1976/89), p. 28. 
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being a replicator now also longevity is required, which refers back to the concept of substance. 
However, we currently simply accept this criterion as well. In regard of a tautological formulation of 
gene-atomism, an early critic of the selfish-gene view of evolution pointed out that this is like "someone 
analysing language, who insists that we must find its fundamental elements, but talks as if it did not 
matter whether we take those elements to be letters, words or sentences."949 And indeed sometimes it 
appears as if Dawkins himself intended to define genes completely tautologically, allowing much larger 
units than single genes 950 "What I have now done is to define the gene in such a way that I cannot help 
being right1''951 
But there are several reasons which speak against the view that Dawkins and otl1er gene-Darwinians 
use the term 'gene' merely to speak about any replicator, however complex. Firstly, gene-atomism 
would have stated nothing new, apart from that there are units of selection. It would still not be clear, if 
a small bit of DNA. a genotype, a whole gene pool, or a whole hierarchy of levels should be regarded as 
replicator In spite of obvious tautological aspects of the above definition, Dawkins and other 
proponents of gene-atomism, of course, have not chosen the word 'gene' by chance and could scarcely 
have used 'system of genes', 'genome' or 'gene-pool' instead. As indicated earlier, a title like 'The 
Selfish Genome' or 'The Selfish Gene-Pool' would have implied a totally different research 
progran1me 952 Additionally in some definitions of genes smallness is mentioned: a gene is "a genetic 
unit that is small enough to last for a large number of generations and to be distributed around in the 
form of many copies"953 Although still advocating a fading-out definition of genes, Dawkins, in regard 
to sexually reproducing organisms (like humans), has always argued that because of the meiotic shuffle, 
"small fragments of genome" are the only biological candidates for a replicator954 "The shorter the 
genetic unit is, the longer-in generations-it is likely to live" and to cow1t as a replicator. He has also 
called his view 'atomisticd55 Moreover, Dawkins himself regards 'higher' fonns of selection and the 
concept of a hierarchy of replicators as utterly wrong956 
Hence, I think we are entitled, to conclude that gene-Darwinism, as advocated by Dawkins, despite 
tautological aspects in the definition of genes, has actually favoured a concept of selection exclusively 
on the level of small genetic fragments. Apart from exceptions like non-sexually reproducing plants, the 
term 'gene' according to this paradigm exclusively refers to small piece of DNA. 
949 M. Midgley. Gene-juggling (1979), pp. 450-451. 
950 R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection (1978), pp. 68-69, In Defence of Selfish Genes (1981 ), pp. 568-570, The Extended 
Phenotype (1982/89), pp. 85-87, 89. 
951 Idem. The Se(fish Gene (1976/89), p. 33. 
952 Cf. e. g.: R. Dawkins, In Defence of Selfish Genes (1981 ), p. 559, The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 33. 
953 Idem. The Se(fish Gene ( 1976/89), p. 32. 
954 Idem. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), pp. 29 f., even his, in this regard, more guarded Replicator Selection and the 
Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 62, even p. 68. 
955 Idem. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 29; The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), p. 113. 
956 E. g.: Idem. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), pp. 2, 39. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 62. 
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(2.) But, if according to this strict gene-atomism small piece of DNA are the only units of 
(replicator) selection, I think this paradigm has to be rejected. Reasons for a rejection of this approach 
are worked out in the next three sections. 
This should, of course, not imply that I want to damn single genes in general as one level of explanation. I do appreciate 
that sociobiology has introduced this level 957 Still, I shall argue that gene-atomists have gone much to far in claiming that 
single genes are the only units of evolution and to understand them as being totally independent and radically selfish. In 
contrast to gene-atomism I shall advocate a multi-level approach in which single genes also have their place, and in which 
the acceptance of higher levels reduces, though not necessarily completely eliminates, the selfislmess on the level of genes. 
b) Higher Genetic Units-also Despite the Meiotic Shuffle 
(1) The general possibility of emergent higher genic units. The denial of larger units of present 
gene-Darwinism refers back to Fisher, often quoted by Dawkins. => 543 Alternatively, authors of the 
second step of the evolutionary synthesis have tried to reduce the atomism of 'bean-bag genetics' 
(Mayr) in their work, and stressed the contextuality and interaction of genes (~ pp. 130 f). Some of 
these authors even explicitly advocated a general position stressing emergent properties on the level of 
systems. 958 
Although gene-Darwinism brought back gene-atomism, there are also theoretical germs within this 
paradigm itself, which, I think, point beyond atomism. I have worked out that the central concept of a 
replicator refers to information rather than to matter (:> pp. 250 f). In my opinion it is a general 
tendency in sociobiology to emphasise the information-transferring property of genes, which not only 
make copies of themselves, but support copies of themselves in other organisms. This also becomes 
apparent in the (helpful) metaphors of DNA as 'a text', the four an1ino acids as 'the alphabet' 959 , or the 
'river of DNA' as a "river of infonnation, not a river of bones and tissues"960 Taken to its own logical 
conclusion, it would become clear that genes understood as information could not be interpreted without 
their context. 
Philosophers might be reminded of the debate about basic sense data, where philosophers from different schools of 
thought like Gadamer, Quine and Rorty criticised the concept of elementary units of interpretation. 
Likewise genetics, as it appears to me, increasingly understands the genome not by the analogy of 
atoms or beans, but rather by the analogy of a computer program. The genome becomes characterised 
by contextuality and structuredness. Tllis becomes apparent if one considers concepts like codogenes, 
exons, introns, regulatory genes, reparation mechanisms, mobile genetic elements etc. 
Even without explicitly referring to information it becomes apparent that genes could not be 
understood without considering their phenotypic effects and its genotypic context. If one thinks, for 
example, of a 'monogenic' inheritance for blue eyes. Even in this very simple case, where only one 
957 E. g.: Idem. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 66. 
958 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 63 f.,~ pp. 136 f. 
959 E. g.: R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 23; The River out of Eden (1995), pp. 11 f, 41, 43. 
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homozygous allele is said to have a phenotypic effect, selection of that single allele can only take place 
in a certain genic context. In the case of albinism a missing enzyme (tyrosinase) and the resulting lack of 
the pigment melanin leads to colourless eyes, which appear pink because the blood vessels of the retina 
are visible. This may be the case although alleles 'for blue eyes' are still at its locus, but because of the 
missing enzyme they are actually not 'expressed' 961 In this sense there is even in the case of monogenic 
inheritance no real independence of genes, there is, strictly speaking, no 'monogenic' inheritance. In 
order to provide the colour of something, that something has to be in place. The gene 'blue (eyes)' can 
only develop and survive together with the totality of genes required 'for the character of eyes'. Hence, 
could we to a certain extent regard this unit as a higher-level gene and itself as a unit of selection? 
Particularly, within a Darwinian paradigm, it appears possible to say that where the new unit has a 
different inclusive fitness from its separate parts, the unit, will-by definition--have an effect on the 
selection process. Hence this higher-level gene fulfils the criteria of being a unit of selection 962 It is a 
chwlk of DNA, which carries genetic infonnation, which is longer than a single gene (in Dawkins 
sense); it replicates and has an evolutionary in1pact. 
In the case of asexual organisms, where no crossing-over takes place, any higher level gene, which 
improves the inclusive fitness of the organism as a whole, directly fulfils the criteria, of potentially being 
inu11ortal or at least long-lived (which we currently simply accept). In case of sexual organisms, we 
additionally have to face the problem of the meiotic shuffle. 
(2) Higher genic units despite the meiotic shuffle. Sexually reproducing organisms have always 
been of foremost interest since we ourselves belong to tllis group. The evolutionary synthesis 
particularly focused on tl1em, because its theoretical core of population genetics is concerned with 
sexually reproducing interbreeding organisms. Gene-Darwinism, although in many respect at odds with 
the syntl1esis, also focuses on this class, since only there this "central argument"963 of meiotic shuffle 
supporting gene atomism comes into play. In the genetic shuffling during meiosis (the special kind of 
cell division to produce sex cells), the "genome is shredded to smithereens" and gene-Darwinians, like 
Dawkins, conclude from this fact that only short bits of DNA can be regarded as continuous units of 
selection 964 As outlined earlier, gene-Darwinians thus argue that the "shorter a genetic wlit is, the 
longer-in generations-it is likely to live"965 . Even if a gene-atomist would concede that a gene can not 
960 Idem. The River out of Eden (1995), p. 4, also p. 19. 
961 R. Dawkins seems to accept such facts, but presumably due to his gennline-reductionism and to his argument 
concerning the meiotic shuffie he draws opposed conclusions: In Defence of Selfish Genes ( 1981 ), pp. 565-568. 
962 For quite small units this is accepted also by R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene ( 1976/89), p. 32. (:'>also footnote 950) 
963 Idem. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 29. 
964 Idem. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), pp. 25 f., Rep/icator Selection and the Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 68 (quote). 
As mentioned earlier, Dawkins in the latter publication is in this respect much more guarded, than in his Se(fish Gene 
965 Idem. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), pp. 25, 29. 
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be interpreted without its context, he or she, based on the fact of meiotic recombination, would still 
conclude that it is not this context which is preserved, and hence there are no higher-level replicators 966 
There are two possibilities for challenging this view. Either replicators have not to be lasting to 
qualify as units of evolution or larger units are actually in some sense lasting as well. I focus on the 
latter aspect and advocate that larger units in a probabilistic sense are actually lasting, but thereby I 
also challenge the assumption that units need to be lasting in the (materialistic) sense of pem1anent 
presence in each concerned instance. 
Gene-atomists argue that as a gene travels from genome to genome through the generations, the genic 
context changes completely. This, in my opinion, is wrong. Gene-atomists, although in other respects 
having started to understand genes as information, here in a somewhat old-fashioned way remain 
materialistic. This is linked to the-already old-'modem' materialist understanding of substance. 
According to gene-atomists, permanence is only given if a nexus of I 00%, in the sense of a material 
continuous unity of one body, is given (which excludes systematic synergetic properties). 
But despite the meiotic shuffle, obviously some contextual continuities do still exist. The Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium, which is concerned with alleles, is based on tllis fact. In regard of different loci, 
the very notion of a locus already assumes a certain structure and a given context. A chunk of DNA 
'determ.itling the eye colour of humans' on its ovvn, put into a test-tube with nutrients, will, of course, 
never develop the blueness without an eye, or an eye without a body. Also in regard of loci continuities 
result from frequency distributions of gene-pools, and not only from the direct descent of organisms967 
Not only in asexual organisms but in sexually reproducing organisms too, the gene for eyes being blue 
will of course usually fmd itself muted with genes for the general existence of tl1e eye. Standard contexts 
could even be regarded to be a precondition for speaking of certain genes at all. 968 If this is provided, I 
see no reason to deny in principle the possibility of higher-level genes in gene pools, only because they 
do not assemble in each and every generation. 
An entity based on probability distributions does not need to appear remarkable, the more so, if we 
think of modem physics. Playing a causal role and being potentially long-lived, it should in principle 
(despite further qualifications) be possible for such higher mlits to count as a unit of evolution. 
One is even inclined to argue that the longer the genetic unit is, the more it is on average inter-
pretable in terms of phenotypes and the larger is its evolutionary role. The wholes only exist in a pro-
966 R. Dawk.ins, for example, replies to E. Mayr's stress on the context of a gene in this way. Replicator Selection and the 
Extended Phenotype (1978), p. 69. 
967 The term 'gene pool' still has the misleading cmmotation of being totally structureless, which is usually not the case. 
968 K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher. The Retum of the Gene (1998/1988), p. 163. 
In that paper it is argued that the stability of the context is given, in order to defend the gene-Darwinian tenet that 
single genes do exist. TI1e authors objected to Goulds argumentation in Caring Groups and Se(fish Genes (in The 
Panda 's Thumb, 1980, p. 77). Although in my view Gould was right in stressing the context dependence of genes, I 
agree that the not direct visibility of genes, does not entail that they do not exist. I do not deny the existence of single 
genes, but I criticise the claim of their exclusive existence. An acceptance of a stable context, using Sterelny's and 
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babilistic sense of context, where the whole does not only determine the parts, but the parts in their 
particular combination and inner dynamics also determine the whole. Hence, the envisioned non-re-
ductive holism, which does not deny the relevance of parts and which is based on a probabilistic or field 
understanding of whales, need not be linked to that sort of Platonic (opposed to an Aristotelian) 
essentialism, which neglects varieties and which has been criticised by Popper, Hull and Mayr969 
It lies outside the scope of this work to clarify the relation of this field interpretation to my field theory of exfonnation 
(~pp. 314 f). 
To sum up, if there is a sufficiently high probability of coming together and togetherness causing a 
property which causes an increase in the fitness of this system compared with each of its parts, then-
leaving all other things equal-the union will itself have the tendency to survive. Despite the meiotic 
shuffle higher level genes can probabilistically have an evolutionary relevance. 
Matters, as we will see, are more complicated, since the tendencies of the parts have also to be considered. Only under 
certain causal conditions the effects of a whole lead to stabilise the system. 
Synergetic or systemic properties, which I have tried to justify probabilistically are often discussed 
under the keyword of the additivity criterion. 
The additivity criterion of a unit of selection was first in detail made explicit by W Wimsatt and 
then, in a different way, was elaborated by E. Lloyd970 I abstract from their views and state an-I 
think-similar formulation in my own words. Perhaps this definition rather mirrors Wimsatt's position 
A unit of selection is any heritable entity or type of entity, which has an additional fitness (and in this 
regard varies to entities which have not this property), which does not appear at any lower level of 
organisation. 
This is not much more than the general old idea that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts', applied in a 
Darwinian context. This simplified-and thereby maybe trivial-idea is implicitly present in many earlier evolutionary 
texts, for example in those of Gould and Lewontin. Also my argument above of the possibility of synergetic higher genic 
units in principle repeats these ideas, although applied on the side of the replicator, and not on the side of interactors. 
The actual definitions ofWimsatt and Lloyd are actually more refined, one focusing on context independence, the other 
on strict additivity. But for my purposes the further details appear not to be relevant. My proposed definition is maybe even 
in contradiction with some aspects of Lloyd' s definition971 
Given a Darwinian framework, additivity or synergetic properties with a fitness effect seem to me to 
be necessary conditions for the evolutionary existence of whales and thus for the transcendence of gene-
. 972 
at01rusm. 
Kitcher's argument with a different intention, also allows for higher-level units and thereby undennines gene-
Darwinian atomism. 
969 Cf. also: M. Ruse. David Hull Trough Two Decades (1989); G. Webster; B. C. Goodwin. Fom1 and Transformation 
(1996), pp. 9, 17 f, 99-100. (On the Plato's and Aristotle's understanding offonns, ~also pp. 78 f) 
970 E. Lloyd. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary The01y ( 19941!988), pp. 69 f.; W. Wimsatt. Reductionistic 
Research Strategies and their Basis in the Units of Selection Controversy (1980), p. 236. 
971 E. L!oyd. The Structure and Cmifirmation of Evolutionary Theory (199411988), p. 102. 
972 In a not purly Darwinian framework, it may be questioned, whether evolutionary morphological constrains, which also 
may have an impact on the direction of evolution, are adequately treated in tenus of fitness. 
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Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson opposed the additivity criterion, although they criticised the 
philosophy of egoistic genes in a different way 973 I do not want to discuss whether Sober and Wilson 
are right in respect of any specific formulation of the additivity criterion,974 but I think that they did not 
turn against the above more moderate exposure of synergetic properties (or if they did, they were wrong 
in doing so) 
Sober and Wilson in regard of a specific fonnulation of the additivity criterion argued, that groups which properties 
which are in a linear way dependent on the proportion of altruist members would by this defmition be excluded from 
counting as whales. But this assumption is central for their group selectionist models, and I agree that it would be absurd to 
exclude such groups from being a counterexarnple to gene-Dmwinism. But, I think, a well understood concept of synergetic 
properties does not exclude these whales. Such a linear relationship, does not entail that the resulting entity is merely the 
sum of its parts. Instead the whales or groups in Sober's and Wilson's examples show supersurnmative properties, which 
depend in their amount on the proportion of certain members. Hence, in my understanding, this could be counted as an 
example of a synergetic property. Thus, I tend to follow Lloyd, who had pointed out that Sober implicitly employs the 
additivity criterion. 975 At least provided a general understanding of synergetic properties this appears to be valid. Otherwise 
Sober m1d Wilson would not have been able to propose group selectionist models, based on the additional fitness of the 
whole group, diftering from the fitness of its elements. 
However, I think that Sober and Wilson were right in having pointed out that additionally a causal 
approach is also needed, 976 to show why a structural property of the super-summative whole (for 
exan1ple due to the altruism of its members) is not ovemm by selfish members. 977 
Therefore further scrutiny of this topic is needed. We will in the next sections be concerned with 
several questions in how far wholes can have a causal impact on their parts and in how far wholes are 
not undermined by selfish tendencies of their parts. We also treat once more the question whether it 
would be more appropriate to convert the parlance of higher-level units into single gene-parlance. And 
we will be concerned with the question in how far the results for loci in one individual are valid for 
alleles in different organisms as well. 
c) Top-Down Causation and High-Level Genes at Different Loci 
In this section we will firstly be concerned with the general relationship of higher-level properties to 
downward causation. Secondly, the question is treated, whether higher-level genes (a system of genes, 
which only together have synergetic properties for the good of the system), are probabilistically stable 
enough not to be overrun on a lower level by alleles which do not have this property. 
(1) The relationship of higher-level genes and downward-causation. Above I have advocated the 
probabilistic existence of synergetic properties of alleles at different loci, despite the meiotic shuffle. 
Now we additionally assume the stability of these probabilistic high-level genes, in the sense of not 
973 E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem (1994/1998), pp. 203 f. 
974 E. g. E. Lloyd opposed this view. The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory ( 199411988 ), pp. 72 f 
975 Cf.: Ibid., pp. 82, 85. 
976 Cf: Ibid. , pp. 82 f 
977 E. g.: E. Sober. What is Evolutionary Altruism? (199811988), p. 462. 
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Entity Reductionism (Physicalism, Gene-Atomism, Genn-Line-Reductionism) 267 
being undermined by selfish components (this will be discussed below). We discuss whether high-level 
genes under these conditions imply what has been called 'downward causation'978 
Properties of systems of genes in a way have to be causally relevant, otherwise we would not 
perceive them and would not speak of a property being there at all. But here we are not interested in 
some causal relevance, but specifically in an evolutionary relevance. In a selectionist model, from which 
we started our discussion, all properties which bear on the fitness are by definition (in average) 
evolutionarily relevant and, hence, synergetic properties which have such an effect (higher-level genes) 
are also evolutionarily relevant (we may think of the example of eyes as wholes) 
Does this entail downward-causation, a top-down causation, which I use in the sense that wholes 
may be causally relevant for their parts? 
In principle it is not obvious that wholes could have an impact on parts. According to a generally do\\nward reductive, 
materialistic ontology, which advocates a modern understanding of substances, whales do not exist at all or are at best re-
garded to be epiphenomena. Whales in this view are merely effects of the composing parts. It is, of course, true that a 
whole can by definition not exist without its parts (at least not in an actual sense), but this does not imply that the whole is 
nothing but its parts. A whole is not something alien to its parts, but it is its parts and specific relations between them. 
Based on my earlier critique of ti1e modern downward reductive understanding of substances in general, I treat properties of 
systems, as long as ti1ey are not shown by their parts on their own (or at least in most other combinations) as properties of 
these systems, of larger wholes. I do not deny the existence of atoms, but I regard molecules with their specific relation-
ships of parts to be real as well, having specific new properties which their elements do not have on their own ( ~ p. 240). 
In a selectionist context, properties of a system, which change the fitness of that system, by 
definition not only influence the survival of the system, but thereby also influence its parts. Hence, parts 
may become selected, because of the properties of higher genic wholes (properties of systems of genes). 
Depending on the importance of such higher level properties, alternative compow1ding alleles may 
perish, although, taken separately, they might have a higher fitness. Hence, higher-level genes can in 
principle have an evolutionary effect on the composing genes. Any such top-down effect, if actually 
found, is in contradiction to the spirit of the arguments and polemics of gene-Darwinians that single 
genes are maximally egoistic and can never serve any higher wholes. 
It is scarcely conceivable that properties of a high-level gene (here at several loci) have no effect on 
the composing alleles. The only case in which tlus may be conceivable is that of a restructuring of the 
genome without changing which genes are necessary. If different high level genes are based on the same 
underlying alleles, a more advantageous system may become established, without affecting which alleles 
build these systems. Here an evolutionary pathway may be taken which is best for the larger unit, with 
no effect for its elements. For example, if the genome of an organism by a specific type of mutation like 
an inversion or a translocation became restructured and this organism founded an isolated new 
population (founder effect), an improved high level-gene may evolve by changing the relations of the 
loci, witl10ut changing what composing alleles are advantageous. It might, for instance, be advantageous 
if the loci of a high-level gene are on one chromosome. 
978 A term, I think, first proposed by D. T. Can1pbell. 
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Actually the species drosophila melanogaster, d. subobscura, d. pseudoobscura and d. willistoni differ mainly in their 
chromosomal stmcture. 
If this population and the other population remained functionally isolated, the new founded 
population only differing in respect of its advantageous high-level gene-and not in respect of its genetic 
components-would probably outbreed the other. In this sense, here no direct top-down effect is given 
Nevertheless the increased fitness of the whole may indirectly still change the fitness of its parts. 
In conclusion, the existence of fitness changing properties of a system of genes (higher-level genes) 
are not only a necessary but a sufficient condition for top-down causation, at least as long as we are not 
only concerned with a restructuring of the genome. 
(2) Stability of higher-level genes on different loci. Probabilistic higher-level genes, can be stable 
in the sense of not being overrun by alternative 'egoistic' genes on the lower level 
In the present section we will be concerned with genes at different loci and we only later turn to the 
slightly more difficult problem of alleles in different organisms (although this will play a role here as 
well). The question of higher level genes at different loci has long been ignored, since the evolutionary 
syntheses was concerned with allelic competition and, at least in its early phase, which Mayr called 
'bean bag genetics', the assumption of the independence of genes has often been taken for granted. 
Although the synthesis later increasingly acknowledged the dependence of different loci and alleles, the 
synthesis remained to be based on models of population genetics, where loci have been treated as 
somehow given, whereas the alleles were seen to be objects of competition and evolution. Proponents of 
the second phase of the synthesis, like Mayr, were also not required to defend higher level genes, 
because they claimed that the individual phenotype, not the gene, is the unit of selection, and the species, 
not the gene, is the unit of evolution. 
A defence of higher-level genes only becomes necessary against the background of the gene-
Darwinian claim that any selection is ultimately gene-selection and that all evolutionary entities are 
reducible to single genes(~ pp. 142 f.). In principle the unity ofthe organism remains mysterious to 
gene-Darwinians 979 "Fundamentally, all that we have a right to expect from our theory is a battleground 
of replicators, jostling, jockeying, fighting for a future in the genetic hereafter. "980 Hence it was only 
consistent, and that gene-Darwinians, in principle have broken the dike between genes at different loci 
and genes on the same locus (alleles), though, of course, not denying their differences. Gene-Darwinians 
have shown that genes on different loci in one genome are competing981 Moreover, it became obvious in 
section a, that gene-Darwinians have argued that in respect of sexual organisms only short strands of 
DNA could count as evolutionary units. 
979 Cf. e. g.: R. Dawk.ins. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 5. 
980 R. Dawk.ins. The Selfish Gene ( 1989), p. 256. 
981 Idem. The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), pp. 156 ff. 
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It should now be shown that higher-level genes at different loci, whose existence I advocated earlier, 
can under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable and are not undermined by single alleles which do 
not show the synergetic propetties of the system. 
In order to show this, we take a closer look at the concept of a genetic system of genes A, B at two 
loci, the simplest possible genic system. For our purposes their distance on the chromosome or whether 
they are located on different chromosomes should not be taken into account. Although this distance is 
one factor determining the probability of the genes appearing together in directly successive generations, 
this point is uncontroversial. Here we are concerned with higher level genes, whose probability of being 
united in the same genome, despite the meiotic shuffle, is a probability function of the frequency of both 
genes in the population. We asswne that only in union do these two genes have a certain synergetic 
property improving the fitness of the two locus system: 
F (A, B) > F (A, b), F (A, B) . · .. F (a;, B), F (A. B) > F (a;, b) 
Here a; and b1 are the classes of alternative alleles corresponding to A and B (for our present example 
it does not matter how many alternative alleles there are). Focusing on this one higher level effect, we 
stipulate for reasons of simplicity, that there are no such synergetic effects in the case of other 
combinations of alleles and that all these other combinations have the same, lower, fitness value: F (a;. 
b) = F (A, b) = F (a,,, B). 
In figure 3 the fitness values of these gene combinations are depicted as being dependent on the 
frequency of A and B relative to their alternative alleles in a given population. In order to present such a 
two locus model in one graph, which is normally used for presenting the relative frequency of two 
alternative alleles at only one locus 982, we have to make some simplifying assumptions. We stipulate, 
only for reasons of representation, that the frequencies of A and B, and of their alternative alleles should 
be coupled: f (A) = f (B); f (~ A) = f (.__, B). This is irrelevant for my argument, but makes it possible to 
depict the relative frequencies of alleles of both loci on one axis. 
We also assmne that synergetic effects have an absolute, not a relative, advantage in the population. Therefore all 
fitness values for certain combinations of genes are parallel to the x-axis983 For our present question this is of no concem. 
Furti1ennore we, of course, employ the usual assumption of population genetics that the gene pool is unstructured and 
that all genes mix randomly. (These assumptions will be criticised later, but for the time being they are helpfuL) 
982 Cf E. Sober. fflhat is Evolutionary Altruism? ( 1998/1988), p. 463. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. Philosophical Work on the 
Unit of Selection Problem ( 1994/1998), p. 207. 
983 In a different context: E. Sober. What is Evolutionary Altntism? ( 199811988), p. 463. 
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Figure 3 and 4: The high-level gene AB could be fitter than their components A and B. Even if their components are less 
fit outside of this system compared with each of their altemative alleles, the systemic advantage may still make them 
evolutionarily stable, if these genes are frequent enough so that the synergetic effect counterbalances this undennining 
effect 
In the chart the gene-combinations of A with B is called briefly 'AB'. The other combinations, of A 
·with some b1, of B with some a;. and of some a;with some b;. are called 'Ac, ', 'Be' and 'Oc'. 
If the basic frequencies of A and B are low, there will only seldom be an AB combination and its 
synergetic advantage will almost never come into play. Hence also the average fitness in this population 
(w) stays almost as low as if the synergetic property did not exist at all. In this first model A and B on 
their own (combined with some different alleles on the other locus) are neutral, if compared to their 
alternative alleles. Hence, if A or B evolved by mutation they will not directly be counter-selected 
Instead one day the combination of As and Bs will come together to form a high level gene and then have 
a higher probability to multiply. The more As and Bs are present in the gene pool the more often the AB-
system will have an advantage, until finally all a; and b1 alleles become extinct. Although the fitness of A 
and B gave each of them, on their own, no advantage, their systemic two locus interaction leads them to 
gain dominance in the population. Already in this case, I think, it would be inappropriate to reinterpret 
tllis in terms of gene-atomism or gene-egoism(:> below and section e and f). 
In figure 4 my point becomes easily apparent. I an1 only changing one assumption. Now we stipulate 
that the As and Bs, as long as they are not building their system, are less fit than their alternative alleles 
a; and b1. 
F(A, B)> F(a;, b)> F(A, b)= F(a;, B) 
A single A or B mutant will now be counter-selected and will soon die out. Here the genes which 
together (systemically) are advantageous for the larger system, will not survive. Only if A and B (as by 
a founder effect) both have a high enough relative frequency that the advantages of the AB-system often 
enough came into play and could counterbalance the other effects, would the AB-system soon come to 
dominate the population. With other words, the AB-system, under these conditions, is an evolutionarily 
stable strategy. A mutant a;, or b1 gene, which under different conditions would have had a higher 
fitness than A and B on their own, would now have a lower fitness value. 
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One should note, that besides the synergetic property of A and B, we are here also concerned with the 
phenomenon of the changing of fitness values dependent on the frequency of composing genes in the 
population. In my view, this, based on the existence of higher level genes, is another synergetic property 
of the relative frequency of genes in a given population. 
Back to our starting question, higher level genes which have a positive effect on a system at large, 
could under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable, even if each of their composing genes, taken on 
its own, is less fit than their alternative alleles. This corresponds to the intuition that without higher level 
genes, which are based on elementary genes and are good for a larger whole, despite being less fit 
outside this specific allelic context, the actual quite harmonious whole of the individual genome would 
be inconceivable. 
I have to concede that up until this point we have not much concerned ourselves with the question of 
the possibility of altruism between organisms, since we have treated higher level genes at two loci of one 
genome (although also the synergetic property of a population became apparent). Later, we will discuss 
to which extend these arguments can be generalised. In any case this argument, possibly trivial from the 
viewpoint of other Darwinian paradigms, clearly undennines the gene-Darwinian philosophy that (in 
sexual organisms) only single genes are the units of selection and all higher levels are epiphenomenal. 
But we have not yet reached secure ground, because gene-Darwinians may still object that the above 
phenomenon could be better expressed in gene-Darwinian terms. I shall argue that such a claim is at 
odds \vith our common understanding of a system. If based on systemic properties, those genes become 
selected which establish the system and, although they are disadvantageous on their own, it would be 
absurd to claim that the system does not exist, but rather only single selfish genes. But this needs to be 
scrutinised more closely. In the next section I argue that strict gene-atomism has to be either refuted or 
one has to define the gene as a unit of selection tautologically. 
d) The Fallacy of Claiming Gene-Atomism Tautological(v 
Dawkins in the Extended Phenotype proposed that different evolutionary perspectives may be like 
two different views of a Necker Cube, a visual illusion, where a two dimensional representation of a 
cube could be interpreted in two completely different ways as a three-dimensional cube984 Dawkins, 
with his own gift of creating illuminating metaphors, captures an experience of the flipping over of 
evolutionary perspectives apparent to anyone, who has seriously pondered these matters. Dawkins 
compared the gene-perspective with that of a whole individual, but I think one can do this equally well 
when one compares the single gene perspective with the group perspective or that of higher-level genes, 
as done in the last section. 
984 R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), pp. I f.; cf. the preface of the second edition of The Selfish Gene 
(1989), p. iix. 
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Should we hence simply draw the pluralistic conclusion that all these perspectives are true? This 
appears absurd, because these perspectives appear at least partly to be inconsistent, particularly in their 
philosophical message. Gene-Darwinism, but equally my opposed position above, would become a 
priori irrefutable. 
Of course, gene-Darwinians do not actually advocate such a pluralism, but, as I have shown earlier, 
they do strictly take sides. They finally advocate an exclusively gene-atomistic perspective. Dawkins 
even in the Extended Phenotype, slightly more guarded on this matter than in the Selfish Gene, clearly 
takes the view of gene-atomism ( :> pp. 14 2 f., 25 9 f.). 
Above I have opposed the idea of an undecided pluralism on this matter as well. I oppose strict gene-
atomism, although I think that even gene-atomism has a true core. Unlike some authors who have denied 
them, I accept that single genes could have evolutionary effects. Nevertheless I object to gene-atomistic 
denial of all larger whales. In terms ofthe atom metaphor, I try not to discard genetic 'atoms' (although 
they are even more context-dependent than atoms proper are), but argue in favour of the existence of 
genetic 'molecules', of high level genes, in their own right. I do this particularly in a selectionist contexi: 
(but I also literary have argued for the existence of molecules in their own right ::> pp. 243 f.) 985 To 
argue that parts and whales could play an evolutionary role and that the task is to determine in each 
case how far whales are important, differs not only from the view that parts are exclusively the units of 
evolution, but also from a pluralism, which regards this to be a mere question of perspective. 
We now have to settle the question whether it is always possible to convert higher-level explanations, 
as for example mine above, into a gene-atomistic language and, if this is the case, whether this is an 
appropriate and preferable representation of given facts. 
It is obvious that in a certain sense one can transfom1 the proposed concept of higher-level genes (as, 
I shall argue, of all other higher whales) into the language of single separate genes, since biological 
replicators, whether whole gene-pools or genomes in some way consist of single genes. A whole always 
consists of its parts. Hence, one may always somehow distribute the effect of the whole to its parts, and 
thereby make the whole disappear. Even if the whole is more than the sum of its parts, one can still 
proceed in a similar way. In this case it is not possible to directly distribute the effects to its parts, 
because the parts lose these properties if they are not part of the system. But indirectly it is still possible 
to distribute these properties, if one introduces tl1e additional condition that this 'distribution' is valid 
for each of the involved elements only if they are together and standing in a certain relation with these 
other elements which before were said to form a system. Besides, the sense of distributing tl1e effects 
has changed. In my example of high-level genes the process of distributing could, of course, not mean 
dividing the fitness by two and adding these halves to A's and B 's fitness. Instead, the synergetic fitness 
985 I am aware that even molecules are, of course, a poor analogy for systems of genes. Cf.: St. J. Gould. Caring Groups 
and Se((ish Genes (in The Panda Thumb, 1980), p. 78. 
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of the system AB would be 'distributed' in a way that A. under the condition of the presence of B, would 
have a completely changed fitness value; and, vice versa, B as well. Hence, with these two additional 
modifications, we can always rephrase the phenomenon of higher level genes in terms of single genes. 
The question is whether this is reasonable and if this implies that single selfish genes could justly be 
called the only units of selection. 
In my opinion a redefinition for which the mentioned additional assumptions have to be made does 
harm to what we usually call a system. These assumptions of our definition only conceal any system, 
which by any reasonable definition would be said to exist. With that definition one would also be able to 
redefine the result of the most radical group selectionist approach, against which gene-Darwinians 
always have turned, in terms of single genes only. It shall be made apparent in the course of this section 
that this is not an aspect of the gene-Darvvinian claim which is scientifically respectable, but a vacuous 
argument; however organised a system may be, it can only be described in terms of its composing parts. 
This does not contribute anything to the discussion concerned. To clarify this matter we must once more 
take a look at gene-atomism. 
In my view two different gene-atomistic claims, which are often fow1d in gene-Darwinism, need to be 
distinguished. The first claim is at least somehow empirically based and indirectly testable, the second 
clain1, however, is, as I shall show, tautological. Rather like Sober and Wilson, I think that officially 
gene-Darwinians normally only made the testable claim, but that in the argumentative twilight of many 
discussions the tautological idea has contributed much to the appeal of this paradigm986 If one wants to 
oppose gene-atomism one needs to disentangle the testable and the tautological arguments which 
somehow support this paradigm. 
(1) The testable claim of gene-atomism. During recent decades, many concepts and many 
phenomena have necessitated the use of an explanatory level of single egoistic genes. I think this has 
become sufficiently apparent in the several treatments of gene-Darwinism represented in this present 
work. Although I do not agree that all concepts and phenomena employed by apparent gene-Darwinians 
are purely gene-Darwinian, I, in any case, basically agree, for example, with Sterelny and Kitcher as far 
as they argue, that it was indeed reasonable, empirically justified, and likewise a fruitful research 
programme, that lies behind gene-Darwinians stress on the existence of single genes, below the level of 
the whole genome and below whole gene pools987 This, in my opinion does not, of course, entail that 
there are no higher levels of explanation existent as well. 
Gene-Darwinians, as we have seen earlier, do make a stronger claim. To them, selfish genes are the 
exclusive units of selection, excluding all higher levels. 
986 E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Onto Others (1998), pp. 33-34. 
987 K. Sterelny, P. Kitcher. The Return o.f the Gene (1998/1988), pp. 161 f., 167 f. 
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This idea has been supported by the success of explaining some important cases of traditional group 
selection by the new concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism (:> p. 43). Gene-Darwinians have 
interpreted these theories as supporting their exclusive gene-atomism. Although it appears correct to me 
that single genes do play a role in these explanations, they, even in these examples, do not play an 
exclusive role. I have called into question whether reciprocal altruism is exclusively a single gene 
phenomenon, since the condition under which this evolutionary mechanism itself becomes an 
evolutionarily stable strategy, and is not undemuned by cheaters, is also dependent on gene frequencies 
of populations, which are properties of the population and not of single genes. More strikingly, group 
phenomena of the hymenoptera-traditional examples of group selection-have been reinterpreted. 
Genetic relationship and not group selection, appears to be pivotal. Nevertheless the entomologist and 
eo-founder of sociobiology E. 0. Wilson himself still seems to have interpreted these explanations in a 
less radical gene-atomistic way than, for example, Dawkins.~ 41 We see that even these matters are 
entangled with interpretation. The involved theoretical changes were, it seems, in any case no mere rede-
fmition of terms. Since its interpretation is problematic, however, we turn to a less ambiguous example. 
It was most crucial for the radical formulation of radical gene-atonusm, that theoretical 
considerations and supporting empirical evidence, had, seemingly, shown that the remauung pure group 
selectionist models were flawed. Although theory here almost also seems more important than the facts 
(as I think it should be), these group selectionist models were not challenged by a mere redefinition of 
terms. Instead it was argued that groups, were true altruism of genes and individuals is possible because 
group selection, could easily be undemlined by selfish genes. In this argument the group advantage is 
not simply defmed away and distributed among the individual members, but a causal problem is stated, 
relevant also for those who hold the opposed view. We are hence concerned with a testable or 
changeable claim. 
Later I shall actually discuss wheti1er Ulis problem, which some naive group selectionist models contain, can be 
surmounted, :l p. 278. 
In my view, gene-Darwinism, also correctly point out that there 1s mner organismic genetic 
competition. Phenomena like meiotic drive could be interpreted in this way. I think, it was a false 
simplifying assumption that alleles at one locus as well as at different loci necessarily evolved, which 
are advantageous for the individual. As we have seen above, it may well be that a combination of 
favourable genes will not become fixed in a population, although this would be the most advantageous 
solution on a higher level of genomic organisation of an individual (fig. 4). 
Since we are concemed with a challengeable claim, it was possible to challenge it above, at least in its exaggerated 
version not only claiming tile existence of single genes, but completely denying U1e existence of all higher units of 
rephcator selection. 
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(2) 'fhe tautological claim of gene-atomism. Firstly, the gene-atomistic tautology eliminates whales 
from our semantic framework by defining whales as being merely elements, and then makes the claim, 
by only restating this assumption, that it has been found that whales do not exist. Secondly, linked to 
this first aspect, gene-atomists have reasoned tautologically that irrespective of the system of which a 
gene is part of the fittest genes always survives, only restating that fitness is defined by survival. In 
either case this results in an unjustified claim that genes, only because of matters of definition, are the 
only possible units of evolution. 
These gene-atomistic tautologies are slightly ditTerent to the found straight definition of the gene as a unit of evolution 
and the tautological claim that the unit of evolution hence is the gene(~ section a). 
(a) I have outlined that one can always simply redefine a whole in tenns of its parts, even if the 
whole is more than the sum of its parts (~ p. 272). One only has to extend the definition of each part by 
introducing the conditionals that the former systemic property has only been shown, if the other 
components of the 'system' are present as well. Even though the property can not be distributed directly 
to its parts, the whole property (in my example of a genetic higher level unit) would appear under the 
given conditions. 
If any whole, by force, is redefined to be only its elements, the non-existence of whales is dis-
cursively a priori given. It is then of course true by definition that whales can not be units of evolution. 
But, is it reasonable and relevant to the questions we are concemed with to proceed in this way? 
I argued earlier, that the general philosophy of downward reductionism and eliminative materialism, 
if applied thoroughly, leads to fundamental problems and does not achieve its aims of an independent 
definition of explanatory elements, of explanatory parsimony, and of an explanatory basis independent 
of historical change (~ p. 243). Also in the present more specific context it becomes apparent that by a 
redefinition of a genetic whole, the other genetic elements would need to be introduced in the definition 
of each single gene and that the result in this regard would not fulfil the criterion of theoretical 
parstmony. 
More important for our present concems is that such a redefinition would conceal the difference 
between a whole, or a system, and a mere aggregation. Certainly, by such a redefinition the synergetic 
properties would not be lost, but would only be hidden in each of the composing parts. Nevertl1eless, the 
philosophical message differs considerably if any whales, however well integrated, are said to be only 
their parts. This undoubtedly would have the inclination to neglect synergetic properties. But an 
aggregation like sand is obviously something completely different from a system, where the sum is more 
than its parts. Any definition which conceals tllis difference, is wrong in the sense of neglecting to focus 
on aspects which are essential to our discussion. It makes a huge difference to argue that whales can not 
be evolutionarily stable because they are undem1ined by selfish genes, or to argue that whales are 
anyway to be defined in terms of single selfish genes. Particularly in a selectionist context we want to 
know whether traits which are good for the whole exist and are stable. 
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Through my example of higher level genes, it has been shown that combinations of genes with an 
advantageous systemic property and a certain frequency in the population will survive, although taken 
in isolation, alternative alleles are advantageous. I think it would miss the point, if one argued that in 
this case no systemic aspect existed. Of course, in that example, the composing genes of a whole survive 
too and even need to survive if that whole should be evolutionarily stable. But this does not mean that 
the whole is merely its parts. I do not think that it has to be a precondition of being a system, that 
members sacrifice themselves for it. Instead I think it is enough if genes create systemic properties 
(properties which the parts separately did not have), which have an evolutionary impact and which are 
evolutionarily stable. Also in this case genes in a way are less selfish than one may conceive, since they 
build up a system. In this example they do indeed profit from the system. I do think, however that it 
makes a difference to the case in which even such systems are undennined by genes which do not have 
this systemic advantageous tendency and which are more advantageous on their own. 
I concede that this is not the most radically thinkable case of sacrificing genic altruism ( :::> pp. 278 f.), but nevertheless, 
I think, we want to make the difference between systemic genes and those which are fitter outside of a system. I will argue 
in the next section that ruthless genetic egoism on the one hand and radical fonns of group selectionist altruism on the other 
hand are extreme forms of a continuum. In the above example genes, albeit not self-sacrificing, become advantageous in a 
certain system, although they are relatively disadvantageous on their own. Such genes differ considerably from genes, 
which do not build such a system. Based on systemic changes the adaptive landscape for the single genes has changed 
considerably. It would be unintelligible to redefine this in terms which neglected these important changes. 
But even if one assumed that an altruist group evolved by group selection, which for some reason 
has not been undermined by selfish genes, such groups could also be redefined as outlined, since their 
replicators are of course somehow composed out of single genes too. This, of course, would obviously 
miss the issue of the unit of evolution debate. 
The case of a mere restructuring of the genome, where the composing genes stay the same likewise 
renders the outlined redefinition absurd. If chromosomal restructuring, for example, plays a role in 
formation of new species, the changed species are not only reproductively isolated, but also change 
some of their phenotypic properties. One would normally attribute the phenotypic changes not to the 
single genes, since they remain identical, but to the structure of the whole. Yet one may still proceed 
with a redefinition, simply by including different structural relationships into the definition of each gene. 
Although this is formally possible, I think it is apparent that this only conceals, what we normally mean 
when saying that the phenotypic change is due to the structure of the whole and not to its parts. 
Finally the idea of a redefinition would be inconsistent with the concession made by most gene-
Darwinians, at least by actually discussing only cases of sexual organisms, that in the unimportant case 
of asexual organisms genomes are the units of replicator selection. In the case of a redefmition, one 
would absurdly have to state that here too only single selfish genes were the appropriate level of 
explanation. 
In conclusion a mere redefinition of whales as simply the sum of their elements, is logically possible, 
but misses the central point of how far whales are evolutionarily relevant and stable. 
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(b) A tautological formulation, which is m my opilllon linked with the first one, is hidden in the 
argument that (in a certain sense) always the fittest single genes survive, and that it is thus appropriate 
to onlv call them units of selection. 
This has similarly been elaborated earlier by Sober and D. S. Wilson, who I generally follow here. I only differ in 
stressing the importance of synergetic properties, which they in my view also implicitly assume when discussing group 
selection instead of synergetic gene pools with fitness effects (:> p. 265)988 (Additionally Sober and Wilson are only 
concemed with the difference of group selection and individual selection.) 
If one integrates in the above ways all synergetic properties of wholes into the notion of single genes, 
it is of course true that the fittest genes always survive, because all systemic properties and top down 
effects then count in favour of single genes. This is because all assumed higher levels involved are 
somehow based on the genes composing them. Whatever survives, whether a certain gene-pool by group 
selection, a l1igh-level gene (although its components were less fit on their own), or a truly selfish gene 
which does not contribute to any larger system, one may state that without any difference the fittest 
genes have always survived. 
In particular E. Sober and D. S. Wilson have shown that, if one argues this way, even a model, 
where altruistic groups evolve because as a whole they are more fit than non-altruistic groups, would 
paradoxically still be taken as evidence for the gene-atomistic and gene-egoistic viewpoint989 The group 
which was fitter as a whole, is somehow composed out of individuals or single genes. Hence one may 
argue that it was the individuals or single genes of that group which were fitter, since they are the 
survivors. No matter how synergetic the genes of a group are, we can decompose them into single genes. 
No matter how altruistic they are redefined to be the most egoistic genes since they survived. Not taking 
into account whether their fitness is created by the group or the single gene, whether it is object of genic, 
individual or group selection etc., it is of course by definition true that those genes which survive are 
always the fittest genes, because fitness is ultimately defined by survive. Although true, this is, of 
course, completely uninformative. One would not distinguish between cases of ruthlessly selfish genes 
which are bad for the whole, and cases where the wholes determine what is good for the genes. 
If one really were to favour such a redefinition, the more substantive gene-Darwinian argun1ent that 
adaptive wholes may be subverted from within by single selfish genes, would not be necessary and 
meaningless, since one could in any case redefine the systemic advantage in terms of selfish genes. 
In principle a similarly absurd tautological argument in favour of levels of selection could easily be proposed. If we 
defme a group as flexible as we defined a gene, of course the fittest group always survives. We would simply still call it a 
group independent of whether even its synergetic properties are subverted by selfish genes or not. 
It is a tautological truth that only those genes survive which survive. If we claim that all genes are 
egoistic and atomistic only because they survive, however altruistic and systemic they may be, then by 
988 E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Onto Others (1998), pp. 3!-50. 
989 !bid, p. 42. 
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definition and not as an empirical result, all genes must be 
atomistic and selfish. It is, of course, inappropriate to simply 
excludes whales from the semantic framework, since tlus does 
not solve but only conceals the crucial issues of the unit of 
selection or unit of evolution debate. 
e) Higher Level Properties of Different 
Organism'>- Four Possibilities to 
Achieve the Good of the Group 
In the last section higher level genes (at different loci of one 
organism) have been shown to be possible. They can exist 
despite the meiotic shuffle and they are also stable if their 
components are less fit on their own. Hence it appears plausible 
f 
org. 1 
Figure 5: A simplified visualisation of 
different loci in the same and in different 
organisms, in order to clari(y my tenni-
nology. The first index stands for the 
organism, the second for the locus. 
(For simplicity reasons the two different 
alleles of each locus within diploid 
organisms are not shown.) 
that this also somehow holds for alleles in different organisms. In principle interaction effects of alleles 
in different organisms may exist in the different cases of alleles at the same locus, higher level alleles 
and cross-loci interactions of alleles. Why should there be no evolutionarily stable synergetic whales 
with a fitness effect in different organisms too? 
Firstly, I shall discuss how far these two different types of whales differ, in order to leam what con-
ditions have to be met to transfer our successful result to this type as well. Secondly, I will give a survey 
of four different ways in which properties which are good for the group may evolve. The first discussion 
may be skipped, but it may help to clarify the functional difference of these two types of higher level 
properties and also gives an, I think, interesting example of a selection above individual selection. 
(1) Wholes in one and in many individuals- loci and alleles. Despite the tautological undertones 
in gene-atomism, as outlined before, one should not forget the lessons which indeed had to be teamed 
from the reasonable aspects of gene-atomism. Groups of members which altruistically support the group 
may be advantageous for that group, but, as has been pointed out by Dawkins and Williams in 
particular, these groups may be subverted from within by ruthless selfish genes or individuals. Gene-
atonlists came to conclude that no higher level of organisation and no true altruism can evolve since 
genes always only 'aim' at reproducing themselves. Anyone who wants to object to the gene-Darwinian 
view of life needs to shmv that not only systenlic properties exist on a supra-gene level, but that these 
properties are also evolutionarily stable. Tlus has been shown above for higher level genes, now it needs 
to be shown for groups as well. 
In order to do tills, it appears helpful to work out the differences of lugher level properties of alleles 
at different loci in single organisms, L11 OL12, and of genes at the same locus or the same loci in 
different organisms, Lu OL21. Lu OL22, (Lu OL12) O(L21 OL22). Confer figure 5. Since we are concemed 
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with sexual organisms it is a simplification not to mention their populational background and that each 
organism has two alleles at each locus. However, this is enough to clarify the main differences: 
(a) The components of a higher level allele at different loci in one organism (L1 1 OL12) are coupled, 
whereas alleles being in different organisms are not. In sexual organisms they are, of course, mixed with 
each and every generation, but nevertheless they are coupled in the sense of having a conunon fate~ and 
are tied to the other alleles on the other loci at least as long as they 'inhabit' that paiticular individuaL 
thus until that individual dies or reproduces. 
Th1s does not entail, as is often simply assumed, that only those genes survive, which are most advantageous for 
individuals. We have seen that genes which are good on a higher level of individual integration will not always be 
evolutionarily stable. 
(b) The distinction of genes at different loci versus genes at the same locus is usually conflated with 
the above distinction whether genes and their interaction are in one organism or different ones. In a 
single organism we are usually concerned with systemic effects of different loci, Lu OLn whereas in 
different organisms we are concerned normally with the same locus in different organisms, L 11 OL21 . 
Although this is an important case, this conflation is obviously a simplification, since in sexual 
organisms there are firstly two alleles of the same locus, from the father's and the mother's side, and 
secondly we can also think of interaction effects of genes in different organisms at different loci, 
Lu OL22 , (these interaction effects play an essential role in some of my following proposals). 
If the genes of the same loci are alleles, they are competitors in the sense that one may replace the 
other at that locus. Genes at two different loci (L 11 OL12, but also Lu OLn) may together become 
predominant in a given population. Besides additional preconditions for not being subverted in principle 
a common universal victory is possible for these genes. This is not possible for two alleles on the same 
locus in different organisms (L 11 OL21 , but alleles at the same locus in one organism). 
To define an allele as being "synonymous with rival"990, nevertheless overstates the case, because in 
principle alleles may also cooperate with other alleles at the same locus (absolutely or relatively). This 
could be exemplified by heterozygote superiority (e. g. in the case of sickle-cell anaemia), where there is 
a negative interaction effect between two identical alleles in one organism. Although here the interaction 
takes place within an organism, this also leads to the advantages of a certain amount of allelic pluralism 
in a population. 
Higher level properties of genes at one locus of different organisms in any case have not to be limited 
to different alleles at the concerned locus. Traditional group selection has advocated a synergetic 
property of the same alleles at the san1e locus in different organisms. One normally concerned with 
altruistic alleles, which enhance the group fitness so much that their individual disadvantage becomes 
balanced by the advantage to the whole. Although in these group selectionist models the altruists are 
990 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1989), p. 26. 
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blindly altruistic to non-altruists as well (the alternative allele), the stability of this effect would be a 
synergetic property of the interaction of several altruist alleles in different organisms. 
Nevertheless, there is still a difference between different loci in single organisms and one locus in 
different organisms even if in the latter case there are the same alleles at the loci of the different 
organism. This is because of the background of the populations which are basic to these processes. In 
this case subversion from within is still a much graver problem. In principle both whales may become 
subverted. In the case of the san1e altruistic alleles at the same locus in different organisms, however, 
the very property which is advantageous for the whole, if supporting the other group members, in 
particular also supports the competitors of the genes with that altruistic property. In higher level genes 
of one organism this could not happen since (mainly) different loci are concerned. 
After this analysis we will better understand what preconditions facilitate the stability of higher level 
genes. Likewise in this case stability is not trivial, since we have seen that certain populational precon-
ditions need to be met if such a whole is not become subverted. In which way does the fact that we were 
concerned with alleles at different loci of one individual facilitate the possibility of genetic higher level 
units? Based on the outlined coupledness of genes, providing that is they inhabit the same organism and 
on the fact that the whole that they build does not particularly support their rival alleles (we here neglect 
that diploid phenotypes have on each locus two alleles) we could distil two transferable facilitating 
preconditions for the stability of a whole. Firstly, the fitness effect is only shown when these genes 
together 'inhabit' an organism. Secondly, their synergetic co-operative effect also gives a fitness ad-
vantage for its composing genes and not for its competing alleles (neglecting the allelic loci within the 
organism). I have argued earlier that it would be wrong to deny the existence of a whole which 1s 
different from the sum of its parts, only because its composing parts profit from its existence. 
These facilitating preconditions for building a stable synergetic system which serve the colllillon good are, as we will 
see later, not necessary. The stronger claim of sacrificing group selection will be discussed below. 
I shall now consider whether the conditions which facilitate the stability of larger whales in regard to 
inner-organismic higher level genes of different loci can also be applied generally in the inter-organismic 
case. In regard to groups this would mean that synergetic properties have only to be shown if all (or 
many) members of a group have the underlying gene, and that the fitness effect, if it is shown, is profit-
able to those members which have this property in particular. It is difficult to think of a strict coupled-
ness as in the case of inner-organismic higher-level genes. Still one is able to think of sinular cases. 
We may for example think of a pack ofwolves hunting together and sharing their prey. Tlus is group 
behaviour where sometlung is achieved which one individual could not achieve on its own. If the food is 
shared between those who have hunted, it is those members in particular who are profiting from this 
synergetic property, who have created it. 
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The non-zero sum advantage of hunting together, clearly a group phenomenon, is linked here to the 
suppmt of those genes which create this holistic effect. It seems that the only problem is that a gene 
frequency needs to become established so that the holistic effect comes into play frequently enough to 
lead to the predominance of the underlying gene in the population. A gene for hunting together only has 
its synergetic effect if others want to hunt together as well. Like in the above case of higher level genes, 
Lu OL12, the establishment of a starting frequencies can be achieved, for example, by a founder effect 
-a new population with a strong proportion of mutants. 
But true gene-atomists would object that there may be a selfish mutant which is too lazy to hunt, but 
still tries to get the same share of the prey which had been caught. Equally all such group cooperations 
are in principle a riddle to gene-Darwinians. But let us assume that the pack would after a while 
somehow exclude this selfish mutant from eating, from reproduction or from the group generally. Then 
hunting together and its profit are again coupled. 
It is indeed obvious that the selfish mutant who is too lazy to hunt, but still tries to eat equally from 
the prey of the pack, would under the above conditions become extinct. (For the tin1e being we are not 
concerned with the possibility of an evolutionarily stable sacrificing altruism.) But despite our 
massively simplified assumptions this argument does not yet secure the stability of the synergistic 
system which serves the good of those who establish it. Additionally the stability of the genetic basis for 
exclusion of the selfish organism has to be considered as well. 
One simple solution of this problem would be to add the precondition that both properties, hunting and excluding the 
non-hunters from the profit, have to be based simply on one gene, in the gene-Darwinian sense a relatively short strand of 
DNA. Since genes mostly have many effects-they are polyphenic (pleiotropic)-this is not as implausible as it may 
appear99J . 
Another relatively simple solution would be that we were concemed with two genes, but they are again for some 
different polyphenic effect morphologically or functionally linked. But since I want to make my argument as general as 
possible, I do not want to rest my position on this assumption. 
We assume that the two properties are based on genes at two different loci, which are not necessarily 
directly linked in any way. We are not merely concerned with another example of higher level genes in 
the L11 OL12 sense, since the advantage is a group advantage, communal hunting and sharing could only 
be done in a group. Whether in a larger group the hunting gene Hand the excluding gene E are present 
in one individual at L 11 OL 12 instead of in two different ones at L 11 OL22 is here only secondary. 
We have assumed that in our population of wolves Hand E are already predominant and is for 
example based on a founder effect. As mentioned above, it is obvious that an egoistic non-hunting 
mutant allele h will die out, because the E genes will exclude the lazy selfish individuals from the 
advantage created by the non lazy group. A more interesting question is whether the excluding gene E 
could not be subverted by a mutant gene e without this property. Indeed e-alleles might enter the 
population without being directly counter-selected, although in the long run they may cause a subversion 
991 Cf. for example: St. Gould, E. Vrba. Exaptation (1982/98), pp. 60 f.; generally ~ p. 307 f. 
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of the systemic advantage of the group. But only as long as no h mutants are around, the e-allele is 
evolutionarily neutral. As long as this is the case the e-alleles will normally remain in the population 
without coming to predominate it. But if a h mutant appears, things change. The lazy non-hunter h may 
now be lucky in the rare case of him meeting two e-mutants with their prey (without any other E-wolf 
there trying to exclude him). In this case organisms with the h-allele will be lucky, but equally the e-
allele organisms will be unlucky because they themselves become less of the food they hunted. Hence 
the few neutral e-alleles now presumably become less fit than the E-alleles and will be reduced in 
number. The case in which the h-mutant meets a group of e-mutants may occur so rarely, that it still 
gets excluded from the group advantage and becomes extinct. Hence the egoistic h-alleles will directly 
perish and as long as they are around the ignorant e-alleles will also have a disadvantage. 
It follows that based on the interaction between different organisms and different loci, which is often 
ignored, a synergetic advantage which would not exist outside of the group and which is advantageous 
particularly to those which create this whole, could be evolutionarily stable and will not be subverted by 
selfish organisms, which try to profit from that group and do not contribute to it. 
Below I shall argue that further radical cases of group altruism and group selectionism are possible. 
There the problem of subversion is graver. In this section the difference of loci and alleles has been 
clarified and an example of stable synergetic properties which are good for the group, involving a 
system of different interacting genetic loci on the population level, has been given. Here I only wanted to 
point out that less radical forms of cooperation and of synergetic properties exist, in contrast to the 
assertion that there are merely selfish genes. Thereby I objected to the gene-Darwinian spirit that selfish 
genes always undermine systems which serve the common good. If the population itself is endowed with 
the necessary internal mechanisms to sustain the course favourable to the common good, a subversion of 
this system may become prevented. 
(2) Four Possibilities To Achieve the Good of the Group. In my view ruthless genetic egoism on 
the one hand and radical group selectionist altruism on the other hand are extreme ends of a range of 
possibilities. In the polemics of some gene-Darwinians it is often wrongly assumed that the absence of 
radical sacrificing altruism implies the selfishness of genes. But the absence of one extreme does not 
imply the other. Without the concept of higher levels one is caught in this dichotomy, taking it into 
consideration, the world has more grades and this dichotomy appears to be a false simplification. 
Sober and D. S. Wilson focus predominantly on group selection of sacrificing altruism. But they have acknowledged 
that group selection of what I call sacrificing altruism and mere altruism have to be distinguished 992 Nevertheless, as far 
as I can judge, they exclude lower levels of selection which may count in favour of group properties. This is the case 
although they have treated at length the fallacy of claiming gene-atomism tautologically. They may have excluded these 
phenomena, because these phenomena do not necessarily lead to higher level properties, although they may lead to these 
properties. Although I agree with Sober and Wilson that gene-Darwinism could in any case be shown to be wrong, to 
neglect the differences below group selection leaves, I think, to much ground to this approach. 
992 E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Onto Others (1998), p. 30. 
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As I have elaborated in the above section on the tautological definition of gene-atomism, it is not 
only reasonable to distinguish between ruthless egoism and sacrificing altruism, but also between 
ruthless egoism undermining a synergetic whole and the stabilisation of a system which is advantageous 
to the whole, even though the composing genes profit from it. We of course normally want to make a 
difference between a criminal robbing a bank and someone who is conscientiously working for a bank 
(thereby I do not want to claim that people working for a bank could not become criminals). 
In the above example, the genes, although not altruistic in a self-sacrificing way, are sustaining a 
system which is advantageous to a larger whole of contributors to that system, but also to themselves. It 
is a group hunting co-operatively and the excluding selfish mutants, which try to make use of the advan-
tage of the group without contributing to that result is part of a strategy, which could secure tllis system. 
It would be wrong to redefine such an example in terms of gene-atomism and gene-egoism Besides the 
reality of single genes, a system has been established which changes the paths of evolution. Now a 
higher over-all fitness is achieved and individuals become advantaged who are, albeit not totally self-
sacrificing, less 'selfish' compared with alternative alleles. They do not exploit and undermine the com-
mon good. A redefi11ition in terms of ruthlessly selfish genes misses the relevant questions of the dispute 
and in its resulting simplified pllilosophical message is, I think, simply outright false and dangerous. 
Based on these considerations I now outline four ways in which properties which are advantageous 
for a group may become established. For the time being (despite differences) I follow Dawkins, Hull 
and others in distinguishing the profiting units of replication (on the genetic side) and the units of 
interaction. I showed earlier that in sexually reproducing organisms selection of individuals, against a 
common simplifying assumption, does not necessarily, but may lead to an adaptation on that individual 
level. This depends on frequency and fitness distributions in the basic population. Here I argue that 
'lower' types of selection can also lead to advantages for higher types of entities. 
In particular the mechanism which I propose for systemic individual selection may be interesting 
where the interaction of several loci of different organisms is shovm to lead possibly to a systemic 
stability of group properties, although without relying on group selection. Treating group selection in 
structured populations I largely rely on Sober's and D. S. Wilson's approach, but I add a proposal 
whereby the applicability of this model is strongly extended. Group selection of whole populations if 
combined with systemic individual selection may according to my proposal lead to stable whales, even 
without the need for permanent group selection. 
(a) Individual selection which may promote the common good. To state this possibility may 
appear trivial, but I think it is not as trivial as one might think and anyway gene-atomism has largely 
concealed this possibility. 
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Let us assume that the runnmg speed of deer evolved because it benefited the individual 
organisms 993 For this trait only individual selection should play a role and it is assumed that neither 
synergetic properties nor a system of individual selection exist (:> pp. 285 f.). Only those individual 
deer would have been successful in surviving which could individually run fast enough. 
We are hence concemed with absolute fitness values of individuals, but in principle one may construct similar 
arguments using relative values (not rmming fast but mnning faster than the rest in the group). 
For assuming an individual selection of the trait of running speed we in my view do not need to 
stipulate that deer in general are in all respects selected individually. 
Despite these assumptions it is in my opinion still possible that the survival of the fastest individuals, 
as a side effect, is also good for the group or for the species. The main objection to this claim is that in 
regard of this trait it does not make sense to speak of a larger whole which may benefit from tilis se-
lection on the individual level, because according to the above stipulation, there is no such whole. 
Nevertheless in a selectionist context ti1e intuitive claim that the individual good may sometimes lead to 
the common good can, I think, be justified. Here three possible arguments supporting this view will 
suffice. 
Firstly, if we can not speak ofwholes in regard to the particular trait of running fast, but we actually 
aim to distinguish wheti1er individual selection does at the same time undermine a synergetic whole, we 
still may take other traits in that group into account, which may have a synergetic group property. 
Presumably, a greater individual running speed will not strongly undermine any other traits based on 
group selection. This, of course, would need to be analysed in each case and is a matter of degree. But 
in the example of the pack of wolves hunting together, a subversion of ti1e allele for the exclusion of the 
cheater by individual selection, would clearly subvert the synergetic property of hunting in groups. 
Secondly, individual selection may even increase the fitness of a group, at least in the sense of the 
fitness of all its members. We assume a second trait that the group would always to some extent wait 
for its slowest members, which should be stable for another reason, for example because it is 
advantageous for vital group coherence. It would result that the fitness of all group members would be 
partly dependent on its slowest member. Although this leaves the austere world of individualism, 
running speed should still predominantly be selected individually; the slowest members should still be 
the easiest prey for predators. Individual selection eliminating very slow deer, would have a particularly 
positive side-effect for the fitness of each other member, by enhancing their absolute fitness (here the 
resulting running speed). Hence, although the physical running speed itself is based here on individual 
selection, its interaction with the waiting trait leads to an increase of the fitness of all members of the 
group. 
993 Cf.: E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Philosophical Work on the Unit of Selection Problem ( 1994/1998), pp. 199, 203. 
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Entity Reductionism (Physicalism, Gene-Atomism, Genn-Line-Reductionism) 285 
Thirdly, the most relevant positive side-effect of individual selection for a group may be that the 
group does not become extinct in the long run. Permanent individual selection pressure for running 
speed may also lead to a herd with enhanced running speed, which then may survive a new more 
dangerous species of predators migrating into their habitat. Survival is at least in some respects in 
sexual organisms a property of an evolutionary line, because no organism can reproduce alone and all 
genes come back to a gene-pool. An early strong selection pressure on individuals may sometimes lead 
to the survival of the group or species as a whole. 
These examples are obviously not meant as an exhaustive treatment of how individual selection may 
lead to group advantages. Definitely many aspects need closer scrutiny, further distinctions could be 
made and a classification might be developed. Here I only wanted to point out that this matter is neither 
completely trivial nor only leads to negative results. 
Individual selection does of course not necessarily lead to the good of the whole and to the good of 
most members of the whole. The subversion of altruist synergetic groups by selfish genes or individuals 
is the prototypic example where lower levels of selection lead to a disadvantage for the whole and thus 
for most of its members. Nevertheless, gene-Darwinism has concealed that sometimes lower levels of 
selection may, as a side-effect, also lead to an advantage for a higher-level. If gene-Danvinians do not 
contradict this claim explicitly, their approach in any case is different in spirit. 
(b) Systemic individual selection. This proposed type of selection is not based on group selection 
and can not guarantee that only properties which are good for the group come into being. It is also 
different from plain individual selection, because a system of individual selection may create a change of 
the direction ofthe whole which is not understandable on the basis of its parts. Hence, by chance or with 
only a little help of group selection, properties which are good for the group, but perhaps 
disadvantageous for the selfish individual, could become established. Systemic individual selection 
could, as I argue in the following, stabilise a property which has been established by group selection 
without the further need of group selection. 
The example I give is linked to sexual selection, but in principle other examples without mate choice 
could also be taken. 
One may also take examples similar to our earlier one of the pack of wolves which hunt together and stabilise this 
property by excluding those selfish mutants who eat equally but are too lazy to hunt. This has been shown to be 
evolutionarily stable against subversion from within without necessitating group selection. 
Now I consider how for a pack of wolves how the bravery of the attacking wolves could be 
evolutionarily stable. One possibility, discussed below is pem1anent group selection among those packs 
with particularly brave wolves, which have a higher overall fitness. Presently, I am concerned with the 
question of how, if taking other loci into account, such a gene or genetic system, leading to the good of 
the group, could evolve without the existence of group selection. We assume (in the usual simplifying 
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way) that there is a mutant gene B for attacking prey in a particularly brave way. In a way aB-wolf 
shall be an altruist in making more effort and risking more than the others in order to achieve the 
synergetic common good of bringing do\\11 the prey, which one wolf would not have achieved on its 
0\\11. Now there is of course the danger that this gene, though good for the group at large, will not be 
evolutionarily stable. It may become established for example by a founder effect, but in absence of 
group selection it will soon be subverted, because it is disadvantageous for the bearer. It will soon be 
outreproduced by less brave and comparatively selfish b-mutants. Hence, mere individual selection 
would lead to the extinction of B. 
But if a system of interacting gene loci is considered, all each regulated by individual selection, 
things do not remain that simple. Given, for example, that reproduction in these wolves would be based 
on female choice and that each of the wolf bitches only reproduces a few times. If a gene C were 
predominant in this pack that wolf bitches prefer to choose to mate with brave wolves (B), the tables 
have turned, then the B-gene, which is also good for the group at large, will soon be more frequent than 
the comparatively selfish b-gene. 
But this is not really conclusive yet; it needs also to be shown that the choosing gene C is stable in 
the population. Mutant c-alleles appear to have an advantage since they would not always mate with the 
individually non-fit altruists, who always risk their life, and whose offspring will later often have the 
same individually disadvantageous property. But this conclusion is false, as long as C alleles are 
predominant in the population. The brave wolf and its descendants will actually, based on the 
interaction with the C-genes in other organisms, be better off. Of course if c-alleles already dominated 
the group, B and C would not become evolutionarily stable. A founder effect, genetic drift or group 
selection would be needed to first establish these starting conditions preferable for the whole, which then 
would be stable. 
It has been sho\\11, that synergetic groups may have a certain stability and need not become 
subverted by selfish organisms or genes, even if this is not secured by group selection. However, if 
certain conditions are not given such a system may collapse. But claiming that such system does not 
exist and that we are still only concerned with nothing but atomic and selfish genes, is committing the 
outlined fallacy of claiming gene-atomism tautologically (:> pp. 271 f.). One may of course somehow 
redefine the systemic whole which has changed the adaptive landscape of each gene in terms of single 
genes, but this would miss the point of what is implied by 'system'. One may also reinterpret the brave 
gene B, which is advantageous for the group, as being truly a selfish gene, since it ultimately survives 
and becomes evolutionarily stable. Any result can be redefined in this way, including the more radical 
forms of group selection, treated below. The composing genes have always survived, but it of course 
makes a difference if they survive because they serve a larger system or not. Here systemic individual 
selection leads to the stabilisation of genes with synergetic properties which are advantageous for the 
whole (in this sense they are not merely individual genes), although they would not have been 
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advantageous on their own. Moreover, this system under certain conditions prevents the subversion by 
selfish individuals. 
Although systemic individual selection may stabilise synergetic properties which are advantageous 
for the common good (here still simply for survival), it has to be pointed out that this does not 
necessarily lead to the adaptation on the group level. 
I.n principle one may imagine that in the preceding example the situation would have changed so that bravery of 
individuals would not be adaptive any more for the group. Nevertheless systemic individual selection would up to a certain 
point still sustain this property. The assumption that bravery becomes disadvantageous for wolves is implausible; it may in 
some respects be more plausible for humans, who also have a cultural system of medals, honours and personal appreciation 
supporting bravery. However, the point is that such a system could have its own stability and inner dynamics to some extent 
autonomous from external selection pressure. 
One may think of the enormous antlers of the palaeontological titanotheres or of present species of 
deer. It has often been argued that the enormous size of the antlers in some cases is not adaptive, neither 
for the individual nor for the group.:m 19 Something like this, as I will discuss later, may well evolve 
through systemic individual selection. In a way it may be wrong to call this evolutionary process 
selection at all. Although this is a type of selection in the trivial sense that some survive and others do 
not survive, it does not fulfil the externality of the selection process which is normally implied by this 
term, particularly in an adaptationist Darwinian context. 
It may appear disappointing that systemic individual selection leads to an autonomous system level 
above individuals, but does not ensure that this system is necessarily the best for the group. Actually, as 
given in our example systems which are advantageous for the group, could and presumably often are 
stabilised by such a kind of organisation. If this is not based on chance, it at least needs one instance of 
group selection(~ below). However, the process itself indeed gains a certain autonomy. This need not 
to be understood as a problem, instead it may point to the fundamental fact that evolution is not only an 
adaptation to an outside environment, but also has inner tendencies of its own, transcending individual 
and group selection. 
This work started with an interest in the evolution of the biological basis of morals. The outlined 
process firstly shows that adaptations which are good for the group, could be sustained based on certain 
frequencies and gene interactions in a population. Secondly, this is a basis for an internal definition of 
what becomes selected. Inner tendencies of groups may come to lead evolution in new directions, which 
are not necessarily adaptive on the whole, but in which in any case the individuals are urged to adopt 
Although parts of our moral presumably serve the survival of the whole, helping the weak and wounded 
is not necessarily adaptive (at least not in any direct sense), neither for those individuals who show this 
behaviour nor for the group as a whole. This may point to the deeper truth that evolution is not only an 
adaptation, but is the establishment of new principles which from within may direct the further 
development. (For a treatment ofautoselection and autonomy:> pp. 384 f., pp. 398 f.) 
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(c) Group selection in structured populations. Group selection directly relates to the fitness of 
groups with advantageous synergetic properties. 
Many group selectionist models require that one group has an advantage over another to speak of group selection, 
similar to when one normally speaks only of a gene which may become selected if there is an alternative allele. "If all 
groups are exactly alike, tl1ere can be no group selection."994 Although this may be controversial, it will not be discussed 
here, since I only want to show that it is in principle possible that traits could be and are stabilised by group selection, 
because they are good for a larger whole. I only present one model here and make a proposal to extend the conditions of its 
applicability. 
Everything which is advantageous for a larger whole, but is not directly advantageous from the perspective of the 
individual or of the gene requires altruism. In evolutionarv parlance no consciousness is required for 'altruism'.=>75 
Altruism is understood as a general matter, including all properties and all behaviour tl1at is good for a larger group or for 
one of its members. This of course does not imply vice versa that every altruism, where single organisms without an 
advantage help group member is necessary advantageous at tl1e level of the group. This has to be shown in each particular 
case. However it is commonly accepted that we could think of properties wlllch are good for the group; gene-Darwinians 
nom1ally only argue that such properties could not be stable based on tills effect. I have worked out above that it is not 
always necessary that advantage of group properties have to be disadvantageous to its bearer. Hence sometin1es altmism, 
instead of sacrificing altruism, is involved. Still sacrificing altruism remains a particularly important question. 
I distinguish group selection of structured populations and group selection of whole populations. For 
structured population models groups do not need to be wiped out completely. The assumption behind 
structured populations has been central for the second phase of the evolutionary synthesis. 
Group selectionist models of structured populations differ considerably. They vary, for example, m 
regard to the assumed population structure, the conditions of mating, the mechanism of population 
subdivision, the selection pressures, the coherence of subpopulations or the incorporation of migration. 
Lloyd provides an overview of the differences of possible models referring to more literature on this 
topic995 Each model has its own advantages and constraints. They partly even contradict each other, but 
there may well be different valid models for different conditions. 
For simplicity reasons I here only summarise one model which has been proposed by Sober and 
D. S. Wilson 996 Their model is restricted to certain conditions and it may also be treated as a model of a 
selection of whole groups. I shall add a proposal as to why their model could more generally be applied 
to groups of relatively small size, which mix with the basic population, in any case resulting in a model 
of structured populations par excellence. Sober and Wilson show that group selection in structured 
population can also lead to the evolutionary stability of sacrificing altruism. Sacrificing altruism 
presupposes that the organism which supports the whole or which helps other members has an 
evolutionarily relevant disadvantage on the individual level. The fitness of an individual who is a self-
sacrificing altruist is by definition, in regard of mere individual selection, lower than that of the egoist. 
The synergetic advantage for the whole is here not coupled to the advantage of the individual. The 
problem is clear. If no synergetic multi-loci-system of individual selection secures the stability of that 
994 Idem. Onto Others (1998), p. 47. 
995 E. Lloyd. The Strncture and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (1994/1988), pp.48 f.; see also M. J. Wade. A 
critical review of the models of group selection ( 1978); on the relationslllp of group selection and kin selection: 
E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. Onto Others ( 1998), p. 55 f. 
996 E. Sober. What is Evolutionary Altrnism? (1998/1988), pp. 463, 470-474; E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Onto Others (1998), 
pp. 23 f 
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trait, as shown above, altruism will soon decline, even if advantageous for the group. How could group 
selection lead to and stabilise an adaptation on the group level? 
Figure 6 shows that, albeit altruism is less fit within each group and will decline in every generation 
in each group where egoists are members, the synergetic advantage of a group with a high number of 
altruists could lead to quicker multiplying of the average member of those groups . Although this has 
also a positive effect for the egoists and the proportion of altruists decreases in each group, this could be 
balanced by the different contribution to the total number of offspring . Without here calculating the 
involved frequencies in detail, figure 6 gives an impression of possible outcomes.997 The frequency of 
altru ists in the two population, 
taken together, first was 50%. 
Although the frequency of 
altrui t lll each population has 
declined ill one (or several) 
generations in the largely 
egoistic group from 10 % to 5 % 
and in the largely altruistic 
group from 90 % to 80 %, the 
altruists on the total , paradox-
ically, have increased not only in 
number but in proportion! Now 
m our hypothetical total popu-
lation 165 altruists and 135 
egoists could be found . The rela-
tive frequency of altruists al-
though falling within each group 
increases from 50% to 55 %. 
Sober calls this non-intuitive statis-
Group 1 Group 2 
Figure 6: Although the proportion of egoists within each group increases in each 
generation, the proportion of altruists rises in regard to the total population, 
because the group advantage in this example more than balances the individual 
advantage of the egoists. Please note the differences on the y-axis. 
(Similar to Sober and Wilson, 1998, p. 24 .) 
tical phenomenon that something on the whole may increase, although it decreases in each sub-class, in tribute to a 
statistician, Sin1pson 's Paradox.998 
Tlus model requires the additional assumption that from time to time new groups are formed , other-
wise the subversion effect within each group becomes stronger than the group advantage of altruistic 
groups. This differs for example to my above proposal of system.ic individual selection, which could 
stabilise properties advantageous for the group and which requires a certain basic frequency within a 
group to be stable. Here, the groups need to be different enough in their composition that the difference 
997 For E. Sober; D. S. Wilson . Onto Others (1998), pp. 23 f. 
998 E. Sober. What is Evolutionary Altruism? (1998/1988), pp. 470-473. 
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of their synergetic effects can be 'seen' by group selection. This variation may be provided by certain 
population structures. Sober argues that this can be achieved by a permanent fragmentation particularly 
of the quickly growing altruist groups, without a mixing too strongly with other populations 999 These 
groups will statistically vary in their composition. Sober and Wilson have also pointed out that this 
assumption is given in the case of sibling groups. Here in sexually reproducing organisms the frequency· 
of 50% or of 100% altruists could easily be achievedwoo Although this is close to what has been called 
kin selection, Sober and Wilson show that this is a kind of group selection through working on kin 
groups. 
This, according to Sober and Wilson has actually even been advocated by W. Hamilton himself, who has contributed 
much to the development of the theory of kin selection. In his later publications, particularly in an article from 1975, 
Hanlilton, based on equations developed by G. Price, has reconsidered his theory of inclusive fitness as representing a 
multilevel selection process. This continues to be ignored by gene-Darwinians. 1001 
I want to propose two extensions of the conditions where these requirements for stable group 
selection could be met, where no fragmentation but a mix and a formation of new groups is sufficient 
Particularly the second proposal may be of interest 
Firstly, there may be the possibility that phenotypic altruists may recognise other altruists to form a 
group, 'in order to' guarantee that differences in groups are found. This altruism would not have to be 
based on the same genes and no siblings need to be involved. 1002 The alternative blind formation of 
groups regardless of the properties of its members anyhow appears bizarre, particularly in regard to 
'higher' organisms. (However, this assumption is usual of most models which for mathematical reasons 
have to be simple.) 
Secondly, groups which should vary enough can also be formed 'blindly', regardless of the pro-
perties of their members. Besides the conditions mentioned above, I shall show that Sober's and 
Wilson's model is also applicable, ifthe groups mix again and again with the basic population, even if 
they formed again in a random way and if no sibling structure were involved. It may appear that tllis 
would lead to groups which always have a number of altruists similar to the average of the population. 
But in my view tills could be prevented if the formed groups are small enough, that they strongly vary 
by chance. In regard to small groups the statistical central limit theorem does not become applicable. 
Simple statistics could show that the average of compositions of each subpopulation (here the relative 
number of altruists) varies on average strongly from the average composition in the basic population if 
the normal population size ofthe subpopulation is small. 
999 Ibid. (1998/1988), p. 474. 
1000 E. Sober; D. S. Wilson.Onto Others (1998), pp. 62 f.. 
1001 Jbem. pp. 71-77. Cf. E. Sober. What is Evolutionary Altruism? (!998/1988), his footnote 9, Cf. R. Dawkins. The 
Extended Genotype ( 1982 ), pp. 187 f. 
1002 This proposal in my opinion has not to be conflated with mere reciprocal altmism. Although, in any group selection, the 
individual somehow in average profits from the group, in group selection the synergetic property is essential, which is 
not necessarily given in the case of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, I have also argued that reciprocal altruism already 
transcends strict gene-Darwinism. (Cf. also the subsection on claiming gene-atornism in a tautological way, ~ pp. 271 ). 
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What in textbooks of statistics is taken as a sample of a larger 
population to estimate a variable, for instance the mean value, of a 
certain property in a basic population, here could be seen as a 
group. The property we are concerned with is altruism. 
Whereas in measurement one is usually interested in getting an 
as adequate measurement as possible, here we are interested in the 
opposite. When does the mean ofthe altruistic property in different 
groups vary enough from the mean of the total population to allow 
group selection to play a central role? The statistical central limit 
theorem shows, as visualised in figure 7, that independent from the 
fonn of the distribution of the basic population, the means of 
different groups (or samples) of n members (or observations) 1003 
approaches a normal distribution, as n becomes high enough 
0 Gro!.!ps with a rei. treq of A 
Figure 7: The distribution of the 
munber of groups with a certain relative 
frequency or mean of altruists. The 
groups in each graph are randomly 
chosen out of a main population. 
Graph a may represent the means of 
100 groups with the group size n = 2. 
Graph b 100 groups with n = 10, 
c for n = 20. 
(normally n > 30). Confer the graphs of a, b, c. More important is that this normal distribution of means 
of different observations (groups), has the variance of din (where d is the variance of the population, 
which is not depicted). This implies, that the smaller the groups are, the more they vary on average in 
their mean from the populational mean, even if the groups are random san1ples. 1004 
Nom1ally one also depicts the population structure in such a graph. Since we are concerned with a dichotomic property, 
'to be or not to be altruistic', this would have resulted merely in two colunms one at 0 the other at I. It makes more sense 
to depict a graded property (which I have done only as an intuitive help). Nom1ally the central limit theorem is used for 
cases with a graded property. Sober's and Wilson's model will presumably also work similarly with graded properties, but 
this would need to be shown in detail, since the basic model would need to be modified. However, the central limit theorem 
is applicable to all fonns of basic distributions. Hence I have confined myself to this case. 
This shows that under the condition of small group sizes sufficient variance of the mean of the 
involved groups may be given, even if random group formation is assumed. Hence also small group 
sizes appear to fulfil the conditions required for Sober's and Wilson's basic model of group selection. 
(d) Group selection of whole populations. Another possibility of group selection is the wiping out 
of whole populations. In popular presentations of evolutionary biology this is sometimes falsely 
presented as the one and only model of group selection. I shall only mention it shortly and also only 
mention the possible combination with the proposed systemic individual selection. 
Let us assume that a group or a species of altruists which are advantageous for the group had 
become established by the founder effect or by genetic drift (phenomena well studied by the 
evolutionary synthesis). Now, the problem of subversion from outside and from within may become 
1003 There is a difference between observations and groups relevant to the central limit theorem in its nonnal fom1. 
Observations are usually understood as random samplings with replacement, whereas the application above on groups is 
actually a random sampling without replacement. In our model members can only be member of one group. Also if we 
do not want to change this assumption (this would be interesting as well) the general lesson from the argument is in a 
different formulation also applicable to random sampling without replacement. 
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pressmg. One simply could asswne that if egoism becomes too predominant in a group tlus group 
simply will not survive, whereas other will. Similar to Sober's and Wilson's original proposal above, 
only assuming complete isolation, the permanent division of successful groups and the frequent 
elimination of whole groups could stabilise the altruistic trait. But one may also think of two other ways 
in which a subversion may be prevented without the need of permanently wiping out whole groups. 
Firstly, tl1e concept of evolutionary constraints may provide the possibility that something which is 
advantageous for the group, but not advantageous for a single selfish gene, may once become 
established and may tlmn be stable for other reasons. The concept of structural constraints has recently 
been reanimated for example by Gould and more radically by Goodwin. Evolutionary constraints stress 
that because of certain morphological (or functional) necessities not all directions are open to evolution. 
According to this view, pathways, once adopted, may have an inner direction, which do not allow their 
subversion. 
I shall also argue that the phenotypic structure i.s not only a result of the genome, but itself also an evolutionary factor, 
channelling possible evolutionary pathways ( ::> pp. 315 f.). 
Secondly, group selection may once establish a system of individual selection, which is advantageous 
to the group and is kept stable by the i1mer stabilising dynanl.ics of the system. In this case only the 
installation of such a system requires group selection. (This concept will be treated in more detail when 
discussing species selection below.) 
Without such modifications frequent selection of groups is required. However, the elimination of 
groups in some species may play a role. Also in regard to the human species this might have played a 
role, if tribes were permanently at war with each other. But this is obviously not a pronl.ising model for 
the present day sociobiol<?gy of humans. If we indeed want to treat such matters biologically (I would 
advocate a relative strong autonomy of cultural aspects), there are, as have been shown, other 
altematives to strict gene-egoism. ln regard to present human sociobiology I would generally prefer a 
structured population model of the advantage of social groups, which mix with other groups, and also 
my model of autoselection, because these models appear more adequately to resemble the presently 
given situation. Additionally, we should not forget that scientific models of human behaviour may also 
have the aspect of a self fulfilling prophecy. 
To sum up, I have outlined four different ways, in which the good for a group may become achieved: 
individual selection, systemic individual selection, group selection in structured populations and group 
selection of whole populations. It has been particularly shown that systenl.ic individual selection may 
gain a certain autonomy relative to mere individual selection and if combined with group selection may 
secure the good of the group without the need of permanent selection. In regard to the presented group 
selectionist model of E. Sober and D. S. Wilson I have shown that its applicability could be extended to 
1004 Cf. e. g. J Bortz. Statistik. Springer-Verlag: Berlin (1993), pp. 87 f. 
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all groups which mix with the population, if the usual group size is small enough to guarantee the 
required inter-group variation. 
f) Stable Synergetic Properties and Selection above Groups -Species and 
Ecosystems 
Also at higher levels selection is conceivable. 11lis has been proposed in the evolutionary discourse 
for species as wholes and in principle also for synergetic systems of several species up to whole 
ecosystems. 
It is questionable, as is in regard to group selection, whether the term natural selection could be 
appropriately applied in the sense of a full Darwinian process of blind variation and external 
elinlination. Another less Darwinian proposal would be that only the second step of this process, 
differential external elimination, comes into play (:> defmition of Darwinism, pp. 107, 348 f.) 
Differential external elinlination of synergetic whales appears to be enough to make such whales 
evolutionarily relevant (the evolutionary stability has to be discussed in any case). It may still be an 
interesting question whether there is a Darwinian blind variation of species and ecosystems? In regard of 
species this has actually been proposed. In the subsequent chapter 9 the transcendence of universal 
process Darwinism will be discussed. Here I am not primarily concerned whether the particular 
evolutionary process is strictly Darwinian, but rather whether these higher levels of organisation could 
in any case reasonably be said to exist and possibly also secure their own stability. Here I can only 
touch upon the discussions on the possibility of the evolutionary relevance first of species and secondly 
of systems of species up to ecosystems. 
(1) Species. The evolutionary relevance and the selection of species in the present discourse has 
early been advocated by Ghiselin 1005 and Hull. Hull has explicitly understood species as 'individuals', 
having a beginning and an ending in time and exhibiting a certain degree of integration. According to 
Hull, the evolution of such 'individuals' could be modelled along Darwinian lines. 1006 
In biology particularly Gould and Eldredge have defended the autonomy of the explanatory level of 
species and argue that the involved processes are at least similar to those of Darwinian individual 
selection. 1007 
Prior to this, the proponents of the evolutionary synthesis, Wright, Dobzhansky and Mayr have in 
principle also supported the existence of species as an evolutionary factor. They advocated that the 
species is the unit of evolution which provides a basic frequency distribution of genes. To them the 
1005 M. T Ghiselin. A radical solution to the species problem ( 1974). 
1006 D. Hull. Are Species Really Individuals (1976 ); Individuality and Selection ( 1980). Cf. the proposal of B. Mishler and 
R. Brandon to decompose the different aspects of the notion of individuality, Individuality, Pluralism, and the 
Phylogenetic Species Concept (1998/1987), pp. 300-305. 
1007 N. Eldredge; S. J. Gould. Punctuated equilibria (1972); Gould, Eldredge. Punctuated equilibn·a (1977); cf.: E. Lloyd. 
The Structure and Confimwtion a.( Evolutional)' TheOI)' (1994/1988), p. 97. (On punctuated equilibrium ~ p. 149) 
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phenotypic structuredness of a population, caused partly by environmental, is evolutionarily relevant 
and an evolutionary factor, The concept of species in this view is linked to a number of properties and 
evolutionary factors like sexual reproduction, recombination, migration and isolation, Additionally, at 
least some advocates have even advocated the possibility of species selection along similar lines to 
individual selection, i, e. a blind overproduction of species and an external selection (~ pp. 130 f.). 
Heretofore, for example Wallace advocated that the species is itself a unit of selection(~ p. 115). 
The properties and evolutionary factors linked to the concept of a species, in my view pose the 
question, how far a species should be regarded as being an object of selection or in how far it itself 
changes the process of evolution. At least for reasons of comprehensibility, I think, we better distinguish 
two aspects of the reality of species, on the one hand the existence of the basic properties of a species, 
which change the character of evolution itself and on the other hand the result of the selection process of 
different species with possible adaptations on tllis level. 
The basic properties which more or less define the very existence of a species, like a common gene 
pool, recombination of genes, the building of subpopulations, the possibility of isolation, inner-specific 
migration, founder effect etc. already make the reality of species, transcending the individuals, apparent. 
But why should these properties make the species real? In my view these properties are themselves 
changing the very process of evolution. Inner-specific groups which we have treated above only become 
possible based on the existence of interbreeding populations. But also the very notion of single genes 
becomes only reasonable based on meiosis in sexually reproducing organisms, transcending the asexual 
evolution of whole organisms and their genomes (also the concept of higher-level genes, presupposes 
single genes in the first place). Genes as treated by population genetics are dependent on the existence of 
interbreeding populations. Semi-isolated gene pools are also necessary to sustain the variability on the 
species level, but equally for evolution on lower levels. But, likewise, phenotypic properties of a species 
like geographical isolation contribute to the way a species evolves too. 
The existence of species makes evolution quicker and less blind, and also changes the direction of 
evolution. Based on recombination new genetic combinations could be found more quickly. From the 
viewpoint of the evolutionary line, now the species, this process is less blind, because these 
combinations are tested in subpopulations, and if successful may become predominant. Before ne\v 
species evolve much will have been 'tested' before, within a species. Based on new combinations and on 
the fact that some genes are recessive, 'valleys' of an adaptive landscape could be crossed which could 
not be crossed before. But, what is even more important, also the adaptive landscape itself changes. If 
an evolutionary line is a species, as outlined, the evolution of inner-specific groups, as discussed above 
is possible and even probable.(~ chapter 9, on the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.) 
It is cardinal that a species is a central unit of heredity in the sense of our earlier emphasis on genetic 
context. All genes, all lligh-level genes and all gene-pools, although they may vary in their reproductive 
rate, are part of this river of information. The species, as interbreeding population, is the ultimate 
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context in which all lower units are finally interpreted. However, this does not yet guarantee that all 
evolutionary products of the species are for the good of the species. 
Nevertheless these properties of a species, as far as they change the process of evolution, are in a 
way inherent in all adaptations which result from this changed process. The crossing of valleys which 
would not have been crossed otherwise, the change of the adaptive landscape, are products of species, in 
the sense that if the species would not have existed these things would not have happened. Therefore, 
species appear to be real in the sense that they change the very process of evolution itself. Although 
most evolutionary results in a species appear to rely on the basic properties which a biological species 
has, not all aspects which are enabled by the very existence of species lead to the good of the species. 
We come to the second aspect, that of the selection of species and whether properties could be 
established which are for the good of the species. Egoistic genes, which may have an inner-specific 
advantage at the cost of the adaptation of the whole species, may gain dominance in the species. 
It appears that species selection is the only way that this could be prevented. I have outlined above, 
that it has often been argued that the general properties of a species, could lead to the process of species 
selection, similar to the neo-Darwinian concept of individual selection. (Actually, as mentioned, I think 
that variation on the species level is less blind, because combinations usually become tested before a 
new population becomes founded . On blindness, ~pp. 358). 
Species selection and the problem of subversion could be understood in a similar way as the selection 
of whole groups, only a species is a group which is, reproductively, completely isolated from other such 
groups. Correspondingly, again a frequent selection of species appears to be required if subversion is to 
be prevented. To arch.-Darwinians in particular this precondition should be no problem, since to them 
evolution anyhow consists almost only of blind allies. 
Subversion may also be prevented by the existence of evolutionary structural constraints (:> p. 
292). Another possibility would be that species selection leads to the installation of what I described as 
a systemic system of individual selection, which has a stability against egoistic subversion (:> pp. 285 
f). Such systems, as we have seen, have a certain autonomy relative to mere individual selection, but do 
not necessarily serve the group or the species. But if such systems which is advantageous on the species 
level once becomes established by species selection, this systems sustains it own inner stability. Species 
selection would only need to change these stable selection systems if they become non-adaptive for the 
species because of an environmental change or the inner evolution of other loci in the gene-pool. 
Species selection has often wrongly been understood in isolation from other evolutionary mecha-
nisms. Here a combination of species selection and systemic individual selection is proposed, which, 1 
think has a synergetic property and each on their own do not have. If both concepts are combined it 
becomes possible that adaptations for the good of the species are installed by species selection, but are 
stable without the need of permanent species selection. This may help to explain why some adaptations 
Part IV. Chapter 8: Transcendence of Entity Reductionism (Physicalism, Gene-Atomism, Germ-Line-Reductionism) 296 
on the level of species, have not been undermined by selfish genes, if permanent elimination of species 
is, likewise, no plausible assumption. 
(2) Ecosystems are obviously less integrated than species are. Different species are not 
reproductively linked to each other as the genes or sub-populations of a sexually reproducing species 
are. Although it is also much more normal for members of different species to hunt exploit and kill each 
other, it is not a priori excluded that properties for the common good of systems of several species or 
f Id . 1008 even o ecosystems cou exist. 
Ecosystems are dynamic complex systems almost defined by the interaction effects of their com-
pounding different species, organisms and abiotic environments. As we are here still concerned with 
replicators only, one may rephrase this concept as a synergetic ecological interaction of several 
reproductively isolated gene-pools with their environment (~ the following critique of gern1-line-
reductionism, pp. 303 f.). In either case ecosystems appear to be partly self-regulatory with frequent 
negative feedback loops, giving rise to new synergetic properties. (On the relevance of self-referential 
causation,~ pp. 398 f.). 
The predator-prey relationship, as a simple two species system described by the Volterra-Lotka 
equations 1009, exhibits neither exponential growth, nor linear stability, as usual patterns to describe 
single populations, but an oscillation of the population size of the two species with a phase Jag. 
Although this oscillation could be regarded as a synergetic property, it is not directly apparent that tllis 
relationship is for the good, neither of this higher system nor for tl1e involved species. In a predator-
prey relationship it appears that only the predator species profits from this interaction and will always 
exploit this system without constraints. But even such a system may lead also to the common good and 
may have self-stabilising properties. 
Firstly, restrains for the predator may evolve. If we imagine that in a predator species a larger 
mutation took place and that this species may 'win' the evolutionary race and capture all the existing 
prey, or so much that the prey species collapses. {yl/e may also think of a highly virulent bacteria killing 
almost all of its hosts.) 1010 In this case the winning of the evolutionary race could cause the e:x.'tinction of 
the winner. Actually such close prey-predator or parasite-host relationships are quite rare. But in any 
case the winning mutant will have a disadvantage and a geographically isolated group without this 
'advantageous' mutation, may have a better chance to survive and may one day also reconquer this 
area. On the species level the predator wllich does not wipe out the prey population may become 
selected by group or species selection and the stability of this feature may also be secured by what I 
1008 J. Lovelock has even radically advocated that the Earth as a whole should be regarded as one organism. Gaia ( 1979). 
The Ages of Gaia ( 1988 ). 
1009 Lotka and Volterra took a systemic approach to evolution, albeit accepting natural selection and arguing for a more 
harmonious understanding of ecosystems than the ascendent Darwinism of the 1930s. 
1010 On the group selection of!ow-virulence strains, cf. E. Sober; D. S. Wilson. Onto Others (1998), pp. 48-49. 
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called systemic individual selection (~ pp. 285 f.). But the real cause here would be the breakdown of 
an ecological system on which a predator depends; in a way we would be concerned with ecological 
selection for the good of that ecological system. 
Secondly, if we assume that the prey would win the race, it appears that this would be only 
advantageous for the prey. But as long as the prey species is not completely wiped out by the predator it 
may, as mentioned before, profit from the resulting evolutionary race, because it may also become fitter 
in relation to other predators it may one day encounter. Additionally, this victory also in part due to the 
effects on the larger ecological system might turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory. For example the possibly 
exponentially growing population may disrupt the balance of the ecosystem on which the species relies. 
Besides maintaining a moderate population size, predators (and generally consumer species), have also other ecological 
positive 'functions', necessary for the stability of an ecological system. For instance, the consumer species in the fragile 
ecosystem of the tundra are probably necessarily for breaking down the dead plant matter. In the tundra the decomposers 
are not abundant enough to break down all the dead plant matter of the producers directly, to provide the nutrients and soil 
for the plants 
Hence, even in the case of predator-prey relations something like ecological selection for the good of 
an ecological system may under certain preconditions take place. Nevertheless the probability of an 
subversion of such system is still high, since for example the predator may wipe out a prey species and 
if the disadvantage is not too high feed on another species. 
We now consider the less problematic exan1ple of a synergetic system of species which more directly 
serves the involved species. In such cases of symbiosis (mutualism) the interaction of species has a 
direct positive fitness effect for all involved species. Following my general approach, it would be absurd 
to argue that these systems do not exist, because they are obviously more than the sum of their parts. 1011 
Lichens, for example, are composite plants consisting of a fungus and one or more algae. The 
involved kinds of organisms are different in kind, but form a common body. The alga synthesises 
carbohydrate that is taken up as food by the fungus, the fungus provides a structure that protects the 
alga from dry and other harsh conditions. Some lichens have even metabolic products which each of its 
composing forms does not produce themselves. Because of the symbiotic and hence synergetic 
advantageous properties of this system, lichens are able to live as pioneers for example on rocks, in 
deserts or in alpine regions. 
But, a synergetic advantageous property of a system which could be selected, is, as we have seen, 
not enough for a synergetic whole to be evolutionarily stable. Additionally it has to be shovm that a 
synergetic ecological system could prevent its subversion by an egoistic species. Again we may think of 
a 'cheating' species, which profits from the system, but does not contribute enough to sustain the system 
and thus undermines the surplus fitness of the system. In our example of lichens a hypothetical mutant 
alga may produce not enough carbohydrate for the fungus and instead replicate within the lichen 
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independent from the fungus. Those egoistic algae would undermine the symbiotic system, but would 
internally have an advantage relative to other algae. But the symbiotic system in which such a 
subversion would have taken place, would have had a much reduced probability to multiply as a whole. 
This is quite analogous with group selection of whole groups. Those groups which as a whole are less 
advantageous may become extinct. Although from the viewpoint of the single organism we are 
concerned with something like group or species selection the ultimate relevant property here, however, 
exists on the level of the ecosystem. Hence, this is an example of a synergetic property of a system of 
organisms of different species which is not easily subverted by selfish mutants. 
Although this is an example at odds with a view that there are no ecological properties with 
evolutionary relevance in their own right, lichens are based on a particular form of symbiosis, which 
pervades almost all aspect of the life of the species involved and where even the reproduction of the two 
species is usually linked to each other (only the involved alga can under some conditions reproduce 
independently). The symbiotic system of these organisms has caused or is partly itself a selection system 
where normally ecological selection, via something like group selection, outweighs individual selection. 
The common reproduction of these different organisms guarantees that their synergetic properties are 
tested together in the next generation. Here the common reproduction in a way serves as the 
geographical isolation of different groups. 
That such stable symbiotic communities are not necessarily undermined by selfish mutants, also 
becomes apparent in regard of ourselves, as we, like all other multicellular organisms, are build out of 
complex, eukaryotic cells. According to L. Margulis hypothesis of endosymbiosis, the eukaryotic cell 
resulted from the association of various single celled species. Today these species in ourselves form a 
pern1anent symbiosis obligatory for their, and our, survival. In this sense each of us humans is herself or 
himself a symbiotic system. 
A strict link between the reproduction of two species (which still do not interbreed) appears to be a 
very successful strategy to secure a close and intimate symbiosis against subversion. It could also in a 
way be found, for example, in ants which tend and protect aphids and periodically 'milk' them. 
Although here the aphids could reproduce independently and the reproductive link is less close in some 
ant species, some aphids are taken with the queen when founding a new colony. But neither a strict nor 
a less strict reproductive link appears to be a necessary precondition for a stable symbiosis. 
In analogy, ecological selection can not only work like the inner-specific selection of whole groups, 
but also like group selection in structured populations, where the individual animals are not strictly 
bound to a group but mix again to form new groups. Concerning systems of species, a certain isolation 
or particular close interaction of the involved species also appears normally to be given, if this 
symbiosis should be evolutionarily stable. This common isolation and interaction of subpopulations of 
1011 On the problem of a tautological definition of whales as parts, ~ pp. 271 f.. 
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two species corresponds to what inner-specifically in respect of individuals is called a 'group'. But the 
common functional and geographical isolation and interaction of the sub-populations of both species, 
need not be a strict one as in the example of lichen above. A link of the subpopulations of the species 
limited in time or in amount (in analogy one can think of a semi-isolation of groups) could obviously be 
sufficient to stabilise a symbiosis. For example, there are ant species where new colonies usually take 
new aphids. These sub-populations of two species are, for the time the colony exists, linked to each 
other. For this time they are in a way commonly isolated and dependent on each other, although their 
reproduction is not closely linked in the sense that the ants species also keeps the aphids in new colonies. 
But the link between the subpopulations of these species is close enough that ecological selection may 
act on this system and that a subversion becomes prevented. 
But symbiotic relations also appear to exist if the relation of the involved species is weaker, par-
ticularly in relationships where many species are involved. Up until here we were mainly concerned with 
two-species relationships, but ecosystems are vastly more complex. The interactions in these systems 
are only beginning to be appreciated, but I think, although this can not be shown in detail here, that also 
some properties of a larger system are for the good of such systems and have been object of ecological 
selection. Different species are linked in complex food chains and food webs. Likewise, in regard to 
shelter and other aspects of life they are often mutually dependent, not necessary only in a one-to-one 
relationship. 
A more complex, but also quite clearly symbiotic, interaction is the coevolution for example between 
flowers and pollinators or similarly between fruit-bearing plants and birds or apes etc. Many flowers 
have nectaries to provide nectar which serves as food for butterflies and many other insects, which in 
turn pollinate them. The successfulness of the involved species relies on this symbiotic system they 
constitute. But for many-species systems the problem of a subversion is particularly obvious. Cases of 
subversive 'cheating' actually do exist, there are for example flowers, which imitate normal flowers 
with nectaries, but which actually do not 'invest' in producing nectaries. They do not support the 
synergetic symbiotic system, but still profit from it by being pollinated. There are also insects which the 
other way round make use of nectaries without pollinating the flowers which provide the nectar. But 
obviously this cheating is not so abundant, since such symbiotic systems obviously still do exist. Some 
insects even actively, with no direct advantage (but presumably with an indirect ecological one), help in 
pollinating flowers. Here a kind of ecological selection appears to play a role securing that the mutual 
advantages of this system are not subverted. This would be rather analogous to group selection in 
structured population, because the involved species are not reproductively linked. How such complex 
ecological systems are stabilised against subversion is only beginning to be understood by evolutionary 
ecology (mosaic evolution etc.). 1012 
1012 Confer also my defence of the evolutionary relevance of phenotypes, based on inter-specific interactions, ::> pp. 316 f. 
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The even much more complex interdependence of different species in an ecosystem becomes 
particularly apparent by the succession of different relatively coherent communities of plants and 
animals in areas which are either colonised by life for the first time, like the bare rock of a volcanic 
island, or which have been devastated, for example, by a forest fire. In the beginning of a succession 
only a few species constitute this system. The system is very fragile and the energy flux through the 
system is quick. Although the first species will soon be replaced they are normally the only species 
which can gain ground under these harsh conditions. As the succession proceeds the simple old 
communities are replaced again and again by characteristic new other ones, which are often more 
complex, often stratified, and enable more species to coexist with one another. If one is concerned with a 
resettlement of a devastated region by already existing species, the succession will cumulate in a 
constellation of an equilibrium, by ecologists called 'climax', where further changes usually take place 
only slowly. At this point the ecosystem, despite fluctuations, is stable a11d invading species largely fail 
to gain a foothold. Likewise if these species are able to enter this ecological system or if environmental 
conditions fluctuate, the increased richness of species and the complexity of relationships normally 
buffer the ecological system. The biomass, the number of species and individuals and the complexity of 
their relationships has increased. The energy flux has slowed down. The degree of organisation is 
sometimes expressed by the informational content and the entropy of a system, by the quotient of 
biomass (stored energy, enthalpy) and the used energy (entropy). One may dispute this as a simplistic 
understanding of organisation, but in any case it is striking that this systemic property, which also if 
measured in such a simplistic way appears to increase in such successions. 
One may argue that the involved species during an ecological succession create an environment for 
each other. I do not want to deny the crucial role of competition in this development and the possibility 
that ecosystems may be subverted by egoistic species and may collapse, but I do oppose a reformulation 
of the described ecological phenomena in terms of single species or even single genes and their 
environments. This would be inappropriate, since this would neglect the supersummative aspects of this 
processes and the systemic dependencies involved. 
Often the importance of inter-specific interactions unfortunately only becomes apparent after a 
system has become disrupted. The building of highly organised ecosystems in evolutionary terms also is 
assumed to need a long time, many millions of years, but their destruction can proceed much quicker 
Although extinctions of species are something normal in evolution, we for example currently live in a 
period of mass extinction. Despite being caused by human activity, the concealed danger of the 
ecological problems lies in an inner dynamics based, for example, on the breakdown of food chains. We 
also experience the instability of the remaining fragile ecological systems if non-endemic organisms are 
introduced into a system or if pests could easily destabilise 'an ecological system. The current ecological 
crisis also leads to an abiotic problem, like the depletion and erosion of soil, or, since less water 
becomes stored in plants, flood disasters and catastrophic draughts. 
Part IV Chapter 8: Transcendence of Entity Reductionism (Physicalism, Gene-Atomism, Germ-Line-Reductionism) 301 
Palaeontologically, the beginning and end of the Mesozoic era, the 'age of the reptiles', is marked by 
the world's largest mass extinctions. Besides e.>..1ernal causes a dynamics of a collapsing ecosystem 
should also be considered. 
The difference between species and ecosystems remains apparent and the problem of subversion 
appears to be more pressing in the ecological case. Of course, not everything which a species does, is 
necessarily positive for its ecosystem. Our own species gives an excellent example of this possibility. 
But if a species tends radically to destroy its ecosystem, it will not survive for long. A first step to 
prevent so-called Homo sapiens sapiens sharing such a destiny, seems to me, to stop denying the 
existence of ecosystems. 
I sum up the main results of the sections on the transcendence of gene-atomism as follows: Firstly, it 
has been shown that gene-Darwinian gene-atomism is not defined to be true by definition. Single genes, 
which are claimed to be the units of selection, are not defined as any stretch of DNA. Despite some 
echoes of such a tautological approach to the unit of selection debate, it is apparent that gene-
Darwinians argue that in sexually reproducing organisms short and selfish stretches of DNA are the 
only units of selection. 
Secondly, the general concept of higher genetic units is introduced and it is shown that the meiotic 
shuffle in sexually reproducing organisms does not prevent the existence of higher genetic units. 
Corresponding to my critique of the physicalist research progran1 (~pp. 240 f.), I advocate that genetic 
whales with synergetic properties can be regarded to exist particularly in their own right. 
Thirdly, probabilistic higher-level genes have a top down effect on single genes. This downward 
selection or downward sorting is presumably the simplest kind of downward causation. But higher level 
genes even within individuals need not become established by individual selection. High-level genes still 
may be subverted by selfish genes not serving the individual good. But, provided certain frequency 
distributions in the population, these high-level genes not only have an evolutionary effect, but they 
could become evolutionarily stable against subversion. 
Fourthly, I discuss the fallacy claiming gene-atomism tautologically. Here wholes are excluded from 
the semantic framework, because whales are simply redefined in terms of their parts. This is different 
from the first point, where such a tautology is given by the defmition of a gene as a stretch of DNA of 
any length. Now larger whales are not simple redefined to be called single genes as well, but wholes are 
defined in terms of their several composing single genes, with no regard whether the whales are more 
than the sum of their parts or not and with no regard to whether these synergetic properties cause their 
own stability or not. This is linked to the claim that those genes which have survived are the fittest This 
is true since fitness is defined by survival. This tautological view could even be applied to cases of 
radical group selection. Even there, of course, the genes are the fittest that have survived. This is true 
but does not contribute anything to the question of whether wholes can determine the course of 
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evolution. This tautological defence of gene-atomism has never been seriously proposed by gene-
Darwinians, but implicitly it may well have played a role in immunising gene-atomism against any 
critique. 
Fifthly, higher level properties in different organisms of a species are discussed. I describe four ways 
in which the good for the group may be achieved. In my view the proposed concept of systemic 
individual selection, transcending mere individual selection, is of particular interest. Systemic individual 
selection, based on an interaction of alleles at different loci could lead to a stabilisation of traits which 
are not favourable on their own. If once combined with group selection, this process may stabilise 
properties for the good of the group without the need of further group selection. In regard to group 
selection itself, I largely only follow the model of Sober and D. S. Wilson, but propose an extension of 
the applicability of their model to all groups which mix with the main population, if they are small 
enough to lead to the required group variance. 
Sixthly, the concept of species selection is discussed, which becomes particularly interesting in 
combination with the proposed process of systemic individual selection. Moreover, I have outlined that 
predator-prey relationships, symbiotic relationships and more complex ecological relationships could 
have a synergetic effect and their own stability. It appears possible that properties for the good of a 
larger ecological system may exist, which have been favoured by something like 'ecological selection'. 
ln conclusion, it generally appears to be wrong that-as gene-atomism suggests-an adaptation is 
never 'for the good' of a larger genetic wholes, but only for the good of selfish genes. Still, of course, 
we have not concluded that adaptations are only for the good of higher units and never for the good of 
selfish single genes. Based on the refutation of strict gene-atomism and based on the supported view of 
higher ontological levels of existence, likewise William's (1960) methodological assumption that the 
burden of proof should always rest on the higher levels of explanation, is called into question. It appears 
more balanced that the burden of proof should rest equally at all different levels. 
Even if we adopted the 'principle of egoism' in regard to substances and accept the classical 
dichotomy of substance and accident, genes have to a certain extent to be seen not as substances but to 
some extent as accidents of higher wholes. The survival of the whole is not only determined by its parts 
but the survival of the parts is to some extent also determined by the whole. In regard to Dawkins' 
concept of selfish genes, both the exclusive existence and the ruthless 'selfishness' of single genes have 
in their radicalness been shown to be wrong. 
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8.3 Genetic Reductionism ll: Germ-Line Reductionism and Its Transcendence 
a) Germ-Line Reduction ism- the Strong Interpretation of the Weismann 
Barrier 
The second form of genetic reductionism of gene-Darwinism, which is even accepted by some of its 
critics, is germ-line reductionism. This is a strong interpretation of the so-called central dogma of 
microbiology, the modem version of the Weismannian theory of the continuity of the germ plasm. 
Germ-line reductionism emphasises that there are only causal arrows leading from genes to body, but 
none "leading from body to genes ."1013 
If we replace 'gene ' with 'eidos 'lidea, this, paradoxically, becomes reminiscent of a Platonic view 
Genes are regarded as being somehow eternal, like ideas in the Platonic mundus intelligibilis they are 
the true underlying background of the actual , changing mundus sensibilis .1014 (Of course, neither Plato 
nor the modem germ-line reductionists would be happy about tllis parallel, because-as we have seen 
above--botl1 employ opposed concepts of substance, the fom1er focusing on fonn, the latter on matter. 
:> pp . 243 f.) Although germ-line reductionists obviously do not regard verucles as completely 
negligible (just as a Platonist would not completely ignore the actual world) , to tl1em the germ-line is the 
primary, approximately eternal, biological substance. Vehicles, like individuals or groups, according to 
genn-line reductionism, are less real, unstab le and temporary " like clouds in the sky or dust-stom1S in 
the desert. " 1015 
The view radicalises ti1e general tendency of neo-Darwinism stressing tilat tl1e developed exists for tile undeveloped, 
tile tree exists for tile genn, and tilereby opposes earlier traditional approaches. 1016 
Weismann (:> pp. 121 f.) stated that the genn plasm is never modified by tl1e somata plasm. The 
modernised version of tllis view, the so-called central dogma of microbiology (cf. I. Watson, 1952), 
states that the genotype, the DNA, is never modified by tl1e phenotype (figure 8) . 
( proteins J ( -> phenotype) 
DNA (genotype) 
Figure 8: Flux of information according to ti1e ' central dogma of nucrobiology'--an updated version of Weismann 's 
Keimplasmathe01·ie. 
Tills modenlised Weismannian view, bound to the theory of random mutation and ex.'temal selection, 
is the backbone of all neo-Darwinian paradigms . Since the end of the eclipse of Darwinism, tllis Weis-
1013 R. Dawkins. The Extended Gene ( 1982/89), p. 97, seep. 98 . 
1014 :> p. 78. 
1015 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1976/89), p. 34 , The Extended Phenotype ( 1982/89), p. 99. 
101 6 H. Jonas. Organismus und Freiheit ( 1994/ 1974/ 1966), p. 94. 
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mannian theory has successfully refuted alternative Lamarckian approaches (e. g. T. D. Lysenko), and 
today it is a theory which is very widely held. 
I would agree that much evidence speaks in favour of this modernised Weismannism with its 
implications for our understanding of evolution, but I think one should also acknowledge the following 
three points in order to reach a balanced position. Firstly, even Darwinian subparadigms differ a lot in 
their interpretations of the neo-Weismannian dogma. The Weismannian central dogma does not appear 
to entail germ-line reductionism. Secondly, even the central dogma has recently been challenged by a 
heterodox group of biologists and may become modified in the course of the molecular revolution. 
Thirdly, even if one accepts the basic Weismannian doctrine as a currently valid hypothesis, as I do, it 
does not give a complete account of the interaction between genotype and phenotype. 
(1) Different interpretations of the central dogma. The acceptance of the central dogma of 
microbiology does not necessarily entail germ-line reductionism. The central dogma is presupposed by 
germ-line reductionism. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for germ-line reductionism. 
Germ-line reductionism is a particularly strong interpretation of this dogma, which regards the 
genotypic side of evolution as being substantial and real, whereas the phenotypic side is regarded as 
only providing the temporary and less real vehicles for the genes. Dawkins advocates a clear and radical 
germ-line reductionism according to which interactors are mere 'vehicles', 'gene-machines' or 'survival 
machines of the genes. 1017 In principle Dawkins even goes further "Fundamentally, all that we have a 
right to expect from our theory is a battleground of replicators". 1018 
This approach radicalises the general tendency of Darwinism that organisms are understood as being 
the object of and not subject to evolution. According to this approach organisms are not only externally 
moulded by natural selection but internally determined by genes, which in turn are determined by 
natural selection. 1019 Gene-Darwinism, of course, accepts statistical fluctuations in the phenotypic 
expression of the genotype, but the organism is, nevertheless, seen as a mere vehicle, which does not 
contribute anything to evolution that has not already been given by the single genes. 
Proponents of the evolutionary synthesis have differed from the strict gene-Darwinian interpretation 
of the central dogma, which is also vital for their also largely Darwinian theory (:>pp. 126 f) 
Proponents particularly of the second phase of the synthesis do not support and partly explicitly oppose 
strict gern1-line reductionism. They advocate that the phenotype plays a crucial role in selection. 
Notably E. Mayr has emphasised the role of the phenotypic organism. 1020 But proponents of the second 
step of the synthesis generally also emphasised phenotypic properties at the level of populations, 
especially if the population structure of a species is phenotypically changed by geographic isolation 
1017 R. Dawkins. The Se((zsh Gene (1976/89), The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), :l footnotes 541, 842. 
1018 Idem. The Selfzsh Gene (I 989), p. 256, seep. 266. 
1019 Cf. K. Bayertz. Autonomie und Biologie (I 993), p. 346. 
1020 E. g.: E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought ( 1982), p. 588. 
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(~pp. 130 f.). Nevertheless some aspects ofthe evolutionary synthesis particularly in its first phase of 
'bean-bag genetics', also prepared today's germ-line reductionism (~ p. 192). However, in its second 
phase the synthesis can not be said to have advocated a full-blown form of gem1-line reductionism. 
The importance of the phenotype is even more strongly emphasised by explicit critics of radical 
Darwinism ( ~ pp. 98 f., p. l 06. ), who have reintroduced concepts of romantic biology to evolutionary 
theory. Despite many differences they all emphasise that evolution is not only determined by genes, but 
is also constrained and directed by morphology, body plans or morphological fields. 1021 (Often this tradi-
tion only has focused on structural necessities, but, I think, in principle the idea of phenotypic 
constraints can and has to be extended to functional constraints as well. 1022) Although proponents of 
such an approach may accept the Weismannian central dogma, they may still emphasise that interactors 
may also play their O\vn cardinal role in evolution and are not mere 'vehicles' or 'survival machines of 
the genes'. 
(2) Violations of the neo-Weismannian dogma? Despite the considerable differences in the 
interpretation of the Weismannian dogma, all approaches would regard something like the systematic 
appearance of reverse transcription of RNA to DNA in gem1 cells as being rather contrary to the neo-
Weismannian dogma. 
Despite earlier refutations of a radical Lamarckism, some more recent findings in molecular biology 
render a more moderate comeback of such a view to be not totally implausible. Actually, the existence 
of reverse transcription was first observed in the late 1950s. It was fully confinned in 1970 for retro-
viruses (H. Temin, D. Baltimore were awarded the N obel Prize for their findings in 197 5). Now many 
retroviruses are known to infect mammals or birds; HN belongs to this class. Although this in a subtle 
way challenges the central dogma, retroviruses are, of course, not processes in healthy organisms. 
However, the general molecular revolution, and the modelling of complex systems, has increasingly 
unsettled the assumption of a totally stable organismic genome, which only becomes changed randomly 
during meiosis(:> p. 148). We now know that DNA is capable of repairing itself Generally, the Nobel 
laureate B. McClintock has shown that genes can be moved within or between chromosomes. If now the 
cellular 'milieu' had a systematic influence on such gene transpositions, especially in the germ cells, this 
would definitely violate the neo-Weismannian central dogma. 1023 
1021 E. g.: G. Webster, B. Goodwin. Fom1 and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology (1996). 
1022 Cf. J. W. Bock; G. v. Wahlert. Adaptation and the Fom1-Function Complex ( 1965/ 1998), pp. 119-120. 
1023 Not all organisms have specialised germ cells. ln many plants or f1mgi the variation of somatic cells can be inherited. 
From the viewpoint of the organism this violates the Weismmmian dogma. L. W. Buss. Evolution, development, and the 
units of selection ( 1983), in E. Lloyd., The Stmcture and Conjimzation of Evolutionary Theory ( 1988/1994 ), pp. 66-67. 
Although this indeed violates the classical Weismannian theory, it does in my opinion not equally violate its modem 
fonnulation m1d its radical germ-line reductionist interpretation. Modem germ-line reductionists do not accept 
organisms as real entities anyway and to them the gem1 line is not defined by certain cells but by DNA. 
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Also in regard of mutational change genn-line reductionism may become violated by further research. It is 
acknowledged that some chemicals cause mutation, which are located specifically in certain chromosomal areas. 1024 If an 
organism under certain circumstances would produce such mutagenic substances itself, this might once be interpreted as a 
systematic violation of the Weismannian doctrine. 
One may paradoxically argue that Darwinian adaptationists should m principle predict that 
Lamarckian mechanisms have evolved. 
The non-existence of such a Lamarckian mechanism would also point to the limits of adaptationism. An interesting 
objection to such an argument would be that the Weismann barrier may also have an adaptive advantage. It may, for 
example, serve as a defence against viruses or it may secure equal reproductive chances of the genes, rendering the 
organism as a whole more stable. 
Since the late 1970s Ted Steel has been proposing and developing a Lamarckian theory of the 
immuno system of higher animals based on somatic mutation and selection and the reverse transcription 
of the aquired properties to the DNA. Although some of his results have been disputed, he and his 
school in recent years appear to have come closer to a full confirmation of their theory. 1025 If his theory 
became accepted, a moderate explicitly Lamarckian perspective in genetics would gain ground. 
Generally, I think, the self-organisation of the genome is still underestimated. Firstly, most research is still limited to 
very simple organisms, like viruses or the genome of fruit flies. Secondly, the evolutionary synthesis had reached a 
discursive equilibrium, allowing both pluralism and group properties. Despite their comparatively moderate interpretation 
of the Weismmmian view, it assumed a simple relationship between genotype and phenotype as an artefact of their 
Mendelian methodology1026 
Research which stresses the self-organisation of the DNA, even under somatic influences, may be 
promising, but it can not be evaluated here in how far particular Steel's approach is empirically 
supported and whether, in the case of its confl.Imation, it is applicable to other phenomena besides the 
immune systems of higher animals. 
I shall hence not rest my argumentation on the validity of this empirical claim. Moreover, an 
enhanced interpretation of acknowledged facts, in my opinion, refutes the radical germ-line reductionist 
interpretation of the central dogma, and defends the evolutionary relevance of phenotypes in their own 
. ht 1027 ng . 
(3) The central dogma as only a partial description of the relationships between genotype and 
phenotype. In the first point above we have distinguished the central dogma and its radical gem1-line 
reductionist interpretation. Here and in the following sections I argue that the central dogma is not an 
exhaustive account of the genotype-phenotype interaction, as claimed by gene-Darwinians. 
The central dogma merely states that the DNA could not be physically altered by the phenotype (of 
that organism). More radically, genn-line reductionism claims that "there is no causal arrow leading 
1024 See e. g. R. Fahrig ( ed. ). Mutationsforschung und genetische Toxikologie ( 1993 ), pp. 6, 50. 
1025 E. J. Steele, R. A. Lindley, R. V. Blanden. Lamarck 's Signature (1998). :> p. 148. 
1026 Cf.: R. Lewontin. Gene, organism, environment ( 19851!983 ). 
1027 In any case I do not think that a purely Lamarckian view is in sight. If, for exmnple, you start regularly to sunbathe or 
you went regularly to a solarium, your baby will presumably not be born with a darker skin colour thm1 you have. But 
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from the body to genes"~ 1013 and hence "organisms are but the transient engines of long-term gene repli-
cation " 1028 Gem1-line reductionism argues that there is no flux of information from the phenotype to the 
genotype and no autonomous role of the phenotypes in evolution. Phenot)1Jes are regarded as mere 
vehicles which are in principle reducible to single selfish genes and which are ultimately the only agents 
of evolution. 
We have seen that there have been biologists who accepted the central dogma, but have still advo-
cated the relevance of phenotypes in their own right. In the next sections I propose a justification for 
such a view which is at odds with strict germ-line reductionism. 
I argue that not only the information of the genotype but also what I call 'exformation' influences the 
phenotype. I do not deny the existence of genes, but argue that the phenotype based on exformational 
aspects is full of 'stuffuess'~ 1036 as well. A reduction to the gene level in this view is a false 
simplification. The phenotype even determines what parts of the genetic code are read and how this code 
is interpreted, otherwise the cells with identical genes in different tissues would not behave completely 
differently. Moreover, the phenotype itself constrains and directs its possible evolutionary pathways. It 
will be argued that phenotypes themselves are evolutionary factors. I shall finally expose a somewhat 
more daring proposal of how mutual morphological resonance of eo-evolving species may be 
evolutionarily relevant. For this argument the concept of form is replaced by the concept of a 
probabilistic morphological field. 
Hence, the 'central dogma' in the next sections will be shown not to be an exhaustive theory of 
genotype-phenotype relations and, thus, germ-line reductionism, as found in gene-Darwinism, is 
rejected. 
b) Information, Exformation and the Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor 
(1.) The General Concept of Exformation 
The concept proposed here of exformation can not only be applied to biology, but is intended as 
more general. It arises out of the critique of the modem materialistic concept of substance and 
epistemological downward reductionism above. Ontologically, it has been argued that it is not 
reasonable to reduce all whales to their parts. Epistemologically, it has been shown that it is not 
reasonable to favour downward reductionism as the only type of explanation(~ pp. 243 f). 
Somewhat analogous to the proposed t)1Jes of explanation (:> p. 249) an entity, according to this 
view, is itself understood as a form or a system, determined not only by its elements but also by the 
instead of seeing Lamarckism and Darwinism as a dichotomy, I shall argue that it is more appropriate to see them as 
extremes of a spectrum of theoretical options, which may even be valid in different respects ( ::> pp 3 50 f.). 
1028 R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 68 
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(irreducible) relations between its elements (form in the narrow sense). 1029 For the 'formation' of an 
entity, it is not only its in-formational aspects but also ex-fonnational ones which are important. The 
elements and the relations between the elements are additionally eo-constituted by an 'extemal' 
environment. Only those elements of the extemal world are relevant which are related to that entity 
(Uexkiillian understanding of environment). The entities themselves will normally only be stable under 
certain extemal conditions. For instance atoms have not always been stable throughout the history of the 
universe. Also the relations of the elements are exformationally influenced; we may, for instance, think 
of a whirl in a wash-basin (~ p. 249), where the direction of relative movements of the involved water 
molecules, the direction of the 'Coriolis force', is ultin1ately determined by the rotation of the whole 
earth. Neglecting these exformational explanations by restricting oneself to only an proximate1030 
downward reductionist explanation of a whole by its parts, seemed epistemologically and ontologically 
inadequate to me. 
The concept of exformation becomes particularly apparent in respect to computer programs. The in-
formation in a certain application program is always only interpretable if it is interpretable by the ex-
formational operating system. Together they build, so to speak, a fom1ational whole. Many functions of 
a certain application program refer to extemally defined functions of a larger system. Likewise while the 
text file I am currently working with contains infom1ation, it only becomes readable when a certain 
exformational program which can interpret this file interacts with it. 
Yet in this view how should entities be treated which have no further parts but are in themselves final 
elements? The only physical entities which may have this character are the elementary particles in 
physics. To sustain the proposed position one could simply concede that these are the only entities 
where there is no need to refer to exformation since they exist in an unchanged way, independent of any 
inner relation and any outer conditions. Although not a physicist, I tend to interpret these entities 
differently in terms of exformation. Quarks and antiquarks only emerge and disappear in couples; the 
so-called baryon number is always preserved. 1031 Thus a kind of context dependence, reminding one of 
an positive and negative electrical charge, apparently exists here as well. 
In respect to human memory it is not difficult to find examples of exformation: we only have to think 
of a knot in one's handkerchief or of a digital personal assistant. But exformation also plays a role in 
less obvious cases. Let us think of the activity of tying one's shoe-laces. Some aspects of this activity 
are obviously stored in our memory itself (information). But although we are capable of tying our shoe 
laces, we might not easily be able to carry out the exact movement without holding the actual laces in 
1029 Aristotelian hylemorphism may also help us to reach more appropriate results in the mind-body problem as welL 
M. McGiim. Real Things and the Mind Body Problem (1999, unpubL). It has even been argued recently U1at iliere "is 
noilirng absurd in tile notion of form wiiliout matter". J. Lowe. Form without Matter (1999). 
1030 The terms 'ultimate' and 'proximate' are used here ill a similar but different way from U1eir usual sense in the 
evolutionary discourse. 
1031 Such a 'contextual' concept of preservation is also advocated in regard to the lepton numbers Le, L~, L' of the three 
lepton families. See e. g. K Stierstadt. Physik der Maten"e ( 1989), p. 19 f. 
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our hands. Exformation lies in the laces themselves and in the specific interaction of the laces while one 
is tying them. Exformation is most intimately linked with information. Exformation in respect to our 
own memory is also often present when we are not aware of it, for example, in the way we structure our 
rooms or we organise our desks etc. The external is not always really external but rather a part of us. 
Although the concept of exformation, and more specifically also that of external 'memory', is in my 
view applicable to many areas, it will in the following sections only be developed in a biological 
respect, in contrast to biological germ-line reductionism. 
(2.) Exformation and the Stuffness of the Phenotype 
The phenotype, and also the extended phenotype, is not only a result of genomic information but of 
exformation as well. In the section on gene-atomism I have argued that together genes may form 
synergetic whales with a higher fitness than each individual part (~ pp. 258 f.). Also their synergetic 
properties can only be understood if the phenotypes are considered. In this sub-section another context 
argument is proposed now for information and exformation. 
In this view 'external' environments of genes are not only mere accidental surroundings of these 
entities but also essential parts of their being. Lewontin, for instance, has stressed that genetic and 
environmental causes are ,inseparable"1032 Neve1theless, I think that it is still possible to argue, for 
example, that the atomic structure of a hydrocarbon molecule itself is not coded into the genes. 
Although they make use of this structure, the structure is stored externally to the DNA. Likewise, the 
synergetic larger physical and chemical properties of a cell and of organs are neither completely stored 
in the genes. There is an exformational side as well and a morphological logic caused by the 
information-exformation interaction. From the viewpoint of the genetic informational side, 
exformational aspects simply appear as given, but they are nevertheless aspects of reality in their own 
right, essential for the genes and not themselves stored within the genes. Hence the phenotype is not only 
based on information, but on exformation as well. 
This argument appears to be linked to the argument that only the phenotype is visible to selection, 
whereas the genes or the genotype are not. This argument has, for example, been elaborated in a more 
formal way by R. Brandon, who makes use of the statistical concept of 'screening of'. Without treating 
his formalization of that concept in detail he generally argues that the phenotype and not the genotype 
determines and directly explains the fitness of an organism or a group. For example, the phenotypic 
property of the height of a tree may determine their fitness. Selection only 'sees' the phenotype 
irrespectively of the genotype. 1033 
This claim, in my view, implicitly refers to two reasons why this may be the case. Firstly, the pheno-
type, as outlined above, is not determined by the genotype alone, but by exformation as well. 
1032 R. Lewontin. Gene, Organism, Environment (1985/1983). 
1033 R. N. Brandon. The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors. 1998 ( 1988), pp. 180 f. 
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A genotype alone does not determine the properties and fitness of a phenotype but exformational aspects 
like the soil in which the tree grows could equally change the 'seen' fitness. Secondly, given constant 
exformation, different combinations of genes may also lead to the same phenotype. If height is an 
advantageous property, then a certain gene is not favoured but possibly quite different combinations of 
genes. This refers to the contextuality within the genotypic side itself and is treated in detail in 
section 8.2 (~ pp. 258 f). In any case the interaction of genes occurs on the phenotypic side, which is 
entangled with exformation. 
Although Brandon is right in some respects, I partly agree with his critics Sterelny and Kitcher, who 
argue that one can indirectly still speak of genes being selected, if one takes all the different 
environments into account and abstracts from them. 1034 I think they are right as far as they claim that 
one can investigate in which genetic and exformational environments ce1tain genes are fit in. But in my 
view this does not imply that single genes are the only units of selection. (I have treated earlier larger 
units of the informational side of evolution ~pp. 258 f.) and does not at all entail that phenotypes are 
epiphenomenal, a point which is more important for our present concern. 
On the contrary, phenotypes are ontologically and epistemologically prior to genotypes. Brandon is, 
in my opinion, completely right in arguing that only the phenotype could directly be seen by natural 
selection. We, and in a way natural selection, can finally calculate the advantages and disadvantages of 
single genes, but this is always abstracted from properties phenotypes have, which are in turn not only 
dependent on genetic information but on exformation as well. Evolution selects certain phenotypic 
properties, which are the result of certain information-exforn1ation interaction. Only based on the very 
existence of phenotypic properties, can we speak of a gene for such a property. Of course, today's 
geneticists have a direct acquaintance with DNA, but they also still need phenotypes to interpret a 
sequence of DNA as being a gene for something. The sequencing of the genome in the human genome 
project only reveals the informational code, an understanding of the meaning of the code, will only be 
acquired if the phenotypic interaction of the parts of this code and their interaction with exformation is 
understood(:> p. 21). 1035 I do not deny the reality of genes, but I advocate the reality of phenotypes as 
well, which have properties not stored in the genes. Moreover, phenotypes are the very basis from which 
we and selection abstracts the meaning of genes. Tlus gives us a first impression of why "anatomical or 
morphological structure is full of 'stuffness'." 1036 The phenotype is based on a synergetic interaction of 
information and exformation. A view centred exclusively on information has to be rejected. It is not 
possible to reduce phenotypes completely to genic information. 
1034 K. Stere1ny, P. Kitcher. The Return of the Gene (1988/1998), pp. 165 f. 
1035 Cf.: H. Markl. V on der Mediengesellschafi zur Wissensgesellschaft (1997), p. 16. 
1036 P. Beurton. Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics ( 1981 ), p. 49. 
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(3.) The Phenotype Interpreting the Genotype 
Although I have accepted the neo-Weismannian central dogma, the phenotype is hence not reducible 
to the informational side of evolution. I now argue that the phenotype, or indirectly also the outer 
exfom1ation of genes, is crucial for the interpretation of the DNA itself. It would be wrong to assume 
that in a phenotype the genetic information itself interacts in an unaltered way with exformation. It is 
more appropriate to argue that, although the physical DNA structure is not altered, the infommtion 
content (here in the sense of meaning) of the DNA itself is often changed by different exformational 
contexts. The 'semiotics of the genotype' are not context free and unambiguous 1037 The influence of the 
phenotypes and the cellular milieu on the interpretation of the genotype becomes apparent by the 
different functioning of cells in different tissues, which all physically have the physically the same code 
of DNA. In developmental biology it becomes apparent that during the phases of ontogenesis different 
genetic sections are decoded by the phenotype. 
The importance of somatic and e:>..'tra-somatic ex-formation was, for example, stressed earlier on by 
Driesch, who showed that during the early growth of a frog the cells of the frog's head could be 
transposed to its foot and vice versa. Their function at this stage solely depends on their position, i. e. 
their morphological and functional relation within the body. 
Exformational aspects could even change the mode of reproduction. For example the Alpine 
Meadow Grass (Poa alpina var. vivipara L.) or some orchids reproduce either sexually or asexually 
depending on their environment1038 The informational side, of course, allows this possibility, but to 
ignore the importance of exformation in such an exan1ple is particularly absurd. 
On the other hand the genotype likewise, in an Uexki.illian sense, determines to a certain extent itself 
what exformational or environmental aspects become important. In turn the resulting somatic and extra-
somatic exformation detem1ines to a certain extent which aspects of the genome are read and how they 
are interpreted. Despite their differences information and exformation mutually determine each other 
dialectically. P. Beurton argued that "the evolutionary nature of genes is non-existent outside the 
whole. "1039 I would not go that far, but, despite the existence of genes, I think it is true that biological 
information and exformation are concepts which are mutually dependent on each other. The information 
plays a role in interpreting the environment, as the exformation and the inner dynamics of the phenotype 
do in interpreting the DNA. 
The importance of exformation particularly becomes obvious in human culture as a special example of exformationa1 
memory(:> pp. 315 f.). Medicine has mainly changed not the genetic makeup of humans, but has exformationally achieved 
the improvement of phenotypes. Particularly in a philosophical treatment of biology one should be aware that general 
biological concepts are often equally applied to humans as well. It would be wrong to conceal the evolutionary importance 
of exformation terminologically. 
1037 E. L. Khalil. Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism: Clearing the Way for Histon·cal Thinking (1992), p. 34. 
Contextualism, normally used in cultural epistemology has recently been advocated e. g. by Putnan1 and Derrida. 
1038 Personal communication wifu Simon Pierce (Univ. of Durham, Dept. of Biology, 1997). 
1039 P. Beurton. Organismic Evolution and Subject-Object Dialectics (1981), p. 49. 
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morphological and ecological exfom1ation 
---------------~ 
Figure 9: Flux of.formation, including information and exformation, according to ti1e points (1.) to (5.) ofti1is section1040 
The phenotype is not only determined by genic information, but by exfonnation as well. Even if one accepts the central 
dogma of microbiology, the resulting phenotype has itself a certain influence on the genotype, interpreting the infom1ation 
and influencing what is transcribed (dotted arrows). Also the transfer of cytoplasm from phenotype to phenotype is 
indicated (dashed arrows). Moreover, not depicted here, the phenotype constrains and directs the viable evolutionary 
pathways (5.). 
(4.) Stuffness and Innel' Dynamics of the Phenotype 
Stressing the information-exformation interaction one may still neglect the iimer dynamics of 
phenotypic development. For example, Lewontin has turned against the view that organisms can be seen 
merely as effects with internal and external causes. 1041 He continues: ,The fundamental general fact of 
phenogenetics is that the phenotype of organisms is a consequence of non-trivial ii1teraction between 
genotype and environment during development. [ ... ] The phenotype at any instant is not siinply the 
consequence of its genotype and current environment. but also of its phenotype at the previous instant. 
That is, development is a first order Markov process in which the next step depends upon the present 
state. [ ... ] Organisms as entities are one ofthe causes oftheir own development"1042 
One may object that this might only be a plausible concept for ontogenesis, not for phylogenesis, 
since organisms die and only genes are transferred to the next generation. 
Later I shall propose how phenotypic structures are not only exformationally influenced, but that in a 
liinited sense properties can be inl1erited by morphological resonance (:> pp. 315 f.). 
Here I only want to point out that it is not correct to assume that the genotype at any tin1e of 
reproduction is bare of any phenotypic context. Cytoplasm always embeds the nuclear genes even in the 
genu cells. A phenotypic context with which to interpret the DNA appears to be needed. 
More controversially, it has recently been argued, by M. W. Ho, that the cytoplasm also stores 
acquired characteristics of the phenotype, which may be transmitted to the next generation in this 
way 1043 However, the continuous phenotype provides a necessary context for the interpretation of the 
genome, not reducible to genic information alone. 
104
° Cf. also: R. Sheldrake. Das Gedachtnis der Natur ( 1988, 1991 ), p. 135 (refering to B. Goodwin). 
1041 R. Lewontii1. Gene, Organism, Environment (I 985/1983), p. 274. 
1042 !bid, p. 277, p. 279. 
1043 See: M.-W. Ho, P. T. Saunders (eds.). Beyond Neo-Darwinism: An Introduction to the New Evolutionary Paradigm 
(1984). p. 280 ff. 
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(5.) The Phenotype as Evolutionary Factor in Its Own Right 
The phenotype is not only irreducible to the genotype because of its partly exformational basis and 
its inner dynamics, but can itself be regarded as an evolutionary factor in its own right. 
Opponents of gene-Darwinism have often criticised the gem1-line reductionist position which ignores 
the phenotypic morphology constraining or directing evolution. The concept of evolutionary constraints 
and i1mer direction is also historically rather opposed to Darwinism and is a hallmark of Platonic, 
Aristotelian, idealistic (eidos = form) or romantic biology, which claim a structural logic of 
development, rather in terms of form than in terms of matter (:>pp. 98 f., 102 f). Notwithstanding the 
triumph of Darwinism there has always been a more or less continuous, presently iconoclastic, research 
tradition of structurally orientated approaches in biology. H. Driesch, D 'Arcy Thompson and 
C. H. Waddington are some ofthe main figures ofthis heterodox tradition. Today, the British biologist 
Goodwin, a disciple of Thompson, appears to be the most well known proponent of a morphologically 
orientated school of thought in the English speaking countries 1044 But implicitly also proponents of the 
evolutionary synthesis, particularly Mayr (despite his critique of essentialism) may still have been 
somewhat influenced by this research tradition through their acceptance of a realist stance towards 
phenotypes. S. J. Gould, who is, modifications aside, largely a Darwinist even more explicitly 
advocates the non-Darwinian concept of structural necessities and constraints. 
Structural phenotypic necessities and resulting pathways in developmental biology have led 
Waddington to coin the metaphor of an epigenetic landscape. This notion has been applied to individual 
ontogeny and to phylogeny as well. Similarly, the concept of a body plan stressed phenotypic 
constraints. Arthropods (i. e. crabs, centipedes, spiders and insects) for example have exoskeletons, 
which protect them, but which are somewhat ineffective if the organism increases in size, since it needs 
to repeatedly burst out of its old skeleton. The body plan of an exoskeleton constrains the evolution of 
larger arthropods. 
The notion of a body plan need not necessary be understood in a Platonic way favouring only one ideal realisation but 
could also be understood in a rather Aristotelian sense, allowing variance, where the form, despite its own causal relevance 
is established by its parts. Later I shall for similar reasons replace the concept of fonns by the concept of fields. 1045 
The emphasis on forms, morphology and evolutionary constraints has been alien to Darwinism 
particularly because this aspect of the evolutionary process is not necessarily adaptive. 1046 Organismic 
constraints limit the number of possible pathways which selection may take. Hence not all aspects of 
evolutionary change are adaptive. Moreover, the traditional focus of Darwinism is on matter, not on 
form, and on a structural developmental logic. The focus is on the selection by an external environment 
and not on directions resulting from the inner phenotypic morphology. 
1044 G. Webster, B. GoodwilL Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology (1996). 
1045 :> footnote 969 and pp. 315 f. 
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Some gene-Darwinians have simply excluded such structural questions from the scientific agenda. 
They are just simply interested in adaptive phenomena. If one then claims the truth of pan-adaptionism 
one commits a tautological fallacy (:) pp. 330 f.). Despite my critical attitude to radical Darwinism 
(~ chapter 9), I, like Gould, think that morphological approaches could be harmonised with a modified 
selectionist account. 1047 But since adaptation is closely entangled with structural aspects I agree with 
Lewontin that the metaphor of adaptation has to be generally replaced-or has at least to be 
complemented-by a metaphor of construction. 1048 
It is not only these phenotypes of organisms but also those of groups that are full of stuffness and 
can be regarded as evolutionary factors. Earlier I showed why gene-pools could develop properties 
which are good for the group and which are not necessarily subverted by selfish genes (::> pp. 278 f.). 
These properties have been discussed on the genotypic side (gene-pools). Nevertheless, these properties, 
which are similar to the properties of individuals, can only be understood when based on an interaction 
of genetic infom1ation and exformation. This view would also rehabilitate the view of the evolutionary 
synthesis that the phenotypic structuredness of populations and the intensity of their geographical 
isolation are themselves evolutionary factors. 
Phenotypes, organisms as well as groups etc. have to be taken seriously. They are full of stuffness, 
are not reducible to the genetic side and their constraints have an own evolutionary effect. The results of 
the last five sub-sections are partly visualised in figure 9. The phenotype is not formed by genetic 
information alone, but by exformation as well. It is full of stuffness and can not be reduced to the germ-
line. Despite accepting the neo-Weismannian central dogma, the phenotype also plays an important role 
in regard to how the genotype is interpreted and which sections of the DNA-code are transcribed at all. 
Finally the phenotypic structure, has its own causal relevance in constraining, enabling and facilitating 
certain evolutionary pathways. The phenotype is not only irreducible to the genotype but itself shapes 
evolution. Hence it is wrong to regard phenotypes merely as accidental vehicles or temporary 
epiphenomena without their own causal role, instead it is more appropriate to regard them as 
evolutionary factors in their own right. 
c) Forms, Fields and the Concept of an External Memory 
After having shown the stuffness of the phenotype and even its role as an evolutionary factor, I shall 
now advocate the more controversial case that, rather than only having phenotypes in±1uenced by 
exformation, changes of exformation may, in a way, be stored systematically outside the phenotype in 
1046 A more differentiated account on different relations of constraints and adaptation is given by: R. Amundson. Two 
Concepts of Constraint: Adaptationism and the Challenge .from Developmental Biology (199411998), p. 96 f 
1047 In my view selectionism in a very broad sense, does not imply a strict Darwinian process of blind-variation-and-
external-elimination, :> pp. 348 f.. 
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question. Tllis additional argument is, in my v1ew, not essential for my critique of germ-line 
reductionism, but it may still be an interesting proposal based on the concept of exformation. 
In the claimed 'external' memory other genotypes do play an essential role, but from the viewpoint of 
a certain organism or evolutionary line this is a flux of exfornmtion, since another evolutionary line is 
involved and the phenotypical interaction of this line is cardinal. This proposed alternative interpretation 
would also have consequences for our taxonomy, rendering some folk biological assumptions truer than 
a strictly Darwinian taxonomy would concede. 
I first want to develop why we may speak of more or less given environmental forms This merely 
resembles a phenotypic formulation for the concept of a niche. It will be argued that since these fonns 
are probabilistic in nature we should rather interpret them as fields. Secondly, the concept of morphic 
resonance and exformational memory will be developed. Thirdly, possible taxononlic consequences are 
explored. 
(1.) Environmental Forms and Fields 
Based on the stuffness of phenotypes shown above one can also interpret the interaction of 
phenotypes in terms ofphenotypic forms. We have seen that despite the crucial role of genes, a fitness 
advantage is a property of a phenotype. The height of trees is advantageous and not directly assigned to 
a certain gene for height. But this property of an organism, is not only a property of that organism, but a 
property of the interaction with phenotypes of other organisms, here with an interaction with other trees 
with a certain height. A structure is advantageous only in relation to a phenotypic context of the 
organism or species in question. In this sense a form is at least partly environmentally given. 
This concept of an external form is largely identical with that of an ecological niche. In both cases 
the concept of potentiality is involved. An increase in height would increase the fitness of the phenotype. 
Environmental form is, firstly, a very broad application of the niche concept and, secondly, interprets it 
in a phenotypic sense. Contrarily germ-line reductionists regard a biotic niche, as a short cut with which 
to talk about genes. Despite the importance of genes, such a view, I think, neglects the stuffhess of 
niches, based on the stuffhess of the compounding organisms. 
Tllis fonn or niche is environmental since its location is external to the organism. Nevertheless, it is 
not strictly external, for, according to our partly constructivist view, it is related to the interaction of a 
certain phenotype. A niche is a part of the specific environment of a phenotype. Environment is here 
understood in a subjective Uexkiillian sense1049 . A niche for bacteria does not equally exist for 
mammals. 
1048 R. Lewontin. Gene, Organism, Environment ( 198511983 ), pp. 279-280. Cf. also M. Ruse. The Mysteries o.f Mysteries. 
1999, pp. 167. 
1049 J. v. Uexktill. Theoretische Biologie (1928173). A. Pobojewska. Die Umweltkonzeption Jacob van Uexkulls (1993). 
Also: R. Lewontin. Gene, Organism, Environment ( 1985/1983 ), pp. 280, 282. 
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We are confronted with a dialectics of the inner and the outer. The phenotype partly defmes what aspects of the 
external world are exforrnationally relevant and the exforrnation partly moulds the phenotype. 
The resulting notion of an environmental forn1 is here used in a partly adaptationist and a partly 
constructivist way. The niche is partly given, partly constructed by features of the phenotype itself 
Despite the venerable tradition of the concept of forn1 (reaching back in different ways to Plato and 
Aristotle) I think that it is important in the current context to replace the concept of fonn with the 
concept of a field, or, to denote the subject area, with a 'morphogenetic field'. 
Also, for example, R. Sheldrake proposed that biological forms, should in an evolutionary context rather be regarded as 
fields. 1050 Goodwin and Webster in detail have elaborated a morphological approach and have advocated a concept of 
hierarchical fields. 1051 
Also proponents of biological systems theory, not influenced directly by a morphological tradition often advocated the 
reality of the phenotype. I think also these approaches may in principle be open to a field idea (L v. Bertalanffy, B. 
Hassenstein, E. Jantsch, R. Riedl, G. P Wagner, F. Wuketits, ~ p. 151.). 
ln my view the concept of form should be replaced with the concept of t1elds, because a phenotype 
encounters these external forms in a probabilistic way. 
For example flowers are not adapted to and 'exforn1ed' by individual bees, although each pollinating 
bee contributes to this process. In this sense, the property of pollination refers rather to the 'beehood' at 
large or even to the 'pollen collecting insecthood'. (~ pp. 293 f) 
Hence in their effect environmental forms are rather reminiscent of physical fields or patterns in a 
neural net, where there are only fuzzy borders. Their effect is not that of rigidly defined forn1s or moulds 
with defined borders. Here, the negative aspect of essentialism, neglecting pluralism (as criticised by 
Hull, Mayr and Popper) can be prevented. Nevertheless, we may still think of an evolutionary logic of 
such probabilistic forms in an environmental context too. The actual forms or fields can be understood 
in an Aristotelian sense to be also determined by their parts, but still a cause in its own right. Only a 
probabilistic fit between the form of the organism and varying instantiations of the niche is needed 
(whereby the niche is partly externally given, partly a result of the organism and similar organisms) 1052 
Once more, such an argument requires also an adaptationist component complementing the constructional component. 
(On the critique of process recluctionism ~ pp. 324 f.). 
(2.) External Memory 
The proposed external biological memory does not reflect a fundamentally new mechanism, but is 
rather intended as a different interpretation of known facts. Besides the stuffness of the phenotype being 
1050 R. Sheldrake has contributed to the development of the notions morphogenetic field and morphic resonance. 
Sheldrake's book 11w Presence of the Past is inspiring, but some of his basic notions stay opaque. I shall try to con-
tribute to a further clarification of this ideas. E. g. R. Sheldrake. Das Gedachtnis der Natur ( 1991/88), pp. 130 f., 143 f. 
1051 G. Webster, B. Goodwin. Form and Transformation. Generative and Relational Principles in Biology (1996). I only 
had a glance at this book upon correcting this work. Although I have partly taken the book into account I had not the 
opportunity to elaborate in detail on the similarities or differences of my field conception to the one in that very inter-
esting book. See also: Goodwin, Webster, J. Wayne-Smith. The 'evolutionary paradigm' and constructional biology 
(1992). 
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an evolutionary factor constraining and directing evolution, I, of course, agree that genes are the main 
stores of evolutionary change. Nevertheless, I think that exformation not only plays a role in constituting 
the phenotype, but also that changes in the exforn1ation may in a way become inherited. This inheritance 
is normally based on the inheritance of another germ-line, but from the viewpoint of a focused 
evolutionary line this is still exformational. 
Firstly, I suggest that organisms normally not only adapt to a given environment, but that they also 
choose, alter and construct that environment. The result of this changed exformation sometimes also 
affects their descendants. Secondly, I propose that from the viewpoint of a certain evolutionary line 
other evolutionary lines may in a way serve as dynamic external memories as well. This could be 
formulated as the morphological resonance of morphological fields. 
(a) Organisms do not only adapt to the external world, as Darwinism has always emphasised 
(:>pp. 348 f., 384 f.), but they construct their environment to some e:x.'tent themselves. 1053 A strong 
exformational change could be achieved by migration. Even locomotion as such creates statistical 
patterns of environments. Of course genetic information plays a role in what exformation will become 
chosen, but nevertheless these exfonnational aspects can not be reduced to genes. Acquired 
exformational properties could at least to some extent-in interaction with genetic information-be 
passed on to progeny as well. A migrating organism may have the property to stay at the place where it 
had found favourable conditions. These positive experiences are in a way passed on to the progeny since 
the progeny is from its birth onwards exposed to the same favourable exformation. 
But organisms also more directly alter the external world as it becomes part of their envir01m1ents. 
They tread down paths, dig out burrows, build nests and establish signals1054 Often, although not 
always, these changes are advantageous to certain genes, individuals, groups or species. 1055 For 
example, paths or nests may be used by several successive generations of one kin group. 
Even more obvious are cases of the transfer of acquired knowledge to other organisms in an exfor-
mational non-genetic way. Young birds have been shown in experiments to imitate the songs also of 
'foster' parents. More complex observational learning is known, for example, from monkeys, and of 
course also from humans. 
But Dawkins in a certain sense is right when he argues that "the accidental incorporation of a pine 
needle instead ofthe usual grass, is not perpetuated in future 'generations ofnests'."1056 Nevertheless, 
firstly there are, as the previous point shows, also extra-genetic traditions which are passed on in 
animals. Here direct observational learning and learning from the products of the parents can transfer 
1052 Still a process like selection in its broadest sense is required. On process reductionism, :> pp. 324 f. 
1053 Cf. R. Lewontin. Gene, Organism, Environment (1985/1983), pp. 273-5, 279 f. 
1054 See: R. Margalef. Perspectives in Ecological Theory (1968). In E. Jantsch: Die Selbstorganisation des Universums 
(1982/88), p. 202. 
1055 On the units of selection debate ~ pp. 258 f. 
1056 R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 68. 
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changes exformationally. The change of the exformation is also transferred in the migration example. 
Secondly, when the information transfer is in principle limited to the existence, for example, of a 
particular nest which is used for several generations only, the role of exformation indeed differs 
considerably from that of the germ-line. But this does not imply that this exformation transfer is an 
evolutionary irrelevant phenomenon. Thirdly, even in the nest example exformational changes may be 
preserved, for more than the lifetime of a particular nest. If in the pine population certain pines with 
needles, normally used for nests, with an improved water resistant property become predominant, this 
will cause a permanent change in the exformation of the nest building bird. This phenotypic change of 
the pine may take place because of an environmental change or because of some genetic mutation. Even 
if this change in the pine is genetically caused-informationally from the viewpoint of the pine-it is 
still exformational from the viewpoint of the DNA or the phenotype of the bird. I do not deny 
differences between informational and exformational inheritance, but I do oppose the terminological 
neglect of exformation. The main difference here is that the exformational change, if advantageous, is 
not an adaptation, but rather-to use Gould's and Vrba's terminology-an exaptation1057 Those birds 
which profit from this change will also presumably have a reproductive advantage, but the changed 
exforrnation itself has been and is currently not selected for this reason, but because of an advantage for 
pines with such a property. I do not want to limit my approach to evolution in cases of adaptations. 
Although not being an adaptation, here a relevant pemmnent change in the exfom1ation of the bird 
species actually has occurred. But I think there are also examples where the storage of a structure based 
on another evolutionary line may even be interpreted as an adaptation. 
(b) Now two coevolving symbiotic species (mutualism) will be interpreted as their mutual external 
memory. 
This idea may in some regards also be extended to predator-prey relationships. This may appear peculiar: ,After all, 
hares do not sit around constructing lyt"Lxes! But in the most important sense they do" 1058 I have pointed out before that a 
predator-prey relationship may not only have synergetic properties, but, in an of course limited sense, also certain 
properties advantageous to both species (:> p. 296). But here I confine myself for simplicity reasons to cases of symbiosis 
(mutualism). 
ecological or morphic exfom1ation 
---------------+ 
genic information 
Figure 10: Flux of formation also considering the concept of external memory. 
1057 S. J. Gould, E. Vrba. Exaptation-A Missing Tem1 in the Science of Form (1982/98). 
1058 R. Lewontin. Gene, Organism, Environment ( 198511983 ), p. 282. 
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As an example we discuss the eo-evolution of flowers and pollinating insects. During their evolution 
flowers evolved presumably from at first wind-pollinated plants, and became increasingly adapted to 
insect pollination. Pollinating insects in turn evolved from non-pollinating arthropods, and became 
increasingly adapted to flowers. Flowers and pollinating insects can be understood as mutually 
interdependent environmental fields for each other. Both are not only influenced by the others 
environmental field, but each in turn influences the other's field-a feedback-loop is closed 
(~ pp. 398 f.). In the section on the unit of selection debate I have advocated the existence of ecological 
whales which are not necessarily subverted by selfish species (~ pp. 296 f.). Here I simply take 
ecological whales with an increased fitness for granted. The evolutionary interaction of two (or several) 
symbiotic species, which are fitter than each species on its own, may lead to a coevolutionary process, 
where the involved species are mutually adapted and build a synergetic whole. Such a whole may indeed 
be an irreducible level of description, but this whole may still be described from the viewpoint of a 
single species as an adaptive transformation of each species to the structure of the other one. This 
results for each species in an advantageous change in their exformation. Nevertheless it is a whole, since 
the sum of the involved species are fitter than each one on its own. In this (of course limited) sense the 
pollinating insect species is part of the flower species and vice versa. Analysed on the species leveL the 
eo-evolving species provides a changing exformation, which is rather an adaptation than an 
exaptation:>1057 for the species in question. 
This approach may resemble Dawkins' concept of an exiended phenotype, which I have approved. However, this 
application rather turns this concept upside down. 
If a pollinating insect species on an island becomes extinct because of a hurricane, we cannot 
conclude from the fact that the informational evolutionary line has died out that the external memory of 
the species will necessarily immediately vanish as well. As long as the corresponding plant type does not 
immediately also become strongly diminished, insects of the same or a similar species could become 
blown to this island and will find perfect environmental conditions there. And why should it not be 
appropriate to interpret this in the sense that the exformation of their predecessors is still present? 
It should not be denied that genetic inheritance in the eo-evolving species is a precondition for this 
process as well. But firstly, phenotypes play a crucial role in this interaction, because the interaction of 
species is defined phenotypically (~ pp. 309 f.) and the advantageous phenotypic property may be 
realised by different gene combinations. Secondly, from the viewpoint of a certain evolutionary line its 
evolution is in any case not shaped by its information and its own genetic code alone, but by the 
dynamic change in the other eo-evolving species as well. That, from this viewpoint exfom1ational, 
species, is of course itself based on its information and exformation as well as the feedback from the 
dependent evolution of the first species. 
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This dynamic, possibly even adaptive, change in exformation, which is normally based on other 
organisms, I call a bit anthropomorphically 'memory'. 
The term memory here should not imply a full identity of the stored and retrieved information. Although this is implied 
by the use of this term in computer science, this is not a defining characteristic for example of human memory. Here a 
further information processing takes place and thus the infonnation becomes somehow changed ( :> pp. 307 f.). 
The idea of an external memory may possibly generalised to other cases of larger wholes. We have discussed other 
wholes in the section on the unit of selection debate. It might be generally possible to regard the components of a whole as 
(synergetic) mutual external memories of each other. 
In this section the concept of an external memory has been proposed as an additional argument 
against gem1-line reductionism. However, the existence of exformation and of inner phenotypic 
constraints as its own evolutionary factor already refutes this particularly radical interpretation of the 
here accepted central dogma of microbiology. 
d) A Partial Revival of Morphological Taxonomy? 
In how far are the preceding considerations relevant to the dispute about universalia and biological 
taxonomy. The unit of evolution or unit of selection debate has been treated above (:> pp. 258 f), and 
here I only argue that exformation and phenotypes are evolutionary factors in their own right. Still this 
also could have bearings on the unit of evolution debate. 
Not only gene-Darwinians, but Darwinians in general have in principle denied the existence of higher 
taxa and asexual species. This is due to the missing flux of infonnational between different species and 
between different asexual organisms. Moreover, this is due to the general neglect of form as an 
evolutionary factor. Hence, higher taxa or asexual species were regarded not to have any causal 
relevance. In this sense asexual organisms do not exist as species. Higher taxa and asexual 'species' 
were regarded as mere notions of convenience, which catalogue organisms or species according to their 
distance of informational descent. Although we have seen that advocates of the evolutionary synthesis 
have rejected germ-line reductionism, they still have not explicitly claimed that the form of the 
phenotypes is an evolutionary factor in its own right. 
Opposed to this general position, transcendental and romantic biologists have always held that 
asexual species and higher taxa are real and have stressed the relevance of the morphological structure. 
If taxonomy should only mirror the line of informational descent Darwinians appear to be right to 
focus only on (sexual reproducing) species. There is, of course, no direct exchange of information 
between asexual organisms of one 'species' or between different species of the same taxon. 
Nevertheless, this taxonomic criterion itself is a principle particular to Darwinism. 
If we accept this view of genetic information, does this imply that the view of romantic biology or 
folk biology is completely wrong in saying that 'species' of asexual organisms and higher taxons are in 
a way real as well? 
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(a) The evolutionary factor of constraints as object of taxonomy (~ pp. 313 f.). If the morpho-
logical and functional structure of phenotypes is understood as an evolutionary factor, taxa could be 
used to express such causally relevant properties species (or organisms of an asexual 'species') have in 
common, like the exoskeletons of arthropods which partly determine the evolutionary pathways of these 
species. In a morphological view one may argue that it is of secondary importance whether this group 
has a common descent. It is important that they have the same basic morphological constraints, a 
similar body plan (Bauplane), because this is causally relevant. One may object that there may be no 
flux of information between morphologically similarly constrained organisms or species. One may reply 
that questions of descent are, in such a view, not the relevant questions anyhow, but that a focus on the 
structural (and functional) similarities and differences raises the more interesting questions. 
I regard the indicated different views as complementary rather than opposed. It may be 
systematically helpful to order organisms or species according to such factors, in principle regardless of 
their descent. But since adaptation also plays an important evolutionary role, the ordering of species 
according to their informational line of descent also provides us with much interesting information about 
their former environment and their properties as well. 
(b) Morphological resonance as the object of taxonomy ( :> pp. 316 f.). Could a mutually 
eJo..'ternal memory of a system of eo-evolving species somehow unify similar species (or similar 
organisms of an asexual species)? The environmental memory of flowers is neither built by a single bee 
nor usually by a single species of bees. A flower species will normally be adapted to the pollination of 
the beehood or to a certain extent to the pollen collecting insecthood. Such relationships hence may 
render the (exformational) existence of (some) species of asexual organisms and of (some) higher taxa 
possible. These partly adaptationist and partly constructivist aspects may also play a role in homologies 
and evolutionary convergence. 
It may be still more convenient to order organisms and spectes only according to their line of 
infonnational descent. The proposed criteria may force the taxonomist to abandon the convenient 
hierarchical classification, which has the advantage of clearly localising certain species within only one 
taxon of each level. In my proposal one species may in principle be a member of several taxons at a 
time based on morphological constraints or morphological resonance. 
In any case a refutation of gene-atomism and genu-line reductionism is much more urgent. It is 
possible to accept the importance of exformation and phenotypes as evolutionary factors, and still to 
advocate a systematics which focuses exclusively on infom1ational lines of descent and neglects 
morphological constraints and resonance. I here only wanted to point out, that it is in principle possible 
to advocate changes in taxonomy as well. It is not given a priori that systematics has to limit itself to 
the lines of informational descent. 
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e) Summary 
In this section 8.3 on germ-line reductionism we were concemed with the question of whether the 
different levels of genetic selection, which we discussed in a previous section (~ pp. 258 f.), are the 
only relevant aspects of evolution and whether the corresponding phenotypic entities can be regarded to 
be the mere vehicles of genotypic units of evolution. 
Firstly, the central microbiological dogma has been described as an updated version of Weismann's 
gem1-plasm theory. Some challenges to this theory were outlined. Nevertheless I took this theory as a 
currently valid hypothesis and focused on the critique of the particular radical germ-line reductionist 
interpretation of this theory. 
Secondly, I have proposed the general concept of exformation, resembling my earlier critique of a 
downward reductionist understanding of substance. Instead a hylomorphic understanding of substance, 
which challenges a simple view of inner and outer, has been proposed. Then phenotypes are shown as 
not being reducible to the germ-line, since they are not only based on genetic information, but on 
exformation which is not itself coded in all its details in the genes as well. Not denying the importance 
of the genotype, the phenotype detennines what genetic information is read and hmv it is interpreted. 
Moreover, phenotypes are causes of their own development. As Lewontin puts it, a phenotype is a "first 
order Markov process in which the next step depends upon the present state". Additionally, the structure 
of an organism bears evolutionary constraints and, vice versa, possible directions. These constraints 
need not be adaptive. The morphological and functional constraints of phenotypes can be understood as 
an evolutionary factor. 
Thirdly, not necessary as a refutation of gem1-line reductionism, I develop the concept of 
environmental forms (similar to a niche) which exist in relation to a certain phenotype. The concept of 
forms is replaced by the concept of fields to take into account the probabilistic pluralistic influences, 
which have been ignored by some earlier morphological traditions. (Goodwin and Weber, for example, 
propose a field understanding of form as well.) Based on the eo-evolution of symbiotic species, I 
advocate that some properties of a focused species may in a way be exformationally stored in the eo-
evolving species and hence inheritable outside of its own genome. 
Fourthly, it is shown that taking the phenotype seriously, may have consequences for taxonomy as 
well. Darwinism regards asexual species and higher taxa as not existing causally, but as mere nomina-
listic conventions to describe the (in-formational) distance of descent. Based on the concept of morpho-
logical and functional constraints as evolutionary factors one may treat the species or organism with 
similar constraints as members of a taxon even if they are not united by common descent, since their 
structure independent of their descent is evolutionarily primary. Another aspect which systematics may 
take into account is the morphological resonance which may have an equal effect for similar species or 
organisms of an asexual species. I conceded, that one may for reasons of convenience reject these 
taxonomic proposals without necessarily rejecting the proposed concepts. 
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Here the primary goal was to show that although the central dogma is accepted as a currently valid 
hypothesis , germ-line reductionism does not need to be valid. The phenotype has been shown to be 
partly based on exformation and to be full of stuffness . Additionally morphology and function of the 
phenotype constrains and directs evolution. My proposals should focus attention upon the neglected but 
fundamental evolutionary role of the phenotype itself The phenotype is not only a vehicle of selfish 
genes, but an evolutionary factor in its own right 
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Chapter 9: Transcendence of Process Reductionism 
A metaphysic that was truly evolutionary, would have to deal with the evolution of its own 
evolutionary mechanisms. Opposed to this, universal Darwinism advocates a process monism. In this 
chapter Darwinian process reductionism is discussed and criticised and some proposals are made, 
concerning how a more evolutionary theory of evolution may be achieved. 
Universal Darwinism, in its gene-Darwinian but also in its process-Darwinian versiOn 
(:> pp. 203 f.), advocates a static monistic view of the evolutionary process itself. According to these 
approaches all evolutionary processes can in principle be reduced to the unmutable process of blind-
variation-and-external-selection. Darwinians often regard the evolutionary mechanism of natural 
selection as itself externally and eternally given and in principle exclude a tme self-transcendence of 
processes. Hence, paradoxically the arch-opponents of fixism and essentialism-those such as Darwin, 
Dawkins and Dennett-are, in respect of processes, radical promoters of fixism and essentialism. 
Darwinian process monism refers back to its historical Paleyian Newtonian roots. Although 
Darwinism also undermined this, the soil on which it is built, it in a Paleyian-Newtonian manner still 
advocates one eternal law of nature, simple and invariant, as if it were preordained. Natural selection in 
some regards ironically resembles natural theology. There is still a certain Platonism inherent in 
Darwinism-albeit materialistically and mechanistically transformed. 
Also, for example, Lyell's actualism influenced Darwin and thereby Darwinism. Actualism also stresses that forces are 
not changed in quality or in quantity throughout time. According to actualism the observation of present geological 
processes, could fully explain the change of geological formations during the history of the earth. 
The concept of an unchangeable law of evolution can often be found in Darwin's own writings, even 
before he formulated his specific theory of evolution. 1059 The later evolutionary synthesis, despite some 
pluralistic aspects, stressed the unchangeable blindness and externality of selection. Finally, gene-
Darwinism advocates a radical version of Darwinian process monism and, likewise, promotes the idea 
that a process like sexual selection is essentially the same process as the natural selection of selfish 
genes(~ pp. 143 f.). 
In this chapter I oppose a radicalised Darwinian process reductionism. In the introduction I have 
already clarified that my approach still draws strongly from Darwinism and that in a very broad 
understanding of Darwinism my approach could even be regarded as a quite Darwinian approach in 
itself, since it, for example, accepts the importance of variational evolution (~ pp. 24 f.). Many 
concepts of the different paradigms of Da1winism and 'pseudo-Darwinism' :l424 are, m my view, 
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indispensable to evolutionary theory. Nevertheless, I do oppose radical Darwinism in criticising pan-
adaptationism and pan-selectionism. 
Moreover, my criticism is not only concerned with tllis radical Darwinism, but with some aspects 
basic to Darwinism in general. To prevent nlisunderstandings, I concede and agree that the Darwinian 
process (natural selection), if understood in a very broad (up to an almost tautological) sense, is the 
central mechanism of evolution. But I think that such a broad understanding of Darwinism, conceals the 
fact that the evolutionary mechanism is itself evolving and the role of developmental constraints and 
chance processes. Natural selection itself, in my view, is actually not one constant mechanism, valid in 
an equal way from the amoeba to Einstein, but, when put under close scrutiny, many mechanisms 
become apparent. These processes may have some aspects in col11111on, but in others they differ 
essentially and have changed during evolution. To make these changes apparent and to exclude 
tautological aspects ofthe definition(:> next sections), I propose a stricter definition of Darwinism, but 
one wllich is still in accordance \vith the evolved meaning of that term. I shall show that evolutionary 
processes differ from that more strictly defined Danvinian process. I shall argue that variation on 
certain explanatory levels is not necessary equally blind and that 'heteroselection' becomes 
supplemented by 'autoselection'. I argue that evolutionary processes can gain a certain autonomy from 
natural selection. I can, of course, here only make some proposals about how such a more evolutionary 
theory of evolution might be achieved by outlining what may count as a process in its own right. I 
cannot, however, elaborate a full treatment dealing with all mechanisms. 
Taken together with the above argumentation that there are different evolutionary levels 
(~ pp. 258 f.) and that phenotypes can be regarded as evolutionary factors in their own right 
(:> pp. 303 f) this results in an interpretation of evolution, which in any case differs considerably from 
gene-Darwinism-but also from Darwinism in general. A differentiation between evolutionary 
processes would also render simplifying claims absurd, like, for instance, the claim that the human 
emotional system, the hypothalamus and limbic system ''evolved by natural selection"1060 This does not 
distinguish between the levels of evolution, or whether say this was due to what I call 'autoselective' or 
'heteroselective' processes. Darwinism, despite its indispensable contribution to evolutionary theory, 
has to be replaced by an evolutionary theory of evolution(:> p. 24). 
One may be inclined to argue that Darwinism in a strict sense has been already refuted by the 
previous critique of entity reductionism (chapter 8), since strict Danvinism was often also defined by its 
reductive attitude towards groups. In our discussions of different kinds of genic reductionism this aspect 
1059 E. g. Ch. Darwin. Notebook B ( ed. by D. Kohn, 1987), orig. p. I 0 I. Confer also Notebook E. orig. p. 3 (refering to 
Malthus). Generally, :>pp. 162 f 
1060 E. 0. Wilson. Sociobiology ( 1975), p. 3. Wilson apparently has a much more complex understrn1ding of evolution. (Cf: 
Ch. J. Lumsden; E. 0. Wilson. Genes, Mind, and Culture, 1981, but the metaphor of an unchangeable mechanism of 
evolution, i. e. of natural selection still dominates his writings. 
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of Darwinism has been challenged. However, a refutation of Darwinian process-monism, which I here 
take as the core of Darwinism, does not follow-at least not directly. 
Because Darwin's own Darwinism was individualistic, or generally reductionist, gene-Darwinia11s have sometunes 
been regarded as the only true-albeit more radical-successors of Darwin, since they advocate a completely reductive 
view of evolution. Under this definition the last chapter has to be understood as a critique not only of gene-Darwirusm but 
also of Darwinism in general. I, however, define Darwinism, more cautiously, with regard to processes. 
If one accepted the above results of different levels of evolution, one would still be a multi-level 
Darwinist (~ pp. 152 f., 258 f., 278 f., 293 f.). In particular some of the main opponents of gene-
Darwinism and defenders of a richer ontological inventory (e. g. Campbell, Hull) became supporters of 
universal process Darwinism (:> p. 152). Process-Darwinism is even possible if one accepts the 
autonomy of cultural processes. It has been shmvn that Darwinian processes could be found in 
psychological trial-and-error theory, the theory of science and some economic proposals (:>pp. 205 f., 
214 f., 218 f.). 
Nevertheless, an acceptance of synergetic or emergent entities and of top-down causality, in some 
respects puts reductionism, also in regards to processes, into question. Why should there not be any 
synergetic and emergent processes as well? TI1is becomes particularly problematic in the light of a 
Whiteheadian process philosophy, in which entities are regarded as processes, and processes vice versa 
are regarded as entities. 1061 
I have argued that the concept of a single gene somehow corresponds to the concept of a Darwinian 
process of blind replication and e:\.1:ernal elimination (:> p. 216). I shall argue in this chapter that, for 
example, species can also be regarded as evolutionary processes. But these processes, despite some 
sinularities, are not identical to natural selection. For instance, a species allows for a synthesis of 
evolutionary lines (sexuality and mixture of subpopulations). Although there is no blending inheritance, 
the splitting up of evolutionary lines is complemented by a certain, and of course limited, possibility of 
synthesis. Moreover, species may be regarded to be less blind than single sexual organisms, since new 
adaptive valleys can be crossed, based on the recombination of genes from a larger gene pool. 
Furthermore, a species changes the adaptive landscape itself, since, for example, new fonns of 
cooperation can now become adaptive. From a Whiteheadian perspective it should not be a surprise to 
regard phenotypes, as I argued in the last chapter, to be evolutionary factors in themselves, constraining 
and directing possible evolutionary pathways. But morphological 'logic' is not identical to a Darwinian 
process; the changes can differ from those predicted on Darwinian adaptationist grounds (:>pp. 313 f., 
358 f.). Here, I shall show that selection is not necessarily blind and externally given on all levels and 
that evolutionary processes can gain a certain autonomy. 
Hence, in this proposed view of nature, Darwinian processes are not a sufficient explanation of 
biological and cultural evolution. "Darwin's dangerous idea"-understood not in too broad a sense-is 
1061 Also in modem physics matter and energy are in principle convertible, :> footnote 916. 
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not the "universal solvent, capable of cutting right through the heart of everything in sight"1062 
Organisms are not only objects but also, to some extent, subjects of evolution, whereas the evolutionary 
mechanisms are not only subjects but also objects of evolution. Since Universal Darwinism, in its gene-
Danvinian or only its process-Darwinian versions currently 'ca.tmibalises' the social sciences, time has 
come to put emphasis on the inconsistencies of this view and on the evolving nature of the evolutionary 
mechanism itself. 1063 Only in a truly evolutionary framework, not delimited only to one algorithm, we 
can realise the full range of freedom we humans have, to change these mechanisms, especially in the 
social stratum. 
I shall first point to some inconsistencies m the process Darwinian approach and discuss two 
possible Darwinian tautologies (9 .1 ). This discussion results in the already mentioned redefmition of 
Darwinism and a proposed spectrum of theories reaching from radical Darwinism to approaches, which 
stress inherent tendencies and a less wasteful evolution (9.2). Subsequently, I discuss the single aspects 
of tllis definition and show the existence of synthesis, autoselection and directed variation. I focus 
mainly on biological evolution, since this is the most controversial case. Finally, it is shown that new 
processes can gain a certain autonomy and, based on Kant, systemic circularity or selfreferentiality is 
discussed as a criterion for the emergence of a 'new' synergetic process (9.3). 
9.1 Inconsistencies and Tautologies of a Darwinian Mono-Mechanistic 
Metaphysic 
In tlus section it will first be shown that the claim of process Darwinism that there are different 
levels describable as evolving exclusively by Darwinia.tl processes, leads to inconsistencies and actually 
to changed or compound processes which not equally appear to be Darwinian. Secondly and thirdly, 
Darwinian pan-adaptionism and pan-selectionism will be scrutinised. It is argued that both claims could 
only be made due to a partly tautological definition of adaptation and of natural selection. This 
discussion will build the basis for my stricter non-tautological definition of Darwinism. 
a) Inconsistencies of Different Levels of Multi-Level Darwinism 
Universal Process Darwinism (~ pp. 214 f) is a metaphysic focusing on the simplest possible 
evolutionary algorithm, the Darwinian algorithm of natural selection. This metaphysic interprets all 
other evolutionary processes in a downward reductionist way. All (relevant) evolutionary change comes 
into being through Darwinian algorithms. Although a theoretical unification under the one and only flag 
of process Darwinism has much appeal (exactly because of its simplicity), the exclusive application of 
1062 D. De1mett. Danvin 's Dangerous Idea (1995), p. 521. 
1063 This may in some respects for example correspond to Lewontin's view that evolution should be represented by the 
metaphor of construction instead of that of adaptation. R. Lewontin. Gene, Organism, Environment (1985/1983 ), pp. 
279-280. 
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Darwinian algorithms in many ontological strata leads to contradictions, even if a particular application 
of process-Darwinism appears to be justified on its own. If one favours many different levels of 
selection (as I did above,:> pp. 218 f., 258 f.) these levels are not independent from each other. 
Selection processes, particularly if they belong to a part-whole relationship, like individuals and 
species, may have effects on each other. As mentioned, the proliferation of species may be less blind 
than thought, because more combinations could be tried than in evolutionary lines of asexual organisms 
and, likewise, combinations could be tested in advance in sub-populations. From the viewpoint of the 
whole-which I argued to exists-evolution is less blind. Moreover, the whole, as I have shown, could 
now have an inner dynamic leading to a certain autonomy from environmental selection(:> pp. 285 f.). 
But, I think, as far as parts-the individual organisms-are concerned, nmtters also from their 
viewpoint have changed; their reproductive prospects change as does their evolutionary landscape. The 
organisms, for example, can now be members of interbreeding synergetic groups, and may thereby 
enhance their fitness. 
The process-Darwinian claim of the equivalence of higher evolutionary levels to simple natural selection generally 
conceals the resulting autonomy of new processes(:') pp. 386 f., 398 f.). 
TI1e other type of relationship between selection processes one may call nested (secondary) 
selection. Darwinian selection processes of that kind are, for example, claimed to enable the 
development of the inunune system, the brain or is given in psychological trial-and-error learning (:> 
pp. 224 f., 231 f.). Let us take the example of organisms with an ability to learn by trial-and-error, 
which is describable as a Darwinian process. What is the difference between such a nested relationship 
and a part-whole relationship of selection processes? The trial-and-error learning, which is also a part 
of the functions of that organism, does not directly change the information of the organism, the whole. 
This is different in the part-whole relationship of species and individuals. 
However, here one can also argue that nested selection processes could reduce the blindness of 
evolution in a way. At the level of the organism nested selection processes lead to plasticity. This 
plasticity, of course, may itself be an object of natural selection. Still, the process of evolution has 
changed considerably. In the interaction with environmental influences (exformation, ~pp. 307 f) new 
optima may be reached without or with only a little change in the biological information. On the 
explanatory level of the organism a feedback loop with the environment is created, leading to a flexible 
adaptation of the organism. The organism does not need to explore every single possibility of the 
environment genetically, but does this via trial-and-error learning. This way of exploring the 
evolutionary landscape at the level of organisms is less wasteful-and in this sense less Darwinian-
than achieving the same result, by the proliferation and selection of particular 'hard-wired' instincts. 
Still a fundamental change may only be achieved by biological mutation, but now the organism could 
flexibly and quickly adapt to smaller fluctuations in the environment without the need for biological 
mutations. Although this is different from the part-whole multi-level selection process, the genetic 
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makeup itself is not altered by the nested selection process and the evolutionary line is to some extent 
open to respond to new challenges by trial-and-error learning. The line to some extent gains an 
independence from momentaneous changes in the environment. 
One may of course argue that this does not make a difference, since-according to the assumptions 
we have accepted-the composing processes of individual selection and the trial-and-error process are 
both Darwinian. But the resulting effect for the organismic level differs considerably. 
And I think we also should and want to make a difference whether we as biological entities have to 
die, or whether only our trials, thoughts and theories die instead of us. 1064 A theory concealing this 
difference, is in my view wrong-at least in its emphasis. 
Moreover, this is a good example which shows that, even if we assume both composing processes 
were purely Darwinian processes, the resulting synergetic whole of an evolving asexual organism or 
species can be said to be less blind. This may be an example which shows that the concept of synergetic 
whales, developed above with regard to the unit of selection debate, is applicable to processes as well. 
In regard to a part-whole relation we discussed earlier the case that successive individual selection 
within a self-referential system could lead to the synergetic property of a certain autonomy from 
adaptation to an external environment (~ pp. 285 f). Even if the processual atoms are Darwinian 
processes, the resulting processual whole can behave quite opposed to Darwinian processes. 
Another example for such a synergetic property is that habits, which may become established in a trial-and-error way, 
may, as Popper has shown, change what becomes selected. In this regard use could somehow direct inheritance, although 
only in a quasi-Lamarckian sense. 1065 
Equally the initial universality of the theory of operant conditioning has also been challenged the 
other way round by biological Danvinism. I have outlined earlier that the theory of conditioning was 
intended as a general approach to psychology and it has even been proposed to subsume classical 
conditioning as a particular case for operant conditioning. In which case the universality of trial-and-
error learning, which is today only rarely supported, would have been shown. Since we have shown 
operant conditioning to be a process-Darwinian approach-despite being opposed to biologism-a 
universality of process-Darwinism in psychology would have resulted. But, besides other influences, the 
understanding of the biological underpinnings of human behaviour and learning-mostly understood in 
Darwinian terms-have in particular undermined the universality of this approach. Biological 
preparedness has been shown to constrain and direct which associations become established and which 
trials are made. 1066 Also other more complex types of learning and understanding have been established, 
with a biological basis partly of its own, like observational learning or processes of problem solving. 
Additionally, the general cognitive turn claiming a multitude of-partly learned-different cognitive 
1064 This has been stressed by P. Munz, although he draws rather Darwinian conclusions. Philosophical Darwinism. (1993). 
1065 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge ( 197111 992), pp. 272 f. This, I think, refers back to the Baldwin effect. 
1066 J. Garcia and M. E. P. Seligman played an importaint role in exploring the concept of biological preparedness. 
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processes, challenged the universality and exhaustively of the trial-and-error process of operant 
conditioning(:> pp. 224 f.). 
Likewise, process-Darwinian economics-which have to be distinguished from biologistic Darwinian 
economics 1067-come into contradiction with a partly biologised psychology. According to this type of 
Darwinian economics the 'struggle for life' and the 'survival of the fittest', in a way similar to that of 
the biological process, takes place on a new ontological level, on the level of economic agents. I have 
mentioned, that the Friedmanian belief in severe competition was actually historically influenced by the 
concept of natural selection and survival of the fittest (~ p. 197). But economists of the Chicago 
school have also to assume that some preconditions have to be met under which severe competition in 
fact leads to the economic survival of the fittest economic agent. Such preconditions are complete 
information and rational choice of the economic agents. But Darwinian biology and psychology shows 
that exactly these assumptions are violated, since the information processing capacity of humans is 
limited and rational thinking is to some extent domain specific and not free from systematic errors 1068 
Hence, Darwinian biology and psychology undermine pan-adaptationism of Darwinian economy. 
In conclusion it is apparent that components of process-Darwinism in different subject areas not 
necessarily support each other theoretically, but can and often do contradict each other. I do not deny, 
that despite such inconsistencies, Universal Darwinism still has a certain appeal. This may also partly 
be due to the tautological aspects of this theory. In the next two subsections we will try to separate the 
tautologically true, but largely meaningless, aspects of Universal Process Darwinism from the testable 
and meaningful aspects of it, before going on to achieve a more precise definition of a Darwinian 
process. 
b) On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Adaptationism 
There is a broad dispute about whether and to what extent Darwinism is marked by tautological 
aspects 1069 We have already briefly discussed the tautological aspects of psychological trial-and-error 
theory, which are analogous to those in biological Darwinism ( :> pp. 224 f). 
1067 :>pp. 232 f., also pp. 173, 197. 
1068 See, for example, the recent evolutionary literature on the implication fallacy and the Wason selection task: L. 
Cosmides, J. Tooby. Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange (1992). G. Gigerenzer. Domain-spec(fic reasoning 
( 1992 ), :> footnotes 855 f. 
1069 Only a selection of literature on this matter can be mentioned here. It is not unproblematic to distinguish between two 
camps of writers, since different authors have discussed different aspects of Darwinism and have differed considerable, 
in what degree they have advocated their position. Nevertheless, in a simplifying way one may distinguish two opposed 
directions, one stressing the tautological aspect of Darwinism the other denying it. 
Tautological aspects of Darwinism have, for example, been emphasised by: Camp bell (19601! 987), p. 385 f./p. I 09 f., 
Popper (1972), pp. 69 f. (Popper has elaborated his position later, 1973, 83~ 1974, pp. 133 f., but has softened it in 
1987), Midgley (1978/1995), pp. xx, 139, 161 and Spaemaru1 and Low (1981 ), p. 242. Some authors regard tautological 
aspects rather as a justification, others as an object of criticism. The charge tl1at Darwinism is partly tautological, in a 
particular way, has also been advocated by some proponents of the taxonomic school of cladism. 
The accusation of tautology has been rejected or has been judged rather critically for example by: De1mett (1995), 
pp. 238-51; Dawkins (1989/1982), pp. 179-194 (Dawkins in this work guardedly concedes tautological aspects of 
certain definitions of adaptation, but still advocates a rather panadaptationist and panselectionist view); Hodge 
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I distinguish between two aspects of process monism, as promoted by universal Darwinism, which 
are related to corresponding possible tautologies. Firstly we discuss pan-adaptationism and, secondly, 
pan-selectionism. In both sections it will be shown that the views, if valid, are in ce1tain respects based 
on an tauto-logical argumentation, which according to the etymological meaning of the original Greek 
term means that what has been said or assumed before is merely restated. Both interrelated tautologies 
are in different ways linked to a certain interpretation of the concept of the survival of the fittest, 
resulting in a concept of the survival of the sun1ivor. 
I do not, of course, advocate that Darwinism as a whole, either in respect to adaptation or in respect 
to selection, was thoroughly tautological, but I intend to point out tautological aspects which may often 
have been endorsed only implicitly, but still may have helped to immunise the Darwinian paradigm 
against criticism. I try to disentangle the tautological and the more empirical aspects of universal 
Darwinism and to show that, without a tautological argwnent, the universality of Darwinian 
processes-although not the existence of Darwinian processes-becomes doubtful. 
The tautologies discussed at this point differ from other tautologies treated in this work. But the tautological aspect of 
the falsificationist refutation of inductivism, discussed previously, is closely related(:> pp. 211 f., 361 f.). We have also 
discussed a tautology of defining genes so broadly that they, by defmition, become the unit of selection (:> pp. 259 f.). 
IJ1stead of redefining genes, one can similarly redefine whales as being only their pm1s, even if a whole is more than the 
sum of its parts. Provided such a definition, it becomes a tautological and empty truth that larger whales are not 
evolutionarily relevant, since they, by defmition, do not exist(:> pp. 271 f.). 
Darwinian pan-adaptationism, often called 'adaptationism' for short, is the claim of the universality 
of adaptation which, in the present context, is understood as being based on natural selection. All 
evolving entities have adapted and adaptation is the only direction giving evolutionary process. 
Adaptation, as a state, is often understood as the fit of an entity to its environment. 1070 Adaptation, as 
a process, is nonnally understood as the increased fit of an entity to an environment. To assume that, in 
this sense, adaptation exists, is, of course, not yet tautological. 
Moreover, I myself even would stress that all entities (maybe apart from ultimate elementary 
particles in physics) have, to some extent, to be adapted to their environments. 1071 For example, 
molecules are stable only under certain chemical conditions. Even today atoms are known to be stable 
only under particular conditions of the physical evolution of the universe. Macroscopic objects of our 
day-to-day life trivially under certain conditions become unstable as well. Actually no biological 
organisms can exist, if they are, for example, exposed to fire for too long. A certain adaptation, in the 
sense of a minimal.fit of entity to environment, is necessary and hence ubiquitous. All entities are to 
(1983/1985), pp. 58-59; Vollmer (1985/1988), pp. 274 f.; Wuketits (1995), pp. 99 f. Also Ruse in mm1y works has 
rejected the methodological problems of Darwinism and even Gould tumed against a too far going accusation of 
tautology(e. g. 1991/1973). 
See generally, for example, Bowler (1984), pp. 327-334; S. J. Gould, R. C. Lewontin (1979); Isak ( 1992), pp. 150-152; 
E. Sober (1996/1998). 
1070 Gould and Vrba have called this an 'aptation'. St. Gould, E. Vrba. Exaptation -A Missing Term in the Science of 
Fom1 (1982/98), p. 54. 
1071 See also my concept of exformation, :> pp. 307 f. 
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some extent adapted to their environments, otherwise they would not exist. If adaptation as state is in a 
certain degree a necessary condition for existence, a process of adaptation appears to follow. Those 
entities-atoms, biscuits, genes and species-which are not adapted will simply not survive. 1072 
Does tllis argumentation hence entail pan-adaptationism? No, pan-adaptationism is not entailed as 
long as one does not modify the meaning of adaptation in a tautological way. To argue that a certain 
minimal adaptedness is necessary, is not the same as to argue that entities are strongly adapted and only 
fanned as result of adaptive processes. Even if adaptive processes play an important role, this does not 
imply that non-adaptive processes did not exist. 
Still, pan-adaptationism has implicitly at least often been assumed to be valid, and, I think, this has 
been made possible by a subtle modification of the underlying understanding of adaptation. Pan-
adaptationists implicitly or explicitly often seem to argue that all those entities which survive are 
generally more adapted, since they survive. Fitness becomes defmed-as has actually often been done-
by survival. Thereby the Darwinian claim of the survival of the fittest results in the tautological claim of 
the survival of the survivor. Such a tautological proposition, is obviously true, but meaningless. 1073 In 
regard to such a basis for adaptatiotlism M. Midgley is completely right in being pessimistic when she 
asks "whether it is possible to invent any trait so disadvantageous that it could not be whitewashed in 
this way"1074 Of course, any entity, which survives, survives. Only those drops of water, those trees, 
tigers, tables and theories survive, which survive. In this sense adaptation is always given and in each 
and every existing respect valid; thus pan-adaptionism seems to follow. The result would be renliniscent 
of the pan-adaptationism of early design arguments and Paley's natural theology or of Leibtliz's pre-
established harmony. 1075 But current pan-adaptationism is linked to Darwinian naturalism, associated 
with struggle and not with preordained harmony. The earlier pan-adaptationism was based on theology, 
but Darwinian pan-adaptationism is-at least partly-based on tautology. 
Pan-adaptationism in general, in regard to a state of being, may indeed be called a 'Leibnizian paradigm' 1076, although, 
in regard to processes, Leibniz's concept of a pre-established harmony is rather diametrically opposed to the wasteful 
mechanism of natural selection. However, with regard to a tautological pan-adaptationism I, in any case, prefer to use 
Gould's and Lewontin's tem1 of a Panglossian Paradigm. This tennis named after Dr. Pangloss, Voltaire's caricature of 
Leibniz. 1077 
But how does this tautological argumentation differ from the non-tautological one above, which 
I supported myself? Previously we defined adaptation as the fit (or the process of an increase of fit) of 
an entity to an environment, a certain relation between inner and outer. In this definition adaptation is in 
principle falsifiable. Entities may become adapted to an environment, or-based on an internal dynamic 
or on chance-may evolve in another direction. Opposed to this, tautological pan-adaptationism defmes 
1072 Here we implicitly use a definition of natural selection which is later criticised as being too broad, :> pp. 340 f 
1073 It is meaningless in the sense of not being falsifiable or verifiable. It of course still confers an ideological load. 
1074 M. Midgley. Beast and Man (1995/78), xx. 
1075 Cf. also R. Dawkins. Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 404, The Blind Watchmaker (1986/91 ). 
1076 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea ( 1995), section 9.2 The Leibnizian Paradigm, pp. 238-251. 
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any entities which survive as having adapted. Accordingly, properties which in the former sense would 
have falsified that an adaptation took place, like a stable im1er dynamic in a non-adaptive direction, 
would also still count as adaptation, since this also confirms the survival of the survivor. Based on a 
definition leading to such a tautological claim, I am and everyone else is, of course, a pan-adaptationist. 
But, it should be obvious that an umnodified definition of adaptation by survival is not a reasonable 
premiss, particularly since the claim of the survival of the survivor is not at all informative. 
If one instead adopts the non-tautological definition of adaptation which is based on an increasing 
fitness to an externally given environment, adaptation will definitely play an important role in 
evolution-but pan-adaptationism can be shown to be false. I nan1e three types of explanation where 
this is the case. 
(a) Systemic individual selection could, as I have argued, lead to trends which are not adaptive 
(:> pp. 285 f). I have shown that the self-referential interaction of individual selection processes-
which on the individual level appear to be adaptive-could stabilise or develop properties which are not 
adaptive in regard to the enviromnent of the system. Such inner dynamics could be stable until either the 
system breaks down or another system is installed by group selection. In regard to the enviromnent of 
the system, neither the system nor its parts become more adapted. The evolutionarily relevant dynamic 
at the system level is not adaptive. Based on the self-referentiality of the internal selection processes, a 
new synergetic property of autonomy from the outside world comes into being on the system level. I 
later shall discuss this as a case of autoselection, which does not necessary lead to an adaptation to an 
external enviromnent ( :> pp. 3 84 f). 
(b) Chance processes, playing a role in genetic drift or in the founder effect, may also lead to the 
establishment of non-adaptive gene-combinations in a gene-pool. But in an account which allows many 
units of evolution, these processes can sometimes be regarded as parts of a larger adaptive process. For 
example, if one assumes a selection process at the group or species level, chance effects within the 
population could lead to the adaptive result that, if accumulated in a certain sub-population, for 
example by a founder effect, it may become possible to cross an adaptive valley which would not have 
been possible otherwise. If one were to claim a strictly Darwinian process at the level of the species, 
these chance effects, like mutations, will be non-adaptive in most cases but still be very adaptive in a 
few cases. Hence chance processes may be part of a process which is itself adaptive (:> pp. 293 f.). 
But chance effects are also presumably equally often only side effects which, for example result from 
a given population structure, and may really lead to the establishment of partially non-adaptive 
properties. Also mutations, as the neutralists have stressed, are often neutral and can often by chance 
drift to genetic fixation in a population. 1078 
1077 St Gould, R. Lewontin. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm ( 1982/89). :> footnote 780. 
1078 Cf. e. g.: D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), p. 161 (mainly refering to M. Kimura), also pp. 75, 85, 509. 
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(c) Inner morphological dynamics or, more apparent still, developmental constraints of an 
evolutionary line have, according to the non-tautological understanding of adaptation, also to be 
regarded as counter-evidence to the claim that only adaptation to an environment determines the course 
of evolution. The morphology itself constrains and directs the pathways evolution could take. 
Morphology can either constrain possible variations or can itself act as a selecting force. The 
phenotypic morphology, besides the adaptation to an external environment, is an evolutionary factor in 
its own right(~ pp. 313 f.). 
It is actually difficult to disentangle internal and external causes in regard to morphology, but this, 
according to the above argumentation, is not only a problem for developmentalists, but for 
adaptationists as well. If it were not somehow possible to disentangle these two aspects then 
adaptationism does, as argued, not have its own empirical content, but only refers to the survival of the 
survivor (the empirical content of a Darwinian process is discussed separately in the next section). This 
distinction, however, does not lead leads to a problem in regard to point (a), nevertheless the distinction 
seems problematic here. It appears as if there are no evolutionary cases where either internal dynamics 
or a certain environmental adaptive pressure were completely absent. Evolutionary accow1ts have in fact 
0 
always been concerned with entities in certain environments, the inner and outer of which seeming to be 
inseparable, related in an dialectical way. But this, I think, does not need us relapse into claiming 
adaptation tautologically. Despite the interrelationship between inner and outer, we seem to be able to 
distinguish what is relatively more due to outer than to inner factors. For example, it seems reasonable 
to regard the exoskeleton of arthropods as morphological constraints on the size of organisms, whereas 
those characters of the whale-originally a land living mammal-which are fish like, can, rather 
reasonably, be regarded to be adaptations to the aquatic environment. To evaluate the relative 
importance of internal or external factors may possibly involve comparisons to other species 1079 
But other proposals have also been made to disentangle the role of the inner dynamics of organismic 
morphology and external adaptationism. For example, R. Amundson (referring toP. Alberch) describes 
a thought experiment to test whether and in how far the separation of two species of organisms in 
morphospace (whose dinlensions show in how far certain phenotypic properties x, y, z etc. are 
expressed) is caused by adaptations to an external environment or by internal constraints. If one were 
to reduce e.>..1ernal selection to a minimum and increased mutation (by mutagens) to a maximum, the 
strict adaptationist hypothesis would be that the descendent morphologies would tend to be no longer (or 
much less) clustered, whereas the developmental hypothesis would predict that the clusters would 
-with certain modifications-roughly stay the same. 1080 
1079 Cf. e. g.: G. Lauder. Historical Biology and the Problem of Design (1998/82), p. 513. Lauder also points out the 
necessity of compmisons, but does this, perhaps, in a slightly different way. 
1080 R. Amundson. Two Concepts of Constraint (1994/1998), pp. 96 f. I would add that a moving of still equally existing 
clusters in morphospace would indicate an internal dynmnics. 
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An acknowledgement of evolutionary side-effects is weaker thm1 the stress on the existence of i.Jmer developmental 
constraints and dynamics in evolution. The concept of properties which are evolutionary side-effects does emphasise that 
they do not have own causal relevance. They may one day of course become evolutionarily relevant as constraint or 
adaptation (more correctly: as exaptation1081 ). However, a side-effect without adaptive relevance actually refers to an inner 
causal necessity and the property itself is i11 fact not an adaptation, it may even be counter-adaptive. If the formerly adaptive 
trait perishes and the neutral side-effect contmues to exist, one can, only even based on the weak notion of side-effects, 
argue that traits could exist which neither actually have any adaptive use, nor have had any adaptive use for themselves 
earlier 011. Although still bei.J1g relatively close to an adaptationist view, 1082 it also, on these grounds, would be wrong to 
argue that all evolved traits are adaptations. 1083 
As a preliminary conclusion a neglect of the difference between internal and external causes of 
survival appears to entail a tautological understanding of adaptation. If one instead accepts that the 
survival of the fittest does not necessarily mean survival of the survivor, but survival of those entities 
which fit best to a given environment, an adaptationist claim is not tautological any more. For this case 
it has been shown that adaptation is essential to evolution, but that it is not the only direction giving 
force. Hence, in this understanding, pan-adaptationism is wrong. It appears that pan-adaptationists 
actually often waver in their use of the term 'adaptation'. If concerned with testability they refer to the 
non tautological fit to an environment and if concerned with its universal validity they refer (implicitly) 
to the tautological concept of survival of the survivor. Only when based on such a peculiar mixture of 
argumentations, can pan-adaptationism neither be criticised for being tautological nor for being 
empirically false. 
But we have not reached our final conclusion on tllis matter yet. I can think of two general objections 
that pan-adaptationist may raise to the argument I have put forward above. 
Firstly, they might argue that evolutionary theory should not primarily be concerned with non-
adaptationist explanations, like inner dynamics, chance effects and morphological constraints. 1084 But 
if evolutionary theory limits its investigations to adaptations from the outset and if then adaptation is 
found to be ubiquitous, then pan-adaptationism is again a mere vacuous tautological truth. 
Secondly, one may argue that the currently used notions of fitness are much more refined than the 
ones I have treated above and do not lead to a tautological understanding of adaptation, even if one did 
not adopt the requirement of an increased fit to an external environment. Moreover, if current technical 
definitions would still lead to tautological results, one could argue that these defulitions could be 
modified in another way to make the claim of the existence of adaptations a non-tautological claim, 
without thereby directly leading to a refutation of pan-adaptationism. These objections need to be 
treated in more detail, but finally I shall conclude that my argument above remains largely valid. 
1081 S. Gould, E. Vrba. Exaptation- A Missing Temz in the Science of Fomz ( 1982/98). 
1082 Cf.: E. Sober. Six Sayings about Adaptationism ( 199611998), pp. 76-80. 
1083 See: S. Gould, R. Lewontm. The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the 
Adaptationist Programme ( 1979). 
1084 See e. g.: R Dawkins. Universal Darwinism (1983), p 404; The Extended Phenotype (1982), pp. 29, 32. 
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Do the existing technical definitions of fitness in evolutionary biology-particularly the ones 
prefered by gene-Darwinians-prevent a tautological understanding of the 'survival of the fittest', 
without refering to the internal-external distinction? 
(a) After a period of unprecise and speculative use of the term fitness (~ also p. 337), fitness 
became to be used in a general way that was designed to show that natural selection always leads to 
adaption (higher fitness). Fitness-as discussed above-became defined by survival. Also Dawkins 
concedes, biologists redefined the intuitive tern1 fitness more exactly by "whatever it takes to make the 
survival of the fittest into a tautology". 1085 One still, of course, had some idea of what adaptation should 
mean apart from a tautologically empty usage of the term. But this, I think, has either been due to 
implicitly adopting the above concept of an increased fit to an environment or has been due to specific 
additional theories on what traits will actually have a high probability of future survival. In any case 
these existing additional theories where not the core of adaptation as survival always remained the 
ultimate test for fitness. Understood in this sense, the claim of adaptationism, taken as such, has no 
predictive value at all and only gains predictive power by other theories with which it is implicitly 
associated. Despite its intuitively, based on these implicit or additional aspects, adaptation itself, as far 
as it is understood in this sense, is merely the tautological concept ofthe survival of the survivor. 
(b) Later fitness becomes defined, in a slightly different way, by reproductive success, and no longer 
by the survival of a single organism. 1086 If taken as basis for pan-adaptationism, this, in my view, still 
carries the burden of the same tautological project. Actually 'survival' had presumably even earlier on 
never just meant the length of life span, since it would be absurd to assume that only this is optimised in 
evolution. If this had been the case, the definition would itself not have been tautologically enough in the 
Dawkinsian sense given above. Natural selection may well lead to a reduction in the life-span if repro-
ductive success is enhanced. To measure the fitness of an organism by its reproductive success seems a 
more relevant way of representing survival. But, if fitness "is measured as the number of children born 
it neglects juvenile mortality and fails to account for parental care. If it is measured as number of off-
spring reaching reproductive age it neglects variation in reproductive success of the grown offspring. If 
it is measured as number of grandchildren it neglects .... and so on ad infinitum. "1087 Hence the concept 
of reproductive success too, if defined in a precise way, is not a strictly appropriate measure of fitness. 
One still aims at the probability of survival in general. But this general aspect of the tem1 'fitness', 
which seems to be its core, leads, without additional qualifications, to an interpretation of adaptation as 
the 'survival ofthe survivor'. Post hoc, it is of course possible to determine which organism was fit or 
which survived, but the general tautological understanding of adaptation is not itself linked to any 
1085 R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype (1982), p. 182. 
1086 Cf. e. g.: R. Dawkins. Replicator Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 63. 
1087 Idem. The Extended Phenotype (1982), p. 184. 
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specific prediction. I think that any definition of fitness which tries to emulate the general concept of 
sun,ival through the use of another term, remains in the sense given above, at its core tautological. 
Nevertheless, a term which is not identical with the term 'survival' is also entangled with non-
tautological aspects as well. To define adaptation by reproductive success, assumes the existence of 
reproductive success, i. e. an evolutionary line and a varying number of descendants. This may even be 
linked to some central aspects of a Darwinian process, which we discuss below. Nevertheless the core of 
the concept of adaptation, remains in this case the tautological claim of the survival of the survivor-
and not an increased fit to an external environment. 
(c) The notion of inclusive fitness is concerned with survival not only in terms of the number of 
descendants of an organism, but also in terms which also consider the organism's effects on the 
reproductive success of its relatives (weighted by their relatedness). 
It seems to me that here an additional non-tautological aspect, linked to the concept of kin selection, 
is introduced besides keeping the generally tautological view of adaptation. A certain clain1 in regard to 
the possibility of certain evolutionary mechanisms or of the unit of selection debate is involved in this 
definition. The concept appears to emphasis the possibility and advantage of mutual help within a kin 
group. That theory of kin selection is (presumably) a falsifiable theory. But the concept of kin selection 
has been interpreted in a gene-atomistic, 1088 an individualistic or a group-selectionistic way:l 1001 
(:> pp. 44 f.), and would lead us on to a discussion about what that specific additional non-tautological 
aspect is involved in our definition. 
However, also here fitness is measured by future survival. Now survival, however, is that of the 
descendants of a particular gene in a certain gene-pool including its effect on its copies in other 
relatives. The still present basic tautological aspect may more easily becomes apparent if one adopts 
Orlove' s reformulation of Hamilton's 'inclusive fitness'. Orlove has reformulated the inclusive fitness 
of 311 organism in a way which does not focus on the org311isms effect on its relatives, but on the 
equivalent effect of relatives on a certain (average) organism. This equivalent reformulation he calls 
'personal fitness'. This is the same ordinary reproductive definition of fitness, "but don't forget that this 
must include the extra offspring he gets as a result of help from his relatives"1089 
Apart from possible additionally integrated non-tautological aspects, the concept of the survival of 
the fittest still points generally to the tautological survival of the survivor. 
An alternative to such, still at least partly tautological definition of adaptation, would be to define 
'fittest' in the sense of its ordinmy meaning, as the strongest, the quickest and the most intelligent. 
These 'athletic' common sense meanings may actually have provided the context in which the actual 
tautology did not become apparent. It is, of course, not tautological to clain1 that the strongest will 
1088 Idem. Replica tor Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 63 
1089 R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype (1982), p. 187. 
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survive. Each of these concrete properties we may-or may not-personally value. But besides the 
problem of priorities of these properties, fitness in this concrete sense obviously does not necessary 
predict survival: we only have to think of the still living order of amoebae or of the extinct Mesozoic 
order of dinosaurs. Thus, if one adopted such a concrete definition of fitness, the claim of the survival of 
the fittest would in very many cases plainly turn out to be wrong. 
Likewise if one uses the definition of fitness as increased complexity, one can object that bacteria in terms of number 
are quite predominant Moreover, such a claim on directed evolution would in any case not resemble the spirit of 
Darwinism. 
Another alternative would be to defme fitness in an abstract way by the probability of survival in the 
long run, the long-term probability to survive. 1090 A pan-adaptationism under such a defmition of fitness 
would be much more justified in being called a naturalised analogy to Leibniz's claim that we live in the 
best of all possible world than the formulations above. ~ 1076 For some reasons such a definition of fitness 
may be useful. But on these grounds the claim of the 'survival of the fittest' would be interpreted in a 
way that would mean especially those entities survive in the short run, which have the best chances at 
surviving in the long run. This formulation is not tautological and also appears not to be true, especially 
in regard to natural selection. Natural selection can in fact in single cases, lead to long term adaptation. 
But particularly since natural selection is assumed as being blind towards long term development and as 
acting instantly, it is not at all guaranteed that those entities survive which will be adapted in the long 
run. Any extinction of a species after a time of development would be a counter-example to pan-adapta-
tionism. Paradoxically, pan-selectionism appears to be particularly inconsistent with pan-adaptationism 
Moreover, for example, subversion of altruistic co-operative groups by egoistic individuals too leads 
to the survival of selfish individuals which are less adapted in the long rw1. This would lead not only to 
a reduced fitness of the group, but also to a reduced fitness of its average members and even of those 
now predominant selfish individuals. 1091 
Hence, also these alternative non-tautological proposals to circumvent a tautology do not lead to 
pan-selectionism. 
But if one does not adopt these alternative definitions, the largely tautological definitions above, 
likewise seem to have more non-tautological aspects than we have worked out here up until now. 
Otherwise, it would be implausible that a mere tautological definition could apparently still yield fruitful 
results. 
It is obviously possible and even useful to check, in a post hoc way, which entities survived and 
which did not. Nevertheless, we have also seen that the concept of adaptation, if directly or indirectly 
defined as the survival ofthe survivor, does not itself have any predictive power: it could not be exposed 
109° Cf.: S. Mills, J. Beatty. The propensity interpretation of fitness (1979); J. M. Thoday. Components of fitness (1953). 
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to a proper testing and does not itself contribute anything to an explanation. In my view, more specific 
theories of why organisms or species survive contribute to the missing predictions, but they are 
additional theories. These theories could also be tested. 
Also the previously proposed concept of an increased fit to an external environment is a testable 
assumption (and which is actually sometimes not given). On the other hand the hypothesis that internal 
factors direct evolution is also testable. But besides these aspects and the already mentioned non-tauto-
logical components of the mainly tautological definitions of adaptation, especially additionally adopted 
theories, in my view render the general-tautological-concept of adaptation as a seemingly testable 
clain1. 
Sober, rather critical of the existence of tautological aspects in Darwinian explanations, conceded 
that although specific adaptive explanations are testable, the general claim that there, in a particular 
case, exists an adaptive explanation is hard to prove wrong. 1092 This, I think, still somewhat resembles 
Gould's objection to adaptationism that it is always possible to invent a new "just so story". In my 
view, the problem oftesting adaptationism in general is due to the often implicitly adopted tautological 
definition of adaptation as the survival of the survivor, which is never ever challenged by any refutation 
of a specific theory about which entity will probably survive. Only those additional specific theories 
about what will evolve and survive can be tested. These theories are crucial since we in fact want to 
predict what traits are evolutionarily stable. Indeed these reasonable specific theories sometimes become 
falsified as well. For this reason the measurement of, for example, gene-frequencies, numbers of 
offspring or life spans is central in order to evaluate these theories. But it adds nothing, to call, without 
qualification, any trait which survives an adaptation. In this sense the actual use of the term 'adaptation' 
seems to be modified in each case, based on the involved specific theories. Specific hypothesis on 
evolutionary mechanisms could be tested. General adaptationism could not be tested and does not 
contribute to an explanation, if adaptation is merely understood as survival in whatever possible way. 
In conclusion, firstly one may abandon the term adaptation all together, since adaptation in its non-
tautological usage is too often entangled with a tautological usage. Secondly, one may keep the notion, 
as an empty tautological umbrella notion referring to all the traits which according to currently valid 
and more specific theories are regarded as leading to survival. In this sense pa.n-adaptationism can not 
be refuted, since any specific theory, which is shown to be false, is by definition no longer covered by 
this umbrella notion. In this way of thinking any causes, also internal trends, orthogenesis and chance 
effects would simply be called adaptations as long as they had some effect on evolution. Thirdly, one 
may keep the notion of adaptation, but purge it from its tautological aspects. This possibility is 
advocated here. I have advocated understanding adaptation as an increased fit to an external 
1091 E. Sober. What is Evolutionary Altroism ( 1988/1998), pp. 463-467. E. Sober, D. S. Wilson. Philosophical Work on 
Units of Selection Problem (1994/1998), pp. 206-207. (:>also pp. 278 f) 
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environment. I have shown that this understanding is not tautological. This particular non-tautological 
understanding has also always been an ideological core of adaptationism, but easily becomes neglected 
when this understanding proves pan-adaptationism to be wrong-as it does. If adaptationism wants to 
be taken seriously, I think, it ought to take its own conceptual core seriously itself. 
Nevertheless, it may, for other reasons, be useful to keep the general notion of fitness, defined by survival. It is only 
wrong to apply this definition to adaptation in a way which leads to the absurd tautological claim of the survival of the 
survivor. It is reasonable to examine what entities survive or which have a probability to survive, but it is absurd to call any 
kind of survival adaptation, since then everything is an adaptation. Besides this, we still want to have a language with 
which to express our more specific hypothesis of which trait will or will not survive, independently of whether it is an 
internally directed development or an adaptation to an external environment. Also the non-adaptationist hypothesis that an 
internal dynamic may lead a certain trait (and not to another trait) may be expressed by the short cut that this internal 
dynamic enhances the fitness of that trait. But in this case an enhanced fitness is not an adaptation to an externally given 
environment. Here the concept of fitness itself does not contribute anything to the explanation, but is only a short cut for the 
probability of survival. And, of course, any evolutionary entity survives or does not survive. Fitness in its general 
understanding, only provides a terminology to express our more specific adaptationist or non-adaptationist hypothesis 
which forces lead to survival, il is in this respect not a theory which can be tested. 
Darwin himself, in the period in which he wrote the Origin. believed in pan-adaptationism, based 
only on natural selection and thus took over the Spencerian slogan of the survival of the fittest to 
characterise his theory. As far as I know he, like many of his followers, did not distinguish between the 
tautological and the non-tautological aspect of pan-adaptionism. Darwin, although challenging the 
ontological fixity of natural theology, still stood in Paley's wake with regard to his belief in pan-
adaptionism. The term 'natural selection' even mirrors the imagery of God's guiding hand, similar to the 
'invisible hand' of another Christian inspired pan-adaptationist, Adam Smith. In Darwin's later period, 
when his religious belief was shaken (mainly by his own theory), he in the fifth edition of the Origin 
abandoned strict pan-adaptationism and the exclusiveness of natural selection (~ p. 113). Although it 
has been to Darwin's merit to see that the simple mechanism of natural selection could in fact lead to 
some adaptation, the strong pan-adaptationist assertion inherent in it becomes highly doubtful if we do 
not base it on either a tradition of natural theology or interpret the concept of natural selection in a 
tautological but vacuous way. 
c) On the Tautological Basis of Pan-Selection ism 
Since selectionism has become universal (:> pp. 203 f.), I, perhaps with a different intention, have 
to agree with Dawkins when he says that it "is time to go back to first principles. What really happens 
in natural selection?" 1093 
Pan-selectionism, which IS opposed to approaches which favour the synergetic emergence of 
processes, nom1ally asserts that besides natural selection-which itself once emerged-no other 
essentially new types of evolutionary processes ever have emerged. Natural selection is understood as a 
universally present ontological principle to which all other evolutional)' processes can be reduced 
1092 E. Sober. Six Sayings about Adaptation ( 1996/1998), p. 81 
1093 R. Dawkins. Replica tor Selection and the Extended Phenotype ( 1978), p. 67. 
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(~pp. 143 f., 207 f.). Natural selection in this view is as basic and exhaustive in respect of processes 
as elementary particles are to radical supporters of physicalist substance reductionism. 
The pan-selectionist claim of process-Darwinism can be formulated as 'all relevant evolutionary 
processes are processes of natural selection'. This often is formulated in a more specific way as 'all 
adaptive processes are processes of natural selection'. Even so, the two formulations are equivalent 
providing that pan-selectionists advocate pan-adaptationism as well. If this is so however, then 
developmental constraints, an internal dynamics or the fixation of traits based on chance, which (as we 
have seen in the last section) do all not necessarily lead to an adaptation to an external environment, are 
ignored as limiting the scope of this claim. Tautological pan-adaptationism simply calls these non-
adaptive processes adaptations because they also play a role in shaping future existence. Another 
assumption leading to the mere tautological truth of the equivalence of the two formulations is that one 
is only interested in adaptive processes anyhow(!) the preceding section on pan-adaptationism). 
Based on an assumed equivalence of (relevant aspects of) evolution and adaptation a pan-selectionist 
may additionally simply define natural selection as an equivalent to any adaptation. Natural selection 
would then merely mean that entities survive or do not survive, which is, of course, always true. Such 
an approach, which by definition regards any evolutionary change, without qualification, as being 
naturally selected, trivially and tautologically implies pan-selectionism. The proposition 'this evolves by 
natural selection' would then not be able to make any more predictions than the proposition 'this evolves 
because of Gods will or because of Providence', since no particular cause or direction is. explicitly 
specified (nevertheless the connotations of these propositions obviously differ considerably). Pan-
selectionism, if based on this tautological argumentation, is obviously too absurd to merit closer dis-
cussion. Perhaps, no one has ever explicitly promoted this understanding of natural selection, but, pre-
sumably, it often plays an implicit role in statements, which in regard to certain properties and without 
any closer scrutiny of the involved process, assume that these properties evolved by 'natural selection'. 
Alternatively, a Darwinian process can still quite broadly, but more appropriately, be defined as 
being characterised, firstly, by different trials and, secondly, by the existence of a selecting force. Often 
a Darwinian process, is, as we have already seen, defined even more strictly. But such a definition from 
the viewpoint of a pan-selectionist may appear to be able to navigate between the Scylla of being a mere 
tautology and the Charybdis of obviously proving pan-selectionism to be wrong. 
I shall argue that this definition of a Darwinian process is still generally too unspecified. In regard to 
the first criterion, it is argued that the concept of different trials is almost-although not totally-empty 
and requires further qualification. The second criterion, the existence of a selecting force, is shown to be 
a completely empty tautological condition-as long as one does not assign a more specific meaning to 
this term. 
--------- - - -- - -
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(0.) Before I come to discuss the afore mentioned criteria of a Darwinian process, it has to be 
mentioned that the definition above is still generally so broad that it can be applied to almost any subject 
area and even to many physical objects. This seems appropriate since we are concerned with universal 
Darwinism and not necessarily just with biological Darwinism. But universal Darwinism, if not claimed 
in a tautological way by calling any change as being a Darwinian process, usually limits itself to 
biological and cultural entities. However, the concept of 'natural selection' has, for example, also been 
proposed by a known physicist to be applicable with regard to the order of atoms in a laser beam. 1094 
Let us take another example-single drops of rain-which may appear particularly implausible. A drop of rain is an 
entity with certain prope1ties such as cohesion etc. The starting point at which a drop is fanned can be regarded as a chance 
process when H20 molecules come together during condensation (trials). Small drops then evolve, one may say, based on 
natural selection, due to the density ofi-hO molecules in the air etc. 
If we would accept that in some cases at least the two criteria (at least in their broad and, as we shall 
see, almost empty sense) would be fulfilled by merely physical entities, we might still argue that in these 
cases no inheritance and replication is given. 1095 I, of course, think that inheritance and replication are 
crucial to biological evolution, since they are preconditions with which past experiences could become 
accumulated and transferred to the future. 
None the less, it should at least be annotated that it is, in my opinion, not entirely trivial that such a 
necessary additional criterion of inheritance and replication would necessarily exclude all merelv 
physical processes from counting as objects of a Darvvinian process. 
Even in regard to a drop of rain, whose order in a way stabilises itself, and one might say 'inherits' its structure to the 
next moment: the drop although possibly loosing some molecules, collects smaller droplets upon falling. (It is astonishing 
to leam that there are intensive scientific studies also on the matter of precipitation.) Moreover, it is known that drops 
which have become very large tend to be broken into smaller drops. Here the macroscopic structure of a drop in a way even 
duplicates itself Something like this may cause a domino effect and may play a role when it is raining. 
Also in more obvious cases of self-organisation in physics something like 'inheritance' seems to be involved. There is a 
huge field of study concerning non-equilibrium irreversible thennodynmnics, a field to which the Nobel laureate 
I. Prigogine has made considerable contributions. It seems that in this subject area states of macroscopic order come into 
being by chance fluctuations. These once established states of order in a process of self-organisation again influence the 
future rm1ge of possible fluctuations. One may doubt whether such m1 inner self-organisational dynmnics may violate other 
criteria of a Darwinim1 process, which refer to an adaptation to an extemal envirorunent. However, if successive 
irreversible states of order dependent on each other, this process in a way may be said to have a memory. Also in regard to 
the physical or chemical evolution of the universe in general, the present structure obviously determines to some extent the 
future structure. An extended physical notion of inheritance may possibly question whether the biological notion of 
inheritance is formulated sufficiently general. 
Leaving aside the question of whether or not properties in physical processes also are somewhat 
inherited from former states, we, in any case, add that for a Darwinian process one also requires 
inheritance. 
1094 H. Haken. e. g. Indeterminismus, Wahl und Freiheit - wie sind diese Begriffe im Bereich des Anorganischen zu 
verstehen? (1984 ), p. 18. Haken' s general theory of synergetics, in my view, still seems rather non-Darwinian since he 
allows new autonomous self-regulative 'regimes' to govem a situation. 
1095 Cf.: R. Dawkins. Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 421. 
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(1.) The criterion of the existence of different trials, although not totally vacuous, is, nevertheless, 
too broad to represent properly the essence of a Darwinian process. 
The concept of different trials-in biology, particularly different mutations, recombinations and 
speciations-merely excludes the possibility that there is only one possible development or direction. All 
trials or steps in more than one direction, however directed they may be, would then qualify as being 
parts of Darwinian processes. Instead of one determined direction a Darwinian process requires a 
probability function of trials with different directions. 
This criterion is not completely empty, since processes which really only produce steps in one dir-
ection are excluded from being Darwinian processes. This aspect of a definition would indeed exclude 
historical pure Lamarckism from being a Darwinian process, because in a purely Lamarckian process 
each adaptive step is assumed to be a 'trial' in one adaptive direction, which is directly informed by the 
environment. This shows tl1e non-tautological aspect of this definition without leading to a refutation of 
pan-selectionism, since radical biological Lanmrckism-besides some open questions (~ pp. 148, 
305 f)-largely has to count as having been refuted. 
But according to this definition, all semi-directed processes would count as Darwinian processes as 
well. Likewise, all evolutionary inner constraints, if still allowing at least two minimally different 
directions, would be counted as natural selection. The concept of constraints on variation leading only to 
precisely one possible direction, is, admittedly, a concept, which can be thought of, but since all 
morphological processes are rather fussy, this would at best be approximated by the actual facts. None 
the less, I think we do want to distinguish between more or less directed processes. 
In the cultural area, which, according to process-Darwinians, is also exclusively describable by 
Darwinian processes, it is simpler to find a counter example even for the very cautious definition of 
pan-selectionism given above. For instance, the possibly directly correct response to a mathematical 
problem, not known to the solver before, would, at least on the level of the individual, obviously not be 
a Darwinian process. 1096 
One may object that internally, cognitively, there has perhaps still been a production of a broad variety of proposals. 
Firstly, this would be a hypothesis which is not proven at all and which even seems difficult to test. Secondly, such a 
general perspective seems to neglect the particular properties of diflerent fonns of exploration, here of rational reasoning. 
Thirdly, even if on some basic level there indeed were a broad variation of trials, this would provide us with an example of 
a processual synergetic whole, since the level of the individual is directed in any case. This interpretation would confim1 
process emergentism, by showing that the combination of Darwinian processes, does not lead to another Darwinian process 
itself, but may, for example, gain properties of directed evolution. 
But also in regard to this example the criterion of 'trials' in any case seems not to differentiate 
appropriately between different processes. In problem solving it does not only make a difference 
1096 One may object that here the basic infonnation is already given by the axioms of logic. Nevertheless it obviously 
requires in some sense a 'new' knowledge to solve new mathematical problems. In this regard I tend to follow Kant in 
regarding complex mathematical judgements as synthetic judgements apriori. 
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whether we directly solve problems or not, but also how many trials we need or how directed the 
process of solving the problem is. 
The criterion of different trials defines a Darwinian process so broadly that processes which are 
partly directed would simply be counted as Darwinian processes. Pan-selectionism is not claimed in a 
strictly tautological way, but reinterprets almost all counter-evidence that suggests it is still close to a 
tautology. Hence a stricter defmition appears to be needed. 
(a) Directed non-adaptive variation. Developmentally constrained variation may only lead to 
evolutionary products which are not optimally adapted 1097 lfthe range of variation is so narrow that no 
proper adaptation can be achieved one may not regard it as a proper Darwinian process. 
Developmentally constrained variation can in my view partly be interpreted as a form of 
autoselection, which in any case will be shown to be non-Danvinian as well. Somewhat differently, 
Amundson, for example, interprets all developmental constraints as constraints on variation and I agree 
that they may play a role. If, for example, mutations are always interpreted along the predominant 
established developmental pathways, certain phenotypic variation-and we are of course concerned 
with phenotypic properties-wilL at least probabilistically, not occur. In regard of an evolutionary line 
as a whole, one can in both cases speak anyway of variational constraints. 
Whales, mammals which earlier lived on land, are in many respects adapted to spending their whole life cycle in water. 
For example, the broad horizontal tail flukes which provide the main propulsive thrust bear no anatomical connection to the 
lost hind limbs. Nevertheless, whales still have, for example, lungs and have not evolved secondary gills to breath air 
resolved in water, which possibly would have been advantageous for their deep dives. This may be interpreted either to be 
due to the developmental pathway making such a mutation highly improbable, or because any mutation in this direction in 
an autoselective way turned out to be disadvantageous. 
The difficulty, but necessity, of distinguishing between an internally caused direction and adaptation 
to an external environment has been discussed before (:> pp. 334 f.). This has been shown to be 
particularly important in preventing a mere tautological understanding of adaptation. 
Amundson, as mentioned above, exposes an interesting proposal about how to distinguish what 
features of given populations are due to internal constraints on variation and to adaptation to an e:>..'ternal 
environment. 1098 
(b) Directed adaptive variation. With regard to adaptations, I think, we should distinguish between 
cases where a blind vast abundance of trials is needed for an adaptation and cases where an adaptation 
may be possibly achieved in a more directed way. 
It appears reasonable to require for our definition that the trials of a Darwinian process are blind, as 
has actually been assumed by the majority of neo-Darwinians. 1099 Trials are blind if no trial has an 
1097 Confer also in section (b) the treatment of the necessary range of variation, :> p. 345 f. 
1098 R. Amundson, in Two Concepts a_( Constraint (199411998), esp. p. 108. :>footnote 1080. 
1099 Including most proponents of the evolutionary synthesis and of gene-Darwinism, :> also footnote 1133. Darwin himself 
had still allowed directed adaptations, even based on an explicitly Lamarckian mechanism, :> pp. 110 f. 
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enhanced probability for being adaptive, relative to other actual or hypothetical trials. 1100 The 
probability function of the different trials causing changes should not correlate with their adaptability. 
The strict blindness of a trial could be interpreted as radical antithesis to inductivism. Blindness assumes that fanner 
experiences, former adaptations, do not improve the probability of solving new problems in the future. Dawkins' in 
Universal Darwinism, argued-on a generally anti-inductivist basis-that Darwinism "is probably the only theory that can 
adequately account for the phenomena that we associate with life" 1101 Elsewhere he states, that "Darwinism is the only 
known theory that is in principle capable of explaining certain aspects of life. If I am right it means that, even if there were 
no actual evidence in favour of the Darwinian theory (there is, of course) we should still be justified in preferring it over all 
rival theories"1102 "The 'Darwinian world view' is not only the theory which happens to be tme, but it is the only theory 
which is possibly explaining our existence"1103 (:>pp. 207 f.) 
Although we aimed at making our definition of a Darwinian process more testable by requiring trials to be blind, at this 
point another tautology seems easily to creep in if one pleads for pan-Darwinism based on an assumed refutation of 
inductivism. I have argued before that anti-inductivism can simply be based on a trivial tautological truth: one does not 
know what one does not know(:> pp. 208 f.). If this were the claim of the inductivists they would of course simply be 
wrong. I have argued earlier, that this has never been upheld by inductivists. lnductivists argue that old knowledge has a 
certain enhanced probability to be valid in new situations. We are entitled to think that the sun will rise tomorrow as well. 
This is the claim that our knowledge has a higher probability than a chance guess of also being valid tomorrow, although 
the world may have changed. Also if situations change an inductivist may either argue that we are directly infonned by the 
enviromnent or, in a less radical way, that we may to some extent be able to skilfully rearrange our knowledge so that the 
resulting generalisations, transformations etc. have nonnally a higher probability of being right than mere chance guesses. 
The question is not whether the unknown could be known (of course not), but, whether fanner knowledge in its 
generalisations and other transformations could also-on average-have any validity in new situations. 
In evolutionary theory the question is whether variation (mutation, recombination etc.) is always necessarily blind 
whether, earlier adaptations, newly combined have a higher probability of being adaptive, than completely chance trials. Of 
course here an aspect of chance is necessarily involved. The question is whether all trials really in principle have to be 
assumed to be completely blind. Linked to this discussion is the question of whether an evolutionary line of a species could 
appropriately be said to be less blind in fmding an adaptive optimum than a line of asexual organisms. If biological or 
cultural processes of knowledge acquisition could be speeded up, we would presumably not call them all equally blind, at 
least not on the level of the focused whole. 
Since I have discussed anti-inductivism earlier on and argued against an a pnori refutation of inductivism, we here con-
tinue with tl1e assumption that the blindness of trials is not a priori given, but a matter of empirical investigation 
(:>pp. 210 f). 
If blindness could be assumed, but the Darwinian process should still lead to adaptation, an 
abundance of trials and a certain range of their variation appears to be required. If the range of 
variation or the number of trials is small, either the assumption of adaptation or of blindness would have 
to be abandoned. With a very limited number and range of blind trials it is not guarantied that in a given 
adaptive landscape within a reasonable amount of time even a close adaptive optimum will be found. 
Alternatively, if adaptation is assumed to have taken place, only a few trials with a limited range of 
variation leading to that adaptation, would not properly be regarded as blind and more variation in non-
adaptive directions as well would have needed to occur in order to sustain the assumption of blindness. 
Hence, if we do not want to abandon adaptation or blindness of trials as essential aspects of a 
Darwinian process, a certain range and number of trials appears also to be required. 
Hence for a comparison of different theories on evolution the amount of claimed variation seems to 
qualify as a yardstick as to just how Darwinian they are. We may, for example, think of two theories of 
language evolution, one of which claims the elimination of a vast number of populations with different 
1100 
:>also e. g. footnote 1134. 
1101 R. Dawkins. Universal Darwinism (1983), p. 403. 
1102 Idem. The Blind Watchmaker ( 1986/1991 ), p. 287. 
1103 !bid, p. xiv. 
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language structures which in turn, led to the existing language structure, other of which claims only very 
few elirninations. Whatever position one holds on this matter (I am personally not committed to any 
position on this specific dispute), it appears to be reasonable to distinguish these theories according to 
where natural selection is 'doing more work'. 1104 A theory which assumes that only a few trials have led 
to the evolution of a property either implies that the trials have somehow been directed towards this 
adaptation or that the trials, if they are assumed to be blind, have probably not reached a very adaptive 
result. It would in my view be absurd to claim alternatively that, for instance, Chomsky, advocating a 
minor role for blind trials and for external elimination, basically supports the san1e theory as someone 
who pleads for its omnipresent role. 
In spite of this Sober, pointed out that in respect to a given observed variation it is difficult or even 
inlpossible to judge how far this variation is directed towards an adaptation, since there are no fixed 
standards for how broad variation has to be. 1105 
It should be noted that this is not only a problem for the critics of Darwinism but equally for Darwinism itself If not 
solved, it would mean that any possible empirical evidence for directed variation would become excluded, not empirically 
but theoretically. Moreover it would equally be possible to regard all processes as directed, because one could also always 
think of a larger range of variation. Directionalism and Darwinism were in danger becoming mere matters of opinion, not of 
empirical evidence. 
Although I agree with Sober that there is a difficulty since no strict general standards are available, 
this does not mean that we cannot make any distinctions. In regard to specific traits we may well think 
of a sufficiently broad variation of blind trials leading to a certain adaptation. We are definitely 
concerned with a question of degree, but in a specific context may still determine whether the range and 
the number of blind trials will probably lead to an adaptation in a given time. This becomes particularly 
apparent in regard of alternative hypotheses, like in those of language acquisition above. It would be 
wrong to call both in an equal way Darwinian. 
In regard to directed adaptive variation, we can generally conclude that we require blindness as a 
criterion for a Darwinian process and not only different trials. Moreover, it appears reasonable-
although remaining slightly more problematic-to require that the trials are also abundant and varying 
enough if it is another precondition that they should lead to adaptation. 
(2.) The second criterion proposed for a Darwinian process-the existence of a selecting force-
represents, if taken as such, not a substantial assertion at all. Without a more restricted use of the term 
'selector' this criterion is vacuous. If a selector, differing from the original cmmotation of the word, is 
broadly understood as all eh.1:ernal and internal conditions under which an entity is fanned, then simply 
all conditions and causes which lead to its existence are meant If possible non-adaptive im1er 
constraints or an inner dynamics are also taken as selectors then selectors are by definition always 
1104 Cf.: E. Sober. Six Sayings about Adaptation ( 1996/1998), p. 78. 
1105 !did., p. 79. 
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given, since simply any cause is meant. If any explanation is defined to fulfil this criterion of a 
Darwinian process, the claim of its universal validity is tautological and vacuous. (Cf. the problem of 
the definition of adaptation, ~ pp. 330 f.). 
An alternative, which would not make this criterion of pan-selectionism a mere tautology, would be 
to define the selecting force as being ex.1ernal. This is actually often done and it is only this that also 
guarantees that selection leads to an adaptation to an external environment. 
Given this, internal developmental constraints leading to a certain evolutionary direction would, 
appropriately, not be interpreted as being Darwinian processes (~ pp. 334 f.). An external selector is 
also absent in regard to the dispersion of genetic neutral genes or to genetic drift, and hence these pro-
cesses also, as it is often argued, would not fulfil this criterion of a Darwinian process. (Drift, however, 
may sometimes play a role in the variational step of a Darwinian process on the population level.) 
Likewise, what I have called systemic individual 'selection' (:>pp. 285 f.) is, on the level of the 
system, not a Darwinian process. Here internally a Darwinian process leads to the adaptation (in the 
afore outlined non-tautological sense) of organisms to otl1er organisms belonging to that system. Even 
so the system as a whole has gained a certain independence from external selectors and, as such, the 
direction of evolution is not necessarily adaptive but determined by the irmer dynamics of this system. 
Hence, the system as a whole is not ruled by a Darwinian process. This is, I think, a good example of 
the synergetic properties of compound processes. in which in regard to processes a whole is not merely 
the sum of its parts(:> pp. 384, 398). 
Hence, if a selector is defined more appropriately as being externaL this criterion of the pan-
adaptationist claim, is not tautological any more-but often false. 
Conclusion. If simply identified with pan-adaptationism, pan-selectionism is fully tautological and 
merely claims the survival ofthe fittest in the sense ofthe survival of the survivor(:> previous section). 
Another seemingly much more differentiated way of defining a Darwinian process is to define it as a 
process of trial and selection. I argue that this is in fact no longer tautological, yet still close to a 
tautology. 
Firstly, the criterion of trials, strictly understood, only completely excludes directed stages of 
evolution. All processes with a minimal variation would fulfil this criterion, even if we are either 
concerned with a strong internally constrained variation not-leading to adaptation or with an adaptively 
directed variation which very quickly leads to an adaptation. Hence, processes which are appropriately 
called non-Darwinian, because they do not lead to an adaptation at all, or because they are directed 
towards adaptation, would absurdly still count in favour of Darwinism. Also in accordance with the 
generally strict neo-Darwinian understanding of a Darwinian process, I argue that a stricter criterion for 
a Darwinian process is required: trials have to be blir1d; there should be no enllanced probability that 
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they lead to adaptation. Moreover, there should be no strong constraints on this blind variation if we 
want to assume that these blind trials lead to adaptation. 
Secondly, the criterion for the existence of a selecting force is vacuous, if understood so broadly that 
any cause and condition, whether internal or external, can be taken as such force. Since any entity has 
internal and external conditions of existence, a claim that there is a selecting force only refers to the 
trivial fact that there are some explanations for the existence of an entity. This is, of course, true, but 
vacuous. If internal constraints and internal tendencies not leading to adaptations were also all called se-
lecting forces, since they are causally relevant and thereby contribute to the survival of a particular kind 
of entity, then this criterion would be, of course, universally fulfilled-without saying anything. 
I argue that the second criterion for a Darwinian process has thus to be understood as selection by an 
environment. This aspect of a refined non-tautological definition is also in accordance with the core of 
the Darwinian tradition. Processes based on an inner dynamics which are not leading to an adaptation, 
could then not be redefined as Darwinian processes. I have pointed to some examples which prove pan-
selectionism to be wrong. 
In the next section the resulting definition of Darwinism and its alternatives will be discussed. 
9.2 Re-Defining the Notions of Darwinism and Lamarckism 
a) A Strict Definition of Danvinism 
From the universal application of Darwinism1107 and from the last two sections on its tautological 
aspects it is apparent that a strict definition of Darwinism is needed which is not tautological but which 
aims at a conceptual resolution that distinguishes different types of processes in the physical, biological 
and cultural spheres as effectively as possible. Aiming at a conceptual resolution is something like an a 
priori condition (roughly in the Kantian sense) to make process emergentism visible. If we believe in the 
existence of the evolution of evolutionary processes, the probability of detecting such an evolution will 
be higher the more strictly we formulate our definition of Darwinian processes. 
Still in accordance with the normal use of the notion, but strictly excluding its possible tautological 
or semi-tautological aspects that were discussed before, I define a-pure-Darwinian process as 
follows. 
(0) The basis for a Darwinian process has to be a direct continuous line of descent and heredity, 
which preserves information. (la) The first step of a Darwinian process is signified by a diversification 
or variation of informational lines. (I b) That variation of the informational line is completely blind. 
Moreover, variation should be abundant and broad enough that relatively close adaptive optima can be 
1106 Cf.: R. Dawkins. Universal Danvinism (1983), p. 420. 
1107 ~pp. 203 f. Cf. also e. g. K. Shrader-Frechette. Should Epistemologists Take Darwin Seriouslv? (1990). 
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found. (2) The second step of a Darwinian process is external selection leading to adaptation in respect 
of a temporally given environment. 
A Darwinian process as a whole leads to the survival of those blindly produced entities, which are 
most opportunistically adapted to their momentaneous environment. 
Proposition zero is normally uncontroversial, and is accepted by most critics. 1108 The other 
propositions also boil down only to a stricter formulation of our working definition, which is widely 
accepted(~ pp. 107 f.). However, it also becomes apparent that tautological formulations of Darwinian 
processes too may often have helped to immunise the Darwinian paradigm and, equally, that a stricter 
definition may challenge pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism (~ pp. 330 f.). Despite the 
resemblance to our working definition, the definition is now more precise and we have aquired certainty 
about the essential role of the components of the definition. The most important aspects of the definition 
above can be summarised in the following phrase, which I already occasionally have used earlier in this 
work. 1109 A Darwinian process is a process ofblind variation (1) and external selection (2). 
This conceptualisation is also historically appropriate in respect to modern Darwinism. Modern 
Darwinism is a synthesis of Darwin's externalism and Mendel's belief in the internal factors of 
evolutionary variation. 1110 But the evolutionary synthesis transfonned the originally anti-Darwinian 
Mendelian and mutationist contribution, so to speak, in a way that was radically Darwinian: the internal 
force of variation, was now understood to be a completely undirected, blind force, producing random 
material on which natural selection could work. The Darwinian evolutionary process is generally 
d "b d '" . h d . I . " !Ill escn e as .. genetic c ance an envtronmenta necesstty . Likewise Mayr regards modern 
Darwinism in essence as a synthesis of mutationism (in the sense of random events or accidents) and 
externalism. 1112 
Although it may have been the originally intended consequence of Darwinism to explain progress, 1113 I suppose that 
Darwin's believe in progress became shattered by his own theory ( ~ pp. 116 f.). At least based on the modem strict 
definition of Darwinism, progress is not at all an essential aspect of that theory. Bowler similarly argued that "Darwinism 
does not really guarantee progress or at least makes it very difficult to define." 1114 I also agree with Gould that from the 
viewpoint of Darwinism, understood as the negation of immte progression and as adaptation only to present and local 
environments, "we are glorious accidents of an unpredictable process with no drive to complexity. " 1115 
In the section which directly follows I propose to regard regarding Darwinism, defined in the strict 
way that I previously elaborated, as one extreme of a spectrum of approaches. In the subsequent sub-
1108 Nevertheless, in a way, this aspect has also been challenged here as being an exclusively valid description of evolution. 
The concept of an infom1ational line has been complemented by the concept of exformation. Although the storage of ex-
fonnation is itself partly based on the information of another evolutionary line, it has been stressed above that certain 
features of one species may, in a way, be stored in another eo-evolving species. (:;l the concept of extemal memory, 
pp. 316 f.) 
1109 This appears to resemble Campbell's terminology, but in the second aspect voluntarily differs from his formulation. 
1110 R. C. Lewontin. Gene, organism, environment (1983), pp. 273 f. 
1111 E. g.: E. 0. Wilson. On Human Nature (1978/95), p. l. 
1112 E. Mayr. Animal Species and Evolution (1963), pp. 1-2. 
1113 R. Richards. The Meaning of Evolution ( 1992 ), pp. 89-90. 
1114 P. J. Bowler. Evolution (1984), p. 310 (refering to Simpson and other authors), cf. also pp. 315-316. 
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sections different aspects of this definition will be clarified and discussed separately in detail. In addition 
to our earlier discussion of pan-adaptationism and pan-selectionism this will lead to a critical evaluation 
ofthe universality of Darwinian processes. 
b) A Spectrum Between Darwinism and 'Lamarckism' 
Darwinism has, sometimes been understood only negatively by the absence of a strictly Lamarckian 
type of evolution. If one accepts such a negative definition, Darwinism seems to gain strength because 
of the weakness of radical Lamarckism. All middle positions then would simply count in favour of 
Darwinism, which would then wrongly mostly still be associated with the implications of Darwinism in 
the strict sense. 
For another reason such a negative definition of Darwinism via Lamarckism is problematic. The 
term 'Lamarckism' leads to a preoccupation with Lamarck's alternative theory of aquired characters 
only, which, in regard to biology-with some reservations-has to count as having been refuted 
(~ pp. 303 f.). In regard to the blindness of evolution Lamarckism might still represent an extreme 
antithesis to Darwinism although only less radical theories may appear possible today. Darwinism, 
however, was also opposed by different theories. Lamarck's original theory (:;, also pp. 96 f.) even 
resembles Darwinism in understanding evolution as a process of adaptation to an externally given 
environment. Lamarckism stressed that organisms "take their fate into their own hands" 1116 only in 
respect of the directedness of trials. Nevertheless, Lamarckism was originally an essentially 
adaptationist approach. But Darwinism has not only been criticised for the concept of the blindness of 
trials, but also for being-like Lamarckism-a theory which stresses adaptation to an external 
environment. Pre-Darwinian and post-Darwinian idealists or romantic biologists, until today, have 
stressed the internally directed unfolding offorms (:>also pp. 102 f., 156 f.). Also today's criticism of 
adaptationism, in my view, still partly follows-albeit often only implicitly-in this wake. Other critics 
of adaptationism stress that chance processes, like drift and neutral mutations, not directly controlled by 
any survival value, play an important role in evolution. Another kind of criticism of Darwinian 
adaptationism-although closely resembling a Darwinian argumentation-is found in my proposal that 
self-referential systems of selection, could acquire a certain autonomy from adaptation to an external 
environment (:>pp. 285 f., 384 f.). In any case, Lamarckism, if used as an antithesis to Darwinism 
conceals the fact that criticism of Darwinism is not confined to Lamarckism in its narrow sense, but 
itself even sometimes differs considerably from Lamarckism. 
A more appropriate notion covering approaches to evolution which are less blind or less adaptive, 
but more directed and internally governed, is not known to me. It would be presun1ably correct to use 
the purely negative term 'non-Darwinism'. In the headline of this section I have, however, kept the 
1115 S. J. Gould. Full House (1996), p. 216, quoted in M. Ruse. The Mystery of Mysteries (1999), pp. 146. 
1116 D. l Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving (1995), p. 45. 
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misrn1derstandable, but well kno\vn, positive term 'Lamarckism' which is meant here in its broad sense. 
This broad usage is also actually found in the later nineteenth century, where 'Lamarckism' often 
referred generally to theories which advocated a less blind and more progressive evolution, mthogenesis 
and inner trends included. 1117 Lamarckism in the narrow sense is often found as an aspect of these more 
generally 'Lamarckian' approaches-as it could actually also be found in early so-called 'Darwinian' 
theories-, but the inheritance of acquired characteristics has only been one aspect of these non-
Darwinian or anti-Darwinian approaches. Lamarckians in a broad sense generally favoured a more 
directed and internally governed form of evolution than Darwinism, and in principle do not need to be 
considered Lamarckians in the strict sense at all. However, one may choose a different term that would 
be less easily misrn1derstood to cover the different non-Darwinian theories. Here I am mainly concerned 
with developing the concept that Darwinism in our strict definition should be understood as one extreme 
of a spectrum of theories. 
From a Darwinian starting point, it appears reasonable to define a non-Darwinian antithesis with 
regard to the two components of the above definition of Darwinism, i. e. blind variation and external 
selection. This does not result in only one spectrum, but in two spectra or rather one spectrum with two 
dimensions. 1118 One dimension reaches from blindness to the directedness of trials, the other reaches 
from stress on increasing fit with an external environment to stress on internal, for example 
developmental, dynamics (fig. 11) 
Directed 
variation 
Blind 
Radical Non-Darwinism 
(Lamarckism in its 
broad sense) 
.· 
Radical 
Darwinism 
variation -1"'~------------l 
Adaptation 
to external 
enviromnent 
Internal 
dynamics 
/development 
Figure 11: Visualisation of the two-dimensional 
spectrum of Darwinian and non-Darwinian 
theories 
Thej1rst dimension contrasts blindness versus direc-
tedness. Darwinism, in the above sense, is characterised 
by the blindness of trials, which-if linked to adap-
tationism-requires a wasteful abrn1dance of trials if 
they were to lead to adaptation (::> pp. 344 f.). Strict 
Lamarckism in the narrow sense-which is also an 
adaptive process-would compose the other extreme 
only on this dimension (upper left corner of the figure), 
since for each evolutionary step only one trial is needed, 
because it is directly infonned by the environment 
Approaches which neither support strictly blind trials 
nor direct informedness by the environment could be 
more appropriately located somewhere in between these radical poles. Likewise, approaches, of course, 
which concede a role to both aspects would be located between theses poles. Darwin himself was partly 
1117 Cf e. g.: Peter J. Bowler: Charles Darwin (1990), p. 21, The Non-Darwinian Revolution (1988), pp. 99-103. (Bowler 
himself, as already the title of the latter book indicates, prefers to use Lamarckism in the narrow sense.) 
1118 This should not imply that these dimensions in regard of a particular theory were completely independent. 
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Lamarckian (~ pp. 110 f.), and neo-Lamarckians came to accept Darwinian concepts. But although 
strict Lamarckism-in regard to biology-has to be taken as having been largely refuted, an approach 
which showed that variation is itself adapted and could be more or less blind (without upholding 
Lamarckian omniscience) would also be in contradiction to strict Darwinism as defined by our above 
understanding. Furthermore, a theory would differ from strict Darwinism, if it stressed that processes 
which themselves may be described in a Darwinian way could lead on another level of synergetic 
whales, which are less blind. 
I shall argue below, that even in the biological stratum-although they are more obvious in the 
cultural stratum-mechanisms can gain a certain 'sight'. In tllis sense none of the radical positions, be it 
Darwinism or Lamarckism, appears to me to be true. I do not want to deny the role of chance. Blindness 
and wastefulness play an important role in evolution. (Even autl10rs like Aristotle ad.nlltted the existence 
of chance 1 1 19) But in a certain sense I dare to argue that even in the field of biology the blindness of 
processes, can be reduced. This becomes even more apparent with respect to culture. Universal 
Darwinism is wrong to stress the unchangeability of blindness and wastefulness. I shall propose that it 
appears possible and appropriate to reinterpret the given evolutionary facts in such a way, that variation 
is neither omniscient nor necessarily completely blind. 
The second dimension in figure 11 represents approaches to evolution wllich understand evolution as 
an adaptation to an external enviromnent in contrast to those which stress an internal unfolding. In short 
a contrast between externalism and internalism. The externalism of Darwinism becomes apparent by the 
very word selection-a selector being normally regarded to be external to the entity which becomes 
selected. The whole Darwinian stress on adaptation to a certain environment is linked to this externalism 
(~ pp. 330 f., 340 f). A. N. Severtsov, who himself was an influential Russian Darwinian, places 
Darwinism together with Lamarckism on the side of eAiernal causes, ectogenesis, and opposes them to 
autogenesis. 1120 Also Mayr contrasts Darwinism witl1 theories advocating changes from intrinsic 
forces. :>I 112 This dimension corresponds to the traditional alternative of whether the evolving entity is 
regarded as the subject or the object of evolution. 1 121 
I have argued above and l shall argue in the further course of this chapter that internal dynamics not 
only constrains evolution, but that inner dynamics can gain a certain autonomy from external selection 
(:>pp. 285 f., 330 f., 384 f.). 
In the following sections I shall neither advocate strict Lamarckism nor strict internal develop-
mentalism, but shall oppose the universality and unchangeability of the Darwinian blind, wasteful and 
1119 Aristotle. Physics, IT, VI, p. 197 b, but see also p. 198 a. 
1120 M. B. Adams. Severtsov and Schmalhausen. In: E. Mayr, W. Pro vine. The Evolutionary Synthesis ( 1980), pp. 193 f. 
1121 Cf.: K. Bayertz. Autonomie und Biologie (1993), p 346. M. Weingarten. Organismen - Objekte oder Subjekte der 
Evolution? (1993). 
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externally imposed mechanism of evolution. The position I want to contribute to appears to be located 
somewhere in the middle of the two dimensions shown in figure 11. Although this would be the best 
approximation for localising my position, it would still misrepresent it, since I argue that the process 
itself evolves and hence its properties vary along both mentioned dimensions according to the focused 
evolutionary line. I am even inclined to argue that there may be an overall tendency away from blind 
externally governed evolution towards seeing internally governed evolution, but this lies beyond the 
scope of this work. Since actual evolutionary processes will never be 'omnicient' there will always be 
cases where the process itself becomes less seeing. A different interpretation of the understanding of 
evolution favoured here would stress the full openness of evolution in regard to processes also. This is 
equally consistent with my argumentation put forward in this work. Here I more generally argue that the 
Darwinian stress on universality, unchangeable blindness and externality of evolution is misconceived. 
Although I am concerned with universal process-Danvinism in general-also at the cultural level-, 
I confine myself in the following discussion mainly to biological Darwinism, which is the paradigm 
case for Darwinian evolution. Instead of trying to build another protective dike in the cultural sciences 
against the rising Danvinian flood, 1122 I mainly try to tackle this flood at source. 
In the remaining sections, it is, of course, not possible to provide a full genealogy of evolutionary 
processes. Instead the inappropriateness of universal process Darwinism will be shown and some 
alternative proposals which may contribute towards a more evolutionary theory of evolution are made. 
9.3 Towards Radical Evolutionism- the Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms 
Subsequently I shall show more systematically that, if we apply the above definition of a Darwinian 
process to existing processes, it becomes doubtful that evolution on all its different explanatory levels 
could appropriately be described by a Darwinian process alone. 1123 
It will be argued that even in the biotic stratum it becomes necessary to accept at least limited 
evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. Early critics of Darwinism, from scientists to theologians, 
although wrong in many respects, may have, to some extent, been right in their critical stance toward 
what Herschel, astronomer and predominant philosopher of science in Danvin's times, called the 
"higgledy-piggledy" mechanism of natural selection. A Darwinian process, in the strict sense set out 
above of course can lead to some adaptation. (Logically it is presumably the simplest process which 
does this.) We have seen that the concept of a simple replicator even entails the concept of a chance 
process of natural selection. This may be accepted as a starting point, but I argue that evolutionary 
processes come into play which are less wasteful and externally governed in the same way that I have 
argued that single genes become organised and unified into more complex systems of organisation, 
1122 Described by: D. Dexmett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (!995), pp. 64 f. 
1123 Cf. generally also the results of section 9.1 on pan-adaptationisrn and pan-selectionisrn, :::>pp. 327 f. 
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which have their own synergetic properties. More complex entities, on some explanatory level, may also 
involve the existence of more complex and less blind and externally governed evolutionary mechanisms. 
Although I, of course, do not deny the millions of years of evolution, I agree with the old criticism that if 
blind-variation-and-external-selection had remained the exclusive mechanism of evolution, the velocity 
of biotic evolution and then, even more so, of cultural evolution could not be properly explained. 
Based on our strict non-tautological definition of natural selection, the pointed proposition of 
G. C. Williams that "the laws of physical science plus natural selection can furnish a complete 
explanation for any biological phenomenon"1124 will be challenged. Such views, which are also claimed 
to include the cultural sphere as well (:> pp. 207 f), still mirror aspects of a Newtonian-Platonic 
Weltanschauung, although Darwinism has forcefully undermined other aspects of these philosophies. 
As far as Darwinism is concerned, there still is only one type of process of evolution, natural selection, 
which is regarded to be externally and eternally given, although physics too has started to stress the 
unfolding of the universe as well as of its inner forces and laws (~ also pp. 168 f.). Although drawing 
strongly upon Darwinism myself, I think the time has come to transcend the Newtonian-Platonic static 
understanding of process, particularly because its only concern with the very simplest process of 
evolution one can think of, and to transform our evolutionary theories in a way in which they become 
coherent with a more truly evolutionary world view. 
In the following sections, based on the definition of a Darwinian process above, I start from within 
the Darwinian paradigm. Firstly the phenomenon of diversification is contrasted with the phenomenon 
of syntl1esis. Secondly, blind variation is contrasted with directed variation-at least on certain levels of 
explanation. Thirdly, the concept of heteroselection, characteristic for Darwinian adaptationism, is 
contrasted to the phenomena of autoselection, which may lead to a certain amount of autonomy. Finally, 
Kant' s concept of self-referentiality is discussed as a possible criterion for the autonomy of processes. 
a) Synthesis instead of Pure Diversification of Information - The First 
Criterion for a Darwinian Process 
A Darwinian process 'is signified by the diversification or variation of informational lines.' This is 
one defining aspect of our strict definition of a Darwinian process, given above. The conceptual core of 
Darwinism only predicts the diversification of evolutionary lines, not their synthesis. This is associated 
with the picture of a branching and diversifying evolutionary tree. In order to differentiate strictly 
between Darwinian aspects of evolution and non-Darwinian ones, we apply this widely accepted aspect 
of definition in a strict way. This may be considered unusual, because one is usually concerned with 
finding explanations rather than answering meticulous questions of delineation involved in 
differentiating different evolutionary paradigms. Another reason for the neglect of this topic is that, 
1124 G. C. Williarns. Adaptation and Natural Selection (1966), pp. 6-7. 
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perhaps, the beauty of unified pan-Darwinism has rendered a less strict application-leading to fewer 
problems-more suitable. 
In respect to physical processes we can 
exclude some processes from classified as 
Darwinian due to this aspect of the 
definition. Planets, for example, -like drops 
of water(~ p. 342)- may in fact be said to 
have a probability curve indicating where 
the mass concentrations will unify in order 
to form a larger planet, depending on the 
general density concentrations of interstellar 
mass. This physical process resembles a 
A Darwinian Process A Non-Darwinian Process 
\ I 
Fig. 12: Visualisation of the diversification of informational lines, 
one criterion of a Darwinian process. 
Darwinian process in regard to the existence of the necessary variation of the starting points and 
different 'trials' of unification. Moreover, one may also, perhaps, speak of external conditions for the 
emergence and further accumulation of mass concentrations. However, this process differs from a Dar-
winian process particularly in the sense that the 'evolutionary lines' (mass concentrations) do not 
diverge, but rather converge. Instead of a multiplication of such lines, one could more reasonably speak 
of a synthesis of different mass concentrations: different concentrations of interstellar mass unite at the 
place of their gravitational centre. In this respect a process like this is diametrically opposed to a 
Darwinian process, whose emphasis is on the diversification of evolutionary lines (and elimination of 
those which are less adapted to a given environment). 
Despite the claims of wliversal Darwinism, cultural evolution cannot, I think, m regard to the 
criterion discussed in this section, be described by exclusively Darwinian processes. 
As biological-cultural integral whales, humans can obviously acquire some experiences and transfer 
them to other humans. On such a level of explanation, evolution, if including culture, is in part radically 
Lamarckian, since acquired knowledge could be transferred to offspring, and, of course, also even to 
unrelated organisms. 
But promoters of process-Darwinism (~ p. 214)-which in its consequences is less radical, 
compared with gene-Darwinism-do not normally take the perspective of human biological-cultural 
whales. TI1ey hold that thoughts, theories and cultural habits, what I have called 'logoi' (:> p. 60), gain 
a life on their own, which has to be dealt with separately. According to process-Darwinism these entities 
are competing with each other and their evolution is to be described by Darwinian processes. 
I also support the view that logoi have to some extent a life of their own. But, this in my view does 
not have to entail the belief that the biological-cultural human as a whole does not exist and can not 
provide proper unit of investigation. The interaction of these two independently existing levels is crucial 
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for both. Hence, the perspective on the biological-cultural whole of a human is both possible and 
suitable. But within this perspective one has to acknowledge the strictly Lamarckian aspects of culture. 
Furthermore, even if one accepted that one always-not only for specific reasonable purposes-has to 
disentangle biological and cultural levels, cultural knowledge itself is not adequately describable by 
Darwinian processes alone. 1125 Here the criterion for differentiation versus synthesis is focused-
whereas other equally problematic criteria, such as the blindness of trials, are left aside. If one traces 
some units of cultural development, for example concepts or symbols, throughout intellectual history 
(the daily bread of any historian of thought) it appears that diversification, which obviously plays a vital 
role, is balanced by the synthesis of different meanings. 1126 Especially in a connectionist understanding 
of the cortical functions of the brain it becomes plausible that representations of different concepts are 
not independent from each other, but influence each other and even may melt into each other. 
Likewise, theories and schools of thought diversify and compete with one another, but they may also 
influence and improve each other, and may even melt and develop a conm1on synthesis. The most 
important intellectual triumphs appear to be the syntheses of views which were previously regarded as 
being opposed to one another-Mendelian genetics and Darvvin's original theory provide an example of 
h h . ]]77 sue a synt ests. -
Furthem10re different cultures are also strongly interwoven. One may, for instance, think of the fact 
that the occidental philosophical heritage of Greek Antiquity was preserved and partly developed by 
philosophers of the Arab world. 
Hence, it appears to me that on all levels of cultural evolution diversification is complemented by 
synthesis. 
Similarly in biological evolution Darwinism has stressed the diversification of evolutionary lines and 
their differential survival. The only diagram in Darwin's Origin illustrates the branching character of 
the tree of descent, without any synthesis. 1128 This concept appears to be valid at least in respect to the 
level of species. This is almost true by definition, because today species are nonnally defmed by the 
absence of any interbreeding. However, in 1994 S. Bartl, D. Baltimore and I. Weissman have 
influentially argued that through viral infection genes appear to be transmitted between what are 
normally regarded as species. 1129 One may also argue that what I have called 'external memory', in a 
way involves a synthesis of common effects of different organisms (:> pp. 316 f). 
1125 Cf. generally: D. Holdcroft, H. Lewis. Memes, Minds and Evolution (2000). 
1126 Even some supporters of Process Darwinism doubt whether cultural evolution could adequately be described as a Dar-
winian process in its strict sense. E. g.: H. Plotkin. Darwin Adachines and the Nature of Knowledge ( 1994 ), pp. 220 f. 
1127 As mentioned earlier, this may not be a good example of a synthesis which has been balanced, since the 'evolutionary 
synthesis' may in some respects be regarded as a purification of the Darwinian paradigm. Also Darwin's theory itself is 
in the present work described as a Malthusian synthesis of romantic and Newtonian thought(:> p. 162). 
1128 Ch. Darwin. Origin of Species (1859/68), pp. 160-161. 
1129 Cf. also: E. l Steele, R. A Lindley, R. V. Blanden. Lamarck 's Signature (1998), pp. 168 f. D. l Futuyma 
Evolutionsbiologie ( 1990/86), pp. 79, 541-542. 
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But one does not need to trouble oneself with such, perhaps, rather specific or peculiar points, since 
the obvious process of biological sexuality involves the tmification of organismic informational lines. It 
may appear senseless to criticise Darwinism based on a process of which all Darwinians have been 
aware and which has even been at the very core of the evolutionary synthesis (itself at least largely 
Darwinian). But generally, it is not impossible to use aspects of a theory against itself In this way 
Darwinism incorporated previously-opposed Mendelism. If we take my (non-idiosyncratic) definition of 
a Darwinian process seriously, it turns out that the synthetic aspect of sexuality is not Darwinian at all. 
Diversification, opposed to synthesis, is anyhow normally regarded as an essential aspect of 
Darwinism, 1130 but even if this were not the case we set out to find a particularly strict definition of a 
specifically Darwinian process. Although sexuality also serves the proliferation of varymg 
descendants-being perfectly compatible with Darwinian views-, the synthetic process equally 
involved here is itself not a predicted or essential part of Darwinism. Dawkins is in my view right about 
Darwinism in general, when he argues that, fundamentally, "all that we have a right to expect from our 
theory is a battleground of replicators"I 131 If one does more than to pay lip service to the definition 
above, the replicational and variational aspect of sexuality at once becomes Darwinian and the role of 
synthesis entangled with these forms of variation is no longer describable as a Darwinian process. 
A true entity reductionist would object that biological sexuality is not a true synthesis in any case, 
and hence no truly new mechanism has come into being. Genes-as we have known since Mendel-do 
not blend. In regard to single genetic elements this is correct, they are genotypically not themselves 
altered in a physical way during sexuality. If one were only to focus on single genes, there would be no 
true syntheses-although one may object in this case that the genetic context, as we have seen, also 
changes the interpretation of single genes (cf: epistasis). But I have argued previously at detail that in 
my view it is not adequate to regard single genes only as wlits of evolution (:> pp. 258 f.). In a more 
holistic interpretation organisms that sexually reproduce are biologically a synthesis of the different 
genomes of their parents (and their current environ.rnent:'ll conditions). In that synthesis genes have a 
certain, slightly changed phenotypic expression. (If the new whole did not somewhat influence the 
interpretation of the parts, the genic features from the mother and the father would not nonnally fit 
together.) Only if the synthesis is harmmlious enough, will the resulting organism have the chance to 
reproduce. The variation aspect, the reproduction aspect, and the survival aspect of sexual reproduction 
are easily linked to Darwinism. But the aspect of synthesis itself, is, as mentioned above, not itself part 
of a Darwinian process. 
The specific aspect of synthesis in sexual reproduction is, if we keep the above strict definition of a 
Darwinian process in mind, not only thoroughly opposed to a Darwinian process, but may also be linked 
with non-Darwinian consequences. The trials in sexual reproduction could be said to be less blind than 
1130 :>pp. 107,348 f., also footnote 1133. 
----------
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mutations. Although it is possible that the genes of the parent generation do not hannonise with each 
other, they are, one may say, pre-selected. In a roughly similar genetic context the genes were tried out 
during the life of the parents and many other combinations will have been 'tested' before in the 
population. Although proponents of the evolutionary synthesis may have expressed this fact differently, 
the apparent differences to mutations, led them to regard recombination as an evolutionary factor in its 
own right (:>pp. 132 f., 367 f.). Moreover, the evolutionary line is nO\V broader than one organism, 
and rather becomes an evolutionary river of one basic population or gene-pool into which all changes 
are flowing back. ::l566 If combinations of advantageous mutations are a limiting factor and populations 
are large enough, a population \Nith synthesis (as part of sexuality) will on average fmd advantageous 
combinations of mutant genes faster than asexual populations can. 1132 Based on synthesis new forms of 
inner organisation also become possible, for example some mechanisms which I shall later call 
'autoselection', which in regard of a system as a whole not necessarily lead to an adaptation to an 
externally given environment. 
If one accepts explanatory levels higher than that of single genes, sexuality does not only involve 
proliferation but also, in a rather non-Danvinian way, synthesis. This also leads to the situation in 
which populations are not necessarily closed entities, but on some level of description may also melt 
their best-or worst-features. 
b) Directed Variation rather than Blind Variation -Discussion of the Second 
Criterion 
'The variation of the informational line is completely blind'. This is the next criterion of our strict 
definition of a Danvinian process. It is a criterion that is largely accepted. A Darwinian process is 
normally regarded as being composed of the two steps of variation and selection::l355 , the first of 
which-which is scrutinised here-is regarded as being completely blind or random. 1133 
Campbell has pointed out that the word 'blind' should be preferred to the more usual 'random', 
because equiprobability is not needed-and is actually often not given. But the criterion of blindness 
nevertheless requires that variations are produced without prior knowledge of how adaptive they will 
probably turn out to be. Moreover, their occurrence is assumed to be independent of environmental 
conditions. No trial should be more likely than another one to be correct, and later trials should not 
1131 R. Dawkins. The Se/fish Gene (1989), p. 256. 
1132 D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), pp. 317 f. (referring partly to J. F. Crow, M. Kimura, 1965). 
1133 D. T. Campbell. Evolutionary Epistemology (1994), pp. 421-422; R. Dawkins. The Extended Phenotype (1982/89), 
p. 168; D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), p. 59; N. Eldredge. Reinventing Darwin (1995/96), p 133; 
D. J. Futuyrna. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), pp. 49, 86 (but e. g. 522); E. Mayr. Evolution and the Diversity of Life 
(1978179), pp. 16-20, 204; J. Monod. Le hasard et la necessite ( 1970/91 ), p. 110; K. R. Popper. Objective Knowledge 
(1972/1979), p. 270. But cf. also: M. J. S. Hodge. Darwin's general biological theorizing (1983), pp. 57-58. 
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make use of the direction of the previous ones. 1134 Thus Campbell has described a Darwinian process 
generally as a process of "blind-variation-and-selective-retention". :l831 
To defme Darwinism in such a way contrasts Darw·inism with more directed and predictable 
approaches to evolution1135 It is assumed that variation does not 'see' what will be positive for the 
survival of the entity in question; in tllis sense Dawkins uses the phrase the 'blind watchmaker' .1136 If a 
Darwinian process were to guarantee adaptation, the blindness of variation would require an abundance 
and wastefulness oftrials (:> e. g. pp. 345 f.). 
Universal Darwinism (::> pp. 203 f.) claims that Darwinian processes are the only relevant 
evolutionary processes. In its more moderate version of process Darwinism ( :> pp. 214 f.), which 
accepts cultural entities, this blindness should equally hold for different types of biological variation 
like, for instance, psychological variation or the variation of theories. In this section I mainly focus on 
the discussion of variation in the biotic sphere. 
I think it is disputable to rest the burden of proof one-sidedly on the view that there is directed variation. Despite my 
objections to pan-adaptationism (:>pp. 330 f.), Darwinians (as Lamarckians and other adaptationists) no doubt have shown 
that adaptation plays an important role in evolution, and it is hence implausible to assume that adaptation plays no role in 
improving the trials of evolutionary mechanisms themselves. 
An often repeated general argument for the implausibility of an unchanged blindness of evolutionary 
processes has been that the limited time span to produce the multitude of different complex organisms. 
Historically the period of time for evolution was estimated incorrectly as being much shorter as we 
know it to be today. This point was used to render Darwinism absurd (e. g. Lord Kelvin) None the 
less, this argument may appear to contain a core of truth, particularly if unchangeable blindness is taken 
in a strict sense, and likewise if the present estimations of the time of the origin of life are taken as a 
basis for it. 
The following argument follows an early, but in principle still applicable, calculation of G. G. Simpson which has been 
re-interpreted by some critics of Darwinism as showing the in1plausibility of a strict blindness of trials. Simpson assumes, 
strongly simplifying, a general mutation rate of 0.000 0 I. (Simpson makes some additional assumptions which slightly 
change the outcome of the calculation but are not importm1t for the line of argument.) The probability for only five 
simultaneous mutations in five specific genes according to Simpson's calculations is not larger than 0.000 000 000 000 000 
000 000 1. Such an event in 100 million individuals with a generation period of only one day will on average take place 
every 274 billion years. But according to the present scientific estimations the first organic life arose about 3 or 4 billion 
years ago. Hence, given the complete unchm1geable blindness of this process, it appears very improbable that such an event 
(in regard of certain specified genes) will have taken place only once in a species of the above parmnetcrs. 1137 
One may object that evolution has found natural ways in which mutations have an enhanced probability of being 
phenotypically expressed together. The fact that many mutations for a time remain silent if they are part of long undecoded 
strands of DNA (introns) allows variation to spread by drift also, if the mutations would not be advantageous outside a 
certain combination (when they would be transcribed). The mutations which have not appeared at the smne time, but 
1134 D. T. Cmnpbell. Evolutionary Epistemology ( 1994 ), pp. 421-422. Almost word-for-word the smne text: Blind Variation 
and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes (1987/60), p. 91; Evolutionmy 
Epistemology, 1974, p. 421. Similarly Dawkins, :> footnote 1176. 
Campbell, however, considers the possibility of "shortcuts", which I rather regard as a violation of the strictest 
understanding ofDarwinim1 process, linked to the concept of the unchangeable blindness of evolution. 
1135 See e. g.: P. Bowler. Darwin. (1990), pp. 155-156, 160-161. 
1136 R Dawkins. The Blind Watchmaker (1986/91 ), pp. 306 f. 
1137 Ch. v. Guttenberg. Biologie als We/tanschauung (1967), 1967, p. 42; very similar: R Nachtwey. Der Irrweg des 
Darwinismus (1959), pp. 79-80. 
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successively, by a, as we shall see, relatively frequent mutation of switching on a certain peace of genetic code, causally 
appear together. Moreover, sexuality and recombination in particular leads, as mentioned, to a quicker evolution by 
combining (earlier tested) mutations from different organisms with one another(~ e. g.: pp. 327 f.; 354 f., 367 f.). 
But such arguments are very close to ti1e point I want to make. Unlike to some authors, I am also looking for 'natural' 
evolutionary explanations. But if the tempo and mode of evolution has actually changed systematically, enabling a quicker 
adaptation, I think it may often be possible to reinterpret this as a change in the evolutionary process itself, and also as a 
change in ti1e production of variation which, perhaps, on some level may suitably be said to have become less blind. 
I here dare to challenge the orthodox neo-Darwinian view that evolution was and is unchangeably 
blind. Since I am not intending to advocate radical biological Lamarckism, this is based on the 
assumption that there are not just two poles, but a whole spectrum of approaches on the dimension of 
blindness versus directedness of variation(~ pp. 348 f.). 
The trial aspect of Darwinism has been discussed before in the section on the tautological basis of 
pan-selectionism (~ pp. 340 f.). In it I have already elaborated the possibility of developmentally 
constrained variance(:> p. 344) and of a lacking abundance of variance. This is also inconsistent with 
Darwinism, but rather on the other dimension of our definition of our two-dimensional spectrum of 
Darwinism and non-Darwinism (:> p. 345, pp. 350 f.). Here we are more concerned with the possibility 
of adaptively directed variation which has been mentioned as well. I am concerned with a re-
interpretation of given evolutionary and genetic mechanisms in a way that some adapted mechanisms, 
may systematically produce trials with a higher probability of leading to survival. Instead of the fitness 
of the organism, a certain variation producing mechanism could in my view be fit as well, and enhance 
the probability of producing varying organisms with comparatively good chances to survive. 
Although most examples will be concemed with directed adaptive variation, the aspect of an adaptation to an extemal 
environment and the inner dynamics is here particularly difficult to disentangle, because they often go in ti1e same 
direction. However, we are here concemed with the aspect of blindness and ti1is blindness is in my view by some 
mechanisms in any case apparently reduced. 
Since I an1 advocating a spectrum of approaches, an alternative to radical Darwinism does not 
necessarily entail a violation of the Weismann doctrine in the sense required for radical Lan1arckism1138 
Nevertheless, I advocate that several evolutionary mechanisms have evolved which on some appropriate 
levels of explanation render the average trials less blind. Whether this is logically possible is closely 
linked to our understanding of explanatory levels and particularly of change, newness and induction 
(:>pp. 361 f.) I do not challenge any commonly acknowledged empirical 'facts', but only their 
interpretation in Darwinian evolutionary biology. One may either regard the point I make as a daring 
interpretative shift or as an almost trivial plausible truth. My re-interpretation of long acknowledged 
facts is based on the strict definition of Darwinism given above (~ pp. 348 f.) and the elaborated multi-
level account of evolution (:> pp. 258 f.). It draws strongly from findings from the rapidly developing 
field of microbiology(~ generally pp. 147 f). 
1138 Such a dichotomy also often implicitly appears to be assumed by normally highly differentiated writers, from whom I 
very much draw in more specific respects. E. g.: D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), p. 86 (but e. g. 522). 
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Firstly, it is discussed, whether trials should be regarded as being blind by definition, based on a 
certain understanding of ne\\rness. Secondly, different types of variation are distinguished, like mutation, 
genetic recombination and specification. This appears to follow from a multi-level account of evolution. 
Thirdly, we come to the main point in which it is sho\\'11 that not all variation appears to be equally 
blind. Some processes producing evolutionary variation seem, themselves, to be adaptations leading to 
trials which, on average, have a higher fitness than they would have on the basis of pure chance. 
Although evolution may have started in a purely Darwinian way, it appears not always to have 
remained strictly blind. Fourthly, some cases will be mentioned where one may, perhaps, additionally 
speak of a particular kind of adapted variation as a direct response to an environment (without 
necessitating a violation of the Weismann barrier). 
(1.) Not Blind by Definition 
It appears possible that biological or cultural knowledge 1s blind simply by defmition, because 
evolutionary trials explore changed conditions and change might be defined as the totally unkno\\'11 and 
something which cannot be seen in advance. This problem has been discussed above under the keyword 
of the problem of induction (:> pp. 208 f., also p. 345). Here I am not particularly interested in the 
direct transfer of information from the outer to the inner, since I do not promote radical Lamarckism. 
Instead I am concerned with the more original question, of whether knowledge could in principle have 
any predictive power, since the 'reality' to which knowledge refers-if knowledge is referential at all-
may always have changed. 
I should also like to shortly examine the frrst question of a direct information transfer. To some extent I share the 
critical attitude of process-Darwinism towards inductivism as direct infom1ation transfer, even on the level of psychology 
and sociology. As equally held by constructivists and idealists knowledge is in my view at least in some respects based on 
an elaboration of prior existing (biological, psychological or social) knowledge. 
All the same, a radical blindness also in this sense and a radical denial of bottom-up processes appears to be one-sided. 
Psychologically we are for example apparently able to 'see' things about which we had no particular hypothesis before. 
(Here seeing could equally be understood literary and figuratively for other ways of perception.) If such phenomena are 
conceded, obviously bottom-up processes take place, otherwise one would not be able to see, for example, an unexpected 
candle placed on the table. 
A process-Darwinist and any other anti-inductivist, may have two objections against this argument. Firstly, an anti-
inductivist may claim that this openness to see an unexpected candle is a result of fanner (biological and cultural) trial-and-
error learning. As a result, it is absurdly claimed that one, in a way, has the permanent hypothesis that candles could be on 
the table. The ability of sight itself is regarded in the usual simplifying parlance to be a product of natural selection. Sight 
includes the ability to detect entities of roughly the size, density, wavelength etc. But even if this is conceded, nonetheless, 
our perceptive capacities have a remarkable openness to see objects, which did not exist earlier in evolutionary history or in 
our individual biography of learning. We may actually perceive something like a candle, even if we had not encountered a 
specific candle before (we ourselves and any of our predecessors). This apparent openness to new forms and combinations 
obviously transcends the earlier experiences we have made. In this sense inductivism seems to be right. 
Secondly, an anti-inductivist may object that there are still trial processes-possibly blind trial processes--on lower 
levels, fluctuations of attention, receptivity of our retina or our neural system. Such aspects, of course, exist, but the ques-
tion is whether there are synthetic bottom-up aspects as well. On some level of explanation there are apparently bottom-up 
processes, for instance the causation of a nerve impulse is controlled by the light density on a certain area of the retina. 
Moreover, even if this were not so, it has been argued above that nested levels of blind Darwinian processes could be 
organised in a way which still allow for a broad openness on a higher level of explanation. In this interpretation the whole 
is not blind even if its parts are. The concept of synergetic properties on higher levels of explanation has previously been 
discussed in respect to processes, for example, in regard to biological specification(~ pp. 327 f.). Such an approach would, 
I think, not correspond to pan-Darwinism, but rather to a process-emergentist viewpoint, which draws 
from the concept ofprocessual Darwinian 'atoms'. 
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Hence, even if it would be correct to evaluate the inductivist aspect of a direct information transfer critically in the two 
outlined ways, I hope to have shown that the inductivist equally makes a valid point. Hence also in the respect to 
information transfer, it appears plausible to me that neither inductivism nor non-inductivism are generally valid alone. 
The question which I am mainly interested in here, is the more original question of induction, con-
cerned with the possibility of prediction, which is here applied in a biological context. Hume's problem 
was that 'all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the 
past'. It appears to me that some proponents of universal Darwinism base their claim of a universal 
blindness of trials on a supposed negative 'solution' to the problem of induction. They argue that pre-
diction, which compared with chance guesses has an enhanced probability of being right, is, strictly 
speaking, not possible at all. 1139 This 'solution' has generally been critically discussed before in tll.is 
work(:> pp. 210 f.). 
Witl1 respect to biology it is often ignored that this problem would not only affect changes in an 
evolutionary line, like mutations, but also evolutionary stability. Actually any concept of fitness, any 
survival and identical replication of an organism would be affected by this problem! Argued the other 
way round, the very survival of organisms and their unchanged replicas proves already a certain 
stability of the (external) world. It is apparent that replication of formerly advantageous properties often 
brings an advantage for the future. If this were not the case not only would pan-adaptationism be wrong, 
but the concept of adaptation would be completely without any foundation. Whether this should be 
regarded as referring to a probabilistic logic of induction or rather to the factual advantage of such a 
heuristic, in any case the existence of a nl.inimal stability of the world, which Hume doubted, is 
supported on these grounds. On the other hand obviously fallibilism was right in stressing that old 
knowledge could always turn out to be wrong; induction never has, of course, the security of deduction 
(:> also pp. 330 f.). 
Despite this parallel tl1e question of the possible probabilistic advantageous use of old knowledge in 
regard to evolutionary change is more difficult. One can, I think, in this respect easily commit the 
fallacy of claiming blindness on tautological grounds only. If change is defined as the unknown and the 
unpredictable, then it is by definition true that no aspect of change can be predicted and that every trial 
to reach an understanding of this change is necessarily completely blind. But such a definition does not 
face what is actually controversial, rather it simply excludes any alternative view from being possible in 
our semantic framework. The very question is, whether change is actually completely unpredictable and 
whether old knowledge can help us in facing the changed world by reapplying the old in a changed way. 
Change, does not necessarily imply unpredictable change. There may be a certain stability in the first 
derivation of existence (in change) as in existence itself. There can be stability in the change of 
knowledge itself, which may systematically enhance the probability of a correspondence with the 
external world (relative to mere chance changes). This could firstly be the case if there are continuities 
!139 R. Dawkins. Universal Darwinism (1983). ::l pp. 207 (see also Popper). 
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in environmental change to which internal change has become adapted. Other possibilities are internal 
continuities of change, which are particularly advantageous when facing external change, because they 
do not need a continuous external dimension or direction of change. We may think of building blocks 
which have turned out to be particularly advantageous in quite different situations. A trial based on such 
building blocks and containing a higher probability than a chance process of producing a system which 
fits a changed environment, could not properly be said to be just as blind as chance guesses. On the 
view expounded here, the question of whether variation is completely blind or not is not a logical, but an 
empirical one. Are there adaptive continuities in biology and has evolution developed mechanisms which 
make use of possible internal or external adaptive continuities? 
Change still mostly contains an unpredictable component, even more than stability itself does. 
However, I shall argue in the following sections that evolutionary change does not always mean change 
to the totally unknown. Trials are never as certain as being completely externally informed or as 
deductions, but trials are neither blind by definition nor are they actually always blind. We could think 
of continuities of change, and we may think of changes which have a higher probability of being 
adaptive than blind chance trials. I shall argue, in a quite Darwinian way, that those evolutionary lines 
with a higher probability to produce trials which have an enhanced probability to lead to a higher fitness 
than mere chance trials, have themselves a higher chance of surviving. If one speaks of organisms with 
an increased probability of surviving, one may also speak of mechanisms which have an increased 
probability of leading to the survival of an evolutionary Line (particularly since I have previously 
defended a multi-level account of evolution). A certain amount of continuity in the changes of the 
organism-organism or the organisms-environment interaction, has-as we will see-been shown to be 
advantageous by evolution. Although a certain degree of blindness always remains, the trials are not 
equally blind throughout. But this empirical question is the topic of the next sections. 
Humean scepticism and the Darwinian concept of blindness are, in my view, right in their fallibilism, 
which stresses that empirical knowledge, both biologically and culturally, could never reach absolute 
certainty. But even so I think the metaphysical dichotomy of blindness versus certainty conceals the 
possible degrees of sight and short-sightedness. Advanced internal model construction, which is still 
fallible, is not the same as simple blind trial-and-error learning. 
In this section I have argued that we cannot judge a priori that biological change is always equally 
blind, but that this has to be investigated empirically. 
In the broader cultural context, which as we have seen also seems to have influenced the 
evolutionary synthesis (:>pp. 188 f.), I think H. Putnam is right: "The idea that correct ideas just come 
from the sky, while the methods for testing them are highly rigid and predetennined, is one of the worst 
legacies ofthe Vienna Circle."1140 
1140 H. Putnam. The 'Corroboration· of Theories (1974), p. 238. 
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(2.) Different Types of Variation 
Because Darwinian processes are characterised by the blindness of variation of an informational line, 
we should take a closer view at the phenomena described as variation, before we come to discuss 
whether empirically they always appear to be blind. 
Here variation means changes in an evolutionary line, and not in what one may call 'stable 
variation'. Stable variation refers to given unchanged distributions of genes as expressed in the Hardy-
Weinberg equation. This does not mean that all continuities of change are excluded because, as set 
forth above, this resulted in claiming the blindness of trials in a tautological way. Yet stable variations, 
and not stabilities in change itself, correspond on the population level to an identical replication of genes 
on the level of genes or individuals and is part of the statics rather than the dynamics of evolution. We 
are hence concerned with any evolutionary change-opposed to identical reproduction-, which still 
possibly includes continuities of change itself (preferred dimensions or directions of change). 
There are different types of such variation. The most prominent and basic class of evolutionary 
changes are mutations. There are simple point mutations (mutations of single base pairs), but also more 
complex mutations like inversions, translocations, frameshift mutations or mutations in which the whole 
genome is restructured. 
I shall argue that some particularly complex mutations may often make systematic use of structures evolved earlier and 
can often be said to be systematically less blind than mere chance. 
Alternatively, genetic cross-over and recombination do not lead to new sequences of base pairs at a 
certain locus, but only to new combinations of such base pairs. Nevertheless, new combinations also 
have to be blind to count as being a Darwinian process. 
I have already indicated above that I regard these trials as less blind, because they are somewhat pre-selected. Although 
they lead to new combinations, they are tested beforehand in a similar context. Moreover, mate choice may enhance the 
probability of certain new combinations, even if the places where cross-overs happen were random. This is discussed in the 
next section. 
If multi-level Darwinism, which is defended above (~ pp. 258 f., 152 f.), is to be taken seriously, 
specification also has to be regarded as a factor producing evolutionary variance in its own right. 
I have mentioned already that specification may not necessarily be blind. Besides the possibility of adaptive speciation 
rates, there may be a pre-selection on the level of individuals or sub-populations, so that specification, on the defended 
level of the species, may well not be totally blind. This has been discussed before ( ::> pp. 327 f.) and we will also touch on 
this topic in the next section. 
In a truly multi-level account one may also think of other levels of variation, like the level of groups 
or the level of ecosystems. But for reasons of simplicity this is not elaborated in the following section. 
Tendencies in the process of group formation determine what genetic combinations will actually have newly been tested 
at the group level. There are presumably mechanisms with which a group is formed at least in 'higher' animals, which may 
systematically enhance the fitness of the group. If this were the case then variation would not be blind. I have discussed, for 
example, the very simple mechanism of the influence of a-perhaps partly inherited-average group size on the stability of 
certain genetic combinations which are advantageous to groups. One may well think of the possibility that the average 
group size itself is a product of group selection, which leads to a stabilisation of this group structure and favours group 
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selection (:>pp. 278 f. ). In this case groups would vary in a way which is particularly adaptive for these groups and not 
blind in the most radical sense. 
Independent of the level at which variation takes place, evolutionary change can have different 
characteristics . We can distinguish, for instance, the average amount of variants, the average difference 
of the variants in relation to the reproducing entity, and the average specific direction of variation . In a 
diagram of different evolutionary trees these types of variation can be visualised (:>fig. 13). 
These possible characteristics of variation are actually partly quantified by biological measures . The 
amount of variation of organisms or genes is usually gauged by their general or specific mutation rate 
as well as by their recombination rates. ln regard to species the same is measured by the general 
speciation rate.1141 The average difference ofvariants and the direction ojvariation (column two and 
three) are normally not actually assessed, but they are in principle given by the distribution between how 
new genotypes or phenotypes differ from the old ones . 
Different Amounts of Variation Different Variations of Variation Different Directions of Variation 
(a) 
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• 
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The munber n of variants The standard deviation a (x) of tl1e The different direction of variation, 
variants (e. g. severity of mutations) different means J.1 (x) of variation 
Fig. 13: Simplified visualisation of types of variation of informational lines or ilieir phenolypic expression. (Here we are 
only concerned wiili variation in ilie sense of evolutionary change.) In ilie diagram only one generation of reproductive 
entities (e. g. complex genes, organisms or species) is shown. The vertical dimension in each diagram is tin1e. The 
horizontal dimension is something like genetic difference or, differently, distance in tl1e morphospace. 
Allliough making some distinctions, naturally, tlus visualisation sti ll makes simplifying assumptions. In regard to species it 
could, for example, be disputed if llie genotypic variance were to emerge suddenly, which is indicated by llie sharp edged 
corners of the trees. Also the emergence of new lines does not need to take place only when old lines have declined . 
With our distinctions between the different types of variation made, the stage IS set to discuss 
whether it is reasonable to regard evolutionary variation as a result of blind chance. Firstly, I discuss 
whether aspects of the actual variation can be regarded as adaptations rather than as the direct results of 
blind chance (we are concerned with all three columns). Secondly, I briefly consider, whether some 
1141 Indirectly also the individual birth, dealli rate and extinction rate play a role here. 
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variations could possibly be interpreted as occurring systematically even as a particular reaction to 
certain environmental conditions. 
(3.) Is there Adaptive Variation? 
There seem to be different classes of cases where one, using a fine grained terminology, wants to 
speak of particularly adaptive variation. We are interested in variation which is systematically less blind 
than the production of trials, exclusively based on chance, even if the central dogma of microbiology (in 
its most constrained sense) is not violated. I distinguish here between two types of adaptive variation. 
Firstly, in a multi-level account of evolution, which I have supported above (~ pp. 152 f., 258 f.), 
there may be interactions between different evolving levels which may render the variance on a certain 
level less blind. For example in speciation the variance on the species level of newly evolved species, 
may be directed by the earlier selection process on the level of individuals or sub-populations. Even if 
the variance at the individual level were completely blind, the species level, which we have argued exists 
as well, is not necessarily equally blind. One may argue that only blind processes count as true 
evolutionary processes, but this again makes the claim of blindness a mere tautology. If one accepts 
many evolutionary levels it may well be that selection processes can be arranged in such a way that 
blindness is reduced on a certain level of explanation, that may even provide the reason for why a 
particular multi-level arrangement has turned out to be evolutionarily more stable. Moreover, as argued 
before, synthetic aspects playing a role on the species level may reduce the blindness (:> p. 357). 
Previously I also discussed two sub-classes of interactions between selection processes, multi-level 
selection and nested selection, which may both lead to an adaptively directed variation (~ p. 327 f.). 
However, in both sub-classes adaptive variation relies on a selection process at another level, without 
itself necessarily being blind. These forms of directed variation are flexible in their response to a certain 
environment. They do not need, like the next class, to assume a certain stability inherent in the 
evolutionary change itself. 
Secondly, some dimensions or directions of change may be permanently more advantageous than 
totally blind trials. In this section I argue that internal molecular structures and sometimes macroscopic 
morphology provides evidence that a repetition of already existing structures was often more advan-
tageous than the production of completely new structures by single steps. There are preferred building 
blocks, dimensions of change and sometimes, perhaps, even directions of change, themselves partly the 
result of adaptation. A recycling of old structures, equal to that in the class above, both refers to a 
previous selection process and to the empirical fact that the use of these particular continuities often-
but not always-has turned out to be more adaptive than mere chance combinations. If such arguments 
are admissible, then one can no longer claim blindness in a tautological way(:, p. 361). I do not, of 
course, deny that most changes (particularly mutations) are still harmful, 1142 but I think the building of a 
1142 D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), pp. 69, 76. 
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complex structure from scratch without 'recycling' pre-selected structures would normally require many 
more harmful steps. In this sense it is reasonable to speak of comparatively less wasteful and more 
directed trials. Certainly, it is never certain whether a particular dimension or tendency of preferred 
change will not become disadvantageous, in the same way as that any adaptation may one day turn out 
to be no longer adaptive. In such a case a tendency may even constrain possible adaptation and in this 
sense adaptive tendencies-although being for a certain time less blind-will remain short sighted. In 
any case, the facts from microbiology, as we shall see, indicate that preferred dimensions and directions 
of change have played a role in evolution and can often be regarded as adaptations. Such tendencies 
have allowed for an often much quicker evolution than one would otherwise think possible, on the basis 
of totally blind mutations alone. Opposed to the class of directed adaptations, which were firstly dealt 
with, here a stable fitness increasing dimension or direction of change is needed. This is either due to ex-
ternal continuities or internal building blocks, which are particularly advantageous in many different 
contexts. 
It is not always easy to distinguish between these two classes, because in both cases some sort of 
pre-selection takes place and because these classes of a more directed variation are in principle 
applicable to most of the mentioned levels on which evolution can take place. 
Speciation, which is described at the species level, may be directed because of a pre-selection at the 
level of sub-populations (class 1). But one can also think of a regular and itself adapted speciation rate 
(class 2). It is actually known that different evolutionary lines have different speciation rates, 1143 and it 
is possible-although the object of a vigorous debate-that speciation rates (or even more radically also 
specification directions) may themselves be the object of adaptation at the species level. One might, for 
example, explain the actual differences in the production of evolutionary change in generalists or 
specialists in such termsn 44 
I now clarify the two possible classes of directed variation in respect to genetic recombination of 
sexual reproduction and crossing-over. 
a) Recombination is indeed largely random in the sense that alleles at a locus coming from both 
parents are norn1ally mixed in a purely random way, so that both have an equal 50% probability of 
being included in a certain sperm or egg cell. This randonmess is a key presumption of the Hardy-
Weinberg equation, itself pivotal to population genetics. It has also been proposed that the adaptedness 
of sexual recombination would break down if its randonmess were not secured. 1145 Neve1theless there 
are actually cases of so-called segregation distortion or meiotic drive which violate this random mixing 
1143 E. g. mentioned in: N. Eldredge. Reinventing Darwin (1995), p. 120. 
1144 Instead this is often explained exclusively by E. S. Vrba's so called 'effect hypothesis'. !bid, p. 139. 
1145 R. Dawkins. The Selfish Gene (1989, added chapters), pp. 264 f. Although Dawkins presumably also regards tllis aspect 
as gene-Darwinian, it appears to me that the benefit of the whole evolutionary line may equally be regarded to be the 
cause for the existence of the randonmess. This refers back to the discussion of the levels of evolution ::> pp. 258 f. 
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and are, perhaps, best explained by selfish DNA 1146 However, I do not question that, apart from such 
exceptions, sexual reproduction in this respect is generally largely random. 
b) Even so in an important and, I think, often neglected respect, the blindness of recombination is 
reduced. Here I am referring to the first class of directed adaptive variation above. Recombination only 
recombines genes which have previously existed at the same gene locus and survived. More radically 
mutations create new base pair sequences at a given locus. However, recombination, as argued above, is 
a kind oftrial in combining genes. Interaction effects of new combinations are tested, which might have 
never been tested before. At least on the level of what I have called 'higher-level genes'(~ pp. 262 f) 
new genes are formed. Such trials still involve the risk that some gene combinations may prevent the 
building of a coherent organism. Nonetheless these trials only use material which has been tested before 
on another level. Thereby the risk involved in the new trials is reduced. Although recombination is 
linlited in its range of which combinations could be achieved, recombination within this range is less 
blind than mutation. The positive results of the more daring mutations which took place in different 
single organisms using this less risky method are combined. In this sense, I think it would be wrong to 
neglect that the process of recombination, on the level of the whole evolutionary line, reduces the 
blindness of evolution (~ also p. 357). 
c) Similarly in respect to the other class of possible directed adaptive variation, recombination 
seems not always to be necessarily blind. 1147 Moreover, the strength at which the two groups of alleles 
are mixed, i. e. how many crossovers take place, is not random. There is a finite number of crossovers 
that take place, and there is a specific average number for each species (such 'ann-chair' arguments 
could be as conclusive as expensive laboratory work). Of course, it would be possible that this specific 
number of crossovers strongly varies inner-specifically and that its average is constant in all species. 
This is implausible, because the number of crossovers is a function of many properties of the re-
productive system. Actually there are rates for different species as regards how many inter-allelic 
recombinations take place (recombination rate). Also any two specific gene loci have a recombination 
rate or recombination frequency indicating how many crossovers will usually take place between 
them1148. 
Moreover, there is no reason why an inherited specific number of cross-overs should not itself 
sometimes be the result of adaptations (sometimes it may, certainly, only be the result of drift or 
constraints etc.). If there is an inherited rate, it appears plausible that this rate is itself an object of 
adaptation. The recombination rate may either be due to differences in the distribution of genes on their 
chromosomal basis or to different probabilities of recombination at certain points. Both could be based 
on adaptation. The simple distance of genetic loci is definitely at least one determining factor in their 
1146 R. Dawkins. The Se((ish Gene (1989), pp. 235-37. The Extended Phenotype (1981189), pp. 133 f 
1147 I am not concerned with sexual selection here, also leading to an enhanced probability of certain combinations, possibly 
even of adaptive ones. 
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recombination frequency. A large part of the genome are introns, which do not become decoded1149 The 
length of an intron, whether evolved for this reason or for a different reason (being an adaptation or an 
exaptation:>1057), may give an advantage to adaptive distances. Advantageous distances causing 
advantageous phenotypic recombination frequencies will enhance the probability of an evolutionary line 
to survive. But the direct modification of a specific recombination frequency of two loci has also 
experimentally been shown. Chinnici has shown that the rate of crossovers of two gene loci pairs in 
drosophila melanogaster (as far as I know, without changes to the introns) can become selected1150 
Another phenomenon which supports an adapted (not blind) aspect of recombination is, for example, 
that crossovers are suppressed if an inversion took place where crossover would only lead to gametes 
with almost no probability of surviving1151 . 
In the following, I shall mainly focus on particularly controversial question, whether it is plausible to 
speak of less blind variation in regard to mutations as well. Here it will not always be clear which 
particular level of evolution is involved. In regard to mutations one may make the distinction between 
the two classes of adaptive variation made above, but it is more suitable to structure the discussion 
along different lines. 
It will, firstly, be shown that the production of new patterns out of repeated genetic and 
microbiological patterns is more effective than production based on single chance mutations. Such 
microscopical repetitions will be shown to be found abundantly in surprisingly different parts of the 
body. Although this may partly refer to constrained evolution, such repetitions have apparently enabled 
very complex adaptations, which otherwise would not have been possible. A certain blindness remains, 
however, as it appears not only possible, but even necessary to distinguish between different degrees of 
blindness and of changed velocity of evolution. 
Secondly, I shall discuss reduced blindness based on preferred macroscopic dimensions of change or 
on the repetition of morphological structures (compared with mere chance structures). The advantage of 
such preferred macroscopic dimensions of change may either lie in the (external) relevance of a 
particular dimension of change over a long period of time or in the (internal) advantage of certain 
macroscopic building blocks, like repeated segments (compared, as in the case of the above repetitions, 
to chance building blocks). 
If these two points can be shown, it would follow that even if one accepts the central dogma of 
microbiology (in a restricted sense) it is nevertheless still necessary, also in regard of mutations, to 
distinguish between different degrees of blindness or sight. 
1148 E. g.: D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), p. 59. 
1149 !bid, 55, 57. 
1150 J. P. Chinnici. Modification of recombination frequency in Drosophila (1971 ). 
1151 D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie ( 1990/86 ), p. 71. 
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1. The adaptive role of genetic continuities in evolutionary change. Some intemal continuities of 
change may be said to be themselves adaptive. I discuss mutation rates at specific loci, the general 
interpretation of any mutation in terms of the genetic code, the overwhelming role of iterations in 
adaptive sequences and the role of transposable elements. These phenomena, I argue, strongly suggest 
that evolutionary trials could reasonably be said to be not always totally blind. 
Mutation rates 1152 of genetic loci may also enhance the fitness of an evolutionary line. For certain 
point mutations a low rate may cause less harm. A higher rate may be advantageous if the phenotypic 
dimension controlled by this gene has played an important changing role in evolution. A relatively high 
mutation rate-also in the sense of a predetermined break point-may cause larger mutations 
(transpositions, duplications etc.). The role of resulting repetitions is discussed below(~ pp. 371 f.). 
A precondition for regarding mutations as being adaptive is that mutation rates are inherited and can 
themselves be modified. Advances in genetics have shown that mutation rates do not simply fall from 
the sky, but are at least partly caused by the inherited and modifiable structure of the reproductive 
system. There are also systematic causes which can change the mutation rates of certain types of 
mutations, like specific chemicals or other genes (mutator genes). Mutator genes, playing a role in 
regulating replication, may for instance enhance the probability of a certain direction of base pair 
mutations in the whole organism. 1153 The mutation rate of single loci can also be modified by 
transposable elements, as elaborated further down (~pp. 373 f.). 
If there are predispositions to certain mutations, provoked by genes or chemicals, and if there are 
certain trials, which are systematically more advantageous than others (as I argue below), then it is 
plausible to assume that those rates become inherited more often. If a species or a certain gene of a 
species has a particular average number of variants (column one of figure 13), or an average amount of 
change (column two), those species will flourish which produce such variations. Then mutations, like 
other evolutionary processes should (partly) be understood as having an enhanced fitness. Without 
advocating pan-adaptationism, the process of evolution itself, as I have emphasised in this work, is also 
object to evolution as well as partly object to adaptation. 
Before discussing the phenomenon of repetition, I briefly want to treat the general and seemingly 
trivial phenomenon of the genetic code. Even if the mutation rate in question is not intemally 
advantageous or extemally adaptive, the genetic code, I think, already renders any mutation less blind 
than one would otherwise conceive. 
At the lowest level of this code, only the four base pairs, the four letter alphabet of the nucleotides, is 
used. Theoretically, one may well think of mutations which do not use this code. But actually the code 
is universal (neglecting some minor differences in the code of mitochondria) and, likewise, mutations are 
1152 E. g. see: R. Fahrig ( ed.). Mutationsforschung und genetische Toxikologie (1993). 
1153 Cf.: D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), p. 83. 
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almost always expressed in this code. More deviant changes do seldom take place and are largely 
excluded by repair mechanisms. One may argue that this inner dynamic is constraining evolution and 
preventing the evolution of a fundamentally new code. This would also be problematic to universal 
Darwinism. However, the nucleotide code is widely regarded as having particularly positive properties 
for information transfer. Hence the exclusion of other trials from the outset can, at least partly, be 
interpreted in an equally problematic way for Darwinism as for adaptive directedness and the reduction 
of evolutionary blindness. 
The nex't level of the genetic code organises the four letters into three-letter syllables: triplets. These 
so-called codons are the blueprints for the basic amino acids. There are 43 = 64 possible triplets. But not 
all combinatorial variations are used. The calculation already presumes a unified left winding of these 
amino acids. Moreover, these 64 variations are actually only interpreted in 20 different ways; the code 
is redundant. There are only 20 amino acids used as the basic building blocks for the protein synthesis. 
Hence the space for possible mutations is already drastically reduced-or one may say directed-, since 
any genetic code for protein synthesis is interpreted in terms of these 20 amino acids. 1154 A mutation 
which hence only again leads to one of these amino acid-only at another locus-, in any case produces 
a building block of high usefulness and internal compatibility; this mutation has an enhanced chance of 
being adaptive or non lethal compared to a hypothetical production of another completely random 
molecule. In so-called frame shift mutations, where the pattern of how the triplets are decoded is 
radically shifted, at least still amino acids are produced1155 Although mutations that only change the 
used amino acid may still well be harmful and, on the level of the metabolism, may lead to relatively 
new molecules, such directed and constrained mutation will generally be more adaptive than a trial 
based on chance only. 
The genetic code itself appears to repeat structures which have generally turned out to be 
advantageous building blocks (and to some extent may also have constrained evolution). In this sense 
mutations which are almost all expressed and interpreted in terms of the genetic code can for this reason 
already be regarded as being somewhat less blind and wasteful than, theoretically, one may conceive. 
We now come to the role of more complex repetitions in the genetic code and the microbiological 
structure. The duplication of complex genes is apparently a central aspect of evolution, based on 
inherited mechanisms and linked to different mutation rates, mutator genes, the organisation of the 
genome and movable elements (:> below). The existence of repetitions within and between different 
complex structures appears to support the view that a 'recycling' of old complex tested structures could 
more easily lead to complex adaptive structures than a process which builds such structures by blind 
single steps. 
1154 The redundancy of the code also leads to the fact that many mutations are 'silent' with no direct effect on the 
phenotype. 
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I think it is wrong to ignore the common phenomenon of a duplication of genes and the largely 
identical repetitive sequences as an evolutionary factor: they appear to be indispensable for most 
complex adaptations. Especially in eukaryotic 'higher' organisms can many repetitive sequences be 
found, whereas almost non are found in the genome of viruses and prokaryotes, which where long the 
main objects of genetic research. Sequences of single copies only still build 90 % of the genome of the 
lower eukaryotes, like fungi, but only 20 % of the DNA of some plants and amphibia. In higher 
organisms, generally the repetition of existing complex genes, and not only point mutations, appear to 
be a highly important phenomenon. 1156 
A part of these repetitive sequences however, seems to be counter-adaptive at the level of the 
individual, the group or the species. A class of such repetitive sequences indeed appears best explained 
in the sense of selfish DNA (~ below). But, as we shall see, complex repetitions also play a role in 
almost any complex adaptive structure. The two cases can not always be strictly distinguished. Selfish 
DNA may, as a side effect, produce an adaptive sort of variation (this mechanism would be an 
exaptation). This will then be less counter-selected at the level of the organism, group or species and 
may be regarded as an adaptation on these corresponding levels. In such cases the border between 
selfish and adaptive repetitions is blurred. There also seems to be different types of repetitive DNA; 
highly repetitive DNA, for example, is often not transcribed1157 I do not promote the idea that all cases 
of repetitions are adaptive, but think it is enough to show that without repetitions the complex 
adaptations which have been achieved would not have taken place in the given time. In this sense, I 
argue that inclinations to a certain kind of repetitions may have made evolution less blind. 
Repetition is found in many functionally important sequences of the genome. In the coding sequences 
(exons), for example, the regulation for a starting point of a transcription is regularly controlled by the 
same repeated code. 1158 Also many, if not most structural genes, which code the proteins of eukaryotes, 
are members of families of gene-complexe/ 159, whose members have a similar structure. Even gene-
complexes with many thousands of members are found to be very homogeneous in their nucleotide 
sequence. 1160 There are, for example, over ten nucleotide sequences which are very similar to the overall 
sequence of haemoglobin. Moreover, the haemoglobin protein of human adults itself consists of the 
repetition of two a and two P polypeptides (a2P2). But besides the repetition of each polypeptide a and 
p, a and p also strongly resemble each other in their exons and in their groupings of exons. It is actually 
assumed that the different haemoglobin chains of vertebrates have evolved through gene-duplication 
1155 Cf.: D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), p. 75. 
1156 !bid, pp. 57, 74 f., 85, 512 f. When I am quoting Futuyma in this section I mainly refer to the facts provided by his 
profound textbook. My interpretation seems to me to be suggested by these facts, but Futuyma himself in a more 
guarded way does not-at least not explicitly-give the interpretation I am promoting here. 
1157 !bid, p. 57. 
1158 !bid, p. 55. 
1159 I here use the term 'gene complex' to indicate the difference to single genes, as defined by gene-atomists. Gene 
complexes are longer strands of DNA, which may code a whole long polypeptide(~ pp. 259 f.). 
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from much simpler structures. Also many so-called pseudo genes, which do not become expressed 
phenotypically, have this structurei 161 if reactivated, they may have a higher-although still lmv-
probability of being adaptive than a random nucleotide sequence of the same length. It actually appears 
that both the repetition of large genetic sequences as well as an repetitive internal structure are quite 
general evolutionary phenomena, which appear to be crucial for many adaptive structures. 1162 
Repetitive Ul1d only slightly differing structures, interrupted by long introns, can also lead to what is called 'exon-
shuffiing' .1163 Such a 'recombination' of codons presumably leads with a higher probilbilitv to a protein which works better 
thill1 other mutational changes. The long introns may lower the probabilitv of cutting through an ex on. 
The duplication of existing complex genes appears to be more advantageous for the building of ne·w 
structures than building them in single chance trials only. Single steps, do of course also play a role in 
the divergence of these duplicated genes, 1164 but it appears that evolution has shown that the use of 
formerly tested building blocks in another conte>..1 can often lead to quicker adaptation than the 
production of each newly used building block completely from scratch. In this sense building blocks 
which have turned out to be advantageous may, systematically, have survived better, and hence more 
often became used in further trials. In this-of course limited sense-such trials are less blind than 
trials based on untested building blocks. 
Transposable genetic elements play a role in the production of duplicated repetitive DNA and gene-
fanlilies. Other causes for repetitive DNA are adaptive points of fracture, mutator genes and the general 
structure of the reproductive system. Transposable genetic elements appear to be a general 
h . . f k 1165 c aractensttc o eu aryotes. 
There are two types of transposable elements, one type of which is replicated only if integrated in the 
genome (transposons) and another type of which whose replication is not bound to the replication of the 
nuclear DNA at all (episomes). 
Transposons seem to have a characteristic sequence-structure at their endings and in some species 
build 10% of their DNA. Some transposons code RNA which by reverse transcription is introduced as 
a new copy into the DNA. It appears that the fidelity of transposons is regulated by general factors and 
by specific other genes. There seem to be different probabilities for an insertion at different regions of 
the chromosome. 1166 
Both types of transposable elements seem to play a role in the reverse transcription of DNA sequen-
ces. In the human genome the so-called Alu-group produced by reverse transcription has over 500 000 
1160 D. J. Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie (1990/86), pp. 57-58, 526 f, 535. 
1161 !bid, pp. 58, 79,509, 513, 514. 
1162 Cf.: !bid, pp. 530, 537. 
1163 !bid, pp. 76 f., 538. 
1164 !bid, p. 537. 
1165 !bid, pp. 57,78 f., 516 f. 
1166 !bid, pp. 518. 
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copies. A relevant part of the mammalian genome seems to be based on reverse transcription. Trans-
posable elements could particularly lead to mutations by inserting regulatory stop and start signals. 1167 
Some transposable elements multiply genes with apparently adaptive phenotypic effects. In bacteria 
particularly genes for resistance against medicaments and for the metabolism of new substrates are 
often found in episomes and transposons. 
But there are also many transposable elements where the adaptive function is not, at least not 
directly, apparent, because they mainly carry the infom1ation to reduplicate themselves. Here Dawkins' 
concept of selfish DNA seems to be appropriate. 1168 Such selfish genes may flood the genome with 
sequences which are not useful to the organism as a whole. 
Nevertheless, here also one has to consider that such a proliferation will sometimes lead to 
exaptations. The abundantly copied structure may still be more similar to a possibly adaptive structure 
than to a mere chance base sequence, because the sequence is at least coding something and only 
relatively small changes may be necessary to change the sequence in order to code something useful. 
Moreover, such genes may reactivate or deactivate genes and seem to play a role in causing the 
inversion and deletion of genes. Although most mutations are lethal, an increased overall .rate of a 
certain mutations may also be positive for an evolutionary line. An effect started as selfish DNA can 
become an adaptation. Alternatively, if the effects of selfish genes are too radically counter-adaptive at 
the level of the organism (or group or species) they will have a higher probability of either facing 
counter-selection within an evolutionary line or of dying witll the whole line which they had subverted. It 
is actually known that selection can regulate the number and tile sort of transposable elements. For 
instance, selection may favour transposons or episomes which produce genes tllat transcribe rRNA, to 
be found some hundred times in tile genome 1169 
The similarities of the above mentioned families of gene complexes become even more remarkable, 
since these similarities are not even always due to their common origin. The central role of repetitions, 
independent of this point, is remarkable on its own, since the recycling of used complex structures in my 
view has to be interpreted to be less blind than the totally blind production of single trials. However, 
members of gene-families which evolved based on duplication long ago, often additionally show the 
obvious effects of parallel evolution, a phenomenon called 'concerted evolution'. For example, a certain 
genetic change which is not observed in apes at all, is found in all 400 copies of a certain human gene 
family, whose members are also mosily found in apes. Either this parallel mutation arose in all 400 
cases incidentally and became fixed-something that is quite implausible-, or one mutation was 
transferred to other mutations in a more systematic way. Concerted evolution appears to propose that 
1167 !bid, pp. 79, 81,512,518. 
1168 !bid, p. 519; ~ footnote 1146. 
I 169 /bid, pp. 522 f. 
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members of a family of gene-complexes do not evolve totally independently from each other. 1170 There 
are different hypotheses about how this may become explained. Transposable elements may play a role 
here as well. In any case concerted evolution points to a relatively organised way of changing different 
sequences of the genome. It appears plausible that there are adaptive mechanisms which secure the 
compatibility of different processes and codes, i. e. which lead to trials which are in this sense less blind. 
More research on the phenomenon of concerted evolution is required. 
Not only in respect to gene-complexes but also in respect to complete parts of chromosomes, 
chromosomes as whales and sets of chromosomes repetition seems to be crucial for evolution. 
We have already seen that close species are often only distinguished by restructured karyotypes 
created by reciprocal or non-reciprocal translocation of parts of chromosomes (~ p. 268). Duplication 
of single chromosomes and also general polyploidy appear to be important evolutionary factors. Here 
the trials are, in a way, less blind-although such mutations are also often lethal. TI1e mutation can 
often directly lead to enhanced robustness and organisms of a larger size. But, perhaps more important, 
such organisms, if they survive, have a pool of identical genes which work, and which then through a 
few small (blind) modifications can adopt new differentiated complex functions. The evolutionary line 
again becomes diploid. A process like this is known, for instance, in the fish family salmonidaen 71 A 
process which would have evolved new complex functions from scratch through many little mutational 
steps, would have taken much longer. In this sense I think it would also be wrong to call this recycling 
of existing complex structures as equally unchangeable, blind and wasteful as an evolution of such 
structures by single point mutations (although these point mutations certainly here have their role as 
well). 
In conclusion it appears plausible to assume that in regard to change there seem to be certain 
internally advantageous continuities. TI1e ubiquitous 'recycling' of complex adaptive structures at least 
in 'higher' organisms seems to show that repetitions and recombinations of apparently generally useful 
building blocks produce new complex adaptive structures more easily than single chance steps. If 
blindness is understood as strictly as possible, it is reasonable, even based only on the present evidence, 
to assume, that there are degrees of blindness and sight. I think that, based on the current evidence, it is 
plainly wrong to claim that it is decided that evolution is unchangeably blind. It appears plausible, and 
is clearly possible on the basis of present genetic knowledge, that mutation rates, building blocks and 
mechanisms like transferable DNA are themselves at least partly adapted to produce trials which on 
average have an increased fitness, compared with totally blind trials. 
1170 !bid, pp. 526-535. 
1171 !bid, pp. 69 f, also 74, 512, 514-516. 
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2 The adaptive role of macrobiological continuities in evolutionary change. The role of a 
macroscopic advantage of preferred dimensions of change or of repetitions is a more specific topic than 
that of genetic continuities, since macroscopic continuities are somehow based on genetic ones, whether 
directly or mediated by developmental mechanisms. A continuity, for example, of adaptive building 
blocks, as we have seen, can sometimes also be advantageous, without an apparent macroscopic 
continuity, if based on the usefulness of such building blocks in quite different structures. However, 
here we are concerned with properties which show continuities in a more direct relation to an 
environment (in the sense of all columns of figure 13) 
One may even think of adaptive directions of change'(third column), as being based on a trend in the 
changing environment. But are there trends in the changing environment? One possibility would be the 
permanent change in a certain environmental variable, another an am1s race in a predator pray relation, 
where the same evolutionary direction may be permanently advantageous for each species. A further 
possibility for adaptive trends could be given even if the relevant aspect of the environment is stable and 
if many steps in only one direction are adaptive for a long time. Such trends do not in any case last 
forever. Nevertheless, if they last long enough it appears, based on the above microbiological grounds, 
reasonable to assume that an adaptively biased production of variation evolves. Although there is, of 
course, never a complete guarantee for the future, such trials are adapted, as static characteristics are 
also adaptive only a certain period oftime. But if trials are adaptive they are less blind. 
In any case, not only evolutionary trends with a certain direction (third column) could give rise to 
less blind mutations, but also only the evolution of a preferred dimension of change with many different 
trials in all directions would violate the assumption of strict blindness (first and second column). 
If there are externally given preferred dimensions, or even directions, of change there is no reason 
why corresponding inner tendencies should not become inherited as adaptations, particularly if we tlunk 
of the mutation genes and mechanisms mentioned above as causing genetic duplication and concerted 
evolution. If a dimension of change has played a role over long periods of time it appears probable that 
those organisms in particular have survived which produce more variation on one such adaptive 
dimension than on another one. It is not difficult to think of examples in which such a general view 
appears to shed light upon empirical facts. 
Firstly, physical height or size have often been important dimensions of adaptation in the evolution 
of many species, independently of whether it is adaptive to be of large or of little size. The view 
expound here would predict that variation rates (also the mutation rates) regarding this dimension are 
higher than on the average (at least for organisms which are known to have evolved most of the above 
microbiological mechanisms). 
Secondly, one may predict a high mutation rate, for example, of the colour of fur of tl1ose prey 
species, which conceal themselves from beasts of prey and which have lived in changing enviromnents, 
favouring different colours. The muridae in its different species may be an example for such an animal. 
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In evolutionary time spans presumably the different colours of fur were advantageous for evolutionary 
lines of this class. Mouse species today are active at different times of the day and in very different 
surroundings. The fur of the muridae is black, grey, brown, reddish brown, or in some species even 
bright yellowish. It is known that mouse species have a relatively high mutation rate in the colour of 
their fur 1172 
Thirdly, there appears to be a phenomenon of evolutionary integration, when changes of certain 
phenotypic properties are (statistically) linked. The biologist R. Riedl has argued that many traits do not 
appear to vary independently from each other, because then many more non-adaptive mutations would 
actually occur. There seems to be a regulatory system which leads to the fact that, for example, the 
length of legs more often vary together than alone. 1173 Although this is proposed within the framework of 
the evolutionary synthesis, this, I think, to some extent refers to the concept of correlation of parts, 
which historically was promoted earlier rather by romantic biology (~ pp. 98 f.). Independent of how 
such regulation is genetically and developmentally realised, the question is whether it leads to variation 
which is pre-adapted. If this is given, as it apparently seems, the strict definition of blindness should in 
my opinion be taken seriously, which would entail that such phenomena are in contradiction to the 
assumption of complete blindness of variation. Even if, say, the genetic regulation for legs were simply 
based on one genetic locus, the variation at the phenotypical level would not be a maximally blind. 
Another possibility how such a mechanism may be realised, is tl1e coupling of genes based on either a 
close location on the same chromosome or on genetically concerted evolution, which is treated above. In 
any case, if the occurrence of non-adaptive variations is probabilistically reduced, then it is false to 
assume an unchangeable blindness of evolution. 
Fourthly, we may think of a typical phenomenon, in which explicit morphological repetition IS 
central-a phenomenon which is also particularly pondered on by romantic biology. Goethe claimed 
that the parts of plants, could be understood as the transformations of one underlying structure, that of 
an 'ideal leaf. 1174 I have argued above that genetic repetition should be regarded as an evolutionary 
factor in its own right, which has often reduced the blindness of variation. Closer scrutiny of 
developmental logic and self-iterative mathematical structures may show that Goethe was not totally 
wrong in stressing the role of macroscopic repetition in its own right (although he apparently took his 
claim too far). Although totally new changes caused by point mutations obviously play a role in 
evolution, I think research should be much more concerned with the role of repetition as a 
developmental and evolutionary factor. (Phenotypic repetition is even found in such basic phenomena as 
the structural units of the body, the cells.) 
1172 !bid, p. R3 (referring to Dobzhansky, 1970). 
1173 Cf.: !bid, p. 497. 
1174 J. W. Goethe. Die Metamorphose der Pjlanzen (1790). 
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In regard to macroscopic structures, here I here only mention the one example of body segmentation, 
which is particularly well exemplified in the taxon of articulata, and especially in the annelids (worm-
like anin1als) and the arthropods (e. g. the millipedes), but can also be found in humans. Could a totally 
undirected variation really be said to lead to such immense receptions of highly structured modules? 
Although matters are presumably more complicated, than I suggest here, as a rule of thumb, in species 
with a high segmentation, all other things left equal, there will be more mutants which vary in regard to 
the number of segments, than in species with no or few segments. 
It is not a priori evident that there is really a simple link between genetic and morphological 
repetition. But actually, the phenomenon of segmentation is knovm to be linked to the phenomenon of 
genetic repetition, shown above as itself being possibly adaptive. The correspondence of phenotypic 
segmentation and repetitive genetic sequences support the hypothesis of the central importance of 
repetition of whole gene complexes (and only their later specialisation) for macroscopic morphological 
properties as well. 1175 
A last example in which the role of a preferred dimension of change may have played a role, is the 
phylogenetic increase in volume and in the microstructure of the human brain. The acceleration of 
evolution in this adaptation has often been regarded as a problem for strict Darwinism and might 
partially have been made possible by an increased probability of variation in these dimensions. 
If there are any systematically preferred adaptive dimensions of change, as actually suggested by em-
pirical evidence and theoretical plausibility, this would violate the assumption of the total blindness of 
trials. This is independent of the question of how such mechanisms are genetically and developmentally 
realised. But the repetition of complex morphological structures is sometimes linked to the repetition of 
complex genetic structures, as was shown in the last section, and is often based on mechanisms which 
themselves appear to be inherited and the object of adaptation. The production of complex morpho-
logical structures out of adapted building blocks, appears to be easier than simple production out of 
chance elements. Although naturally a degree of blindness always remains to be given, certain dimen-
sions of variation which have turned out to be particularly adaptive may have accelerated evolution and 
reduced its blindness. The more radical claim, that there are not only adaptive dimensions, but also 
adaptive directions, can not be supported explicitly here. This represents an open question, which may 
soon become resolved by evidence from the growing field of genetics. In respect of adaptive dimensions 
of change I hope to have provided some evidence which supports the view of a less radically blind 
evolution. Also here genetics should, in principle, soon provide us with more rigid investigations. Based 
on present evidence, however, I think, it appears reasonable to assume that there are preferred 
dimensions of biological variation which are partly adaptations and hence less blind. Given this, it is 
1175 D. J Futuyma. Evolutionsbiologie ( 1990/86), p. 491 f. 
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plainly false to assume that evolutionary variation has, systematically, never a "bias towards bodily 
. ,]]76 
unprovement . 
(4.) Adaptive Variation as Reaction to the Environment? 
It might even be possible to go one step further: some aspects of variation may be regarded as an 
active reaction of the biological entity to certain environmental conditions. In this sub-section I focus 
mainly on the level of organismic variation. 
If there are adaptive dimensions of change or adaptive mutation rates, then there is, in principle, no 
reason why there should not also be cases of environmentally triggered adaptive types of variation. 
Although this presupposes a slightly more complicated mechanism, one does not need to asswne direct 
instruction by the environment, but simply a process of triggering a dimension of variation or certain 
mutation rate which has become adapted. More research has to be done on the correlation of mutation 
rates, about which we know increasingly more, with certain environmental situations. Here only a fe·w 
possible examples, mostly of unspecified reactions of variation rates to environmental situations, will be 
discussed. We consider, whether apparent systematic changes in organisrnic variation in response to 
environmental change, might be interpreted as a systematically advantageous strategy for an 
evolutionary line that is used to better get out of an adaptive valley. 
(a) It is commonly acknowledged that, when "stressed, most organisms quickly stop reproducing, 
conserving energy and waiting for better times."1177 This is a quite conunon phenomenon which is also 
found in humans (lecturers, for example, may be acquainted with passion killers such as stress). 
Such influences on the reproductive activity do not directly influence the percentage of mutants in a 
population. Nevertheless, an adaptively reduced number of offspring may still be regarded as a less 
blind way of producing variation. Here only indirectly is the number of variants (colunm one in figure 
13) affected, not the breadth of the variation. At least in respect to the abundance of trials (offspring) it 
is worth noting that this is not totally blind. 
I have to concede tl1at this example does not strictly fulfil the criterion which I defined as evolutionary variation at the 
outset of this treatment of evolutionary blindness. Nevertlleless tl1is phenomenon appears to suit in my interpretation of 
evolution as a process witl1 changing blindness; tl1erefore I mention it here. The following two examples b and c more 
strictly fulfil tlle outlined understanding of evolutionary variation. 
Another passion killer for human beings is, for instance, depression. In this example the influence of 
cultural values on the reproductive system is apparent. Missing contentment could also influence 
activities necessary to sustain one's own survivaL like eating and concentration etc. 
Even something like what Freud called 'Thanatos' may play a role here. This assumes that the self 
destructive tendencies of an individual, which are at odds with the values of his or her group, have an 
advantage at the group level. I am aware that this might have some similarities to Wynne-Edwards' 
1176 R. Dawkins. The Blind Watchmaker (1986/91 ), p. 307. (:> footnote 1134.) 
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conception of group selection, a theory which is still widely in disrepute. Nevertheless, we have seen 
that the gene-Darwinian denial of any properties which are good for the group went to far. It has also 
been shown that there are different more refmed models in which traits advantageous to groups do not 
have to be undermined by subversion from within (not even always requiring permanent group selection, 
~ 278 f). Hence in the light of such models, also some phenomena discussed by Wynne-Edwards may 
become rehabilitated, and shown to, in fact, be referring to the good of the group. 
Mechanisms that cause self-destruction or reduced reproductive activity may possibly not be 
adaptive at all, but the mere side effects of the exhaustion of an organism. But actually most opponents 
of group selection also interpret this partly as adaptation but now on the individual or gene level. I also 
think that, independently of the question of the evolutionary level, tllis behaviour, at least in part, seems 
to be an adaptation. In this case, the number of variants produced (column one) seems to be changed as 
an adapted reaction to tl1e environment. This is normally acknowledged, but not taken to point to a 
fundan1ental aspect of evolution. I think one should stress it as an aspect of the general possibility of re-
duction of evolutionary blindness that offspring, in higher organisms, are not blindly bom into an un-
known future, but with respect to their probable chances of survival. In this linlited sense of affecting 
the number of offspring, variation is not totally blind, but is itself tuned in an adapted way ( ~ but see 
small print above). 
(b) It is knovvn that tl1e rate of incidence of cancer is higher when the immune system is running at a 
low level. From psycho-in1munology we know that problems of tl1e immune system are often caused by 
general frustration or stress in the organism. The normal interpretation of this phenomenon is that full 
functioning of the immune system simply cannot be kept up if the organism is stressed. 
An alternative explanation would-somewhat cynically-consider the possible adaptedness of the 
mutations themselves, at least for the evolutionary line as a whole. It may be plausible that an increased 
mutation rate in tl1ose evolutionary lines where organisms are stressed is advantageous. It could be 
assun1ed that the generally increased probability of mutations occurring also enhances the probability of 
mutations in tl1e germ line. If organisms, which are stressed over long periods, develop an especially 
high number of mutant offspring, this would ensure that organisms or populations in a disadvantageous 
situation have an increased probability of fmding a way out of a maladaptive valley. 
(c) Sexual selection, in a way also produces variation tl1at may be adaptively directed. This 
directedness may even react to very particular changes in the environment. At least in human beings it is 
plausible to assume that in the complex cognitive processes of human partner choice, aspects may be 
involved which react to the needs given in a changed environment. Human partner choice also seems to 
be linked generally to changing cultural values. These values may, apart from a certain autonomy of 
1177 This is commonly acknowledged. N. El dredge. Reinventing Darwin ( 1995), p. 187. 
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culture, also partly lead to a flexible adaptive response to a changed environment-as well as in respect 
of biological reproduction(:> on the concept ofautoselection, pp. 384 f., 398 f.) 
In respect to the above examples I have to concede that they are partly in danger of being just-so stories and may 
actually rather refer to side-effects than to adaptations. Although I think it is reasonable to apply the idea of adaptation to 
the evolutionary process itself, which has been strangely separated by Darwinians, I do not want to commit the criticised 
fallacies of promoting an unqualified pan-adaptationism. Moreover, although the examples appear to me to make sense, 
only a more concrete empirical foundation for such claims render these views secure. Here only a certain plausibility of 
such views should be pointed out. Furthermore, I have not argued in favour of a even more radical position, claiming the 
direct chemical control of particular directions of mutations. Although also such a position may in principle have some 
plausibility, particular of one thinks of the known phenomena of reverse transcription, mutator genes and chemical 
catalysts of mutations, it may well be given that such a more complex mechanism has never evolved. Actually, Ted Steele, 
as mentioned earlier, has defended such a more radical view. In any case, such a more extreme position, as we have seen, is 
not necessarily required for a concept of adaptive variation as a reaction to the environment. 
These more daring concepts have not been so clearly supported as, for example, the concept of 
simple adaptive dimensions of change, discussed in the last section. But based on a multi-level account 
and a strict understanding of blindness, it at least appears not implausible, that, following my general 
interpretation, there is also adaptive variation in a particular response to the environment (without 
assuming a violation of the Weismann doctrine). In this sense variation may even directly react to the 
changing 'needs' of an evolutionary line. 
(5.) Summary and Conclusion 
It has been shown that it is reasonable to regard biological variation rates (e. g. mutation rate, re-
combination rate, and speciation rate) as not being totally blind in every case, but in being partly 
themselves adaptations. Such a view gains plausibility if one takes into consideration that these rates 
can be shown to be somehow inherited. Even at the level of mutation rates there are certain chemicals, 
genes and extra-chromosomal episomes which appear to catalyse mutations in a systematic way. It 
seems reasonable to regard some aspects of variation itself as meta-adaptations. In such cases 
adaptations are not a given state of an organism, but an enhanced probability to mutate along a certain 
evolutionary dimension. 
Firstly, we were concerned with the possibility of claiming the blindness of trials in a tautological 
way. If change in an evolutionary line is defined as being that which is not known in advance, then by 
definition every trial is blind. Aiming at a strict definition of Darwinism I have had to abandon this 
tautological definition, which would otherwise build a impregnable bastion of Darwinism, build on 
merely terminological grounds. I rather regard the blindness of evolutionary lines as a topic for 
empirical research. Although trials are concerned with change, there may be continuities in that change, 
which may be used for mere adaptive strategies. If in particular those lines survive which produce trials 
which are more adaptive, then the evolved direction of trials could itself be regarded as being adapted, 
i. e. not blind. It is hence inappropriate to argue tautologically that all change is blind. Likewise in 
regard to change there may be continuities, so that the old may help to explore the new In the 
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subsequent sections, I argued that there actually are, for instance, adaptive dimensions of change, 
adaptive mutation rates and an adaptive linkage of genes. 
Secondly, I distinguished between different levels, in which evolutionary variation, in a multi-level 
account of evolution, is appropriately regarded as taking place. Different descriptive aspects of 
variation have also been disentangled. 
Thirdly, in a longer treatment, I gave support to the view that variation is not always and not on all 
explanatory levels equally blind. I have distinguished between two types of adaptive variation. There is 
a flexible type of adaptive variation, which in a multi-level account of evolution is based on pre-
selection at another level. Although the composing processes are blind, the relevant fact is that the trials 
at the level of the whole are not equally blind. The other type of adapted variation requires an enduring 
importance of a certain dimension of change over a long period of time. I have clarified these two types 
of adaptive variation for the level of species and for genetic recombination. 
The most problematic topic is the possible directed.ness of mutations. Here I did not structure the 
discussion along the lines of the above distinction, but firstly treated genetic and microscopic 
continuities and secondly macroscopic, mainly morphological, continuities. 
In respect to the genetic level I have discussed the genetic basis of mutatiop rates, the role of 
episomes, concerted evolution and repetition. I can here only mention some aspects of this discussion 
Mutation rates are shown to be inherited and also genetically changed. They appear to be the basis for 
adaptive dimensions of change. Another important point is that the genome of higher organisms shows 
an enormous number of repetitive sequences-also in most coded adaptive structures. Tllis suggests the 
interpretation that the repetition of previously tested complex genetic structures builds the basis of most 
complex adaptations. Genetic repetitions do not necessarily imply macroscopic repetitions, instead they 
could also contribute similar building blocks to quite different macroscopic structures. These building 
blocks seem to have turned out to have a generally higher probability of producing advantageous 
mutations than plain chance mutations. Without denying the role of blind point mutations, it appears 
that without the duplication of complex sequences, evolution would not have been able to design 
complex structures in the time given. There seem to be particular mechanisms that enhance the 
probability of the duplication of whole gene-complexes. Transposable elements also seem to figure in 
causing these phenomena. The apparent repetitive use of adapted building blocks, and other phenomena 
which have been discussed, clearly speak in favour of the concept of directed variation. 1178 Despite the 
constraining aspect of resulting directions, the strong amount of repetition in complex structures seems 
at least partly to point also to an adaptive directedness, for exan1ple, of a repeated use of such 
advantageous building blocks. 
1178 Critics of Darwinism have always pointed out that trials are more directed, either in an adaptive or in a constraining 
sense. Cf. e. g.: Ch. v. Guttenberg. Biologie als Weltanschauung (1967), p. 43. 
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More briefly, I discussed possible macroscopical and morphological continuities. There may be 
preferred dimensions of change or even certain directions of change. It appears plausible to assume that 
some dimensions of change over long periods of time were important for evolutionary lines. If many 
steps are needed for a certain adaptation or if there is a permanent external trend, then even a certain 
adaptive directedness of trials is thinkable (I have, however, focused on the less daring claim of adapted 
dimensions). Likewise morphologically, repetition, I argue, appears to play an adaptive role. Another 
class of macroscopic adaptively directed variation that I mentioned appears to be an adaptive 
coupledness of genes, which can systematically lead to a reduced number of blind trials. 
Finally, I have argued that these adaptive aspects of variation may even be regulated more 
particularly in direct response to a situation in the evolutionary line. 
In conclusion, without favouring a strictly Lamarckian kind of evolutionary mechanism in biology, 
variation does not necessarily seem to be always equally blind in its strictest sense. Variation even on 
the level of mutations appears itself to be adapted, but be it only in the sense of a preferred dimension of 
mutations. If this is given, the strictly interpreted assumption of a Darwinian blindness of evolution is 
violated. Likewise, if variation is not totally blind, but could to a certain extent itself be adapted, the 
other exireme, proposed earlier by the mutationists 1 179, that mutations are very well informed and almost 
omniscient, is also false. 1180 The variation step of evolution seems to be neither strictly Darwinian nor 
strictly mutationistic. It is neither totally blind, nor omniscient, but located somewhere in between on the 
dimension I have outlined above (~ pp. 350 f.). A precise value in how far variation is adaptive, can 
not generally be given. The adaptedness, for example, of mutation rates depend on the specific 
evolutionary line and the specific locus under discussion. 
A Darwinian might object that he or she regards this position as still being predominantly 
Danvinian. I indeed have not criticised universal adaptationism in this section, but have done earlier on 
(~ pp. 330 f.). I have shown here that it is wrong to regard the process of variation as being 
unchangeably blind, and to artificially exclude it from becoming adapted itself. Variations, for example, 
in respect to preferred dimensions, could also be adapted. In this sense Darwinism, if thoroughly 
applied, undermines its own basis. Measured against the vast number of variants that are theoretically 
possible (a more than astronomical numberJJ 81 ), many actual mutations, according to my strict 
interpretation, appear to be less blind and rather directed. The degree of their sight differs, as the 
wastefulness of evolution appears to differ as well. The dogma of an unchangeable blindness, if based 
1179 The term is alluding to a school of biologists at the tum from the 19th to the 20th century, who saw (directed) mutation 
(mutation pressure) as the main driving force of evolution, opposed to natural selection. Proponents were H. de Yries 
(who still accepted natural selection), W. Bateson and T. H. Morgan. 
1180 See: R. Dawkins. The blind Watchmaker ( 1986/91 ), p. 308. 
1181 D. Dellllett (referring back to Dawkins, Quine and J. L. Barges) has nicely illustrated the hugeness of such a number in 
his section on the 'Library of Mendel'. Darwin's Dangerous Idea. pp. I 07 f. (The number is even much bigger since 
Dennett does not consider the code argument, given above, ~pp. 370 f.) 
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on a differentiated understanding of blindness and sight, can in my opinion not be sustained. Hence it 
appears that a Darwinian process in regard of the criterion of blindness, has been transcended by 
evolution. Evolution evolves and in this respect too has not remained unchanged from the amoebae to 
Einstein. 
c) From Hetero-Selection to Auto-Selection -Discussion of the Third 
Criterion 
The last criterion for our strict defmition of a Darwinian process (~ p. 348) is concerned with the 
second step in the process. This could either, be positively called 'selection in the narrow sense' or, 
negatively, 'elimination'. In our definition we have mentioned two aspects of how this step should be 
specified: selection is (1.) external and (2.) an opportunistic response to the moment. Subsequently, I 
summarise the justification for why an externality in the second step of a Darwinian process should be 
assumed. Following this, I discuss the aspect of the opportunistic response to the moment. Finally, I 
come back to criticise the concept of externality and introduce the concept of autoselection. 
(1.) Darwinian Externalism 
The characterisation of Darwinism as externalism has been justified earlier in this work and was part 
of my strict definition of Danvinism. I had the intention of formulating a strict definition in order to 
reveal an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms which is possibly concealed by often imprecise usage of 
the term 'Danvinism'. The afore mentioned characterisation has arisen naturally from my historical 
treatment of Darwinism, out of the need to contrast Darwinism with alternative approaches and out of 
the discussion of a mere tautological understanding of pan-adaptationism. 
Historically, Darwin took over the passive Newtonian understanding of matter (:> pp. 168 f.). Like 
matter on which an external force impinges, organisms, according to Darwin, are "not actively 
adapting, but are adapted by the external force of natural selection". Organisms, like planets, have an 
inertial tendency, and-without any force acting on them-they would tend to reproduce similar 
organisms. Their transformation is only brought into existence by the force of natural selection, which 
(like gravity) acts externally upon the them. 1182 
For example, Lewontin has argued that for "Darwin, the external world, the environment, acting on 
the organism was the cause of the form of organisms", whereas organisms themselves are the "passive 
objects moulded by the external force of natural selection" .1183 
Darwin devised his theory to explain organismic adaptations to changes in the environment in natural 
ways. Darwin inherited this interest in adaptation from Paley. Although Darwinism, of course, can 
today, not simply be equated with Darwin's theory (:>pp. 107 f., 110 f.), this assumption is still part 
of the core of this paradigm. The concept of an exogenous force moulding evolution is also found in 
1182 D. J. Depew, B. Weber. Darwinism Evolving ( 1995), pp. 9, 89. 
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process-Darwinism and not only in respect to biological processes, but also in respect to other levels as 
well; this has also been a main object of criticism. 1184 However, Darwinism has always understood 
evolution mainly as an adaptation of the body to an environment, or, more generally, an adaptation of 
the internal to the external. 
Thereby Darwinism contrasts itself with other evolutionary theories, which have rather emphasised 
internal direction and internal constraints. Generally Darwinism, in arguing that evolution is "brought 
about solely in response to local environmental pressures"1185, is opposed to approaches which promote 
an inherent tendency towards perfection, a Bi ldungs trieb or an internal autonomy of processes. 
One may object, that not only did Darwin formulate the theory of natural selection, but that of sexual selection as well. 
Se;-,.'1tal selection, however, can, likewise, be regarded as stressing an active aspect of the evolutionary line itself. 
But Darwin in his middle period, his most 'Darwinian' period, focused predominantly on natural selection. The title of 
the On.gin is significantly 'The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection' and even in other editions of tl1is main 
work there are only few paragraphs on sexual selection. Hence, why should sexual selection be regarded as being more at 
the core of Darwin's theory than the evolution of acquired characters, which he also mentions in about the same length? 
Moreover, Darwin in his middle period only believed in the existence of single organisms. But if there were no larger 
units of explanation, then sexual selection is also exogenous simply in respect to each organism. Only in a multi-level 
account, which I have also supported in tl1is work, may sexual selection be said to transcend Darwinian extemalism. 
Proponents of the evolutionary synthesis in its second phase, as we have seen, have partly accepted higher explanatory 
levels, but as also mentioned, sexual selection was also met with disapproval by important advocates of the synthesis. 1186 
Gene-atomists again have rehabilitated sexual selection, but have not regarded it as an emergent new mechanism but, 
rather, a phenomenon reducible to (external) gene-selection (!:I pp. 143 f.). 
I think Rensch summed up the spirit of Darwinism excellently: "All known evolutionary rules can be 
explained by mutation and selection. The assumption of autonomous creative principles or driving 
forces is inappropriate. Only alterations to environmental factors are decisive for the formation of new 
species and higher categories. " 1187 
Furthern1ore, if selection were to be defined differently as being e;..'ternal or internal, then the claim 
would lose any meaning. If, for example, internal tendencies and needs determining the course of 
evolution, were called Darwinian, then simply everything would be called a selection process and the 
second step of a Darwinian process would itself become a completely vacuous claim. In the earlier 
section on pan-adaptationism I elaborated in detail upon the fallacy of making Darwinian claims in a 
tautological way, something which also redefines internal tendencies as being adaptations. If any 
internal direction giving force is called adaptive then simply any process can be called adaptive, since 
the survival of the survivor is a true but an empty tautology (:> pp. 330 f.). Similarly, as discussed in 
the section on tautological aspects of pan-selectionism, the second step in a Darwinian process becomes 
vacuous (and also does not necessarily lead to adaptation in any meaningful sense) if simply any cause 
1183 R. C. Lewontin. Gene, organism, environment (1983), pp. 273, 275; :> also footnote Ill 0. 
1184 For example, in respect to economics: E. L. Khalil. Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1992), pp. 35-36. 
G. Soros. Die kapitalistische Bedrohung ( 1997), p. 26. 
1185 P. Bowler. Darwin (1990), pp. 155, also 156, 161. 
1186 S. J. Frankel. The Eclipse of Sexual Selection Theory (1994 ), :> also p. 136. 
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of survival is meant. I do not dispute that there are causes in general for an entity 'to be or not to be' (:d 
pp. 340 f., particularly pp. 346 f.). 
We come back to a critical evaluation of Darwinian extemalism, after the concept of momentaneous 
opportunism, the other defining aspect in the selective step of a Darwinian process, has briefly been 
expounded and discussed. 
(2.) Opportunistic Response to the Moment? 
As I am aiming at a strict definition of a Darwinian process in order to achieve the conceptual 
resolution necessary to distinguish different evolutionary processes, another criterion for the discussed 
selection step of a Darwinian process becomes evident. In Darwinism, the term 'selection'-despite its 
almost theological connotations-points to a process of differential survival, which is, as Mayr states, a 
totally "opportunistic response to the moment" 1188 If we were not to demand this criterion for 
Darwinian selection, then it would also be possible to call any forward-looking, foresighted selection 
process, even a provident extemal selection undertaken by God, Darwinian. Darwinians have always 
stressed that the present and local environment alone is relevant to selection. Hence, it is appropriate, to 
require of a proper Danvinian process that its second selection step be such an opportunistic response to 
the moment and that it be taken without any foresight. (This is somewhat similar to the concept of the 
blindness of variation which I dealt with earlier, :';)pp. 358 f.). 
This criterion is nom1ally accepted and is even fundamental to the ideological message which 
Darwinism conveys. But if taken seriously and applied without double standards, I think, it becomes 
apparent, that not all selection processes actually fulfil this criterion. This, however, would be in 
contradiction to the claim of a general validity of universal Darwinism (:> pp. 203 f., 324 f., 340 f.). 
This can only be sketched here. 
For example, artificial selection by human breeders is not necessarily Darwinian in this strict sense. 
Breeders may, for example, select cattle for breeding because they are resistant to a certain virus, which 
has not yet become epidemic. Selection, of course, happens at the very moment it happens, but in this 
example the selector uses his or her knowledge in order to anticipate selection pressures which might 
occur in the future. 
A similar line of argument appears to be applicable to biological 'selectors' (even to what in the next 
section should be called their 'autoselection'). Here I give an example conceming involuntary abortions 
which seem to occur during the human gestation period. From lOO fertilised egg cells only about one 
fifth survives until birth. About 70 % of these abmtions are involuntary, while 30 % are deliberate. 1189 
1187 B. Rensch. Historical Development ~f the Present Synthetic Neo-Darwinism in Germany ( 1980), p. 298; here quoting 
an article of himself from 1943, p. 52. 
1188 E. Mayr. One Long Argument (1991 ), p. 44. Evolution und die Vie/fait des Le bens ( 1978179), p. 204. 
1189 These statistical numbers relate to Gennany, but they, I think, should, in principle, roughly be similar for other 
countries as well. H. Rauh. Fn1he Kindheit. p. 137. In: R. Oerter, L. Montada. Entwick/ungspsychologie (1987). 
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Of course, perhaps, all involuntary abortions might simply be regarded as accidents. But partly, at least, 
they appear to be explainable as adaptations. In the long run, those organisms or species, which in the 
case of a developmental monstrosity or of a breakdown of large parts of the embryo's metabolism, 
develop a mechanism of an early natural abortion will save resources and have advantages in survival. 
Actually 55 % of aborted embryos die very early and are even unrecognised by their mothers in the first 
weeks of pregnancy. In terms of evolution it would be plausible-particularly if starting from a 
Darwinian viewpoint-that, if there is apparently no chance for survival in the long run, involuntarily 
abortions may take place as adaptations (and, perhaps, also constrain evolution). How fine such a 
process could be and how well tuned it is is disputable, but there is in principle no reason why the 
existence of such a mechanism should be denied. Given the existence of some mechanism like this, 
selection can no longer be seen as totally an 'opportunistic response to the moment'~1188 . According to 
our definition it is, hence, not strictly and purely Darwinian. Based on an adaptive process of its own, 
an internal selection process may on the whole render evolution a little less wasteful and even somehow 
more directed. 1190 This can be regarded as another type of example for the tendency of Darwinism to 
undermine and transcend itself 
(3.) Autoselection and Autonomy 
In the last but one section (:> p. 384) the externality of selection has once more been justified as 
being a defining criterion of the second, selectional, step in a Darwinian process. This has been based on 
historical as well as on systematic considerations. In the present section, it is shown that the criterion is 
not always fulfilled by existing evolutionary processes. In respect to it the universality of Darwinism, as 
sometimes assumed, is also shown to be wrong. It is also in this regard that the evolutionary processes 
themselves appear to evolve. Given a concession to an evolutionary multi-level account, which I 
elaborated upon previously (:> pp. 240 f), the necessity in acknowledging-in an of course limited 
way-that the evolutionary mechanism itself even changes in the biological stratum will be shown. In 
this sense evolutionary processes that have evolved themselves are not always Darwinian in the strictest 
sense of the word. 
Particularly the number of deliberate abortions will vary, but also the number of involuntary abortions may well differ 
due to differences in health systems, envirotmtental factors and their genetic basis. 
1190 There are many other empirical facts which may be interpreted in this way. We may, for example, think of a 
combination of group selection and, what I called, systemic individual selection, in which a once installed system which 
may intemally stabilise a property whose loss could result in the extinction of the whole group. Systemic individual 
selection was discussed in a detailed way, earlier on (:> pp. 278 f.). 
Even the gene-atomist view, with its metaphors of almost conscious genes, not only proves to be a most radical form of 
Darwinism, but also once more to undennine its own approach. It has become commonplace to emphasise the 
investment of genes (e. g. of parents) into their future. E. g.: R. Dawkins. Parental investment, mate desertion and a 
fallacy (1976), p. 132. In my opinion these phenomena should rather be interpreted in the sense developed here and in 
the subsequent section. The active intemal process of autoselection may replace the passive Darwinian concept of 
heteroselection, and may include an foresightful pre-selection which is itself an adaptation. 
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The criterion for the ex-ternality of selection adequately contrasts Darwinism with certain classes of 
alternative schools of thought (:> pp. 350 f.), which have actually often criticised tllis aspect As 
mentioned, Darwinism was historically opposed to earlier evolutionary theories, which stressed the role 
of internal form. This concept was cardinal both to early essentialist conceptions in biology, which 
denied evolution (~ pp. 98), and to romantic biology (~ pp. 1 02), that stressed an inner evolutionary 
unfolding of forn1. 
Later on, these research traditions partly continued to exist as relatively unimportant heterodox 
schools of thought. Likewise, the evolutionary synthesis had and has difficulties in integrating in parti-
cular the disciplines of morphology, developmental biology and palaeontology into a common, mainly 
Danvinian, framework. 1191 In these disciplines these heterodox schools still have a certain hold, which is 
presumably partly due to the disciplines' demand that a focus be placed on the internal logic offonns. 
However, in contrast to the radicalisation of Darwinism, the role of internal constraints and internal 
direction have recently once more became a topic of increased interest (~ pp. 145 f., 334 f.). Critics of 
ultra-Darwinism have partly even favoured a full paradigm shift to a more morphological or 
developmental biology, as, for instance, advocated by the biologist Goodwin. Likewise the school of so-
called critical evolutionary biology (Senkenberg Museum), for example, focuses on the internal process 
of reconstructing body plans by detennining invariant necessities. 1192 Theories of self-organisation 
(autopoiesis) too, wllich are based on system theory and the complexity revolution, stress the complex 
internally governed organisation of change. But many critics of pure Darwinism do not favour a full 
paradigm shift, but, for instance, like Gould, only stress the incompleteness of current Danvinian 
evolutionary theory. The critical stance towards strict Darwinian externalism and the support of a more 
active role for the internal in an evolutionary process of construction, is not necessarily restricted to the 
above mentioned disciplines, but may today, for instance, also be fow1d in microbiology(~ pp. 147 L 
cf. also pp. 369 f.). Moreover, there are phenomena at the core of Darwinian evolutionary biology, 
wllich reveal the necessity of accepting the relevance of internal dynamics in evolution (~ pp. 285 f., 
398 f. and below). 
Even authors who clearly regard themselves as Darwin.ians sometimes seem to accept such internal tendencies which 
are here treated as the hallmarks of theories opposed to Darwinism. For instance, the (perhaps rather existentialistic) 
Darwinist Monad stresses that to a certain extent the organism itself chooses its selection pressure. 1193 
Even phenomena pivotal to sociobiology, which are often interpreted as evidence for militant gene-Darwinism, could in 
this respect be interpreted as undermining Danvinism. The concept of investment, crucial to the theories of kin selection 
and reciprocal altruism, presumes a self-selection on the level of related or co-operating organisms, which takes 
probabilities offuture happenings into account(!) also footnote 1190 and pp. 361 f.). 
Before discussing particular cases myself, I discuss this phenomenon of internal selection in general 
and introduce a clearer terminology. 
1191 Cf.: E. Mayr, W. Pro vine. The Evolutionary Synthesis ( 1980). 
1192 This school seeks invariants not in pure morphology, but rather in bio-mechanical tem1s. Cf.: M. Weingarten 
Organismen- Objekte oder Subjekte der Evolution? (1993), p. 280~ !) footnote 609. 
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As concluded above, Darwinism in its strict sense requires the selection step in a Darwinian process 
to be external. In order to make this requirement more transparent and explicit here I use the term 
'heteroselection'. This term is in a way a pleonasm, since selection in any case appears to refer to an 
external selector. Moreover, it has been shown, that alternatively if one were to understand selection as 
any cause relevant for the survival of a certain evolutionary line, then selection in an empty tautological 
sense would always be given, since it is an apparent truth and not a particularly Darwinian assumption 
to suggest that there are, of course, always reasons why survivors survive (~ pp. 346 f). Such a 
largely empty claim, would entail that selection became understood in such a broad sense that it is not 
required to lead to adaptation to an external environment at all, since internal trends would also be 
redefined as processes of selection (:> also pp. 330). Nevertheless, selection is actually sometimes used 
in such a tautological way. This is the reason why I explicitly use the tern1 'heteroselection' here. 
To refer to internal, rather non-Darwinian, causes of survival which do not necessarily lead to 
adaptation, I use the corresponding opposite term 'autoselection'] 194 If one uses 'selection' in its 
restricted and proper sense, it is a contradictio in adiecto. But since 'heteroselection' is used here in this 
proper meaning, tl1e tern1 'selection' is set free to mean in fact merely any cause of survival. 
'Autoselection' should in this sense refer to any internal-not necessarily externally adaptive-cause of 
preferred survival of an evolutionary line. In autoselective processes the entity in question is itself, in a 
rather non-Darwinian way, a main cause of the direction of its own evolution. The term 'selection' 
within 'autoselection', if restricted to the second step in a Darwinian process, is also still conceptually 
linked to the Darwinian aspect of the variation of evolutionary lines. The concept of variation, however, 
has been dealt with previously (~ pp. 354 L 358 f.). 
But why introduce the tenn 'heteroselection' at all, if one can use Darwin's original term 'natural 
selection' instead? The notion heteroselection, as introduced here, is not, at least not directly, 
synonymous with natural selection. Heteroselection is a more general notion since it can be directly 
applied to very different ontological levels, not only to biological ones, but also to other levels accepted 
at least by process-Darwinism. To take an example from the history of ideas, historically, 'Darwin's 
dangerous idea' had a difficult start. Presumably this was partly due to the external counter-selection 
represented by certain theological convictions of that time. (The clash between Huxley and Bishop 
Wilberforce has become the icon of the conflict between Darwinism and theology=>341 .) It is 
inappropriate to call such a process 'natural selection', since the selecting force in this example is not 
meant in any direct sense to be nature, but rather other ideas. Since the selector may still be exogenous 
one can still speak of heteroselection. 
None the less, heteroselection and natural selection are closely linked and not only in the sense that 
natural selection is a specific type of heteroselection. If one assumes that only processes of 
1193 J. Monod. Le hasard et la necessit(i (1970/91), pp. 27, 115-116. 
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heteroselection are involved at different levels, it appears plausible that heteroselection-indirectly and 
possibly with a time lag-is ultimately only a mediation of natural selection. In opposition to this, the 
approach I favour in this work, can be seen as regarding heteroselection as not always referring 
ultimately to natural selection, since, for example, on the level of culture many relatively autonomous 
processes of autoselection take place, so that cultural heteroselection may not necessarily only mediate 
natural selection but also autonomous tendencies of culture. However, process-Darwinism, which does 
not accept autoselection in general, has, I think, to claim that heteroselection ultimately refers to natural 
selection. In this view there is no true autonomy: biological external nature remains the only ultimate 
selector. As we have seen, in this understanding, cultural entities, like words, concepts or theories, 
finally only serve the biological survival of the entity in question. Heteroselection and natural selection 
fmally coincide, and in this respect process-Darwinism becomes identical to biologistic Darwinism. 
Indeed, it only differs from it in assuming the existence of mediation processes. In such a view it is in 
fact justified to conclude that "no species, ours included, possesses a purpose beyond the imperatives 
created by its genetic history"1195 
I now come to the treatment of particular mechanisms which may be interpreted as autoselection, 
without, of course, thereby intending to deny or neglect processes of heteroselection. In respect to the 
cultural stratum, I only, v.rithout discussing them in detail, briefly mention cases in which autoselection 
seems to be involved, I then turn to examples of biological autoselection, which have partly been 
discussed at depth in this work before. Biological processes are scrutinised more closely, since their 
existence appears to be more controversial. 
To a great extent human beings appear to be 'selected' by the cultural world they themselves have 
created. Human survival is in general not only determined by the changing climate (even this is 
influenced by humans), but also, for instance, by a system of values, morals and laws. These created 
values also appear to have a certain, I think partly positive, autonomy. They somehow 'reproduce' 
themselves without referring to an advantage in biological nature. These nonns, for example, to some 
extent help the weak and vulnerable, and sometimes also those who help them (but cf. also ~pp. 48 f.). 
Similarly theories, even if we regard them as a problem, may to a certain extent select themselves. 
This becomes apparent, for example, when we look at Lakatos' concept of theoretic protective belts 
(something that we have come across repeatedly in this work). 
In respect to economic processes, previously I pointed to some structural similarities an1ong the 
thinking of certain economic schools of though and Darwinism. E. L. Khalil, who has pointed to many 
1194 On possible ways to disentangling internal and external causes even in respect of morphology,~ p. 334. 
1195 E. 0. Wilson. On Human Nature ( 1995/1978), p. 2. 
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similarities between neo-Darwinian biology and neo-classical economtcs, particularly criticises the 
concept of an externally given selector likewise found in neo-classical economics. 1196 
According to Khalil, neo-classical economics idealises consumer preferences as an ultin1ate selector. Consumer 
satisfaction was wrongly assumed to be the externally given gauge of economic efficiency. Actually, however, consumers do 
not have perfect knowledge and may even have, for instance, a certain 'irrational' loyalty to firms. Additionally, firn1s are 
not simply externally selected in regard to how far they satisfy consumers· needs and interests, but may themselves have 
the power to shape the preferences of consumers and even possibly to manipulate their knowledge. 1197 
Equally evolutionary biology has, in my view, to acknowledge that selection (here broadly meant as 
the causes of survival) are not always e>..iernal in a Darwinian way. (Cf. generally, ~ pp. 333 f., p. 
346.) Alternative internal autoselective processes can generally lead to two results. 
Firstly, autoselection may reduce blindness in the evolution of an evolutionary line and in a way may 
even accelerate the adaptive process. This resembles the possible reduction of blindness of variation, as 
elaborated above (~ pp. 366 f.). Likewise, autoselection may itself be adapted to accelerate the 
adaptive process and may eliminate the variation of organisms with particularly small prospects very 
early on. Some microbiological examples have been discussed which can, presumably, be subsumed 
under this interpretation. An example of this is provided by the genetic repair mechanisms that prevent 
mutations not expressed in the established genetic code from taking place (~ p. 370). Here mutations 
using different molecules to the usual ones in the genetic code, are eliminated in advance. Thereby 
mutations which on average have very little chance of producing an improvement that would be 
compatible with the metabolism of the organism would be eliminated. Similarly sexual selection can 
accelerate the process of natural selection, by pre-selecting, for example, those which are perhaps 
particularly brave hunters (~ pp. 285 f.). Although here the direction of evolution may largely remain 
the same, its wastefulness and blindness is reduced. Despite referring to adaptation, the interpretation 
that the mediation of autoselection may reduce the blindness of an adaptive process ts, I think, still 
rather non-Darwinian. 
Secondly, autoselection always contains the possibility of autonomy. Since the evolutionary entity in 
question becomes one of its own causes, it may also internally turn evolution in a direction, that, if 
judged in relation to the external environment, is not advantageous. From this external viewpoint, self-
determination may sometimes appear as a constraint on adaptation to an external environment. 
Autoselective processes may often have evolved as blindness reducing adaptations in the sense 
illustrated above, but because of the self-referentiality involved, they may have acquired a certain 
autonomy. If internal criteria were to come to dominate, by chance or through some other means, then 
simply those entities would survive which best fulfil these internal criteria. In this case the causes for 
1196 This has generally been criticised, for example, by Boulding and Th. Veblen. H. Driefenbacher, U. Ratsch. 
Verelendung durch Naturzerstdrung (1992), p. 241. 
1197 E. L. Khalil. Neo-classical Economics and Neo-Darwinism (1992), pp. 35, 50-52. 
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selection are partly sui generis. In this sense autocatalytic circular causation 1198 and autopoiesis, 
opposed to passive adaptation to an exiernal environment, should be acknowledged as playing a relevant 
role in evolution. 
Throughout this work phenomena have been dealt with, which may be interpreted as autoselective 
processes. 
At the level of individual morphology and genetic mechanisms autoselection is generally discussed 
under the keywords of internal constraints and direction. Starting from amidst the Darwinian paradigm, 
terminologically, these internal constraints and directions may also refer to certain variational processes, 
which I dealt with earlier on. I have already shown that-despite difficulties-it is generally possible 
and even necessary to distinguish between the internal and external causes of a trait, particularly if one 
wants to speak of adaptations to external environments in a reasonable way(~ pp. 334 f). Although I 
did not work out the differences between the variational and autoselective causes of constraints, 1199 I am 
not going to repeat my argumentation here, because it has become apparent that both causes can be 
involved and that the given argumentation is equally applicable to either case. 
Autoselection in a similar way may play a role but not in respect to microbiological and genetic 
mechanisms (which we may distinguish from macroscopical morphological constraints). In tllis section I 
have already mentioned the repair mechanism that selects those mutations which are not expressed in 
the genetic code. Although this case is most appropriately regarded as an adaptation, as it has been 
treated above, such genetic autoselective processes can also lead to constraints on the direction of 
evolution (as seen from the viewpoint of an adaptationist) or to an autonomous tendency of evolution. 
The exclusion mechanisms and autoselective repair mechanisms might, perhaps, have prevented the 
evolution of a much more adaptive evolutionary code(~ also pp. 370 f.). 
Systemic individual selection provides an example of autoselection at group level (:> pp. 285 f.). In 
the detailed treatment of this case it has become apparent that many cases of heteroselection at tl1e level 
of individuals or of single genes may compose a system, which has new systemic properties. The system 
they compose may possibly have the additional property of stabilising a certain distribution of 
properties or a certain internal trend. This distribution or trend need not result in an adaptation for an 
environment external to the system as a whole. Based on the internal self-referentiality of selection 
processes as a whole, the system is autoselective, and, for good or bad, may have a certain autonomy in 
relation to external selection pressures. 
The most obvious class of such autoselective systems of mdividual selection is sexual selectzon 
(above I gave different examples, and this interpretation can, perhaps, also be applied to evolutionarily 
stable strategies). Sexual selection, as has been mentioned before, does not necessarily have to be 
1198 An excellent treatment on the importance of such processes in nature is, for example, given by: E. Jantsch. Die 
Selbstorganisation des Universums (1979/88), pp. 255 f. . 
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regarded as autoselection. On the contrary, surprisingly Darwinians have often failed to acknowledge 
the autoselective aspect of sexual selection or have not been concerned with sexual selection at all 
(:> p. 385, small print). If one only regards individual organisms as being real it is actually consistent to 
also conclude that sexual selection is-in respect to individual organisms-external, and, hence, only 
another example of heteroselection. But, following the above refutation of gene-Darwinian 
nominalism 1200, we are entitled to regard sexual selection at a certain relevant level of explanation as 
being a autoselective process. 1201 If those organisms are, internally, strongly selected, because they 
follow an-perhaps externally non-adaptive-trend, only those organisms will survive that follow this 
trend and that mate with organisms which follow this trend. The autonomy of the internal tendency is, of 
course, restricted-a too strong internal tendency would simply end in the extinction of a whole species. 
Yet, it is plainly false to assume that on all relevant evolutionary levels evolved characteristics are only 
moulded by an external environment as they may also be the product of such internal dynamics. 
The behaviour, particularly learned behaviour, of organisms (or groups of organisms), provides us 
with a particular kind ofautoselection. Learned behaviour may change the way in which the parts ofthe 
body are used. Thereby behaviour could determine what features are actually adaptive and which are 
not. A change in behaviour may render formally adaptive properties to be particularly non-adaptive. 
This can be understood as a special kind of autoselection, because here the organism contributes to the 
direction of evolution. It is particularly interesting that by such a mechanism learned habits indirectly 
exercise a systematic influence on the direction of bodily evolution and on the genetic makeup of an 
evolutionary line. 1202 
This effect is called the 'Baldwin effect', after the psychologist James Mark Baldwin, who-
although not opposing Darwinism throughout-sought to infuse some mind and rationality into the evo-
lutionary process. Like Baldwin, C. H. Waddington proposed a mechanism of genetic assimilation 
( 1957) and Sir Alistair Hardy (1965) argued that innovative behaviour and habits in this way could 
influence the course of evolution, without requiring a violation of the Weismann barrier1203 
Popper, when considering inborn central behaviour-controlling parts of an organism rather than 
learned features, argued that a change in the central parts is less likely to be lethal and, what is more 
important here, that changes in these parts direct the evolution of the executing parts 1204 
Phenomena in which the central organismic propensity structure, or even learned behaviour, 
detennines the direction of evolution (more than simply being selected themselves), were often regarded 
1199 At certain levels of explanation this distinction may not be reasonable anyhow. Particularly where any autoselection 
leads to constrained variation. 
1200 ~ chapter 9 on the transcendence of substance reductionism. 
1201 In the section on systemic individual selection an example of sexual selection was interpreted in this autoselective 
sense, ~ pp. 285 f 
1202 On a rather critical stance towards this effect see e. g.: l Watkins. A Note on Baldwin Effect (1999). 
1203 Mentioned by: P.l Bowler. Evolution (1984), p. 321. 
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as evidence which was counter to strict Darwinism. 1205 Such phenomena, if explained as I have done so 
above, do not, I think, support Lamarckism in its strict sense; nevertheless neither do they support strict 
Darwinism. An emphasis on the active organism, on internal goals and on learning stand in contrast to 
the main message of unchangeably blind and passive adaptation to an external environment. Particularly 
if we aim at defining Darwinism as strictly as possible in order to reveal an evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms, one will not subswne such a changed mechanism as being purely Darwinian. In respect to 
the criterion which is presently to be ctiscussed, the Baldwin effect involves autoselection in which the 
central propensity structure of the organism, and perhaps even its learning, and not only blind external 
selection, guides the direction of its evolution. 
This Baldwinian kind of autoselection, which is based on self-referentiality, may also lead to both, 
increased sight or increased self-determination-effects which were mentioned before generally. If 
organisms can find more advantageous ways of behaving through learning, the selection pressure caused 
by this behaviour, itself becomes changed to support the further evolutionary biological refinement of it. 
On the other hand there may be behaviour, which is itself so deeply build into the propensity structure 
of an organism, that it canalises evolution in this direction. The effect of which is that evolution tends to 
refine that behaviour, although, perhaps, different behaviour may have favoured evolutionary changes 
which would have been more consistent with the overall bodily endowment of the organism. 
In this section I have justified the third criterion of our strict definition for a Danvinian process. It is 
part of the core of Darwinism to regard selection as external and as an opportunistic response to the 
moment. But if this is given, it has also been shown that both aspects of this criterion of our non-
tautological definition are not always factually fulfilled. Paying considerable attention to the role of 
external and internal causation in respect to the second step of a Darwinian process, I have shown that 
not all evolutionary processes fulfil the Darwinian criterion of externality. If we understand Danvinism 
and non-Darwinism as the two extremes of a spectrum, instead of being the only two alternatives, then 
neither Darwinism nor the non-Darwinian position opposed to it-advocating inner dynamics as the 
only evolutionary force-appears to be generally right. Without aiming to din1inish the role of 
heteroselection, the claim of a Wliversality of Danvinian processes has to be criticised. The necessary 
asswnption of externality is not only problematic in respect to process-Darwinia.11 economics, but also in 
respect to biological Darwinism itself. Instead the phenomena discussed here, rather point to an 
evolution of evolutionary processes-which already exists in biology. 
1204 K R. Popper. Objective Knowledge ( 1972/1979), Chapter 7; particularly p. 278. 
1205 G. Masuch. Zum gegenwiirtigen Stand der Diskussion. (1987), p. 49; J. Schluter. Kritische Aufarbeitung des 
gegenwiirtigen Forschungsstandes ( 1987), p. 94; R. Nachtwey. Der lrrweg des Darwinism us ( 1959), pp. 171-173. 
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d) The Evolution of Evolutionary Mechanisms 
In this final section of the chapter on process reductionism, firstly I argue, that, based on the results 
of the preceding sections, a theory of evolving evolutionary mechanisms is generally required. It should 
replace universal Darwinism, which regards the evolutionary process as being unchangeably blind, 
wasteful and externally governed. Secondly, I discuss in detail how the emergence of evolutionary 
processes may become conceptualised, and how the many cases of process emergence we can1e across, 
are linked to the notion of autonomy. Since this chapter is only intended as a critique of Darwinian 
process reductionism and not as a full proposal for an alternative approach, I only show that such an 
approach generally proves to be necessary and, additionally, provides some concepts and examples 
helpful in imagining such an approach. 
(1.) The Necessity of a Concept of an Evolution of Evolutionary 
Mechanisms 
Darwinism has been characterised by a materialistically transfonned Newtonian-Platonic concept of 
an eternally given pre-existing law of nature (:> e. g. pp. 168 f.) The ubiquity and unchangeability 
generally inherent in a Darwinian view of life, is fully expressed in some recent proposals, in which the 
Darwinian process is regarded in a strait forward way as "the universal solvent capable of cutting right 
to the heart of everything in sight."1206 We have dealt with universal Darwinism in its gene-Darwinian 
and process-Darwinian forms in detail before (~ pp. 203 f.). A Danvinian approach, be it applied to 
biology and repudiative of all other ontological levels, or also to psychology, economy or theory of 
science, entails, in either case, a theory in which the evolutionary mechanism is essentially regarded as 
being unchangeably a Darwinian process. 
Our previous discussion of different criteria for a Darwinian process is based on a strict definition of 
such a process (:> pp. 348 f). This definition avoids tautological justifications of Darwinism 
(:>pp. 330 f.), and has been formulated in order to enhance our conceptual resolution and to make the 
possibly concealed evolution of evolutionary mechanisms detectable. A Darwinian process has been de-
fined-for short-as a process of blind-variation-and-external-selection. A definition which, as 1 have 
shown, does no injustice to the essence of the Darwinian paradigm. A strict defmition made it possible 
to regard Danvinism as one extreme of the dimensions of blindness of variation and the externality of 
selection (:> p. 350). Only the externality of the selection process secures a certain adaptation to an 
external environment. Based on this definition, processes, as we have seen, may well be located 
somewhere between being blind or omniscient (:> p. 358) or between being determined externally or 
internally (:> p. 384). Hence, in this view a denial of radical Lamarckism does not necessarily imply 
Darwinism and vice versa. 
1206 D. Dennett. Darwin's Dangerous Idea (I 995), pp. 521; 21, 40, 42, 51, 133, 232 etc. 
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In the preceding sections, we have discussed in detail to what extent actual processes fulfil these 
criteria. Although we partly discussed cultural processes, we did not patrol the borderlands between 
biology and the social sciences extensively. Although I regard culture as the most relevant change in the 
evolutionary process, here I focused on biology itself 1207 Despite the relevance of process-Darwinism to 
other fields, the core of the Darwinian paradigm is located in biology and the alternative theory of a11 
evolution of evolutionary mechanisms (transcending Darwinian processes) which I have suggested will 
be most controversial in this field. 
The last sections proved that even in biology all the criteria for Darwinian processes, if applied in a 
strict way, are violated by actual evolutionary processes. It becan1e evident that there is not only vari-
ation, but also true synthesis, that variation on many explanatory levels cannot always be regarded as 
being blind, that variation does not always remain equally wasteful, that selection is not always an 
opportunistic response to the moment and that there are autoselective processes which do not necessarily 
lead to adaptations in respect of an externally given enviromnent 
But given such processes which reduce the blindness a11d wastefulness of evolution and which gain a 
certain autonomy from external selection, it plainly follows that, according to our definition, 
evolutionary processes do not always remain strictly Darwinian. Evolutionary processes evolve 
themselves and can be changed, composed into new wholes or emerge completely new. 
As far as they increase the sight of an evolutionary line, the processes which I have discussed 
already, like the re-use of adaptive building blocks, the re-shuffling and recombination of pre-selected 
genes, adaptive autoselection etc., in my view, have presumably played a role in enabling an increased 
velocity of evolution, or better of particular evolutionary lines (:> also p. 359). Such mechanisms, I 
think, made it possible to cross over maladaptive valleys which prior to that may have been 
unsurpassable parts of the adaptive landscape. Without elaborating upon this, it appears to me-a11d in 
this I follow in the footsteps of a whole tradition of authors-, that the palaeontological record itself 
could well be interpreted in a way that would suggest that evolution in its early beginnings occurred at a 
slower rate than it did later on. The oldest fossils indicate that life started about 3 .1-3 .4 billion years 
ago. For a long period of about two billion years only prokaryotes, a simple type of unicellular 
organisms, populated the earth. After which eukaryotes. still single celled organisms with a more 
complex cell-structure, started to predominate. The first multicellular organisms emerged only about 
640 million years ago. 1208 Then in many further steps the course of evolution seems to have speeded up 
somewhat. 1209 In my interpretation the apparent increase in evolutionary velocity is not only an irrele-
vant epiphenomenon, but appears partly at least to reflect changes in the evolutionary processes 
themselves. 
1207 :> also e. g. pp. 355 f., 328 f., 390. 
1208 E. g.: D. J. Futuyma. Evo/utionsbiologie (1990/86), pp. 365 f. 
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Such a view may gam more plausibility through the use of an analogy usmg algorithms in 
information technology. Darwinian processes can be regarded as a representation of a certain 
algorithm. :>356 The same simple mechanism always becomes repeated. In information teclmology, 
evolutionary strategies have been modelled for technological problem solving as search strategies in an 
(multidimensional) adaptive landscape. A strictly Darwinian process of chance-variation-and-external-
selection in these models indeed leads to some adaptation. But although a purely Darwinian process has 
the advantage of being very simple, and is still open to all directions, it has in most settings been shown 
to have the important disadvantage ofbeing slow and resting on only local maxima. 1210 
It has been shown that many evolutionary processes are not Darwinian processes in their strict sense 
-strict Darwinian processes may even be rare. I have argued, for example, that variation rates at many 
levels are not always systematically blind. In this view many processes, which are often loosely said to 
be Darwinian processes, should, under closer scmtiny, not be characterised in this way. To elaborate a 
theory of the evolution of evolutionary processes in more detail, it will be important to disentangle the 
Darwinian and non-Darwinian aspects of the processes. In this way processes which are commonly 
accepted have to be scmtinised as to how far they change the wastefulness and the direction of 
evolution. Evolutionary processes generally have to be understood not as being externally and eternally 
given, but as evolving and themselves being partly im1er properties of the evolving entities in question. 
Besides a reinterpretation of acknowledged evolutionary phenomena, other phenomena which would 
nonnally not be focused upon in this field, need to become understood as evolutionary mechanisms in 
their own right; the mechanisms of duplication of complex genetic stmctures, evolutionary constraints 
and some neglected mechanisms of autoselection provide good examples of this. 
Generally, I am even inclined to take the somewhat Whiteheadian stance that whether a new type of 
entity has evolved (e. g. a species opposed to asexual reproducing single organisms only), or whether a 
new process has come into being, changing the speed or course of evolution is largely equivalent1211 
Although one has to note that this parallel has some limitations, 1212 someone who accepts the synergetic 
emergence of new independent levels of organisation in respect to things, a view which is supported in 
this work as well (~ pp. 243 f.), will not be startled by a similar emergence of processes. 
For example the emergence of biological sexuality, not only brings a new entity (thing) into being, a species in the 
reproductive sense, but also equally changes the evolutionary process itself. As argued elsewhere, this process can, for 
example, be characterised by the recombination of pre-selected genes, a process which in part does not fulfil our strict 
defmition of a Darwinian process (!>pp. 367 f., 357 f.). Moreover, sexuality enables a bunch of other evolutionary 
processes, like genetic drift, founder effect or frequency dependent evolution. 
1209 Ironically even the evolutionary trees given in D. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea ( 1995), pp. 86-90, could be 
interpreted in roughly this way. 
1210 See: Th. Bliimecke. Wunder der Evolution. Optimierung m it Evolutionsstrategien und genetischen Algorithmen ( 1991 ). 
Cf. also: K.-P. Zauner. Vorbild Natur. Biologische Viren unter dem iJiformationstheoretischen A1ikroskop (1992). 
1211 On the parallel of a truly Darwinian process and a truly atomistic replicator, :> pp. 216 f., 253 f. 
1212 A new kind of entity may refer to a new process of an old kind, only on another level. However, often the different 
levels will be linked and may nevertheless lead to new systemic properties. 
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Apart from considerations about the speed of evolution and about the, so to speak, Whiteheadian 
parallel of processes and things, which may render the view of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms 
more plausible, it, as shown, in any case plainly follows from the exposed differences of actual 
evolutionary processes to strict Darwinian ones that evolutionary processes themselves evolve, 
transcending strictly Darwinian processes. 
(2.) Process Emergence, Circularity and Autonomy 
The preceding sections have shown that the defining criteria of a Darwinian process are all violated 
by existing processes. Darwinian processes may nevertheless serve as a base line, against which more 
complicated and less blind processes can be measured. 
In this section I am concerned with summarising the discussion of the different new processes we 
came across earlier. In this section I try to characterise the emergence of processes in a positive way and 
to link this to different notions of freedom. Although the negative characterisation shown by the 
difference to Darwinian processes remains the ultimate criterion for the discussion of a transcendence of 
Darwinism, and although no general positive criterion for new processes is found (apait, of course, 
from the almost tautological aspect in which way the new process works has somehow to have a causal 
effect which is systematically changed), the differently elaborated ideas in this section may possibly 
contribute to a general theory of process emergence. 
I start by discussing causal feedback or circular causation. This can be regarded as one possible 
condition for the emergence of new processes. In regard to things, Kant argued that it is a precondition 
for the oneness of parts that they are mutually cause and effect for each other. 1213 
This is discussed in the context of Kant's moderate teleological understanding of nature, in which the mutual 
interdependence of parts is understood as a precondition which is entitled to assume (as a regulative idea) that parts serve a 
certain purpose (not only lying in themselves). TI1is had a general impact on romantic biology. 1214 
One may argue that new wholes can be fonned by closing a causal circle, this means that they are 
formed by mutually relating entities which have not been causally related or only related in one direction 
before. If one also applies this thought to processes, the two independent linear causal processes, A ----f B 
----f C. and C ----fA, can be assumed to form a new whole, which would, potentially, contain new 
properties, if the feedback loop is closed: A ----f B ----f C ----fA. 
This concept of emergence is similar to that found, for example, in the later work of K. Lorenz. 
Generally, self-referentiality is fundamental to cybernetics, system theory and theories of self-
organisation(:> p. 151), by which Lorenz appears to have been influenced. 1215 
Lorenz in his book Die Ruckseite des Spiegels (1973) applied such a emergence concept in an, 
I think, illuminating way, to organismic learning processes, starting with a treatment of the amoeba and 
1213 I. Kant. Kritik der Urteilskra.ft ( 1790/93/99), orig. pp. 290-291. :>pp. 87 f. 
1214 T. Lenoir. Morphotypes and the historical-genetic method in Romantic biology ( 1990), pp. 120-121. 
1215 K. Lorenz. Die Ruckseite des Spiegels (1973177), pp. 48-50 (Lorenz regards this as an important subtype of emergence) 
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ending with a treatment of cultural development. However, although the emergent learning processes, 
which have already been discussed may indeed be interpreted as parts of the evolutionary process, it 
appears to me that Lorenz does rather dissociate evolved processes from the evolutionary process itself. 
In any case Lorenz does not treat processes which are close to evolutionary biology and, perhaps, does 
not sufficiently clarify the relation of nested learning mechanisms in tenns of their being part of this 
process. 1216 
In general the proponents of the evolutionary syntl1esis have to a certain ex1.ent worked with tl1e concept of emergence 
(~ p. 139)-'217 They introduced mechanisms on tl1e species level, which are now, as has been shown, underrated by 
proponents of gene-Darwinism. None tl1e less, they have promoted the complete blindness of trials, which on different 
explanatory levels has been questioned in tllis work and but have not developed a concept of autoselection (they even 
played down fue role of sexual selection, which may be interpreted as a type of autoselection.) 
I see no reason why Lorenz's idea of new feedback loops should not be applied to evolutionary 
processes themselves. 
Implicitly, this concept has been essential to the concept of autoselection, as I have dealt with it 
above(:> pp. 384 f.). We were concerned with morphological, genetic and systemic autoselection. It has 
been shown, that these mechanisms can either lead to the systematic pre-selection of the adaptive 
direction or to an internally detern1ined tendency which does not result in an adaptation to an external 
environment. 
In this sense this type of process is linked with the possibility of autonomy. The circularity of the 
process may induce an inherent dynamic, which can have an independent influence on the further course 
of the evolution of the entity or the system of entities in question. Thereby, it is not only the speed of 
evolution that may be changed, but also the direction that can be changed in a way which need not be 
adaptive in respect to an external environment. 
Here I will once more discuss sexual selection, which, in my interpretation as a particular case of 
autoselection, may lead to non-adaptive trends and even in the long run may be able to sustain its inner 
tendency. Above I have outlined why my interpretation of sexual selection can be regarded as being 
different to the strict Darwinism one(:> p. 385, cf. also: pp. 285 f.). 
Sexual selection often evolves as an adaptation. In this respect autoselective aspects which are 
involved in it may work to accelerate the work of heteroselection. Even this, according to our strict 
definition of Darwinism, is non-Darwinian, since systematically this reduces the average blindness of 
trials. Sexual selection, selecting in an adaptive way, for example, those animals which are strong in 
combat, so to speak, selects earlier than natural selection does. In a population where sexual selection is 
developed it is not necessary that a huge mass of organisms are raised and nurtured, which only go on to 
have extremely bad chances of survival. Hence, the number of dead-ends gets reduced and in this sense 
1216 E. g.: The evolved processes were always "bound to results of tl1e trial and error method of the genome". (Ovm 
translation). !bid, p. 66. 
1217 E. Mayr. The Growth of Biological Thought (1982), pp. 63-64 
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evolution becomes somehow less wasteful and, in our understanding, less Darwinian. Moreover, species 
which have evolved the process of adaptive sexual selection may gain a certain independence from 
short tenn fluctuations in the environment, which would otherwise produce many blind alleys. 
But the adaptive advantages of this autoselective mechanism are linked to the possibility that tlus 
process gain a certain independence. From an adaptationist viewpoint autonomy would rather be 
described in tenns of disadvantageous constraints. If every wrong path does not have to be tested, then 
some advantageous paths may also be missed. If the process of sexual selection produces counter-
adaptive results it will possibly be counter-selected itself. But a counter-adaptive tendency to some 
extent and for a certain time is continued. 1218 
Moreover, sexual autoselection can even lead to a stronger form of independence. It might not only 
gain a certain autonomy which after a while will still be reduced by natural selection, but also an 
autonomy with which to determine its own direction quite independently of natural selection. As an 
example I take the enormous antlers of palaeontological (and perhaps also present) deer, the existence of 
which represents a phenomenon which , historically, was important to proponents of inherent possible 
non-adaptive evolutionary trends. 1219 Let us assume that the remarkable relative size of the 
palaeontological species titanothere 's antlers have evolved by sexual selection, be it by male combat or 
by female choice. In terms of natural selection, the enormous size of antlers may well be regarded as 
maladaptive. If one takes this as given, I think, sexual selection could have led to such an autonomous 
trend which is even maladaptive from the viewpoint of natural selection. I have shown earlier that 
sexual selection does not need to become reduced to a strength wllich would be suitable from the 
viewpoint of natural selection. The autoselective process of sexual selection, could, up to a certain 
extent, take over and may itself determine the direction of the evolution of a given line. On average only 
those animals will be able to reproduce, that have followed the, in terms of natural selection, 
maladaptive trend to big antlers. In a way then it will only be these animals that are exposed to natural 
selection. If the process of sexual selection is strong enough, this may lead to continuing inner 
dynamics, although natural selection may work against it. The process of sexual selection itself will not 
necessarily be reduced, because those organisms that mate especially with organisms with big antlers, 
obtain an advantage through mating with these organisms, since based on tllls very trend in the filial 
generation their offspring have an increased relative probability of reproducing. Both, the genetic basis 
of antlers and that of the preference of mating are stabilised by this tendency.(for a more technical 
elaboration of this argument, :> pp. 285 f). If, however, such a trend becomes too maladaptive, and 
1218 Strangely enough even R. A. Fisher has conceded that: "The importance of this situation lies in the fact that the further 
development of the plumage character will still proceed [ ... ] so long as the disadvantage [in natural selection] is more 
than counterbalanced by the advantage in sexual selection." In: The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (first 1930), 
pp 135-6. (Quoted inS. J. Frankel. The eclipse of sexual selection the01y (1994 ), p. 182. 
1219 The concept of an iimer momentum of change has been cardii1al to orthogenesis as for mstance advocated by T. Eimer 
One main research ii1terest of H. F. Osbom, another proponent of orthogenesis, was the evolution of antlers of the 
paleaontological mmnmal titanothren, which in the following is taken as example. 
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does not at some point become balanced (not even reduced) by natural selection on the level of 
individuals or groups, it is, of course, possible that the whole line becomes eA1inct. The species of 
titanotheres has become extinct-possibly partly for this reason. In this sense the freedom from natural 
selection, remains limited. But nevertheless, mechanisms could in this way have a certain inner 
autonomy, without the need for indirect dependence on natural selection. 
In respect to such possible autonomous tendencies (and equally in respect to the mechanisms of 
reduced blindness) it is not only false but also irresponsible to claim-even if only meant as a 
popularisation-that the human limbic system, our emotional structure and hence1220 our morals have 
,. I d b 1 I . ,. 1271 
'evo ve y natura se ect10n '. -
Homo sapiens spend an exceptional anwunt of time and endeavour on their sexual lives and on matters of partner 
choice. There may well be much ground for autonomous tendencies here as well. Matters are actually even much more 
complicated in regard to humans because of the additional stratum of culture. Also at the level of culturally transmitted 
ideas (what I have called logoi), such autonomous processes may take place. For instance the idea of the Good may foster 
self-sustaining tendencies, which may not always be necessarily adaptive in respect of the outside world. (This may be due 
to the particular character the notion of the Good has, which cannot be discussed here.) Such autonomous cultural trends 
may then also have a downward effect on the, partly autonomous, biological feedback loop of sex'Ual selection. 
We have shown that feedback, the establishment of a partly self-referential causal circle, IS one 
mechanism, which can lead to the emergence of processes with new properties. Moreover, emergent 
processes of this type can potentially not only lead to a less wasteful process of adaptation, but also to 
autoselective trends, which do not have to be adaptive in respect to an environment external to the 
system in question. Kinds of autoselection may even lead to permanent autonomous inner dynamics, 
which, up to a certain extent, are no longer controlled by natural selection. 
Not all the processes mentioned in this work, which differ from the elaborated base line of a strictly 
defined algorithm of a Darwinian process fulfil (at least in its full sense) the positive criterion for self-
referentiality (~ pp. 398 f). Apparently other changes also seem to qualify as changes in the 
evolutionary process. 
We turn to the class of processes which have been characterised by their adaptively reduced 
blindness a_( trials at different explanatory levels(~ particularly pp. 358 f., 327 f.; here I do not deal 
with the concept of constrained variation). Likewise within this class one can distinguish between 
processes which have changed themselves and processes which are combined in such a way as to 
acquire new synergetic properties as a whole. 
In respect to composed processes we may think of nested selection processes (I shall mention the 
part-whole relationships of processes below; ~ also pp. 328 f.) Examples of nested selection processes 
were operant conditioning and, according to a ce1tain theory, the neural development of organisms 
(:>pp. 224 f, 231 f.). One may-opposed to the view supported here-assert that the biological process 
1220 Such a conclusion actually silently assumes an emotive theory of ethics. 
1221 E. 0. Wilson. Sociobiology (1975), p. 3, On Human Nature (1978), p. 6 (~also footnotes 96, 151 ). 
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has, as a whole, not changed, since the underlying evolutionary process remams a Darwinian one 
Although, if the processes are judged in isolation, this proves to be tme, it does not remain so if they are 
judged in their natural unity. Taken as a whole, processes of compound nested selection, could much 
more quickly find adaptive optima. Special niches, which only exist as enviromnental fluctuations for a 
short period of time, can still also be used even if they do not exist permanently. Biological selection 
alone would not have been quick enough to find these niches, which for the basic biological process 
alone, would only lead to blind alleys. In this sense, I think, one has to acknowledge, that on some level 
this process involves a reduced blindness (~ pp. 328 f.). 
In respect to processes which have themselves been changed, the possibility and, even, plausibility of 
the evolution of processes with a reduced blindness of variation on different levels of the multi-level 
account of evolution have been discussed in detail earlier in this work (:!> pp. 366 f.) Even at the level 
of mutations, this is rendered plausible by the many phenomena which we treated in the different and 
quickly developing fields of genetic research: the heritability and selectability of mutation rates, 
transposable genetic elements, the pivotal role of repetition of gene-complexes in most complex adaptive 
stmctures, the apparently adaptive evolutionary integration of certain genes, the phenomenon of so-
called concerted evolution, etc. (~pp. 369 f). Taken together with our above dismissal of the 
tautological argument that any change has to be blind, it has been argued that it is highly plausible that, 
on tllis level too, variation is not actually always blind, but sometimes itself systematically adapted. One 
may, for example, think of building blocks, which are apparently useful in many respects and found in 
many adaptive genetic codes, in which quite different macroscopic properties are encoded. Those 
species which, through one of the mechanisms which I have mentioned and which are acknowledged 
today, have evolved a higher probability that these multi-purpose building blocks are copied within the 
genome, have an increased probability of evolving in an adaptive way, relative to other species wllich 
have not evolved such mechanisms and building blocks. Today genetic facts provide enough of a basis 
to assume-without thereby proposing a strictly Lamarckian theory-that mutations are often to a 
certain, but limited, e"-'tent themselves adapted. But the adaptation of variations implies a systematic 
reduction of blindness and an increased evolutionary speed in reaching a new adaptive optima. 
It may seem that the preceding example of a new and changed variational mechanism, may entail a 
certain circularity, by which we originally characterised another group of mechanisms, that were dealt 
with previously. Repetition seems to be linked to circularity Here we discussed the repetitions of 
complex stmctures which have tumed out to be adaptive in many contexts. There is in fact a certain 
interaction between variation and extemal selection, but, it would, I think, be nlisconceived to regard 
this as a circular process in the sense I gave earlier. Here we are concemed with a linear repetitive 
causal process. None the less tllis iterative aspect has in fact played a role in the evolution of the 
changed properties. (A sinlilar argument seems to me to be applicable to the above example conceming 
composed nested selection processes. Yet this cannot be elaborated upon here.) 
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Hence, such emergent processes (as long as they are adaptive1222) are not linked with the autonomy 
that 1 discussed before, i. e. with an inherent and possibly non-adapative tendency which is independent 
of selection by an external environment. But in another sense, processes, which I have just discussed, 
which increase the general adaptability and reduce the blindness of a certain evolutionary process, can 
also be said to be free. 1223 
In philosophy autonomy is often distinguished to imply two meanings: the first is a negative notion of 
fi'eedom .fi'om e:\:ternal determination, the second is a positive notion of freedom to do the things which 
are necessary. Above I have once more outlined that even in biology, processes can evolve a certain 
negative autonomy from heteroselection. It may be suitable to say, that, in a way, processes have also 
evolved a certain positive autonomy which still leads to an adaptation to an external environment, but 
which has become less blind in achieving this adaptation. 
I am aware that the notion of positive autonomy in respect to ethics usually has crucial connotations, 
which are not fulfilled by such a simplistic application of this in biology and which still normally only 
refers to an adaptive necessity. But equally I agree with Jonas, that we should build the basis of the 
notion of autonomy into our basic ontology. 1224 Othenvise, evolutionary accounts, as shovm in this 
work, will tend to sweep away the notion of freedom altogether (:> on the natural fallacy, pp. 65 f.) 
Indeed, in respect to the level of human culture both aspects of autonomy may become combined. If in 
culture the notion of the Good (due to a certain inner reasonableness of this notion) or, likewise, more 
specific values, became the basis of an inner and autonomous self-replicating trend, then processes 
which in a less blind way lead us to do good-to follow these specific values-would fulfil the outlined 
positive criterion for freedom, without thereby necessarily referring to natural selection. 
In the preceding sections, many more processes have been discussed, which are not dealt with here. Finally I mention a 
class of mechanisms which are enabled by the aspect of synthesis in biological sexuality that I dealt with earlier. I have 
discussed at several places in this work why evolutionary lines of sexually reproducing species could, on the level of the 
whole, be regarded as being less blind. It made it apparent that sexuality enables an evolutionary line to cross broader and 
deeper valleys of an 'adaptive landscape', than would be possible for lines of single asexual organisms, 01132 whose 
evolution in this respect is more closely modelled by a simple Darwinian process. It has been pointed out before that a 
Darwinian process in infom1ation technology is known to get caught at local optima easily. 01210 It has also been shown that 
such an evolutionary line not only becomes quicker at finding adaptive optima, but also changes the adaptive landscape 
itself, by, for example, rendering certain kinds of co-operation between individuals possible, which had been impossible 
before. Generally the phenomenon of sexuality, aside from its obviously Darwinian aspects, partly appears to point to 
aspects of positive freedom as well as negative freedom, since a quicker adaptation is partly secured and a certain i1mer 
tendency can also be involved. 
The synthetic aspect of sexual reproduction is also linked to, or provides the basis for, many other processes, which may 
be said to partly transcend Darwinian processes in their strict sense as well. Here I only mention two of these mechanisms, 
which may be re-interpreted in this way: the part-whole relationship of the processes of individual and group selection and 
also the process of genetic recombination. They have both been dealt with before as involving a certain preselection and 
leading to a somewhat reduced blindness of evolution on some relevant evolutionary level. 
1222 An adaptational directed variation (for instance, an enhanced probability of the repetition of adaptive genetic building 
blocks), may also lead to an evolutionary constraint or non adaptive trend. Although such trends are in my opinion not 
as stable as those based on sexual selection, they still have a certain independence. 
1223 This, as shown, can be a property of an autoselective process as well. Strictly speaking both, processes of increased 
variation and processes of autoselection, can, at least indirectly, be linked with both types of freedom outlined below. 
1224 H. Jonas. Evolution und Freiheit ( 1984 ); Organismus und Freiheit ( 1973/[994 ), pp. 17 f. ~ footnotes 118 f. 
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The part-whole relationship of individual selection and group selection are somehow linked by sexual reproduction. Of 
course, not every adaptation on the individual level, as we have seen, is adaptive at the group level. But any adaptation at 
the group level also requires a minimal adaptation at the individual level (and vice versa). In this-limited-respect it 
might be possible to argue that individual selection-despite the possible differences with group selection that I have 
conceded-will often produce less radically absurd trials as a preselecting factor for group variation than blind chance 
alone. In tlus sense this combination of Darwinian processes nlight, at the level of the group, often lead to more adapted 
trials than mere chance trials. In this sense the trials at the group level may possibly be regarded as being of reduced 
blindness. 
More clearly, tl1e process of recombination, i. e. the cross-overs of chromosomes of different parental organisms, 
-although actually remaining blind in some respects-have been interpreted as a less blind type of secondary selection. 
Only new genetic combinations, which at tl1eir particular locus have been pre-selected before, are combined. Although tl1is 
recombination still involves a risk and a certain blindness, it is less blind than a process without such a preselection 
(~pp. 367 f.). 
To sum up, it has become apparent that a theory of evolution of evolutionary mechanisms is 
generally needed. The strict definition of a Darwinian process has been taken as base line against which 
the differences in other processes can be measured. In this section the mechanisms elaborated upon 
earlier have been reviewed. Self-referentiality as an important cause of process emergence has been 
discussed (a proposal whose basis can at least be traced back to Kant). We have seen that in regard to 
both the main defining Darwinian criteria, that of blindness and externality, that processes can evolve 
and that this can be linked to proposed notions of positive and negative autonomy of processes. 
Summary of the chapter on process reductionism 
This chapter has been concerned with a refutation of the claim of universality, as found both in 
biologistic Darwinism and in process-Darwinism and which were elaborated upon in earlier chapters. 
The influence of Universal Darwinism seems to be increasing and D. Dennett has pointed out, while 
new waves of Darwinism keep coming, new protective dikes are busily being built always at the expense 
of the land on the inward side. Here I have supported endeavours to reverse this process, not by trying 
to build another dike, but by critically scrutinising the concept of a Darwinian process itself, especially 
in biology. Tllis chapter objects to the transfonned Newtonian-Platonic view of Darwinism which states 
that in its essence evolution can exclusively be described as a Darwinian process, which is itself eternal, 
essentially unchangeable and ubiquitous. I think that this view conveys a pessimistic message, which is 
also found in the work of Spencer: "But there is bound up with the change a normal amount of suf-
fering, which cannot be lessened without altering the very laws of Iife." 1225 Although I mainly focus on 
biology, I think that through my critique of Darwinian process reductionism 'light will be thrown on the 
origin of man and his history.' 
Firstly, I have shown that an application of process-Darwinia.n at different levels, as proposed by 
proponents of a Darwinian multi-level account, may actually lead to inconsistencies. Darwinian 
processes, whether in a part-whole relationsllip or whether nested, may, as a whole, have different pro-
perties to their parts. I have, in detail, have scrutinised the tautological aspects of pan-adaptationism 
and pan-selectionism. In these, presumably the most refmed sections of the work, it is shown that pan-
1225 H. Spencer. Social Statics (1851), p. 325. 
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adaptationism and pan-selectionism can not be sustained if they are not defined tautologically. Based on 
the treatment of possible tautological aspects of Darwinism, a strict defmition of a Darwinian process 
has been formulated. This definition has led us to a two-dimensional spectrum of theories, in which Dar-
\Vinism in both dimensions can be regarded as an extreme pole. It follows, that if one denies strict Dar-
winism, one does not have to adopt strict Lamarckism or a romantic inner unfolding of evolution either. 
Foil owing this I critically discussed the different criteria of Darwinism, partly in great detail. I 
illustrated that variation in biological evolution can not reasonably be said to be always and in all 
respects to be ruled by blind chance (despite its undeniable 'short-sightedness'). Equally I have shown 
that not all evolutionary processes are based on extemal selection, which is a precondition for 
adaptation to an extemal environment. Instead to some degree intemal trends can determine the direction 
of the evolution of a certain line. Although essential for the validity of my argumentation, the 
complexity of these sections can not be reflected in tllis summary. However, it became apparent that the 
criteria which I discussed are clearly all violated by existing evolutionary processes, most of which are 
violated on many levels of the multi-level accow1t which I promote in this work. I conclude that the 
difference between actual evolutionary mechanisms and Darwinian processes in a strict sense 
necessitates a concept of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. Finally I discussed how the 
emergence of processes may be conceptualised, linking them to two notions of autonomy, which, in a 
way, can be said to have already been found in biology (although the notion of autonomy in respect to 
human beings is additionally related to ethics and morals). 
In the previous chapter, substance reductionism was criticised and a multi-level account of evolution 
was proposed; in this chapter, partly along similar lines, Darwinian process reductionism has been 
criticised and a view of nature has been proposed which stresses the evolution of, to some extent, 
autonomous evolutionary processes. 
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Chapter 10: Towards the Transcendence of Selfishness 
"Not only does man need the earth for his life and activity but the earth also needs man'' 
C. G. Carus. Van den Naturreichen, ihrem Leben und ihrer Venvandtschaft. 1820, p. 26 f. 
"Nur wer Sinn sucht, wird Sinn finden. " 
Hans Georg Gadamer, 2000 
This work on Universal Darwinism and its transcendence does deal not directly with ethics, even so 
it has some ethical bearings and represents an investigation that has also partly been led by moral 
intentions. Proponents of the theories I have criticised have actually claimed that these theories have a 
strong impact on ethics. Without intending to favour a naturalistic fallacy, one's ethics somehow appear 
to depend on one's ontological and metaphysical stance (and vice versa). It is important to ethics which 
entities exist, whether there are only genes, or also organisms, groups, species and ecosystems. It is 
likewise relevant to ethics to know whether the ontological framework only allows Darwinian processes 
to exist, or if it also allows new processes to come into being which are less blind or which may possess 
a certain autonomy and intrinsic direction. 
The limits of gene-Darwinism in respect to the claim that it should be taken as an exclusive basis for 
ethics were discussed at the outset of this work. After later on having gained a deeper understanding of 
gene-Darwinism and process Darwinism in part II and Ill, I criticised their substance reductionism and 
process reductionism at detail in part IV. Our treatment ex negativo resulted in an approach which 
recommends different evolutionary levels and an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. 
Although the ethical implications of my metaphysical and ontological proposals have not been 
discussed within the main parts of the work itself, I, here at least, want to give a rough sketch of some 
ethical considerations, which may follow from the general spirit of the previous work. In the concluding 
outlook on ecological idealism (:> next section) some more features of a corresponding metaphysics 
will be clarified. In respect to ethics, it appears to me that the view of nature suggested in this work 
leaves more room for ethics than, in particular, that of gene-Darwinism. Here only three aspects of 
ethical relevance can be sketched (and a sketch, of course, is not a fresco). 
(1.) The idea that we are, to a certain extent, part of larger wholes IS a feature of many 
metaphysical systems. It has been a main purpose of this work to show the falsity of the gene-
Darwinian claim that the ontological inventory is limited to single selfish genes only. Without denying 
that even these sub-organismic entities exist to some extent in their own right, I have shown that strict 
gerrn-line-reductionism and gene-atomism, inherent in gene-Darwinism, are false and have to be 
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transcended. It was demonstrated as being reasonable to accept the 'stuffness' of the organism and to 
some extent also to accept the existence of ontological wholes, like groups, species and even 
ecosystems. Although mainly concerned with biology, I, likewise, advocated the existence of different 
cultural entities. 
Even in the biological stratum it has, for example, been shown that true individual altruism towards 
a group can under certain conditions be evolutionarily stable, whether it is based on structured 
population models of group selection which are more refined than those originally criticised by gene-
Dan.vinism, or whether without ongoing group selection by a certain systemic constellation of individual 
selection processes (~ pp. 278 f.). 
I am aware that the claim that higher ontological levels have to some extent an existence on their 
own, is not only controversial but also at some point may perhaps even become dangerous. In this work 
I have therefore tried to steer a course between the Scylla of atomism, with its danger of venerating the 
ruthless sel:fislmess of its elementary parts. and the Charybdis of holism, with its danger of rendering a 
rather totalitarian interpretation. Surely, we should not completely surrender to larger wholes, but we 
have and we should still have a feeling of responsibility for some of them, as we should also have one 
for ourselves. 
(2.) Another aspect of the view of nature advised in this work, which appears relevant for ethics, is 
the possibility of a notion of autonomy which is not incoherent with a theory of evolution. 
It appears necessary to me that the notion of freedom already becomes build into our basic 
ontological concepts. In this point I differ from a Cartesian position and generally follow Ha.tls Jonas, 1226 
notwithstanding that I, of course, also favour a particular role for culture and consciousness. If a notion 
of freedom, essential to many ethical systems, becomes not built already into our basic ontological 
concepts, at least as a potential, I think that it might easily become swept away by approaches which 
demand consistency with such a basis. 
In this work I have shown that even biological processes are not always reducible to natural 
selection. Processes can to a certain extent become autonomous. (Since process reductionism and 
substance reductionism was discussed along similar lines, the notion of autonomy may-in a 
Whiteheadian wake-be similarly applicable to both processes a.tld substances.) The gem1 of that notion 
of autonomy, which we have found in biology, is, of course, not as refined as the notion we want to use 
in respect to culture and consciousness. An approach which starts in a bottom-up way will always have 
problems explaining the highest phenomena, which can partly only be understood if treated directly. 
But, I think, once a certain basis for such a notion a.1.1d a general evolution of evolutionary processes 
itself is conceded, approaches that more directly deal with such higher phenomena in culture will also 
tend to be taken seriously more easily. 
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In this work, a basic notion of autonomy has been developed both in a positive and in a negative 
sense. At this point 1 focus on a notion of negative freedom (~generally, pp. 398 f.). 
The positive freedom to do what is necessary in the biotic world will still nom1ally refer to adaptatio14 here, however, it 
will be interpreted as the increased reduction of blindness and wastefulness of the evolutionary processes themselves. 
I tl1ink the general idea tl1at a reduction of blindness and wastefulness is possible may also somehow be of interest for 
etl1ics. But the general possibility of a certain directedness, may become particularly interesting if in cultural history it 
becomes linked to values partly trallScending adaptation. This leads us to the second, negative, notion of freedom. 
The notion of negative freedom from external determination, can in a basic sense already be used in 
biology. It has been shown that processes can acquire a certain autonomous inner dynamic, which need 
not lead to adaptation to an external environment. In this sense processes could, to a certain extent, 
become self-governed and free from external determination. 
Generally, this concept of inherent tendencies may also make intrinsic autonomous tendencies in 
culture more plausible. The cultural sphere in general may already appear to be free, but only because it 
is, as I also supported in this work, based on an informational stratum of its own. For example, 
concepts can themselves be stored, transferred and copied-without a change in biological information 
(cf. also the treatment of 'memes' and what I rather called 'logoi '). Culture can thereby accelerate the 
adaptation process and reduce its wastefulness and blindness. Such tendencies have here also been 
regarded as being rather non-Darwinian. 1227 But this does not yet directly imply negative freedom from 
external, natural determination. Yet, it has been shown that such autonomous inherent tendencies even 
exist in biotic nature, particularly if autoselection is involved. If this is conceded, it will, I think, become 
even more plausible for culture, in which there is such an additional level of inforn1ation transfer above 
biological inheritance. Autonomous cultural tendencies in turn may have strongly influenced, for 
example through sexual selection, even our biotic nature. 
The war-cry of some radical sociobiologists that morals have evolved "by natural selection":l 1221 and 
that morals only serve survival, neglects the multitude of actual evolutionary processes within the biotic 
world, which involve autonomous tendencies; moreover it wrongly, I think, denies the possibility of 
autonomous dynamics in culture. 
(3.) The idea of the good, in the most general understanding of the term is fundamental for most 
philosophical and religious systems. Here it can be regarded as being to a certain extent an autonomous 
idea, which itself regulates the organisation of other ideas. A proper treatment of the idea of the good, 
even if conceived roughly along such lines, would refer to the complex discourse of ethics itself, and 
hence lies rather outside the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I still dare to make at least some 
speculative suggestions on this topic. 
1226 H. Jonas. Evolution und Freiheit ( 1984); Organismus und Freiheit ( 1973/1994), pp. 17 f. :::> footnotes 118 f., 1224. 
1227 Such tendencies may be regarded as being linked to positive freedom in its most basic sense. Cf. small print above. 
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The approach of an evolution of evolutionary mechanisms, which can , up to a certain degree, lead to 
autonomous inner trends, suggests, as mentioned above, that presumably even more autonomous 
internal trends exist within culture. Although this cannot be elaborated upon here, the view may allow 
for intrinsic values which, in turn, may have an influence on our daily lifes. A discussion of these trends 
would require to consider the historical character of human culture, the complexities of human reason as 
well as all the processes involved, in the case values evolve and change. My emphasis on the autonomy 
of values (understood in a broad sense) should not conceal the fact that values obviously also partly 
serve survival on the biotic level. Biotic survival is, in a way, a precondition for all other values. Yet, 
even survival, as I have shown in this work, need not be restricted to the interests of single selfish genes 
(~point one) and, moreover, values may also achieve this survival in a rather non-Darwinian, less 
wasteful, way. Values may lead, for example via sexual selection, to the effect that properties which are 
favourable for the group become evolutionarily stable without necessitating permanent group selection. 
But it is likewise plausible, in an analogy to the autonomous processes even in the biotic sphere that I 
have already discussed, that values can also acquire a certain autonomy from adaptation to an external 
environment. It is, for instance, widely held that one should value the absence of pain or the pursuit of 
happiness as being positive. This is the case-at least to some extent-even if these values no longer 
serve survival (otherwise the pains of those who are dying should not bother us). 
Autonomous values, however, are not unrelated to each other and often acquire their autonomy not 
only by direct autoselection, but by being related to what we regard as being good The abstract notion 
of the Good may be regarded as the supreme value towards which other values could become directed. 
But how does the notion of the Good come into being? Only a few possible aspects can be mentioned 
here. Early on this notion may have at least primarily served adaptive purposes at the biotic level. It 
may have served to secure group cohesion or social exchange etc. The notion may have also been linked 
also with advantages it gave to the members who fulfilled the culturally and flexibly defined values of 
prehistoric societies. But one may also think of a certain inner stabilisation and autonomy of such a 
trend from external criteria, along similar lines, as it has been discussed in regard to sexual selection 
before. In culture, of course, the process of increasing autonomy will presumably have been much more 
refined, based on aspects of our rationality and certain processes which only appear on the level of 
culture itself. For instance, open discourses, on how things should develop seem to necessitate, at least, 
a very simple version of such a notion: it is actually difficult not to agree that we should organise our 
relationships or our society in such a way as good as possible. Even most dictators-who seem not to 
have relied on open discourses-often have tried to justify their rule as being good. However 
manipulative such discourses on what is good sometimes may have been, the notion of the Good 
somehow refers to a search for a common perspective (:>pp. 412 f.). 
The more concrete aspects of particular understanding of the Good that certain individuals or groups 
hold, can, I think, also be regarded as a unification of all the more particular values. In this perspective, 
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the Good is the hypothetical and always changing point of synthesis for all values which are regarded as 
being positive. The notion of the good, then, would, like the single values from which it draws, refer to 
survival aspects and equally to some autonomous tendencies, such as the afore mentioned value of the 
absence of pain. Such a synthesis would, of course, not have to be understood as a mere additive list of 
values, but a complex and self-referential (reflective) process which is based on all our cognitive-
emotional capacities, which are in tum strongly moulded by the notions and procedures that we have 
leamed. Our rationality and all involved processes have their own inner necessities. (The concept of 
selfreferentiality and multitude of processes will, perhaps, be plausible if one adopts an approach 
advocating the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms.) The good in this concrete sense is always 
constructed anew and is based on the multitude of processes, which in its most developed fom1 may be 
called reason or wisdom. The notion of the good thereby transcends the particular autonomous 
tendencies, values and concepts from which itself draws. In this respect I agree with Moore: the notion 
of the Good is, once established, irreducible. 
But how does the resulting notion of the Good again have an effect on the values which had been 
given before? Even values which do not represent an autonomous trend at all (which are exclusively 
based on heteroselection) need not refer to the natural criteria of survival alone, because, if a general 
and partly autonomous (partly autoselective) trend of the Good is established they may refer to this 
trend. This trend may constitute their new environment. Values within a general cultural development 
may become selected because they serve the general tendency of the Good, which in tum partly serves 
survival and partly the particular autonomous tendencies involved. ln this sense the Good would have 
become, to voluntarily misuse a Kantian term, a 'regulative idea'. 
Generally this work is open to very different conceptions of the Good; I distinguish three types of 
approaches which are in principal compatible with the proposed view of nature. 
(a) Relativistic (normative) subjectivism. Approaches which I denominate in this way, do not deny 
the causal force (shown above) of what is regarded as being good-in this weak sense they remain 
normative. They may additionally even hold that there are certain standards of the good within an 
individual or a community. In the above outlined w1derstanding, the notion would still refer to a certain 
hypothetical point of synthesis for all the tendencies which are actually given. Nevertheless, tllis 
approach does not claim that this good refers to any o~fective truth. 
(b) Relativistic o~fectivism likewise acknowledges the possible multitude of forms, but, nevertheless, 
still favours an logic of forms (eidos) which is objective. A general stress on form, reminiscent of 
Aristotelian or Platonic approaches, may be coherent with my rather hylomorphic definition of entities 
(:>pp. 243 f.). Although in such an approach it would be argued that different structures may have 
their own optimal fmm, these ideal forms are still objective for each case. For example Aristotle 
understands rightness in an objective but still situational way. More practically one may, for instance, 
say that, if organisms have evolved feelings, consciousness, and a notion of the Good, it then will be a 
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necessary ethical truth for them that the prevention of pain is a good in itself (which to some extent 
transcends mere survival). In such a formulation the objective law of form is located in the if-then 
relation, whereas the relativistic pluralism is found in the different possible premises. 
(c) Universal objectivism could still possibly argue that the actual difference in the organisation of 
our highest values may be due to our ignorance. If this view should become possible in a context 
accepting evolution, it is necessary that the diversification of beings, which is obviously a basic 
phenomenon in biology, could become transcended on some level. The concept of the evolution of 
evolutionary mechanisms, developed in this work, renders it at least possible that on some level of 
cultural organisation it is not only diversification but also synthesis that may become cardinal. Even 
Popper argued that the process of evolution, understood as a process of knowledge acquisition, in the 
cultural quest for truth enters into a new mode, which does not lead to the diversification of opinions, 
but tends to unite them into one common stem. 1228 One may also speculate that such a cultural process, 
which leads to synthesis, had in evolution one time also to come into being, particularly if one considers 
the concept of processes of increased sight and self-referentiality as they are dealt with in this work. It 
may be possible to make plausible the idea that one day evolution needed to produce beings with 
feelings, consciousness and reason. These beings in their accidental properties would possibly differ 
considerably from humans, but certain values may be essential to any entity with such basic properties. 
For instance the partly autonomous value involved in the reduction of pain and the pursuit of happiness, 
may, in this sense, be regarded as being preordained. I think, however, that such a position could only 
possibly be made reasonable in respect to the most general ethical concepts that we may hold, like, for 
example, the a priori concept of Kant's categorical imperative, or, perhaps, a general religious or 
Christian, love commandment. 
These three approaches need not to exclude each other but, if each approach is applied to different 
phenomena, they may also become combined. It may, for instance, be plausible to combine the third 
view, applied to the most abstract aspects of the notion of the Good, with the second (and perhaps the 
first) one, if applied to more specific aspects. I do not want to weigh these different options here against 
each other, but only aimed to point out that they may all more or less be compatible with the view of 
nature as exposed in this work. 
In any case it appears plausible that values and our understanding of the Good plays part in 
moulding the actual world. (At least in the second and third case this may even be called metexis, 
~pp. 78 f.). 
None the less I finally want to consider an aspect of the notion of the Good which, in my view, is in 
any case essential to the notion itself. (Without discussing it here, this, perhaps, involves a certain 
inclination towards one of the above positions.) The notion of the Good is in my view tied to a search 
1228 K. R. Popper. Objective Knowledge. An Evolutional)' Approach ( 1972/1979), pp. 262-263. 
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for transcending a mere subjective position. Although our ethical considerations will always start from 
a subjective or culture-specific viewpoint; a very property of the notion of the Good appears to be to 
aim to transcend these specific viewpoints. Although it is essential that existing internal autonomous 
tendencies are considered and possibly valued, it is, in my view, equally essential for ethics to search for 
a more general viewpoint. Ethics itself can even be understood as the quest for such a viewpoint in 
respect to the normative aspects of the world (as ontology can be regarded as being such a quest in 
respect to the descriptive aspects of the world). Although Kant is concerned with what he called the 
"moral law within me"1229 , his categorical imperative can be understood to entail such a search for a 
viewpoint on the Good which is as general as possible; the maxim one ought to search for must equally 
be a possible principle of a general legislation. The scope of this generality is in principle unrestricted. 
The most general viewpoint is the view from nowhere or from evetywhere. Such a hypothetical 
objective viewpoint is compatible with the acknowledgement of the existence of individual or cultural 
subjectivity. 1230 The objective view-point which is sought after, points to something like what Rawls has 
called a 'veil of ignorance' 1231 : while determining what is just and good, we try to abstract from the 
particular role we find ourselves in. Such a position does not need to deny that there are different 
inherent tendencies, which may also come in conflict with each other. Such a basic position does not 
entail a particular theory of justice, such as for example egalitarianism. These more concrete theories 
are linked to our further ontological, metaphysical and ethical positions. Likewise, this view from 
nowhere does not necessarily imply that we are personally responsible for everyone alike. Our personal 
duties may well be linked to the role we actually find ourselves in. Such a position only assumes that we 
try to determine what is just or good independent of our actual own position in the world. 
But even if the notion of the common Good entails such a search for an impartial evaluation, the 
actual starting points of our search for the Good, and even the way in which we construct the world, 
will differ. None the less, it is of relevance whether one seeks impartiality or not. Such a quest implies a 
certain openness towards the Other. In a still different way also evolution from its outset is also not only 
directed towards se~f-preservation, but is open to the Other. Becoming, understood as a dialectical 
resolution (Aujhebung) of being and not-being, is not self-preservation, but self-transcendence. This 
becomes, in a changed way, even more so, if, in culture, the process of self-transcendence becomes 
directed by the notion of the good. 
After much hard analysis in earlier chapters, I have in this short chapter only sketched some thoughts 
in as to what respect the ontological view that I have proposed here may have bearings on ethics and the 
1229 I. Kant. Kritik der praktischen Vemunft (1990/1788), pp. 161-162, org.: pp. 288-289 (' der bestimte Himmel Ober mir 
und das moralische Gesetz in mir'). 
123° Cf.: Th. Nagel. The View from Nowhere (1986), pp. 3 f. 
1231 J. Rawls. A Theory of Justice (19901!971 ), pp. !59 f. 
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general possibility of ethics. I, likewise, want to end this chapter in an open and slightly speculative 
way. It appears plausible to me that we are to a certain degree free to determine our O\vn course of 
evolution and historical development. We are, as Sartre expressed 'condenmed to be free'. We are 
thro\Vll beyond open skies, and the light which leads us out of the dark is the idea of the Good. In order 
to determine the meaning of this notion constantly anew, we have to critically take into account and 
assess the treasures of all of our knowledge and ethical traditions. This has always been one of the 
primary tasks of philosophy. Contrary to some verdicts passed on it, philosophy is far from being dead. 
If it were, its 'rebirth' would be required. 
Summary and Outlook-Towards Ecologicalldealism 414 
Summary andl O!UI~~ook- Towa~rdls IEcologicai~ ~td!ea~osm 
This work has been concerned with the historical understanding of gene-Darvnnism and other 
Darwinian paradigms, with the exposure of Universal Darwinism and finally with a critique of the 
different types of gene-reductionism and Darwinian process reductionism. 
In this last section, the work is first placed in a broader philosophical context. Then its contents are 
summarised with a particular focus on the work's last part. Finally an outlook on ecological idealism is 
sketched out. 
On the General Philosophical Context 
With respect to the general intellectual context, this work can be regarded as being concerned with 
the gene-Darwinian approach to re-unify the so-called 'two cultures' (Snow) in an especially 
downward-reductive way. The phenomenon of two cultures of understanding, given in the different 
subject areas, which are either concerned with the natural or the cultural world, goes back to Cartesian 
dualism which, in general, moulded the discourses of modern philosophy. It has been pointed out in this 
work that Cartesian dualism itself has even been influenced by a hidden Christian agenda regarding the 
human as a free alter deus and the physical world as a law governed, created machina mundi 
(~pp. 81 f.). In modern times the concept of Machina mundi has become increasingly w1derstood in a 
hylomorphic sense, but in a mechanistic sense of matter in motion. 
There have been many attempts to re-unify what only later became called the 'two cultures'. Often 
tilis has been undertaken in a downward-reductive way. Materialism asserted that everything could be 
reduced to matter in motion and, perhaps, a few basic physical laws of nature. In this work we have 
been concerned with ti1e biologistic clain1 that ti1e social sciences and ethics can and ought to become 
reduced to biology and ti1at these disciplines ought to become disciplines of evolutionary biology. The 
discussed radical paradigm of gene-Darwinism resembles earlier materialist approaches not only in its 
harsh generally biologistic downward reductionism, but also in its particular atonlism and understanding 
of laws of nature. Gene-Darwinism claims a thorough gene-atonlism, in which single genes alone are the 
ultimate units of selection and all other seenlingly existing layers of organisation are only their 
ephemeral vehicles. Moreover, gene-Darwinism (and process-Darwinism alike) advocates that 
Darwinian processes are the only and essentially unchangeable evolutionary processes. As already 
elaborated in more detail in this work, Darwitlism in general can be understood as materialist 
transformation of a Newtonian-Platonic understanding of laws of nature, in which the laws of nature, 
and particularly the law of natural selection, are still regarded as eternally given. A force acts on 
organisms, =>677 which remait1 the blind and passive objects of evolution. 
Although I share the intention that we should aim at fonnulating a unifying ontological framework, 
I think there is also some truth in dualism, at least in the lin1ited sense that consciousness and culture are 
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hallmarks of the human being and that they are linked with a particular degree of sight and autonomy. 
Only because of this can human beings truly be characterised as having attributes like homo symbolicus 
(Cassirer), homo metaphysicus (Schopenhauer), or homo politicu.s (Aristotle). Any simple reduction of 
one realm to the other bears difficulties and the danger of neglecting the specific character of the other 
realm. 
However, instead of defending the autonomy of consciousness and culture, I have in this work 
analysed radical gene-Darwinism, which is normally engaged in biologising these concepts. Instead of 
ignoring biology or pursuing the downward reduction of all layers above selfish genes, here I try to take 
a third way in criticising gene-Darwinism in order to achieve a paradigm which is, firstly, more suitable 
for biology itself and, secondly, also provides a better ontological basis for cultural freedom and ethics. 
Hence, although I also have treated process-Darwinian explanations in culture, I have been mainly 
concerned with biological questions. 
This work generally suggests that an evolutionary theory of evolution is needed. Without denying the 
existence of selfish genes, it has proved impossible to reduce all evolving entities to simple selfish genes. 
Likewise, without denying the existence and importance of Darwinian processes, the Newtonian-
Platonic understanding, still silently inherent in Darwinism, that the laws of nature do not essentially 
evolve, can, if based on a strict definition of Danvinian processes, not become sustained. A truly 
evolutionary theory, in which the processes of evolution are not static, is required. Apparently, nev.· 
processes evolve which are not as radically blind and externally governed as it has to be assumed of 
Darwinian processes. It is shown that processes already become autonomous and self-determined in the 
biotic world. 
IfDarwin-as, for instance, Depew and Weber have suggested-can adequately be regarded as the "Newton of a blade 
of Grass" (an originally Kantian term), not only for Darwin's importance but also because of his passive tmderstandi.ng of 
organisms on which extemal selection is acting, it appears to me-far from intending to belittle the great contributions of 
Darwin-that still an 'Einstein of a blade of Grass' is needed to come. Einstein has shown that the extemal categories of 
space and time are themselves not completely unchangeable, but are object to the structuredness of the physical world. 
Likewise, it appears that blind Darwinian processes are not etemally and extemally given but to some extend can be said to 
evolve and change themselves. 
Summary 
In this summary, like generally in this concluding section, I mainly focus on the last critical part of 
the work. The earlier parts are rather briefly mentioned, but there are local summarising remarks at the 
beginnings or endings of most chapters as well as of several long sections. The main line of argument 
has also been outlined in the introduction. 
In part I, chapter l deals with the description of sociobiology and as such pays attention to relevant 
sub-theories. At that point I have not elaborated in detail upon the distinction between the subject area 
and the paradigm, which I have clarified in the further course of the work Even so the way in which I 
have described sociobiology in this chapter can, in retrospection, be regarded as closely resembling what 
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I later understand to be gene-Darwinism. Nevertheless, it also has become apparent that not all specific 
theories dealt with in this chapter have to be interpreted in a strictly gene-Darwinian way. 
In chapter 2 the claim to biologise morality, as is often found in sociobiology, is discussed. I have 
argued that this claim, if taken seriously, would not only lead to a neutral acknowledgement of some 
aspects of our biological nature-to which, no doubt, sociobiology can contribute-but to a dismissal of 
what, from quite different viewpoints, has been called 'ethics'. If one does not dismiss ethics altogether, 
a, so to speak, biological imperative, conceived exclusively along gene-Darwinian lines, can, because of 
the denial of any higher form of organisation aside from single selfish genes, and any other process aside 
from natural selection only venerate the prudent, but unconstrained, ruthless egoism of genes. 
In part 11, the historical part, I have in chapter 3 outlined pre-Danvinian conceptions of nature in the 
history of philosophy and early biology. Pre-Darwinian concepts of evolution have also been mentioned. 
Tlus chapter later helped to contrast Danvinism with other possible plulosophical viewpoints and other 
understandings of evolution. 
In chapters 4 and 5 an account of the internal and e)o,.'ternal history of Danvinism has been given. 
Chapter 4 on the inner-biological theoretical and empirical appeal of different Darwinian sub-paradigms 
has revealed that what is often broadly called 'Darwinism' is not as unifonn as is often assumed. This 
phenomenon was one of the reasons for the later endeavour to formulate a strict, but still appropriate, 
defmition of a Darwinian process. In this chapter, resulting from a comparison with other discussed 
paradigms, I have also worked out what I regard to be the essence of gene-Darwinism. 
Chapter 5 is an inquiry into the external influences on biological Darwinism and its sub-paradigms. 
It has been shown that Darwinism developed in intensive interaction with the more general philosophical 
Zeitgeist and also with some specific ideas from other subject areas, such as physics and econonlics. 
Such a historical understanding suggests, that-without denying inner-biological necessities-biology 
should also be conceived as being in part a Geisteswissenschaft. 
In part Ill on universal Darwinism, Darwinian processes in many other non-biologistic subject areas 
have been laid bare. This was done partly based on the historical inquiry into the interaction of 
Darwinian processes. In chapter 6 two types of universal Darwinism have been distinguished, 
biologistic Darwinism, at best exemplified by radical gene-Darwinism, and (universal) process-
Darwinism. It has not only been shown that these approaches actually regard Darwinism as a kind of 
new alkahest, a universal solvent for any problem, but an argument that has been developed which 
might substantiate a Danvinian metaphysic. I have considered in this respect the possible denial of any 
kind of induction. This has been understood in a broad sense as the claim that, in principle, any 
mechanism of change can never transcend blind guesses. I, however, ultimately opposed this argument 
at the point at which it is set out (and also later on). I have contended that this argument would only be 
justified if one had already defined any change as being totally unknowable. It is then only a true but 
empty tautology to claim that no change can be known in advance. I have opposed this position and 
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argued that certain processes of change can also have an enhanced probability of leading to positive 
results, and that it is an empirical and not merely a theoretical question to ask whether universal 
Darwinism is true or not. 
In chapter 7 I have given a brief survey of how Darwinian algorithms have actually been applied in 
different subject areas outside of biology. It became apparent that there are not only structural 
similarities between, for instance, random-mutation-and-natural-selection processes in biology, trial-
and-error learning in psychology and Popper's falsificationism, but also that the processes found in 
other subject areas have been partly criticised along similar lines. This is also true in respect to the 
discussion of tautological aspects. This treatment contributed to the later and detailed discussion of the 
possible tautological aspects of Darwinism particularly in biology. This part has also built also the 
basis for the later discussion of substance reductionism (as found in gene-Darwinism) and process-
reductionism (as found in gene-Darwinism and process-Darwinism). 
In part IV different types of substance reductionism and process reductionism have been discussed 
and criticised. In its t\vo relatively long chapters this criticism also resulted in many suggestions for a 
multi-level account of evolution and an approach emphasising the evolution of evolutionary 
mechanisms. 
In Chapter 8, the first section is on problems of reductionism in general while the second is on the 
transcendence gene-atomism and the third on the transcendence of genn-line reductionism. 
Discussing reductionism in general, it has first proved to be necessary to disentangle reduction from 
explanation: nonnally only a certain kind of explanation is meant by reduction-that of whales to their 
parts. Only this more specific notion can reasonably be the object of criticism. For reasons of clarity I 
have named reduction, understood in this sense, as 'downward reduction'. The epistemological notion of 
downward reduction is here understood to correspond with the ontological notion of eliminative 
materialism. After these tenninological preliminaries, I show that materialism leads to physicalism, but 
that modem physics does not at all support a simplistic concept of matter in motion. In the next sub-
section, which is pivotal for the general case against downward reductionism, I have not mainly 
defended the feasibility of whales in their own right. Instead I have argued that the modern under-
standing of substances, which regards whales as essentially being made up exclusively of their parts, is 
misconceived and turns out-if taken seriously-to be an inconsistent and not a viable conception. 
Besides this ontological argumentation, I, in parallel to this, positively propose a classification of 
different ways of explanation which would involve relations and structurally analogous cases as well. 
(From this perspective substance emergence has not to be linked to total unpredictability, which is 
otherwise entailed by occasionalism and, perhaps paradoxically, prevents the possibility of process 
emergentism.) Finally, I have discussed the general inconsistency of biologism with downward 
reductionism and I have advocated that the actual biologism in an interesting and subtle way already 
involves a subversion of the general principle of downward reduction. 
Summary and Outlook- Towards Ecological Idealism 418 
In respect to gene-atomism it has, firstly, been made clear that the atomism involved cannot be 
interpreted in a tautological sense, meaning simply any stretch of DNA. Although such a tautological 
understanding seems sometimes to have immunised this view against criticism, a closer analysis reveals 
that selfish genes are taken to be relatively short sequences of DNA. 
In the following I argued that, despite the meiotic shuffle, it is nevertheless reasonable to accept the 
existence of higher level genes which exist in a rather probabilistic sense and which, because of their 
synergetic properties, have a causal impact. Synergetic properties alone, however, do not necessarily 
lead to a stable larger wholes. I concede that these higher level units may, under certain conditions, 
become subverted by selfish genes that do not contribute to these advantageous wholes. Even so, I also 
showed that in certain populational constellations higher level genes may well be evolutionarily stable 
and even increasingly come to dominate the more selfish genes. 
Then I discuss another tautological fallacy, namely that of defining any surviving gene as being 
selfish and then accepting this as a new finding. According to such a definition even genes which favour 
radical group altruism, and possibly survive through group selection, would, absurdly, be redefined as 
being selfish. 
In the following sub-sections on the criticism of gene-atornism, I have discussed different 
possibilities of how genes which serve the good of the group can be established and become 
evolutionarily stable. I have discussed what I have called 'systemic individual selection', in which 
individual selection processes may occur in systemic combination and stabilise certain properties which 
would otherwise be subverted by selfish genes. If once such a system becomes established, for instance, 
by group selection, then such a system is stable against subversion from within by selfish genes and 
without the necessity of further permanent group selection. Moreover, following and developing on the 
proposals of Sober and Wilson in particular, it has been shown that refined structured population 
models of group selection, including groups of mixing individuals, can lead and stabilise evolutionary 
properties serving the common good. Gene-Darwinism, although correctly having pointed to some 
problems in some simple models of group selection, has gone much too far in claiming that such models 
are never viable at all. (I have also proposed that the conditions of applicability for the particular model 
discussed, can apparently-leaving everytl1ing else equal-, and based on a statistical effect, be 
generally extended to small groups of a ce1tain maximal size.) 
Finally, the species level and the possibility of multi-species systems up to the level of ecosystems 
have been discussed. I have come to the conclusion, that many different levels of evolutionary 
organisation seem, more or less, to have a causal relevance and, additionally, under certain conditions 
can not be subverted by selfish entities of a lower level. Gene-Darwinism has, in my view, been right to 
point out the existence of sub-organismic units of selection. Even so I have argued that the existence of 
larger levels of organisation can be proved and are also evolutionarily relevant. In this sense I reject the 
strong nominalism of gene-atomism. 
Sununary and Outlook- Towards Ecological Idealism 419 
In the nex.1: section on germ-line reductionism, I have started to make clear that the Weismann barrier 
does not imply germ-line reductionism. Although the Weismann barrier is currently being put to 
question by a few authors and some empirical phenomena, I take this so-called 'central dogma of 
microbiology' as generally given. Nevertheless, I have reasoned that germ-line reductionism has to be 
seen as a particularly radical gene-Darwinian interpretation of the central dogma, which regard 
phenotypes as mere vehicles of the genes, that have causal impact of their own. After introducing the 
general concepts of 'information' and 'exformation', I contended that phenotypes are not reducible to 
genetic information alone but also rely on exformation. Although this exformation is only indirectly 
altered, it is still a cause, which is, for instance, structurally present in the material which is used. These 
forms have their own necessities and can favour a certain direction or lead to certain evolutionary 
constraints. I argue that the morphological and functional constraints, albeit which also rely on genetic 
information transfer, are a causal factor in their own right. 
The, perhaps, more daring concepts of morphological fields (also Goodwin), of external memory (still relying on 
genetic information transfer in another evolutionary line) and of a partial revival of morphological taxonomy crumot be 
summarised here. (Cf. the longer summary at the end of that section.) 
To sum up, in chapter 8 I have opposed downward reductionism in general as well as gene-atomism 
and germ-line reductionism. As an alternative I have proposed a different understanding of substance 
and explanation; I have presented a multi-level account of evolutionary entities and I have also 
advocated that phenotypes have a certain importance in their own right. 
In chapter 9, I have discussed and opposed process-reductionism, which is particularly marked in 
radical gene-Darwinism but also characteristic of process Darwinism. Process reductionism is in this 
work also generally regarded as being in principle a hallmark of pure Darwinism. 
In the first section of this chapter I have pointed out that if Darwinian processes are applied on many 
ontological levels, as claimed by process-Darwin.ism or inner-biological multi-level Darwinism, then this 
will lead to inconsistencies. Moreover, I have shown that combinations of Darwinian processes taken as 
a new whole may have quite non-Darwin.ian effects. 
Following this, two types of tautological arguments which are sometimes implicitly present in 
Darwinian approaches have been discussed at detail. Firstly, I have discussed tautological aspects of 
pan-adaptationism linked to the concept of the survival of the fittest and understood in the sense of the 
survival of the survivor. In this section, which I regard as one of the most refmed of this work, I have 
analysed different notions of fitness and how far particular theories on what will actually survive can 
reasonably be called Darwinian. I have concluded that pan-adaptationism is either based on a 
tautological argument or is plainly false. The concept of adaptation, if understood as an increasing fit to 
an external envirorunent, is, however, not a tautology. The subsequent discussion of possible 
tautological aspects of pan-selectionism follows along similar lines and provides the basis for our strict 
non-tautological definition of Darwinian processes. 
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To prevent tautological aspects of Darwinian processes I have subsequently defined Darwinian 
processes in a stricter way. I likewise aimed at such a definition in order to render a possibly concealed 
evolution of evolutionary mechanisms detectable. A Darwinian process is, for short, understood as a 
process of blind-variation-and-environmental-selection. Danvinism according to this definition turns out 
to be an extreme on the two dimensions of the blindness of trials and the externality of selection. In this 
understanding a refutation of, for instance, radical Lamarckism or predominantly internally directed 
evolution, as favoured by romantic biology, does not necessarily entail Darwinism and vice versa. I 
have argued that there can be positions between these extremes. 
In the further course of chapter 9, I have shown that the different defining criteria of Darwinian 
processes are not met by many actual processes-even in biology. Besides diversification, synthesis also 
becomes an important factor of evolution in its own right. I argued at depth that variation is not always 
equally blind and wasteful but may gain a certain sight. I have started this argumentation by coming 
back to tl1e earlier argument that variation should not be regarded as being blind by definition (only 
because it is concerned with change). There may be itmer or outer continuities within evolutionary 
change itself I have argued that evolutionary variation is actually not always totally blind. This has 
been argued within the proposed multi-level account of evolution. But I have also contended-v.r:ithout 
thereby promoting Lamarckism-that, based on our present knowledge of genetics, it appears 
reasonable to assume the existence of the variation of reduced blindness even in respect to mutations. 
I have considered acknowledged genetical phenomena, like mutation rates, transferable elements, the role of repetition 
in complex adaptations, concerted evolution and genetic integration. I have argued, for example, that intricate genetic 
building blocks are often repeatedly found in quite different complex adaptive structures. It appears plausible to assume a 
certain enhanced fitness of such building blocks, since it is apparent tl1at tile involved complex adaptive structures would 
have never been build from scratch by single bli11d mutations. I have reasoned that a repetition of certai11 building blocks, 
relative to radically bli11d chance trials, could be assumed to have been intemally advantageous. TI1is, however, does not 
entail tl1at iliese mutations are not mostly leilial as well, but that evolution only actually shows iliat iliey have-relatively-
a much enhanced probability of leading to advantageous complex mutations tl1an single radically blind trials, which would 
be needed for such complex adaptations instead. I also have advocated tile existence, for example, of adaptive dimensions 
(perhaps even directions) of adaptation, not only in respect to microscopic structures but also in respect to macroscopic 
properties of the organism. But if one concedes that iliere are-intemal or extemal--dimensions of variation, which are on 
average more relevant to adaptation tlmn oiliers, it becomes, based on tile proven heritability and selectability of mutation 
rates and of transposable elements (and tile oilier outlined mechanisms), highly plausible iliat to some degree also 
mutational variation has not always to be regarded as totally blind. 
Furthermore, I have contrasted Darwinian heteroselection with the concept of autoselection, which 
can either also lead to less blind evolution or to im1er autonomous dynamics. Processes based on 
autoselection do not need to lead to an adaptation to an external environment. 
In the concluding sub-section of chapter 9 I once more discuss but somewhat more directly the 
evolution of evolutionary mechanisms and once more mention different ways in which new processes 
can evolve by being combit1ed, changed or by emerging completely anew. Although Darwinian 
processes in tllis section have remait1ed the baselit1e against which the differences of processes are 
measured, other more positive characteristics have been discussed. I have particularly reviewed the role 
of causal feedback for the emergence of new processes, a conception which, in a way, can be traced 
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back to the works of Kant at least. I argue once more that processes, which partly become their own 
determining cause, can give rise to developments which are truly independent of external selection. This 
has been linked to the notion of negative freedom from external determination. I then discussed other 
processes in which in a multi-level account of evolution the blindness of variation could be regarded as 
being reduced. In these cases autonomy, in the above sense, is not automatically achieved. Nevertheless 
the classes of processes which I discussed with a reduced blindness might also be said to have acquired 
a certain positive freedom to do what is necessary. Although necessity in biology will still be mostly 
understood as adaptation, particularly in the cultural realm, this general concept of directedness may 
also become linked to autonomous values or the pursuit of the good. 
In chapter 10, which is brief, I have only sketched out how an ethical theory might look like, which is 
m accordance with the general results of this work. The 'regulative idea' of the Good could be 
understood to be a partly a autonomous idea, which possesses actual causal relevance. I have argued 
that the view proposed in this work builds a much better basis for ethics than universal Darwinism does, 
and is open to many quite different conceptions of the Good as they are actually found in different 
schools of ethics. 
Ecological Idealism-an Outlook 
After the ethical outlook put forward in chapter 10 I should now like to present an also slightly 
speculative more general outlook. The disputes within biology and philosophy concerning the 
understanding and interpretation of evolution seem to have a streak of W. Wordsworth' s blissful dawn 
within them. A new synthesis seems to be in the making, leaving gene-Darwinism and, perhaps, 
Darwinism in general behind. This new evolutionary synthesis does, I think, still strongly draw from 
Darwinism-even from gene-Darwinism-, but does nevertheless transcend Darwinism and also differ 
considerably in its message (also Einstein's theory of relativity did not deny most of the phenomena 
observed by Newtonian physics, but gave them a different general framework). But I think that more 
than a new evolutionary synthesis is at stake and that more might be won. I hope that a new general 
paradigm, to which this work can of course only be a humble contribution, neither simply rests on the 
complete separation of the two cultures, nor simply tries to unify them by 'biologising' the social 
sciences. I risk to speculate that a new general philosophical framework-clearly differing from strict 
universal Darwinism, but still providing a unified ontological account-will arise. In post-modem times 
this might sound absurd, but surely such a framework would not be as restrictive as scholasticism had 
been. Equally, because today's known Lebenswelten differ enormously, a framework of this kind would 
definitely have to leave much space for plurality. Still, a common framework might become constructed 
in which the basic convictions of classical Philosophia Perennis and knowledge of modem science are 
synthesised. In this work I have pointed to the possible and, I think, necessary concept of the evolution 
of new layers of organisation and even to the concept of the evolution of evolutionary mechanisms. 
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The more general approach which I have in mind might be called 'ecological idealism'. I think that 
this approach is also in line with what has been elaborated upon in this work, but may not directly 
follow on from it. I should therefore like to shortly characterise this approach. Idealism may refer to the 
following three aspects. 
Firstly, the whole evolutionary process can broadly be understood as an intellectual process. Indeed, 
despite stressing the possibility of enhanced sight, I do not deny the blindness of this process at its very 
beginning and its remaining short-sightedness, particularly in biological evolution. Generally, in this 
view every organism is partly considered as representing a theory about its environment (and partly also 
revealing something about its inner reflective dynamics). 
Secondly, there are inherent tendencies of evolution. The evolution of entities is not just externally 
governed. This inner dynamic can, to a certain e;.ient, gain some freedom and detachment. The 
'theories' (for instance, of organisms or real concepts alike) are not to be understood in a naively 
realistic sense. Although this appears to me to be even more valid in regard to the cultural sphere, it has 
been made apparent in this work that, up to a certain degree, there are autonomous internal trends 
already in the biological sphere. Although entities are also 'tested' against the 'external' world, they 
have also an own itmer structure and possibly an inherent tendency which may, up to a point, even come 
to dominate the direction of evolution. (Cf. the treatment of autoselection and autonomy.) 
Thirdly, in respect of culture, I have advocated the possibility that the values, which may partly 
serve survival and also partly refer to autonomous tendencies, might become unified and controlled by 
the regulative idea of the Good. We human beings not only live to survive but also to realise our ideals. 
I have argued, that the Good has, in any case, to be understood as taking part in moulding the actual 
world. I have contended that the outlined understanding is still open to be filled in by the different 
ethical traditions, which either interpret the Good in a relativistic and subjective sense or refer to the 
necessities of an inner logic of forms, understood in an Aristotelian, in an a prioric or even Platonic 
sense. (Cf. the treatment of the notion of the Good; the discussion of the evolution of evolutionary 
processes and the criticism of the modern understanding of substance, in which I favoured a rather 
hylomorphic conception.) 
Despite these three reasons to choose the tenn 'idealism', I want to make clear that I do not intend to 
neglect the outer because I stress the importance of the inner. In terms of epistemology this approach 
would aim at the combination of a coherence theory and a correspondence theory of truth (as, perhaps, 
also became apparent in the argumentations of this work). Both empiricism and rationalism possess a 
certain truth. Moreover, there is a certain inner freedom and an unfolding of inner forms, but this 
freedom is limited and there are also external necessities (and forms). In this sense I do not intend to 
defend radical idealism, but use the term in contrast to other theories which do not put emphasis on the 
three points made above. 
Sununarv and Outlook- Towards Ecological Idealism 423 
The first reason why the adjective 'ecological' has been adopted, is exactly to moderate the possible 
understanding of idealism. Ecology usually-from the human perspective-stresses the importance of 
the outer. Moreover, ecology is linked with a materialist understanding of nature, although not in a 
radical downward-reductive sense. However, these aspects of the notion ecology should serve to 
somewhat counterbalance an over-ambitious understanding of idealism: although we may exist to serve 
the idea of the Good, we should neither ignore the actual world nor our own limitations in doing what 
we suppose to be good. 
Secondly, the term 'ecological' should also stand for the aspect of this envisioned approach that 
neither focuses on single entities nor on the whole, but rather on their relations or interconnections. The 
conception of substance which I introduced abandoned the modem elementary materialistic formulation 
and has reformulated the classical conception, putting a stronger emphasis on the concept of relation. 
(Cf. the criticism of the modem understanding of substance and also, perhaps, the concept of 
exfonnation.) 
Thirdly, the term 'ecological' points to the fact that humanity has developed far enough to take 
aspects of the biotic world into 'the expanding circle' of ethically relevant creatures. This is on the one 
hand necessary to save the survival of the 'zoon ethicon ', while on the other hand, it is touchstone for 
whether this animal deserves this nan1e. 
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